BILL ANALYSIS
AB 412
Page 1
Date of Hearing: March 31, 2009
Counsel: Nicole J. Hanson
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Jose Solorio, Chair
AB 412 (Carter) - As Amended: March 23, 2009
SUMMARY : Creates a misdemeanor when any person hangs a noose,
knowing it to be a symbol representing a threat to life for the
purpose of terrorizing. Specifically, this bill :
1)Declares and finds the following:
a) Hanging a noose is directly correlated with America's
history of racial hatred and murder, representing not only
a threat to African American life and safety, but causing
further psychological and emotional trauma as well, and
noose hanging is still happening now.
b) There are 2,805 documented victims of lynch mob killings
between 1882 and 1930 in 10 southern states. The vast
majority of lynch victims were African American. Of these
black victims, 94% died in the hands of white lynch mobs.
The scale of this carnage means that, on average, a black
man, woman, or child was murdered nearly once per week,
every week, between 1882 and 1930 by a hate-driven lynch
mob.
c) The lynching era encompasses nearly five decades between
the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great
Depression. Although lynchings and mob killings occurred
before 1880, notably during early Reconstruction when
blacks were enfranchised, radical racism and mob violence
peaked during the 1890's in a surge of terrorism that
extended well into the 20th century.
d) In addition to the punishment of specific criminal
offenders, mob lynching atrocities against African
Americans in the American South served to maintain social
control over the black population through terrorism;
suppress, eliminate, or neutralize black competition for
economic, political, and social rewards; stabilize the
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white class structure and preserve the privileged status of
the white aristocracy; eradicate specific persons accused
of crimes against the white community; serve as a mechanism
of state-sanctioned terrorism designed to maintain a degree
of leverage over the African American population; and serve
as a symbolic manifestation of the unity of white
supremacy.
e) The documented reasons for African American lynchings
included, but were not limited to, acting suspiciously,
gambling, adultery, race hatred, race troubles, improper
conduct with white women, arguing with a white man,
resisting a mob, inflammatory language, informing, being
obnoxious, spreading disease, insulting a white man,
insulting a white woman, suing a white man, insurrection,
courting white women, testifying against a white man,
living with a white woman, defending an alleged rapist,
demanding respect, miscegenation, trying to vote,
disorderly conduct, mistaken identity, unpopularity,
eloping with a white woman, unruly remarks, entering a
white woman's room, using obscene language, being a peeping
Tom, violating quarantine, voting for the wrong party,
frightening white women, and membership in a civil rights
organization.
f) Given this history, to a reasonable person, the display
of a noose at a school, park, place of employment, or other
public venue amounts to a direct and immediate threat of
force that would intimidate persons based on racial
characteristics.
2)Provides that any person who hangs a noose, knowing it to be a
symbol representing a threat to life, on the private property
of another without authorization for the purpose of
terrorizing the owner or occupant of that private property or
in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or
occupant of that private property, or who hangs a noose,
knowing it to be a symbol representing a threat to life, on
the property of a primary school, junior high school, high
school, college campus, public park or place of employment for
the purpose of terrorizing any person who attends or works at
the school, park or place of employment or who is otherwise
associated with the school, park or place of employment, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed
one year, by a fine not to exceed five $5,000, or by both the
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fine and imprisonment for the first conviction and by
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, by a
fine not to exceed $15,000, or by both the fine and
imprisonment for any subsequent conviction.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Declares that any person who places or displays a sign, mark,
symbol, emblem, or other physical impression, including, but
not limited to, a Nazi swastika on the private property of
another, without authorization, for the purpose of terrorizing
the owner or occupant of that private property or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of
that private property shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to $5,000,
or by both the fine and imprisonment for the first conviction
and by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year,
by a fine not to exceed $15,000, or by both the fine and
imprisonment for any subsequent conviction. [Penal Code
Section 11411(a).]
2)Makes any person who engages in a pattern of conduct for the
purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant of private
property or in reckless disregard of terrorizing the owner or
occupant of that private property, by placing or displaying a
sign, mark, symbol, emblem, or other physical impression,
including, but not limited to, a Nazi swastika, on the private
property of another on two or more occasions, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, 2
or 3 years, by a fine not to exceed $10,000, or by both the
fine and imprisonment; or by imprisonment in a county jail not
to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or by both
the fine and imprisonment. [Penal Code Section 11411(b).]
3)Provides that any person who burns or desecrates a cross or
other religious symbol, knowing it to be a religious symbol,
on the private property of another without authorization for
the purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant of that
private property or in reckless disregard of the risk of
terrorizing the owner or occupant of that private property, or
who burns, desecrates, or destroys a cross or other religious
symbol, knowing it to be a religious symbol, on the property
of a primary school, junior high school, or high school for
the purpose of terrorizing any person who attends or works at
the school or who is otherwise associated with the school,
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shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, 2 or 3 years, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or
by both the fine and imprisonment; or by imprisonment in a
county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed
$5,000, or by both the fine and imprisonment for the first
conviction and by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, 2 or 3 years, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or
by both the fine and imprisonment; or by imprisonment in a
county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed
$15,000, or by both the fine and imprisonment for any
subsequent conviction. [Penal Code Section 11141(c).]
4)Defines "hate crime" as a criminal act committed, in whole or
in part, because of one or more of the following actual or
perceived characteristics of the victim:
a) Disability;
b) Gender;
c) Nationality;
d) Race or ethnicity;
e) Religion;
f) Sexual orientation; or,
g) Association with a person or group with one or more of
these actual or perceived characteristics. (Penal Code
Section 422.5)
5)Provides that no person, whether or not acting under color of
law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure,
intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other
person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of
California or by the Constitution or laws of the United States
in whole or in part because of one or more of the actual or
perceived characteristics of the victim as proscribed under
existing law. [Penal Code Section 422.6(a).]
6)States that no person, whether or not acting under color of
law, shall knowingly deface, damage, or destroy the real or
personal property of any other person for the purpose of
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intimidating or interfering with the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the other
person by the Constitution or laws of California or by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, in whole or in part
because of one or more of the actual or perceived
characteristics of the victim as proscribed under existing
law. [Penal Code Section 422.6(b).]
7)Penalizes persons convicted of interfering with the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
or her by the Constitution or laws of California or by the
Constitution or laws of the United states with imprisonment in
a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed
$5,000, or by both the above imprisonment and fine, and the
court shall order the defendant to perform a minimum of
community service, not to exceed 400 hours, to be performed
over a period not to exceed 350 days, during a time other than
his or her hours of employment or school attendance. [Penal
Code Sections 422(c).]
FISCAL EFFECT : Unknown
COMMENTS :
1)Author's Statement : According to the author, "At the request
of the California State Conference of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), I have
introduced this bill in response to recent incidents of noose
hangings at college campuses and other public venues in our
state. One hundred years ago, the NAACP was founded in
response to a then common practice of murdering
African-Americans by noose hangings. Just as they were in the
past, the recent noose hangings in California are directly
correlated with racial hatred and murder. This kind of act
represents a real threat to life and safety, and it has
terrorized many college students and residents of our state.
Hanging a noose is simply unimaginable, intolerable and a
threat to public safety. It is important that California use
the full weight of the law to discourage and punish noose
hangers for threatening, or carrying out, an act of murder by
noose hanging."
2)Background : According to information provided by the author,
"Existing law does not provide a deterrent to hanging a noose,
which is a well known symbol that represents a terroristic
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threat to life. This bill would enhance existing statute, and
use the full weight of the law to discourage, to a substantial
extent, potential noose hangers from threatening, or carrying
out, an act of murder by noose hanging."
3)Hate Crime in California : According to the Attorney General's
(AG) Hate Crime Report, 2007, there were 1,426 total hate
crime events, which included 1,931 offenses; 1,764 victims;
and 1,627 known suspects. Hate crime events increased 9.2%
from 1,306 in 2006 to 1,426 in 2007. Hate crime offenses
increased 13.5% from 1,702 in 2006 to 1,931 in 2007. The
number of victims of reported hate crimes increased 9.5% from
1,611 in 2006 to 1,764 in 2007. The number of known suspects
of reported hate crimes increased 0.9% from 1,612 in 2006 to
1,627 in 2007. Anti-black hate crime events increased 15.3%
from 432 in 2006 to 498 in 2007. Race/ethnicity/national
origin hate crime offenses have consistently been the largest
bias motivation category of hate crimes reported since and
account for at least 60% of all hate crime offenses. Within
this category, anti-black hate crimes continue to be the
largest bias motivation accounting for at least 26% of all
hate crime offenses annually since 1998.
4)The Noose : In 1945, sociologist Oliver C. Cox defined
"lynching" as "an act of homicidal aggression committed by one
people against another through mob action for the purpose of
suppressing either some tendency in the latter to rise from an
accommodated position of subordination or for subjugating them
further to some lower social status." [Cox, Lynching and the
Status Quo (1945) 14 J. of Negro Educ. 576, 576.]
As the NAACP said in its 2007 "State of Emergency" report: "The
hangman's noose is a symbol of the racist segregation-era
violence enacted on blacks. . . .[It is] an unmistakable
symbol of violence and terror that whites used to demonstrate
their hatred for blacks." In analyzing the number of
lynchings in Louisiana alone from the post-bellum period into
the Jim Crow era, Michael Pfeifer found that "[l]ynchers
killed 263 persons, at least 219 of them black, in northern
parishes between 1878 and 1946." [Pfeifer (2004) Rough
Justice: Lynching and American Society, 1874-1947, at 15.]
Another set of statistics reported that between 1889 and 1931,
3,290 people were lynched in the South, of whom 2,789 were
black. [Tolnay, Beck & Massey (1989) Black Lynchings: The
Power Threat Hypothesis Revisited, 67 Soc. Forces 605,
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605-06.]
The symbol of this period in American history, the noose, is
making a disturbing resurgence. A BusinessWeek study from
2001 noted "many experts say they are seeing a disturbing
increase in incidents of [racial] harassment." (Bernstein,
Racism in the Workplace, Bus.Wk., July 30, 2001, at 64.) The
study discovered noose incidents occurring in large, diverse
cities such as San Francisco and Detroit, and reported that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had managed
25 noose cases in the 18 months prior to the study,
"'something that only came along every two or three years
before.'" [Id. (quoting Ida L. Castro, former EEOC
chairwoman).] The BusinessWeek study correlates with the
findings from the AG's Hate Crimes, 2007 report that racial
harassment using the symbol of a noose is on the rise.
5)The First Amendment : The hallmark of protection of free
speech under the First Amendment is to allow for the "free
trade in ideas" - even ideas that the overwhelming majority of
people might find distasteful or discomforting. [Virginia v.
Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343; see also Texas v. Johnson (1989)
491 U.S. 397, 414 ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").] Thus,
the First Amendment "ordinarily" denies states "the power to
prohibit [the] dissemination of social, economic and political
doctrines which a vast majority of its citizens believe to be
false and fraught with evil consequence." [Whitney v.
California (1927) 274 U.S. 357, 374 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).] The First Amendment also affords protection to
symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.
[See, e.g., R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377,
382; United States v. O'Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367; Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S.
503, 505.] Symbolic speech can incorporate symbols (i.e.
noose or swastika), signs, and other means of expression - as
well as speech - plus conduct activities such as picketing and
demonstrating receive First Amendment protection. "Displaying
a red flag as a symbol of international revolution, . . .
incorporating the Confederate stars and bars battle flag into
the official flags of several southern states to symbolize
oppression to desegregation, . . . pledging allegiance to the
national flag of the United States, . . . defacing the
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national flag, [and] wearing clothing and armbands to protest
the Vietnam War." (Swanson, Unholy Fire: Cross Burning,
Symbolic Speech, and the First Amendment: Virginia v. Black,
2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 83.) "There is no question that a
burning cross is a combination of speech and conduct, and that
the symbol can convey ideas and intimidation. In Virginia v.
Black the Court found burning a cross to be sufficiently
different to allow restrictions that would otherwise be
prohibited by the First Amendment.")
The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are
not absolute. It has long been recognized that the government
may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with
the Constitution. [See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
(1942) 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 ("There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem").] The First Amendment permits
"restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality'." [R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, 505 U.S.
377, 382-383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315
U.S. 568, 572).)
As the high court has acknowledged: "Many crimes can consist
solely of spoken words, such as soliciting a bribe (Pen. Code,
653f), perjury (Pen. Code, 118), or making a terrorist
threat (Pen. Code, 422)." In In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal. 4th
698, 710, the court held that "the state may penalize threats,
even those consisting of pure speech, provided the relevant
statute singles out for punishment threats falling outside the
scope of First Amendment protection."
As speech strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue
and free exchange of ideas and moves toward willful threats to
perform illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to
regulate expression. [Shackelford v. Shirley (5th Cir. 1991)
948 F.2d at p. 938.] Nonetheless, statutes criminalizing
threats must be narrowly directed against only those threats
that truly pose a danger to society. [People v. Mirmirani
(1981) 30 Cal. 3d at p. 388, fn. 10.] For example, a state
may punish those words "which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
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[Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 568, 572; see
also R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, 505 U.S. 377, 383
(listing limited areas where the First Amendment permits
restrictions on the content of speech).]
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals. [See Watts v. United States (1969)
394 U.S. 705, 708 ("political hyberbole" is not a true
threat); R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, 505 U.S. 377,
388.] The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats "protects
individuals from the fear of violence" and "from the
disruption that fear engenders," in addition to protecting
people "from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur." (Ibid.)
a) The Metamorphosis of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court
i) R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul : In R. A. V. v. City
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court laid a rigid foundation
disfavoring regulations used to quell conduct mixed with
speech. In R.A.V., the Court struck down a city
ordinance in St. Paul, Minnesota criminalizing cross
burning. (Id. at 381.) The facts of the case involved
Robert A. Viktora, a white teenager, and several other
white juveniles who burned a cross on the lawn of the
only black family in their neighborhood. (Id. at 379.)
Viktora was arrested and charged with violating the
ordinance. (Id. at 379-80.) The St. Paul regulation
made it a crime to place on public or private property a
burning cross or other symbol likely to "arouse anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender." (Id. at 380 [quoting
St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code 292.02 (1990)].) The
Supreme Court stated that the local ordinance did not
pass constitutional muster because it discriminated on
the basis of content by targeting only those individuals
who "provoke violence" on the basis specified in the law.
(Id. at 391.) The ordinance did not include "[t]hose
who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with other
ideas to express hostility, for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or
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homosexuality." (Ibid.) This content-based
discrimination was unconstitutional because it allowed
the city to "impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."
(Ibid.)
ii) Wisconsin v. Mitchell : One year later, the Supreme
Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476 upheld
a "hate crime" penalty enhancement statute which when a
defendant has been found to "intentionally select[] the
person against whom the crime [is committed] because of
his race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person."
[Wis. Stat. 939.645(1)(b).]
In Mitchell, Mitchell and several other African-American
men beat a white juvenile unconscious after Mitchell
said, "There goes a white boy; go get him!" (Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, supra, 508 U.S. 476, 480.) Mitchell was
convicted of battery with an enhanced sentence under the
aforementioned statute because he was determined to have
intentionally selected the victim based on race.
The Supreme Court distinguished the Wisconsin hate speech
statute from that in R.A.V. by determining it to be a
regulation on unprotected conduct. (Id. at 480.) The
statute was said to focus on conduct and had only an
incidental effect on speech. The Court noted that
"[t]raditionally, sentencing judges have considered a
wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing
on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a
convicted defendant." (Id. at 485.) "The defendant's
motive for committing the offense is [but] one important
factor." (Ibid.) "Deeply ingrained in our legal
tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the
criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."
(Ibid. [quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137,
156.].)
iii) Virginia v. Black : In Virginia v. Black (2003) 538
U.S. 343, the Supreme Court decided how much one can
suppress conduct without banning expression. In Black,
the first respondent burned a cross during a Ku Klux Klan
rally, and the second and third respondents burned a
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cross in the yard of an African-American neighbor. (Id.
at 348-350.) The respondents were found guilty under a
Virginia statute which made it a felony "for any person .
. . , with the intent of intimidating any person or group
. . . , to burn . . . a cross on the property of another,
a highway or other public place." [Ibid. (quoting Va.
Code Ann. 18.2-423.).]
Respondents contended that their expressive conduct in
burning the crosses was protected by their constitutional
right to freedom of speech. The United States Supreme
Court held, however, that a prohibition of cross-burning
with the intent to intimidate was not unconstitutional
since it banned conduct rather than the expression of a
disfavored topic. While cross burning could constitute
expression, such expressive conduct was not proscribed
unless it was done with the intent to intimidate, and
targeting cross burning was reasonable because burning a
cross was historically "a particularly virulent form of
intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating
messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of
intimidating messages in light of cross burning's long
and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.
Thus, just as a state may regulate only that obscenity
which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so
too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of
intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of
bodily harm." (Id. at 363.)
The Court in Black was careful to differentiate hate speech
regulated on the basis of its viewpoint from hate speech
prohibited because it seriously threatens issues of
personal security, i.e. a true threat.
b) Applying Cross-Burning Principles to Noose Hanging :
Many noose displays would qualify as true threats under the
rationale of Virginia v. Black. " . . . [C]ross burnings
done with the intent to intimidate . . . [are] a
particularly virulent form of intimidation . . . Instead of
prohibiting all intimidating messages, [a state] may choose
to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light
of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal
of impending violence." (Ibid.) Thus, a state may choose
to prohibit those forms of intimidation most likely to
inspire fear of bodily harm, i.e. the placement of a noose.
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Twenty states, including the District of Columbia, have
statutes explicitly prohibiting cross burning. [(1) Ala.
Code 13A-6-28; (2) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1707 (3) Cal.
Penal Code 11411; (4) Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-58 (2007);
(5) Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 805 (2008); (6) D.C. Code
Ann. 22-3312.02; (7) Fla. Stat. Ann. 876.17; (8) Ga.
Code Ann. 16-11-37 (2007); (9) Idaho Code Ann. 18-7902
(2008); (10) 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-7.6; (11) La.
Rev. Stat. Ann.14:40.4 (2008); (12) Mo. Rev. Stat.
565.095 (2008); (13) Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-221 (2007);
(14) N.Y. Penal Law 240.31 (Consol. 2008); (15) N.C. Gen.
Stat. 14-12.12 (2007); (16) Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 1174
(2007); (17) S.C. Code Ann. 16-7-120 (2007); (18) S.D.
Codified Laws 22-19B-1 (2007); S.D. Codified Laws
22-19B-2 (2007); (19) Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1456
(2007); (20) Va. Code Ann. 18.2-423 (2008); (21)Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. 9A.36.080.] To date, three states have
passed laws to specifically punish those who hang nooses as
a means to intimidate. These states are Connecticut,
Louisiana, and New York. (Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-58; La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:40.5; N.Y. Pen. Law 240.31.)
In 2007, the United Senate passed a resolution speaking to
the permissibility of placing criminal prohibitions on
hangman's nooses. The resolution reads:
"Expressing the sense of the Senate that the hanging of
nooses should be thoroughly investigated by Federal, State,
and local law enforcement authorities and that any criminal
violations should be vigorously prosecuted.
"Whereas, in the fall of 2007, nooses have been found hanging
in or near a high school in North Carolina, a Home Depot
store in New Jersey, a school playground in Louisiana, the
campus of the University of Maryland, a factory in Houston,
Texas, and on the door of a professor's office at Columbia
University;
"Whereas the Southern Poverty Law Center has recorded between
40 and 50 suspected hate crimes involving nooses since
September 2007;
"Whereas, since 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has filed more than 30 lawsuits that involve the
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displaying of nooses in places of employment;
"Whereas nooses are reviled by many Americans as symbols of
racism and of lynchings that were once all too common;
"Whereas, according to Tuskegee Institute, more than 4,700
people were lynched between 1882 and 1959 in a campaign of
terror led by the Ku Klux Klan;
"Whereas the number of victims killed by lynching in the
history of the United States exceeds the number of people
killed in the horrible attack on Pearl Harbor (2,333 dead)
and Hurricane Katrina (1,836 dead) combined; and
"Whereas African-Americans, as well as Italian, Jewish, and
Mexican-Americans, have comprised the vast majority of
lynching victims, and, by erasing the terrible symbols of
the past, we can continue to move forward on issues of race
in the United States: Now, therefore, be it
"Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the hanging of nooses is a reprehensible act when
used for the purpose of intimidation and, under
certain circumstances, can be criminal;
(2) incidents involving the hanging of a noose should
be investigated thoroughly by Federal, State, and
local law enforcement, and all private entities and
individuals should be encouraged to cooperate with
any such investigation; and
(3) any criminal violations involving the hanging of
nooses should be vigorously prosecuted." [Sen.Res.
No. 376, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2007).]
This resolution seems to encourage and endorse
criminalization for the display of hangman's nooses for the
purpose of intimidation. This bill creates a misdemeanor
against those who hang a noose, knowing it to be a symbol
representing a threat to life for the purpose of
terrorizing. "Terrorize" is defined under Penal Code
Section 11411(d) as "caus[ing] a person of ordinary
emotions and sensibilities to fear for their personal
safety." "Terrorism" as defined by Black's Law Dictionary
means "[t]he use or threat of violence to intimidate or
cause panic . . . . " [See Black's Law Dict. (4th ed.
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2001) p. 702, col.1.]
This bill provides sufficient safeguards, such as requiring
the intent to terrorize, in order to sanction a criminal
law addressing hangman's nooses. The use of the word
"terrorize" in this bill is substantially similar to
"intimidate" and should, therefore, preserve the
constitutional right to free speech.
6)Argument in Support : According to the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) , "AB 412 would
provide that no person, whether or not acting under color of
law, shall maliciously either hang or reuse to remove a noose
at any school, park, place of employment, or public venue.
"Racism is still prevalent within our state. There is no other
place where racism is more prevalent than within our public
school system and at places of employment AFSME represents
129,000 workers of all colors, nationalities, and backgrounds.
We believe AB 412 is important to eradicating all forms of
racism across California."
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees
California Communities United Institute
California Teachers Association
Opposition
None received
Analysis Prepared by : Nicole J. Hanson / PUB. S. / (916)
319-3744