BILL ANALYSIS Ó
AB 543
Page 1
Date of Hearing: March 22, 2011
Counsel: Kimberly A. Horiuchi
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Tom Ammiano, Chair
AB 543 (Torres) - As Introduced: February 16, 2011
SUMMARY : Makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by up to six months
in the county jail and/or a fine of not more than $1,000, for
any person who is granted probation or placed on parole for the
conviction of a crime that requires him or her to register as a
sex offender to use any Internet social networking Web site, as
defined, during that period of probation or parole if the victim
of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time of the
offense or the Internet was used in the commission of the crime.
Specifically, this bill :
1)Includes in the statement of notice any registered sex
offender must sign, the prohibition against using any Internet
social network Web site, as specified, when the offender is on
probation or placed on parole.
2)States that any person on probation or parole, as specified,
who is prohibited from accessing an Internet social networking
Web site and who seeks an exception to the prohibition to use
an Internet social networking Web site for legitimate
professional purposes may apply for an exception through the
appropriate parole or probation supervising agency when that
person is on parole or probation. Approval shall be valid for
one year unless revoked by the supervising agency with notice
to the person required to register. The person may apply to
renew the exception annually.
3)Defines "Internet social networking Web site" as any Internet
Web site that does all of the following:
a) Allows users through the creation of web pages or
profiles or by other means to provide information about
themselves that is available to the public or to other
users;
b) Offers a mechanism for communication with other users
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where such users are likely to include a substantial number
of minors; and,
c) Has as its primary purpose the facilitation of online
social interactions.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Requires persons convicted of specified sex offenses to
register, or reregister if the person has been previously
registered, upon release from incarceration, placement,
commitment, or release on probation. States that the
registration shall consist of all of the following ÝPenal Code
Section 290.015(a)]:
a) A statement signed in writing by the person, giving
information as shall be required by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and giving the name and address of the
person's employer, and the address of the person's place of
employment, if different from the employer's main address;
b) Fingerprints and a current photograph taken by the
registering official;
c) The license plate number of any vehicle owned by,
regularly driven by or registered in the name of the
registrant;
d) Notice to the person that he or she may have a duty to
register in any other state where he or she may relocate;
and,
e) Copies of adequate proof of residence, such as a
California driver's license or identification card, recent
rent or utility receipt or any other information that the
registering official believes is reliable.
2)States every person who is required to register, as specified,
who is living as a transient shall be required to register for
the rest of his or her life as follows:
a) He or she shall register, or reregister if the person
has previously registered, within five working days from
release from incarceration, placement or commitment, or
release on probation, pursuant to Penal Code Section
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290(b), except that if the person previously registered as
a transient less than 30 days from the date of his or her
release from incarceration, he or she does not need to
reregister as a transient until his or her next required
30-day update of registration. If a transient is not
physically present in any one jurisdiction for five
consecutive working days, he or she shall register in the
jurisdiction in which he or she is physically present on
the fifth working day following release, as specified.
Beginning on or before the 30th day following initial
registration upon release, a transient shall reregister no
less than once every 30 days thereafter. A transient shall
register with the chief of police of the city in which he
or she is physically present within that 30-day period, or
the sheriff of the county if he or she is physically
present in an unincorporated area or city that has no
police department, and additionally, with the chief of
police of a campus of the University of California, the
California State University, or community college if he or
she is physically present upon the campus or in any of its
facilities. A transient shall reregister no less than once
every 30 days regardless of the length of time he or she
has been physically present in the particular jurisdiction
in which he or she reregisters. If a transient fails to
reregister within any 30-day period, he or she may be
prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which he or she is
physically present.
b) A transient who moves to a residence shall have five
working days within which to register at that address, in
accordance with Penal Code Section 290(b). A person
registered at a residence address in accordance with that
provision who becomes transient shall have five working
days within which to reregister as a transient in
accordance with existing law.
c) Beginning on his or her first birthday following
registration, a transient shall register annually, within
five working days of his or her birthday, to update his or
her registration with the entities described in existing
law. A transient shall register in whichever jurisdiction
he or she is physically present on that date. At the
30-day updates and the annual update, a transient shall
provide current information as required on the DOJ annual
update form, including the information.
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d) A transient shall, upon registration and
re-registration, provide current information as required on
the DOJ registration forms, and shall also list the places
where he or she sleeps, eats, works, frequents, and engages
in leisure activities. If a transient changes or includes
to the places listed on the form during the 30-day period,
he or she does not need to report the new place or places
until the next required re-registration. ÝPenal Code
Section 290.011(a) to (d).]
3)Provides that willful violation of any part of the
registration requirements constitutes a misdemeanor if the
offense requiring registration was a misdemeanor, and
constitutes a felony of the offense requiring registration was
a felony or if the person has a prior conviction of failing to
register. ÝPenal Code Section 290.018(a)(b).]
4)Provides that within three days thereafter, the registering
law enforcement agency or agencies shall forward the
statement, fingerprints, photograph, and vehicle license plate
number, if any, to the DOJ. ÝPenal Code Section 290.015(b).]
5)States that a misdemeanor failure to register shall be
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one
year, and a felony failure to register shall be punishable in
the state prison for 16 months, 2 or 3 years. ÝPenal Code
Section 290.018(a)(b).]
FISCAL EFFECT : Unknown
COMMENTS :
1)Author's Statement : According to the author, "Increasingly,
sex offenders are using social networking Internet websites to
troll for victims. A 12-year-old in Anaheim, California was
lured into a hotel where she was sexually assaulted by a
33-year-old man she met on MySpace.com. Cases of this sort
abound. As the Internet becomes today's playground, social
networking websites are increasingly being utilized by
children and youth. There must be clear restrictions on sex
offenders' access to these websites to protect our children
online. The Child Cyber Safety Act of 2010 prohibits
registered sex offenders from using social networking Internet
sites. Today, 1 in 5 children have been sexually solicited
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online. Only 25 percent of those children ever told their
parents (David Finkelhar, 2002. Online Victimization).
"Just since 2007, the number of users on social networking sites
like MySpace, Facebook, and Bebo has doubled. An estimated
750,000 children between the ages of 8 and 12 use social
networking websites, despite many of these sites prohibition
on child users (Pew Research Center, 2009. Social Media and
Mobile Internet Use among Teens and Young Adults). Many
millions more teenagers use social networking websites as one
of their primary mechanisms for social interactions with other
teenagers or adults. Nearly 80 percent of teen users report
that they are not careful about giving out personal
information online (Pew Internet and American Life, 2005.
Protecting Teens Online).
"According to the National Criminal Intelligence Service,
Internet pedophiles are becoming increasingly adept at using
the Internet to mask their identity and using technology to
assist in their search for victims.
"As the law stands now, the perpetrator who assaulted the
12-year old in Anaheim could serve a prison sentence, be
released back to the public and log back on to MySpace.com
without penalty. Even if a parent learned about this criminal
using a social networking site again, law enforcement would
not be able to do a thing to stop his activities.
"The increase in use of social networking sites by youth and
children has turned the internet into a new playground.
Increasingly, sex offenders are using social networking
Internet websites to troll for victims. These types of cases
abound. For example, recently a 12-year-old girl in Anaheim,
CA was lured into a hotel where she was sexually assaulted by
a 33-year-old man who befriended her on MySpace.com.
"Under current law registered sex offenders can to troll on
social networking sites frequented by children without
restriction. Law enforcement does not have the legal tools to
prevent them from socializing with children online. If a
parent becomes aware that a registered sex offender is
communicating with their child, the parent's only option is to
ask their child to stop communication. Under current law the
very same 33-year-old sex offender who assaulted the child in
Anaheim, while on probation or parole could log back on to
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MySpace.com without restriction."
2)First Amendment "Chilling Effect" : The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees to all citizens the
right to freedom of speech and association. The pertinent
Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through
the Fourteenth amendment. ÝThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
95 (1940) provides that "Congress shall make no law?abridging
the freedom of speech . . . ." ÝUnited States Constitution.
Amend. I).] Generally, sex offenders who have completed their
terms of imprisonment and completed parole has all of the
other rights and benefits accorded to all citizens.
In Reno v. ACLU (hereinafter Reno) (1997) 521 U.S. 844, the
Supreme Court stated that "The Internet is an international
network of interconnected computers . . . enabÝling] tens of
millions of people to communicate with one another and to
access vast amounts of information from around the world. The
Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication." (Id. at 850.)
"Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide
variety of communication and information retrieval methods.
These methods are constantly evolving and difficult to
categorize precisely. ÝA]ll of these methods can be used to
transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures and moving
video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique
medium - known to its members as cyberspace - located in no
particular geographical location but available to anyone,
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet."
Following its expansive discussion of the many benefits of the
Internet, the Court turned its attention to First Amendment
issues, finding that the "CDA ÝCommunications Decency Act] is
a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a
regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of
its obvious chilling effect on free speech," citing Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-1051 (1991). The
Court further stated that the CDA, as a criminal statute, "may
well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate
even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images." As a
practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled
with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague
regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those
implicated by the civil regulations reviewed in Denver Area
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Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518
U.S. 727 (1996).
"Given the vague contours of the statute, it unquestionably
silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to
constitutional protection. The CDA's burden on protected
speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more
carefully drafted statute. We are persuaded that the CDA
lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a
statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA
effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted
to serve." (Id. at 874.)
The Court further held that the Government may not reduce the
adult population to only what is fit for children.
"Regardless of the strength of the government's interest in
protecting children, the level of discourse reaching a mailbox
simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox," citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983).
The Court concluded, "As a matter of constitutional tradition,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical
but unproven benefit of censorship." (Id at page 885.)
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles
recited by Reno v. ACLU, supra, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S.
656 (2004), when it stated, "The purpose Ýof the strict
scrutiny test] is to ensure that speech is restricted no
further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is
important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or
punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the
status quo of existing regulations, then ask whether the
challenged restriction has some additional ability to achieve
Congress' legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech
could be justified under that analysis. Instead, the court
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should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives."
(Id.)
In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002),
the Supreme Court further stated that "the mere tendency of
speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason
for banning it. The government 'cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person's private thoughts,' citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 566 (1969.) First amendment freedoms are most in
danger when the government seeks to control thought or to
justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to
think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning
of thought.
"ÝT]he government may not prohibit speech because it increases
the chances that an unlawful act will be committed at some
indefinite future time," Ashcroft v. The Free Speech
Coalition , supra, at 253, citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105, 108 (1973). "ÝT]he government has shown no more than a
remote connection between speech that might encourage thoughts
or impulses and any resulting child abuse. Without a
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government
may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage
pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct." (Ashcroft, supra,
at 253 - 254.)
3)Sex Offense Registration : Existing law specifies that if a
person has been convicted of a sexually based offense, he or
she is required to register as a sex offender. ÝPenal Code
Section 290(c) (includes all offenses where registration is
required if committed on or after July 1, 1944).] The purpose
of sex offender registration is to provide law enforcement
with a list of offenders who may be likely suspects in the
event of another sex offense.
"The purpose of ÝPenal Code Section 290] is to assure that
persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be
readily available for police surveillance at all times because
the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses
in the future. The statute is thus regulatory in nature,
intended to accomplish the government's objective by mandating
certain affirmative acts." ÝIn re Leon Casey Alva (2004) 33
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Cal. 4th 254, 264.] Unlike other states, California requires
lifetime registration for all listed sex offenses. ÝPenal
Code Section 290(b).]
The registration statute does not distinguish crimes based on
severity and instead requires all persons convicted of a
listed crime must register annually within five days of his or
her birthday and for the rest of his or her life. ÝPenal Code
Section 290.012(a).] Although most registerable offenses are
felonies, there some alternate felony/misdemeanor penalties
and a few straight misdemeanors. ÝSee Penal Code Section
243.4 (sexual battery); Penal Code Section 266c (obtaining
sexual consent by fraud); Penal Code Section 311.1, 311.2(c),
311.4, 311.11 (child pornography); Penal Code Section 647.6
(annoying or molesting a child); and, Penal Code Section
314(1)(2) (indecent exposure).]
4)Limits for Persons on Probation or Parole : Several states
have placed Internet restrictions or prohibitions on sex
offenders on probation or parole. Although such restrictions
must have a clear nexus or be reasonably related to the
offense, Internet restrictions for probationers and parolees
have withstood constitutional challenge. ÝSee U.S. vs.
Thielemann (3rd Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 265; U.S. vs. Paul (5th
Cir. 2001) 274 F. 3rd 155; U.S. vs. Granger (4th Cir. 2004)
117 F. App 247.]
California law has long held that probationers and parolees have
fewer constitutional rights than ordinary people, although
conditions of probation or parole must be "reasonable since
parolees and probationers retain constitutional protections
against arbitrary and oppressive official action." ÝIn re
Ramon Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233; Morrissey vs.
Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 477.] The Ninth Circuit in U.S.
vs. Reardon affirmed the imposition of a probation condition
prohibiting the defendant from possessing or using a computer
with access to any online service without prior approval of
the probation officer finding that the restriction was
reasonably related to the offense of shipping child
pornography across state lines. ÝU.S. vs. Rearden (9th Cir.
2003) 349 F.3rd 608.]
However, the California Court of Appeals rejected an Internet
ban on a paroled child molester because the restriction was
not so narrowly tailored as to avoid suppression of protected
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speech.
The Court held, "Here, BPT ÝBoard of Prison Terms, now Board of
Parole Hearings] was legitimately concerned that a released
child molester's unfettered access to a computer might result
in criminal conduct. In contrast to cases such as Crandon,
Paul and Rearden, the broad prohibition on use of the computer
and Internet bore no relation to Stevens's conviction for
child molestation and imposed a greater restriction of his
rights than was reasonably necessary to accomplish the state's
legitimate goal.
"BPT, concerned about Stevens's illegitimate use of the
Internet, sought to prevent his having any access to
cyberspace. One can understand the dilemma BPT faced.
ÝC]yberspace defies boundaries; it offers unlimited access.
'ÝT]he openness of this architecture means this: That there
is no "natural" or simple or "automatic" way to keep people
out because there are no natural or real borders that close
off access to those who should not have access.' Ýinternal
citation omitted.]
"But BPT's task was less daunting than it appeared to be. A
focused restriction could be enforced by unannounced
inspections of material stored on Stevens's hard drive or his
removable disks Ýinternal citation omitted]. BPT might also
have explored the implementation of monitoring software which
automatically generates an e-mail to the parole officer should
the parolee engage in an illegal use of his computer. ÝSee,
e.g., McKay, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway:
Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender
(2003) 106 W.Va. L. Rev. 203, 242.] Finally, BPT can verify
Stevens's Internet usage with a sting
operation-surreptitiously inviting him to respond to
government-placed Internet ads for pornography Ýinternal
citation omitted].
"BPT cannot, of course, monitor every aspect of Stevens's
behavior. Other than a prohibition on his use of a computer
to access pornographic sites, BPT would most likely be unable
to monitor Stevens's use of someone else's computer. But like
any other parolee, Stevens's unauthorized use of any computer
would be at his own peril.
"As observed by Sir William S. Gilbert, 'a felon's capacity for
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innocent enjoyment is just as great as any honest man's.'
(Gilbert & Sullivan, Pirates of Penzance (1880) act II.)
Rehabilitation of a felon entails integration into society
where he or she can be self-supporting. In appropriate cases,
access to the Internet assists parolees to become law-abiding
citizens." ÝIn re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.]
5)Constitutionality of Sex Offender Registration : Both the
California and the United States Supreme Court have ruled
that, generally, sex offender registration laws do not run
afoul of constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto,
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. ÝIn re Leon
Casey Alva (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 254; Smith vs. Doe (2003) 538
U.S. 84.] In making such a finding, both courts applied the
Mendoza-Martinez test which outlines several guiding factors
in determining whether a law is punitive. The factors include
whether the "regulatory scheme" has been regarded in history
and tradition as punitive, imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint, promotes the traditional aims of punishment, has
a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, or is
excessive with respect to its purpose. The state may not make
publicity and stigma an integral part of the objective of such
regulation. ÝKennedy vs. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S.
144.] Sex offender registration has been viewed as a
non-punitive regulatory scheme because it is designed only to
keep law enforcement and to some extent, the public aware of
dangers.
For the most part, sex offender registration laws have been
remarkably resilient to constitutional challenges. While a
few courts have held that retroactive community-notification
provisions are punitive and thus violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the overall legal trend has been to find community
notification regulatory and not punitive in nature. However,
several courts have enjoined community-notification provisions
under the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that states must
provide minimum due-process protections, such as hearings and
a state burden of clear-and-convincing evidence for those
hearings, before infringing upon either state privacy rights
or the right not to be defamed by the government. The courts
generally recognized that the increased burden on the state
was necessitated by the relatively serious liberty interest of
the registrant when compared to the insubstantial value of
community notification to the state. As stated by the Third
Circuit:
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"An erroneous underestimation of an individual's dangerousness
will not necessarily result in harm to protected groups . . .
. On the other hand, an overestimation of an individual's
dangerousness will lead to immediate and irreparable harm to
the offender: his conviction becomes public, he is officially
recorded as being a danger to the community, and the veil of
relative anonymity behind which he might have existed
disappears." ÝE.B. vs. Verniero (1997) 119 F.3rd 1077;
Garfinkle, COMMENT: Coming of Age in America: The
Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community -
Notification Laws to Juveniles, (2003) 91 Calif. L. Rev. 163,
202.]
The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District held
that after the residency restrictions in Jessica's Law passed
in November of 2006, sex offender registration may no longer a
regulatory scheme but instead a form of punishment. The court
stated:
"We conclude, based on our analysis of the salient
Mendoza-Martinez factors, Jessica's Law's residency
restriction has an overwhelming punitive effect. It
effectuates traditional banishment under a different name,
interferes with the right to use and enjoy real property near
schools and parks, and subjects housing choices to government
approval like parole or probation. It affirmatively restrains
the right to choose a home and limits the right to live with
one's family. It deters recidivism and comes close to
imposing retribution on offenders. While it has a
non-punitive of protecting children, it is excessive with
regard to that purpose. It would oust a person never
convicted of any offense against a child from his family home
near a school or park, forcing him to leave his family or
consigning the family to perpetually threatened transience.
Relocation would be limited to the few outskirts of town
lacking a school or park. Yet the residency restriction would
allow a convicted child molester to stroll past the school,
eat ice cream in the park, and live next door to small
children-as long as he retreats at night to housing far from a
school or park. Building exclusion zones around all schools
and parks for all registered sex offenders is excessively
punitive.
"The severe punitive effect of Jessica's Law's residency
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requirement clearly outweighs the proclaimed lack of
regulatory, non-punitive intent. ÝSee Smith, supra, 538 U.S.
at p. 92 ('clearest proof' of punitive effect outweighs lack
of punitive intent).] We are not the first jurists to
recognize the overwhelming punitive effect of a residency
restriction. ÝSee State v. Pollard, supra, 886 N.E.2d at p.
74 (residency restriction is punitive); Mikaloff, supra, 2007
WL 2572268 at pp. 9-10 (same); Leroy, supra, 828 N.E.2d at p.
793 (dis. opn. of Kuehn, J.) (same); Miller, supra, 405 F.3d
at p. 726 (conc. & dis. opn. of Melloy, J.) (same).]
"Because the residency restriction is punitive, its imposition
by the court increases the penalty for a nonsexual offense
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon the jury
verdict alone. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Thus,
the facts required to impose the residency restriction must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury." (Ibid.) ÝPeople
vs. Mosley (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 512, 533, cert. granted by
the California Supreme Court]. The lower court did not
directly rule on the constitutionality of Jessica's Law or sex
offender registration and the California Supreme Court has
recently held that various provisions of Jessica's Law were
not unconstitutional as applied to four parolees. ÝIn re E.J
et. al. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258.] Nevertheless, by placing
greater requirements on a person who is required to register
as a sex offender, it may be more likely seen as punitive by
the courts.
6)Arguments in Support : According to the Child Abuse Prevention
Center , "AB 543 would make it a misdemeanor for any person
granted probation or on parole for conviction of a crime that
requires registration as a sex offender to use any internet
social networking website, if the victim was under 18 years of
age or the internet was used in the commission of a crime.
Additionally, it authorizes the person seek an exception to
the prohibition for legitimate professional purposes by
applying through the appropriate parole or probation
supervising agency. Millions of California children who use
the internet everyday are at risk from sexual predators. The
internet has provided an alternative avenue for predators to
victimize unsuspecting youth; child predators, in particular,
are moving from the playground to the web in their search for
unsuspecting children. In this regard, AB 543 provides
assistance in limiting the ability for predators to victimize
our children via highly popular social networking channels."
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7)Arguments in Opposition : According to the California Public
Defenders Association , "This proposed legislation would create
a new misdemeanor adding Penal Code Section 290.96 prohibiting
persons granted probation or placed on parole for a sexual
offense that requires him to register where the victim was
under 18 years of age or the Internet was used in the
commission of the crime, from accessing an Internet social
networking website during the period of probation or parole,
and making conforming changes to 290.015.
"For the purposes of this section, 'Internet social networking
Web site' is defined as an Internet Web site that does all of
the following: (1) Allows users, through the creation of
Internet Web pages or profiles or by other means, to provide
information about themselves that is available to the public
or to other users. (2) Offers a mechanism for communication
with other users where those users are likely to include a
substantial number of minors. (3) Has as its primary purpose
the facilitation of online social interactions. (italics
added).
"This proposed legislation is unnecessary, wastes money and
endangers the public. Evidence based research recognized by
the California Sex Offender Management Board shows that
reintegration of sex offenders into the community reduces the
risk of re-offense. That means that 290 registrants need jobs
and housing in order to maintain stability and rebuild their
lives. If sex offenders are able to find gainful employment
and appropriate housing, they are less likely to re-offend,
thus less likely to endanger the public.
"Currently, many people finds jobs through social network
websites; i.e., Craig's List, Facebook or Twitter. Indeed,
facilitating job searches is an advertised focus of social
networking sites. Many companies have Facebook accounts and
encourage users to follow their business on Facebook. This is
even more likely to be true in the future. To deny 290
registrants an opportunity to find employment is short sighted
and bad public policy.
"Further, this legislation is unnecessary as existing law
already authorizes the terms and conditions of probation or
parole to be tailored to achieve legitimate purposes of
rehabilitating a defendant to avoid future criminality. If
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the particulars of the commitment offense make prohibition
again internet access appropriate under the circumstances, the
mechanism presently exists not only impose such a condition
but to enforce compliance through a violation of probation or
parole."
8)Related Legislation :
a) AB 653 (Galgiani) requires a person required to register
as a sex offender report his or her Internet accounts and
Internet identifiers to local law enforcement and defined
to include e-mail addresses and designations used for the
purposes of chatting, instant messaging, social networking,
or other similar Internet communication. AB 653 is pending
hearing by this Committee.
b) AB 755 (Galgiani) requires, inter alia, by July 1, 2012,
any person or entity that collects and makes available, in
any format, the personal data of California minors, to
certify with the Department of Justice a plan to obtain
information and implement reasonable policies to restrict
or block access to that information by persons required to
register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. AB
755 is pending hearing by this Committee.
9)Prior Legislation :
a) AB 841 (Portantino), of the 2007-08 Legislative Session,
would have provided that any time a person required to
register or re-register as a sex offender, as specified, he
or she shall provide all e-mail addresses and IM addresses
that he or she may use or is using. AB 841 was
significantly narrowed in Assembly Appropriations Committee
and ultimately gutted and amended in the Senate into a bill
related to health care.
b) AB 179 (Portantino), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session,
would have mandated a person required to register as a sex
offender, or a person who is released as a sexually violent
predator, as specified, to report all e-mail addresses and
IM identities at the time of registration. AB 179 was
considerably narrowed to address costs and was ultimately
gutted and amended into a bill related to corporate
taxation laws.
AB 543
Page 16
c) AB 1850 (Galgiani), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session,
prohibits any person sentenced to probation or is released
on parole for an offense that requires him or she to
register as a sex offender, as specified, from using the
Internet under certain circumstances. AB 1850 is
substantially similar to this bill and was held on the
Assembly Appropriations Committee's Suspense File.
d) AB 2208 (Torres), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session, is
substantially similar to this bill was held on the Assembly
Appropriations Committee's Suspense File.
e) SB 1204 (Runner), of the 2009-10 Legislative Session,
requires every registered sex offender to inform the law
enforcement agency with which he or she last registered of
all of his or her online addresses, e-mail addresses, and
IM user names by December 31, 2011 and thereafter at the
time of original registration and within 30 days of
establishing a new online account. This information, may,
upon request, be shared with the DOJ or other law
enforcement agencies. SB 1204 was held on the Assembly
Appropriations Committee's Suspense File.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
California State Sheriffs' Association
Child Abuse Prevention Center
Opposition
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Analysis Prepared by : Kimberly Horiuchi / PUB. S. / (916)
319-3744