BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    Ó



                                                                  AB 406
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          Date of Hearing:   April 25, 2011

                      ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND FINANCE
                                   Mike Eng, Chair
                  AB 406 (Davis) - As Introduced:  February 14, 2011
           
          SUBJECT  :   Adjustable rate mortgages: balloon payments

           SUMMARY  :   Prohibits the inclusion of a balloon payment in an 
          adjustable rate residential mortgage loan.   

           EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:

           Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer Protection Act 
          (Public Law 111-203-July 21, 2010) balloon payments are 
          prohibited for high-cost loans, which are defined as loans, 
          generally, that have interest rates at 6.5% above prime.  
          Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires the Federal banking 
          regulators, along with the Director of Housing and Urban 
          Development (HUD), the director of the Federal Housing 
          Administration (FHA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
          to draft a definition of "qualified mortgage" that gives due 
          consideration to "prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon 
          payments, negative amortization, prepayment penalties, 
          interest-only payments, and other features that have been 
          demonstrated to exhibit a higher risk of borrower default."  
          Furthermore, under Dodd-Franks "qualified mortgage" definition 
          (still subject of additional regulations), a qualified mortgage 
          cannot include terms that lead to balloon payments.  Dodd-Frank 
          offers a very narrow exception for "balloon loans" that may, by 
          regulation, be included under a qualified mortgage if certain 
          underwriting standards are met, and that the balloon loan is 
          retained in the portfolio of a lender that meets certain asset 
          size thresholds.
           
          EXISTING STATE LAW:

          Provides, under Business & Professions Code Section 10241.4, for 
          various disclosures concerning balloon payments.  Under 
          financial code 4995.2 bans higher priced loans from containing 
          provisions that could lead to negative amortization.  
           
           FISCAL EFFECT  :   Unknown

           COMMENTS  :   








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           Need for the bill  .

          According the background supplied by the author's office,

               Although sub-prime lending has largely vanished, reforms 
               such as the Dodd-Frank Act do not go far enough in 
               eliminating the loan features that have contributed to the 
               foreclosure crisis, and may not curb features such as 
               balloon payments sufficiently to prevent future harm when 
               the state and national economies eventually rebound.  The 
               Center for Responsible Lending has targeted balloon 
               payments as one of the key indicators of a predatory 
               lending situation.  In addition, federal regulators are 
               being criticized for pre-empting state attempts to rein in 
               predatory lending (see attached April 14, 2011 article from 
               the Los Angeles Times, "Lenders Told to Fix Flaws in 
               Foreclosures." State legislation to ban balloon payments is 
               therefore appropriate at this time.

           Background.
           
          This committee has covered in detail in various forums the scope 
          and scale of the subprime lending crisis that precipitated 
          current economic conditions.  Regulators were largely unable to 
          keep up with growing innovations in residential mortgage 
          products that transformed product features, largely reserved for 
          experienced borrowers, into the features to assist first time 
          homebuyers into acquiring their first home.  With a mass of 
          risky features, coupled with a lack of prudent underwriting and 
          regulatory standards it is of little surprise that this system 
          of mortgage lending could not continue.  One of the first 
          responses by regulators was the Interagency Guidance on 
          Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, issued in September 2006, 
          and the Statement on Subprime Lending, issued in June 2007.  
          Additionally, SB 385 (Machado), Chapter 301, Statutes of 2007 
          required California regulators to comply with the parallel 
          guidance documents developed by the Conference of State Bank 
          Supervisors and American Association of Residential Mortgage 
          Regulators for use by state licensees in complying with the 
          federal guidance documents.  This guidance set about prudent 
          underwriting standards for non-traditional loan products, 
          meaning those products that allow deferral of principal and/or 
          interest.    









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          On January 9, 2008 the Federal Reserve Board (Board) published 
          proposed rules that would amend Reg Z, which implements Truth in 
          Lending Act (TILA) and the Home Owner Equity Protection Act 
          (HOEPA).  The proposal included new restrictions and 
          requirements for mortgage lending and servicing designed to 
          protect consumers from abusive mortgage product features and 
          deceptive acts.   This proposal created a new class of loans for 
          coverage called "higher-priced loans."  Additionally, in 2009 
          the Governor signed AB 260 (Lieu) Chapter 629, Statutes of 2009 
          which incorporated the definition of the Reg Z "higher-priced" 
          loan definition along with California specific restrictions on 
          these loans.

          Changes to loan features and products have not been the only 
          response to the subprime crisis.  In 2008 Congress passed the 
          Secure and Fair Enforcement of Mortgage Licensing (SAFE) Act, 
          pursuant to Title V of the provisions of the Housing and 
          Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HR 3221; Public Law 110-289).  
          The SAFE Act requires mortgage loan originators to register with 
          a national database, undergo background checks, and comply with 
          minimum education and ethical requirements.

          Just last year, congress passed and the President signed the 
          Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the 
          largest overhaul of financial regulation of this generation.  
          The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes various changes to the mortgage 
          finance and origination system.  In addition, to imposing 
          minimum underwriting standards on all mortgages, it proposed 
          regulations to further corral the securitization and 
          risk-retention rules of various mortgage products.  The risk 
          retention provisions are designed to force lenders to retain 
          some risk in non-qualified mortgage loans because lessons from 
          the subprime crisis have demonstrated that greater care and 
          accuracy in mortgage lending occurs when the risk of that 
          transaction cannot be fully passed on to the secondary market.  
          While Dodd-Frank put forth ground breaking (and very complex) 
          mortgage lending standards it also empowers and directs federal 
          regulators, including the new Consumer Protection Bureau to 
          draft further mortgage lending rules.
          In summary, between state and federal laws passed in the last 
          four years we now have multiple layers and requirements for 
          non-traditional, higher-costs, higher-priced, qualified, and 
          non-qualified mortgages, as well as, standards for loan 
          originators and a new framework for risk retention and secondary 
          market activity.








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          Finally, with the subprime crisis came a massive and sudden 
          evaporation of capital for the mortgage markets, other than 
          federal government support.  Over the last few years, 
          subprime/non-traditional lending is hardly a blip on the radar, 
          if it exists at all for homeowners.  With the combination of 
          changes that have occurred, combined with a lack of real test 
          cases in the market, it is hard to determine the true impact of 
          the changes that have already been made.  Committee staff 
          predicts that it may take an additional one to two years to have 
          a true picture of the sum total of residential mortgage 
          regulation.  At that time, it may become necessary to revisit 
          state codes for clean-up and general fixes to allow the multiple 
          layers of regulation to actually work in concert.

           Questions and Issues  :

          1)Considering the changes within Dodd-Frank concerning balloon 
            payments, is this change really necessary?  Dodd-Frank allows 
            only a very narrow window for the inclusion of balloon 
            payments, and in situations that would not appear to affect 
            middle-class homeowners.  Additionally, Dodd-Frank allows 
            future regulations that could ban balloon payments, even under 
            those narrow circumstances.

          2)With additional regulations not yet drafted by federal 
            regulators, is it appropriate to add on this layer? 

          3)What evidence exists that loans since the crisis have included 
            abusive balloon payments?  This bill will only apply going 
            forward, not to any existing loans that may have balloon 
            payments.

          4)The cornerstone of the federal government's foreclosure 
            prevention strategy is the Home Affordable Modification 
            Program (HAMP).  Under HAMP, balloon payments may be used to 
            defer interest rate adjustments to help borrowers stay in 
            their home.  Could this ban on balloon payments interfere with 
            HAMP modifications?

          5)Within the supporting documents provided to the committee is 
            an LA Times Article, Lenders Told to Fix Flaws in Foreclosures 
            (April, 14, 2011) describing ongoing discussions between 
            federal regulators and mortgage loan servicers regarding loan 
            modifications.  It includes a sentence, used as justification 








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            for this bill via reference, that "The bank regulators have 
            been criticized for failing to stop unsafe lending during the 
            housing boom and for preempting state attempts to rein in 
            predatory lending."  Many policy makers, and consumer 
            advocates would agree that federal regulators did not react 
            quickly enough and in some cases failed to address consumer 
            protection issues.  However, as demonstrated in the background 
            section of this analysis, congress and the state Legislature 
            have responded in an effort to mitigate any potential future 
            crisis.  Furthermore, the lack of response pre-subprime crisis 
            is not an indication of responsiveness post-crisis.

           

          REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :   

           Support 
           
          National Asian American Coalition
          The Greenlining Institute
          West Angeles Community Development Corporation

           Opposition 
           
          California Association of Realtors'
          California Bankers Association
          California Chamber of Commerce
          California Credit Union League (CCUL)
          California Financial Services Association
          California Independent Bankers
          California Land Title Association
          California Mortgage Association
          California Mortgage Bankers Association
          Civil Justice Association of California
          Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
          United Trust Association
           
          Analysis Prepared by  :    Mark Farouk / B. & F. / (916) 319-3081