BILL ANALYSIS
Senate Appropriations Committee Fiscal Summary
Senator Christine Kehoe, Chair
2263 (Yamada)
Hearing Date: 08/12/2010 Amended: 03/22/2010
Consultant: Jacqueline Wong-HernandezPolicy Vote: Public Safety
7-0
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BILL SUMMARY: AB 2263 would extend the sunset to January 1,
2012 provisions of law that provide that the court shall, in its
discretion, impose the term or enhancement that best serves the
interest of justice, as required by SB 40 (Romero), Chapter 40,
Statutes of 2007, and SB 150 (Wright), Chapter 171, Statutes of
2009.
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Fiscal Impact (in thousands)
Major Provisions 2010-11 2011-12
2012-13 Fund
Base sentence discretion Unknown; potentially significant
costs or savings General
Enhancement discretion Unknown; potentially significant
costs or savings General
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STAFF COMMENTS: SUSPENSE FILE
AB 2263 would extend the sunset of provisions of statute
(enacted by SB 40 and SB 150) that sought to conform the state's
determinate sentencing law to the findings in Cunningham v.
California. The Cunningham decision found a portion of
California's determinate sentencing laws unconstitutional, on
the ground that they violated an individual's right to a jury
trial.
The former version of the state's basic determinate sentencing
statute provided that, for crimes punishable by three possible
terms, the court had to impose the middle term of imprisonment
unless it found circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. If
the court found that there were aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, it could impose an upper or lower term (former
Penal Code section 1170(b), pre-SB 40, Stats. 2007, c. 3).
However, in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held upper term
sentencing, under California's determinate sentencing law,
invalid under the Sixth Amendment. In Blakely v. Washington 542
U.S. 296 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held in order to comport
with the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior
conviction) that exposes a defendant to a sentence beyond the
relevant statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. Subsequently, in
Cunningham v. California 549 U.S. (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that California's determinate sentencing law violated
Blakely because the middle term was the statutory maximum for
the crime, but the law allowed the court to impose the upper
term based on circumstances in aggravation found by the court by
a preponderance of the evidence.
In light of Cunningham, the Legislature amended Penal Code
section 1170(b) (effective March 30, 2007) to fix the
constitutional defect inherent in the statute with regard to the
term imposed for the crime. Accordingly, under current law,
Penal Code section 1170(b)
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AB 2263 (Yamada)
gives the court discretion to choose the appropriate term, based
on the interest of justice, from the three-term range provided
as punishment for the crime. Since the middle term is no longer
the presumptive term of imprisonment, the defendant has no right
to a jury trial, with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on
circumstances in aggravation that would support the imposition
of the upper term.
SB 150 addressed the same constitutional issue for sentence
enhancements, some of which are punishable by three possible
terms. It deleted the requirement that the court impose the
middle term unless it found circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation and instead provided that the choice of term will be
within the court's discretion, when a sentence enhancement
called for the court to select either a lower, middle, or upper
term.
The fiscal impact of extending the provisions is unclear because
the costs are determined by the behavior and decisions of
individual judges in sentencing hearings. This bill poses
potentially significant annual General Fund costs, for increased
state prison terms to the extent that more offenders receive
aggravated enhancement terms than the current presumptive middle
term. In the absence of a sunset extension, the court would no
longer be able to go above the middle term of a base sentence or
an enhancement. By giving judges this discretion, there is a
potential for increased incarceration time, which is a cost to
the General Fund in future years. This bill also, however, gives
judges the authority to impose the lower limit of enhancement.
This bill could result in costs incurred in 2011, but those
additional costs would not be paid until after the middle term
is served of the sentence, the enhancement, or both.