BILL ANALYSIS
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, REAPPORTIONMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair
BILL NO: AB 2023 HEARING DATE:
6/15/10
AUTHOR: Saldana ANALYSIS BY:
Darren Chesin
AMENDED: 4/27/10
FISCAL: YES
SUBJECT
Post election audits: pilot project
DESCRIPTION
Existing law requires an election official, during the
official canvass of every election, to conduct a public
manual tally of ballots tabulated by the voting system,
including vote by mail ballots, cast in one percent of the
precincts chosen at random.
This bill authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS) to
conduct a pilot project in five or more counties to
evaluate post canvass risk-limiting audits of election
results. The bill does not relieve a participating county
from conducting the currently required one percent manual
tally. Specifically, this bill:
A.Defines a "risk-limiting audit" as a manual tally
employing a statistical method that ensures a large,
predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual
tally whenever a full manual tally would show an
electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported
by the vote tabulating device for the audited contest.
B.Defines an "audit unit" as a precinct, a set of ballots,
or a single ballot.
C.Provides that a precinct, a set of ballots, or a single
ballot may be used as an audit unit only if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
The relevant vote tabulating device is able to
produce a report of the votes cast in the precinct,
on the set of ballots, or on the single ballot;
The elections official is able to match that
report with the ballots corresponding to the report
for the purposes of conducting a risk-limiting audit;
and,
Each ballot is assigned to not more than one
audit unit.
d. Requires a risk-limiting audit to begin with a hand
tally of the votes in one or more audit units and to
continue to hand tally votes in additional audit units
until there is strong statistical evidence that the
electoral outcome is correct.
e. Requires the risk-limiting audit to include a full
manual tally of all votes if counting additional audit
units does not provide strong statistical evidence that
the electoral outcome is correct.
f. Encourages the SOS to include urban and rural counties,
counties from northern, central, and southern
California, and counties with different voting systems.
g. Requires each county that chooses to participate in the
pilot project to conduct a post canvass risk-limiting
audit of one or more contests after each election
conducted in that county in the 2011 calendar year.
h. Requires an elections official who is conducting a post
canvass risk-limiting audit to do all of the following:
Provide at least a five-day public notice of the
time and place of the random selection of audit units
to be manually tallied and of the time and place of
the audit;
Make available to the public a report of the vote
tabulating device results for the contest, including
the results for each audit unit in the contest, prior
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to the random selection of audit units to be manually
tallied and prior to the commencement of the audit;
Conduct the audit upon tabulation of the
unofficial final results or upon completion of the
official canvass for the election; and,
Conduct the audit in public view by hand without
the use of electronic scanning equipment using the
procedures established under existing law for
conducting a manual tally of ballots in one percent
of precincts.
i.Requires the SOS to report to the Legislature on or
before March 1, 2012 on the effectiveness and efficiency
of post canvass risk-limiting audits conducted as part of
the pilot project.
j.Requires the report to include an analysis of the
efficiency of the post canvass risk-limiting audits,
including the costs of performing the audits, as compared
to the one percent manual tallies conducted under
existing law.
aa.Prohibits an audit from being conducted under the pilot
project with respect to a state or multi-jurisdictional
contest unless all counties involved in the contest
choose to participate in the pilot project.
bb.Provides that advisory elections and elections for
political party central committee may not be included in
the pilot project.
cc.Defines "unofficial final results," for the purposes of
this bill, as election results tabulated as part of an
official canvass but not yet reported to the governing
board or the SOS.
dd.Allows a voter to request a recount either upon
conclusion of the official canvass or upon completion of
the post canvass risk-limiting audit, if one is
conducted.
ee.Makes other technical changes.
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BACKGROUND
One Percent Manual Tally and the Post-Election Manual
Tally : As noted by the author below, for 45 years,
California law has required elections officials in counties
that use voting systems to tabulate ballots to manually
tally the ballots cast in one percent of the precincts as a
check to ensure that the voting systems are tallying
ballots correctly. Although state law governing the one
percent manual tally has been updated to reflect changes in
voting technology and to provide additional public notice
and reporting requirements, the requirement to manually
tally the ballots cast in one percent of precincts has not
significantly changed since first being enacted in 1965.
In 2007, the Secretary of State conducted a "top-to-bottom
review" (TTBR) of several voting machines certified for use
in California. The purpose of the review was "to determine
whether currently certified voting systems provide
acceptable levels of security, accessibility, ballot
secrecy, accuracy and usability under federal and state
standards."
At the conclusion of the TTBR, the SOS decertified and
conditionally re-certified three voting systems that had
been the subject of the TTBR. The SOS also decertified a
fourth voting system, which was unable to be tested during
the TTBR. Subsequently, after that system was tested, it
too was conditionally recertified.
Among the conditions that the SOS imposed as part of the
recertification of these voting systems was a requirement
that counties using the systems must conduct a larger
manual tally in close races than the manual tally of one
percent of precincts that is required for all elections.
The manual tally of the additional ballots was required to
be completed during the official canvass of the election.
These post election manual tally (PEMT) requirements were
challenged in court, and on August 31, 2008, the California
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the SOS had the
authority to institute PEMT requirements, but should have
done so using the procedures for adoption of regulations in
the Administrative Procedures Act. The SOS subsequently
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adopted emergency regulations so that the PEMT requirements
would be in effect for the November 2008 election. Those
emergency regulations expired in April of last year, and
new PEMT requirements have not been established by statute
or by regulation.
One of the primary purposes of the PEMT requirement was to
establish a higher level of confidence that any error by a
voting system in tabulating ballots did not change the
outcome of the election. The pilot project proposed by this
bill could help determine whether a post canvass
risk-limiting audit could serve the same purpose.
COMMENTS
1.According to the author , AB 2023 authorizes the Secretary
of State's office to establish and conduct a
statistically based, post-canvass audit pilot program.
Current law requires county elections officials to
conduct a manual tally of one percent of all precincts
following each election. The Legislature established the
one percent manual tally in 1965 - 45 years ago - to
check voting machine function and accuracy. Under current
law, however, there is no requirement to expand the
manual tally beyond one percent even when significant
differences are found between the manual tally and the
machine count. By law, the one percent manual tally
cannot change election outcomes either. Instead, when
the machine results are very close, candidates and ballot
measure proponents and opponents must file and pay for
expensive hand recounts and election contests if they
wish to challenge the outcome of a contest.
In 2007, the Secretary of State's office established a
Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group which
published recommendations for how California can improve
its elections auditing process. AB 2023's pilot program
implements many of the Working Group's recommendations.
Allowing and encouraging county elections officials to
implement risk-limiting audits will improve the
likelihood of identifying voting system errors and
security breaches.
Risk-limiting audits also have the potential to reduce the
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need for election recounts because the audit model begins
with a small sample and gradually escalates - potentially
to a full hand count - if significant differences persist
between the machine and manual tally results.
Modern auditing methods can help elections officials focus
scarce budget resources on very close races that pose the
highest risk while still confirming the outcomes of
contests that show wide margins after the machine count.
Simply put, statistically based, post-canvass audits can
improve the accuracy of and public confidence in our
elections.
PRIOR ACTION
Assembly Elections and Redistricting Committee: 7-0
Assembly Appropriations Committee: 17-0
Assembly Floor: 76-0
POSITIONS
Sponsor: Secretary of State
Support: American Statistical Association
Brennan Center for Justice
California Common Cause
Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota
Verified Voting
Oppose: None received
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