BILL ANALYSIS Ó AB 543 Page 1 Date of Hearing: March 22, 2011 Counsel: Kimberly A. Horiuchi ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY Tom Ammiano, Chair AB 543 (Torres) - As Introduced: February 16, 2011 SUMMARY : Makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by up to six months in the county jail and/or a fine of not more than $1,000, for any person who is granted probation or placed on parole for the conviction of a crime that requires him or her to register as a sex offender to use any Internet social networking Web site, as defined, during that period of probation or parole if the victim of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense or the Internet was used in the commission of the crime. Specifically, this bill : 1)Includes in the statement of notice any registered sex offender must sign, the prohibition against using any Internet social network Web site, as specified, when the offender is on probation or placed on parole. 2)States that any person on probation or parole, as specified, who is prohibited from accessing an Internet social networking Web site and who seeks an exception to the prohibition to use an Internet social networking Web site for legitimate professional purposes may apply for an exception through the appropriate parole or probation supervising agency when that person is on parole or probation. Approval shall be valid for one year unless revoked by the supervising agency with notice to the person required to register. The person may apply to renew the exception annually. 3)Defines "Internet social networking Web site" as any Internet Web site that does all of the following: a) Allows users through the creation of web pages or profiles or by other means to provide information about themselves that is available to the public or to other users; b) Offers a mechanism for communication with other users AB 543 Page 2 where such users are likely to include a substantial number of minors; and, c) Has as its primary purpose the facilitation of online social interactions. EXISTING LAW : 1)Requires persons convicted of specified sex offenses to register, or reregister if the person has been previously registered, upon release from incarceration, placement, commitment, or release on probation. States that the registration shall consist of all of the following ÝPenal Code Section 290.015(a)]: a) A statement signed in writing by the person, giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and giving the name and address of the person's employer, and the address of the person's place of employment, if different from the employer's main address; b) Fingerprints and a current photograph taken by the registering official; c) The license plate number of any vehicle owned by, regularly driven by or registered in the name of the registrant; d) Notice to the person that he or she may have a duty to register in any other state where he or she may relocate; and, e) Copies of adequate proof of residence, such as a California driver's license or identification card, recent rent or utility receipt or any other information that the registering official believes is reliable. 2)States every person who is required to register, as specified, who is living as a transient shall be required to register for the rest of his or her life as follows: a) He or she shall register, or reregister if the person has previously registered, within five working days from release from incarceration, placement or commitment, or release on probation, pursuant to Penal Code Section AB 543 Page 3 290(b), except that if the person previously registered as a transient less than 30 days from the date of his or her release from incarceration, he or she does not need to reregister as a transient until his or her next required 30-day update of registration. If a transient is not physically present in any one jurisdiction for five consecutive working days, he or she shall register in the jurisdiction in which he or she is physically present on the fifth working day following release, as specified. Beginning on or before the 30th day following initial registration upon release, a transient shall reregister no less than once every 30 days thereafter. A transient shall register with the chief of police of the city in which he or she is physically present within that 30-day period, or the sheriff of the county if he or she is physically present in an unincorporated area or city that has no police department, and additionally, with the chief of police of a campus of the University of California, the California State University, or community college if he or she is physically present upon the campus or in any of its facilities. A transient shall reregister no less than once every 30 days regardless of the length of time he or she has been physically present in the particular jurisdiction in which he or she reregisters. If a transient fails to reregister within any 30-day period, he or she may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which he or she is physically present. b) A transient who moves to a residence shall have five working days within which to register at that address, in accordance with Penal Code Section 290(b). A person registered at a residence address in accordance with that provision who becomes transient shall have five working days within which to reregister as a transient in accordance with existing law. c) Beginning on his or her first birthday following registration, a transient shall register annually, within five working days of his or her birthday, to update his or her registration with the entities described in existing law. A transient shall register in whichever jurisdiction he or she is physically present on that date. At the 30-day updates and the annual update, a transient shall provide current information as required on the DOJ annual update form, including the information. AB 543 Page 4 d) A transient shall, upon registration and re-registration, provide current information as required on the DOJ registration forms, and shall also list the places where he or she sleeps, eats, works, frequents, and engages in leisure activities. If a transient changes or includes to the places listed on the form during the 30-day period, he or she does not need to report the new place or places until the next required re-registration. ÝPenal Code Section 290.011(a) to (d).] 3)Provides that willful violation of any part of the registration requirements constitutes a misdemeanor if the offense requiring registration was a misdemeanor, and constitutes a felony of the offense requiring registration was a felony or if the person has a prior conviction of failing to register. ÝPenal Code Section 290.018(a)(b).] 4)Provides that within three days thereafter, the registering law enforcement agency or agencies shall forward the statement, fingerprints, photograph, and vehicle license plate number, if any, to the DOJ. ÝPenal Code Section 290.015(b).] 5)States that a misdemeanor failure to register shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, and a felony failure to register shall be punishable in the state prison for 16 months, 2 or 3 years. ÝPenal Code Section 290.018(a)(b).] FISCAL EFFECT : Unknown COMMENTS : 1)Author's Statement : According to the author, "Increasingly, sex offenders are using social networking Internet websites to troll for victims. A 12-year-old in Anaheim, California was lured into a hotel where she was sexually assaulted by a 33-year-old man she met on MySpace.com. Cases of this sort abound. As the Internet becomes today's playground, social networking websites are increasingly being utilized by children and youth. There must be clear restrictions on sex offenders' access to these websites to protect our children online. The Child Cyber Safety Act of 2010 prohibits registered sex offenders from using social networking Internet sites. Today, 1 in 5 children have been sexually solicited AB 543 Page 5 online. Only 25 percent of those children ever told their parents (David Finkelhar, 2002. Online Victimization). "Just since 2007, the number of users on social networking sites like MySpace, Facebook, and Bebo has doubled. An estimated 750,000 children between the ages of 8 and 12 use social networking websites, despite many of these sites prohibition on child users (Pew Research Center, 2009. Social Media and Mobile Internet Use among Teens and Young Adults). Many millions more teenagers use social networking websites as one of their primary mechanisms for social interactions with other teenagers or adults. Nearly 80 percent of teen users report that they are not careful about giving out personal information online (Pew Internet and American Life, 2005. Protecting Teens Online). "According to the National Criminal Intelligence Service, Internet pedophiles are becoming increasingly adept at using the Internet to mask their identity and using technology to assist in their search for victims. "As the law stands now, the perpetrator who assaulted the 12-year old in Anaheim could serve a prison sentence, be released back to the public and log back on to MySpace.com without penalty. Even if a parent learned about this criminal using a social networking site again, law enforcement would not be able to do a thing to stop his activities. "The increase in use of social networking sites by youth and children has turned the internet into a new playground. Increasingly, sex offenders are using social networking Internet websites to troll for victims. These types of cases abound. For example, recently a 12-year-old girl in Anaheim, CA was lured into a hotel where she was sexually assaulted by a 33-year-old man who befriended her on MySpace.com. "Under current law registered sex offenders can to troll on social networking sites frequented by children without restriction. Law enforcement does not have the legal tools to prevent them from socializing with children online. If a parent becomes aware that a registered sex offender is communicating with their child, the parent's only option is to ask their child to stop communication. Under current law the very same 33-year-old sex offender who assaulted the child in Anaheim, while on probation or parole could log back on to AB 543 Page 6 MySpace.com without restriction." 2)First Amendment "Chilling Effect" : The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and association. The pertinent Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth amendment. ÝThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) provides that "Congress shall make no law?abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." ÝUnited States Constitution. Amend. I).] Generally, sex offenders who have completed their terms of imprisonment and completed parole has all of the other rights and benefits accorded to all citizens. In Reno v. ACLU (hereinafter Reno) (1997) 521 U.S. 844, the Supreme Court stated that "The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers . . . enabÝling] tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication." (Id. at 850.) "Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. ÝA]ll of these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures and moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium - known to its members as cyberspace - located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet." Following its expansive discussion of the many benefits of the Internet, the Court turned its attention to First Amendment issues, finding that the "CDA ÝCommunications Decency Act] is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech," citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-1051 (1991). The Court further stated that the CDA, as a criminal statute, "may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images." As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil regulations reviewed in Denver Area AB 543 Page 7 Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727 (1996). "Given the vague contours of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. The CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve." (Id. at 874.) The Court further held that the Government may not reduce the adult population to only what is fit for children. "Regardless of the strength of the government's interest in protecting children, the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox," citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983). The Court concluded, "As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." (Id at page 885.) The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles recited by Reno v. ACLU, supra, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), when it stated, "The purpose Ýof the strict scrutiny test] is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the status quo of existing regulations, then ask whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to achieve Congress' legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified under that analysis. Instead, the court AB 543 Page 8 should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives." (Id.) In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Supreme Court further stated that "the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it. The government 'cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts,' citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969.) First amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought. "ÝT]he government may not prohibit speech because it increases the chances that an unlawful act will be committed at some indefinite future time," Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition , supra, at 253, citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). "ÝT]he government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse. Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct." (Ashcroft, supra, at 253 - 254.) 3)Sex Offense Registration : Existing law specifies that if a person has been convicted of a sexually based offense, he or she is required to register as a sex offender. ÝPenal Code Section 290(c) (includes all offenses where registration is required if committed on or after July 1, 1944).] The purpose of sex offender registration is to provide law enforcement with a list of offenders who may be likely suspects in the event of another sex offense. "The purpose of ÝPenal Code Section 290] is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future. The statute is thus regulatory in nature, intended to accomplish the government's objective by mandating certain affirmative acts." ÝIn re Leon Casey Alva (2004) 33 AB 543 Page 9 Cal. 4th 254, 264.] Unlike other states, California requires lifetime registration for all listed sex offenses. ÝPenal Code Section 290(b).] The registration statute does not distinguish crimes based on severity and instead requires all persons convicted of a listed crime must register annually within five days of his or her birthday and for the rest of his or her life. ÝPenal Code Section 290.012(a).] Although most registerable offenses are felonies, there some alternate felony/misdemeanor penalties and a few straight misdemeanors. ÝSee Penal Code Section 243.4 (sexual battery); Penal Code Section 266c (obtaining sexual consent by fraud); Penal Code Section 311.1, 311.2(c), 311.4, 311.11 (child pornography); Penal Code Section 647.6 (annoying or molesting a child); and, Penal Code Section 314(1)(2) (indecent exposure).] 4)Limits for Persons on Probation or Parole : Several states have placed Internet restrictions or prohibitions on sex offenders on probation or parole. Although such restrictions must have a clear nexus or be reasonably related to the offense, Internet restrictions for probationers and parolees have withstood constitutional challenge. ÝSee U.S. vs. Thielemann (3rd Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 265; U.S. vs. Paul (5th Cir. 2001) 274 F. 3rd 155; U.S. vs. Granger (4th Cir. 2004) 117 F. App 247.] California law has long held that probationers and parolees have fewer constitutional rights than ordinary people, although conditions of probation or parole must be "reasonable since parolees and probationers retain constitutional protections against arbitrary and oppressive official action." ÝIn re Ramon Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233; Morrissey vs. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 477.] The Ninth Circuit in U.S. vs. Reardon affirmed the imposition of a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing or using a computer with access to any online service without prior approval of the probation officer finding that the restriction was reasonably related to the offense of shipping child pornography across state lines. ÝU.S. vs. Rearden (9th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3rd 608.] However, the California Court of Appeals rejected an Internet ban on a paroled child molester because the restriction was not so narrowly tailored as to avoid suppression of protected AB 543 Page 10 speech. The Court held, "Here, BPT ÝBoard of Prison Terms, now Board of Parole Hearings] was legitimately concerned that a released child molester's unfettered access to a computer might result in criminal conduct. In contrast to cases such as Crandon, Paul and Rearden, the broad prohibition on use of the computer and Internet bore no relation to Stevens's conviction for child molestation and imposed a greater restriction of his rights than was reasonably necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate goal. "BPT, concerned about Stevens's illegitimate use of the Internet, sought to prevent his having any access to cyberspace. One can understand the dilemma BPT faced. ÝC]yberspace defies boundaries; it offers unlimited access. 'ÝT]he openness of this architecture means this: That there is no "natural" or simple or "automatic" way to keep people out because there are no natural or real borders that close off access to those who should not have access.' Ýinternal citation omitted.] "But BPT's task was less daunting than it appeared to be. A focused restriction could be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on Stevens's hard drive or his removable disks Ýinternal citation omitted]. BPT might also have explored the implementation of monitoring software which automatically generates an e-mail to the parole officer should the parolee engage in an illegal use of his computer. ÝSee, e.g., McKay, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender (2003) 106 W.Va. L. Rev. 203, 242.] Finally, BPT can verify Stevens's Internet usage with a sting operation-surreptitiously inviting him to respond to government-placed Internet ads for pornography Ýinternal citation omitted]. "BPT cannot, of course, monitor every aspect of Stevens's behavior. Other than a prohibition on his use of a computer to access pornographic sites, BPT would most likely be unable to monitor Stevens's use of someone else's computer. But like any other parolee, Stevens's unauthorized use of any computer would be at his own peril. "As observed by Sir William S. Gilbert, 'a felon's capacity for AB 543 Page 11 innocent enjoyment is just as great as any honest man's.' (Gilbert & Sullivan, Pirates of Penzance (1880) act II.) Rehabilitation of a felon entails integration into society where he or she can be self-supporting. In appropriate cases, access to the Internet assists parolees to become law-abiding citizens." ÝIn re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.] 5)Constitutionality of Sex Offender Registration : Both the California and the United States Supreme Court have ruled that, generally, sex offender registration laws do not run afoul of constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto, double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. ÝIn re Leon Casey Alva (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 254; Smith vs. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84.] In making such a finding, both courts applied the Mendoza-Martinez test which outlines several guiding factors in determining whether a law is punitive. The factors include whether the "regulatory scheme" has been regarded in history and tradition as punitive, imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, promotes the traditional aims of punishment, has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, or is excessive with respect to its purpose. The state may not make publicity and stigma an integral part of the objective of such regulation. ÝKennedy vs. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144.] Sex offender registration has been viewed as a non-punitive regulatory scheme because it is designed only to keep law enforcement and to some extent, the public aware of dangers. For the most part, sex offender registration laws have been remarkably resilient to constitutional challenges. While a few courts have held that retroactive community-notification provisions are punitive and thus violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the overall legal trend has been to find community notification regulatory and not punitive in nature. However, several courts have enjoined community-notification provisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that states must provide minimum due-process protections, such as hearings and a state burden of clear-and-convincing evidence for those hearings, before infringing upon either state privacy rights or the right not to be defamed by the government. The courts generally recognized that the increased burden on the state was necessitated by the relatively serious liberty interest of the registrant when compared to the insubstantial value of community notification to the state. As stated by the Third Circuit: AB 543 Page 12 "An erroneous underestimation of an individual's dangerousness will not necessarily result in harm to protected groups . . . . On the other hand, an overestimation of an individual's dangerousness will lead to immediate and irreparable harm to the offender: his conviction becomes public, he is officially recorded as being a danger to the community, and the veil of relative anonymity behind which he might have existed disappears." ÝE.B. vs. Verniero (1997) 119 F.3rd 1077; Garfinkle, COMMENT: Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community - Notification Laws to Juveniles, (2003) 91 Calif. L. Rev. 163, 202.] The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District held that after the residency restrictions in Jessica's Law passed in November of 2006, sex offender registration may no longer a regulatory scheme but instead a form of punishment. The court stated: "We conclude, based on our analysis of the salient Mendoza-Martinez factors, Jessica's Law's residency restriction has an overwhelming punitive effect. It effectuates traditional banishment under a different name, interferes with the right to use and enjoy real property near schools and parks, and subjects housing choices to government approval like parole or probation. It affirmatively restrains the right to choose a home and limits the right to live with one's family. It deters recidivism and comes close to imposing retribution on offenders. While it has a non-punitive of protecting children, it is excessive with regard to that purpose. It would oust a person never convicted of any offense against a child from his family home near a school or park, forcing him to leave his family or consigning the family to perpetually threatened transience. Relocation would be limited to the few outskirts of town lacking a school or park. Yet the residency restriction would allow a convicted child molester to stroll past the school, eat ice cream in the park, and live next door to small children-as long as he retreats at night to housing far from a school or park. Building exclusion zones around all schools and parks for all registered sex offenders is excessively punitive. "The severe punitive effect of Jessica's Law's residency AB 543 Page 13 requirement clearly outweighs the proclaimed lack of regulatory, non-punitive intent. ÝSee Smith, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 92 ('clearest proof' of punitive effect outweighs lack of punitive intent).] We are not the first jurists to recognize the overwhelming punitive effect of a residency restriction. ÝSee State v. Pollard, supra, 886 N.E.2d at p. 74 (residency restriction is punitive); Mikaloff, supra, 2007 WL 2572268 at pp. 9-10 (same); Leroy, supra, 828 N.E.2d at p. 793 (dis. opn. of Kuehn, J.) (same); Miller, supra, 405 F.3d at p. 726 (conc. & dis. opn. of Melloy, J.) (same).] "Because the residency restriction is punitive, its imposition by the court increases the penalty for a nonsexual offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon the jury verdict alone. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Thus, the facts required to impose the residency restriction must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury." (Ibid.) ÝPeople vs. Mosley (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 512, 533, cert. granted by the California Supreme Court]. The lower court did not directly rule on the constitutionality of Jessica's Law or sex offender registration and the California Supreme Court has recently held that various provisions of Jessica's Law were not unconstitutional as applied to four parolees. ÝIn re E.J et. al. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258.] Nevertheless, by placing greater requirements on a person who is required to register as a sex offender, it may be more likely seen as punitive by the courts. 6)Arguments in Support : According to the Child Abuse Prevention Center , "AB 543 would make it a misdemeanor for any person granted probation or on parole for conviction of a crime that requires registration as a sex offender to use any internet social networking website, if the victim was under 18 years of age or the internet was used in the commission of a crime. Additionally, it authorizes the person seek an exception to the prohibition for legitimate professional purposes by applying through the appropriate parole or probation supervising agency. Millions of California children who use the internet everyday are at risk from sexual predators. The internet has provided an alternative avenue for predators to victimize unsuspecting youth; child predators, in particular, are moving from the playground to the web in their search for unsuspecting children. In this regard, AB 543 provides assistance in limiting the ability for predators to victimize our children via highly popular social networking channels." AB 543 Page 14 7)Arguments in Opposition : According to the California Public Defenders Association , "This proposed legislation would create a new misdemeanor adding Penal Code Section 290.96 prohibiting persons granted probation or placed on parole for a sexual offense that requires him to register where the victim was under 18 years of age or the Internet was used in the commission of the crime, from accessing an Internet social networking website during the period of probation or parole, and making conforming changes to 290.015. "For the purposes of this section, 'Internet social networking Web site' is defined as an Internet Web site that does all of the following: (1) Allows users, through the creation of Internet Web pages or profiles or by other means, to provide information about themselves that is available to the public or to other users. (2) Offers a mechanism for communication with other users where those users are likely to include a substantial number of minors. (3) Has as its primary purpose the facilitation of online social interactions. (italics added). "This proposed legislation is unnecessary, wastes money and endangers the public. Evidence based research recognized by the California Sex Offender Management Board shows that reintegration of sex offenders into the community reduces the risk of re-offense. That means that 290 registrants need jobs and housing in order to maintain stability and rebuild their lives. If sex offenders are able to find gainful employment and appropriate housing, they are less likely to re-offend, thus less likely to endanger the public. "Currently, many people finds jobs through social network websites; i.e., Craig's List, Facebook or Twitter. Indeed, facilitating job searches is an advertised focus of social networking sites. Many companies have Facebook accounts and encourage users to follow their business on Facebook. This is even more likely to be true in the future. To deny 290 registrants an opportunity to find employment is short sighted and bad public policy. "Further, this legislation is unnecessary as existing law already authorizes the terms and conditions of probation or parole to be tailored to achieve legitimate purposes of rehabilitating a defendant to avoid future criminality. If AB 543 Page 15 the particulars of the commitment offense make prohibition again internet access appropriate under the circumstances, the mechanism presently exists not only impose such a condition but to enforce compliance through a violation of probation or parole." 8)Related Legislation : a) AB 653 (Galgiani) requires a person required to register as a sex offender report his or her Internet accounts and Internet identifiers to local law enforcement and defined to include e-mail addresses and designations used for the purposes of chatting, instant messaging, social networking, or other similar Internet communication. AB 653 is pending hearing by this Committee. b) AB 755 (Galgiani) requires, inter alia, by July 1, 2012, any person or entity that collects and makes available, in any format, the personal data of California minors, to certify with the Department of Justice a plan to obtain information and implement reasonable policies to restrict or block access to that information by persons required to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. AB 755 is pending hearing by this Committee. 9)Prior Legislation : a) AB 841 (Portantino), of the 2007-08 Legislative Session, would have provided that any time a person required to register or re-register as a sex offender, as specified, he or she shall provide all e-mail addresses and IM addresses that he or she may use or is using. AB 841 was significantly narrowed in Assembly Appropriations Committee and ultimately gutted and amended in the Senate into a bill related to health care. b) AB 179 (Portantino), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session, would have mandated a person required to register as a sex offender, or a person who is released as a sexually violent predator, as specified, to report all e-mail addresses and IM identities at the time of registration. AB 179 was considerably narrowed to address costs and was ultimately gutted and amended into a bill related to corporate taxation laws. AB 543 Page 16 c) AB 1850 (Galgiani), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session, prohibits any person sentenced to probation or is released on parole for an offense that requires him or she to register as a sex offender, as specified, from using the Internet under certain circumstances. AB 1850 is substantially similar to this bill and was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee's Suspense File. d) AB 2208 (Torres), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session, is substantially similar to this bill was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee's Suspense File. e) SB 1204 (Runner), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session, requires every registered sex offender to inform the law enforcement agency with which he or she last registered of all of his or her online addresses, e-mail addresses, and IM user names by December 31, 2011 and thereafter at the time of original registration and within 30 days of establishing a new online account. This information, may, upon request, be shared with the DOJ or other law enforcement agencies. SB 1204 was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee's Suspense File. REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION : Support California State Sheriffs' Association Child Abuse Prevention Center Opposition American Civil Liberties Union California Public Defenders Association Analysis Prepared by : Kimberly Horiuchi / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744