BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    Ó



                                                                      



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          |SENATE RULES COMMITTEE            |                   AB 578|
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                                 THIRD READING


          Bill No:  AB 578
          Author:   Hill (D)
          Amended:  5/30/12 in Senate
          Vote:     21

           
           SENATE ENERGY, UTIL. & COMMUNIC. COMM.  :  10-0, 5/15/12
          AYES:  Padilla, Fuller, Berryhill, Corbett, DeSaulnier, 
            Emmerson, Kehoe, Pavley, Simitian, Wright
          NO VOTE RECORDED:  De León, Rubio, Strickland

           SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  :  7-0, 8/16/12
          AYES:  Kehoe, Walters, Alquist, Dutton, Lieu, Price, 
            Steinberg

           ASSEMBLY FLOOR  :  57-19, 1/30/12 - See last page for vote


           SUBJECT  :    Public utilities:  natural gas pipeline:  
          safety

           SOURCE  :     Author


           DIGEST  :    This bill requires the Public Utilities 
          Commission (PUC) to formally respond to certain safety 
          recommendations concerning gas pipeline safety made by the 
          federal National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and 
          federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
          Administration (PHMSA). 

           ANALYSIS  :    Existing law requires the PUC to regulate gas 
          transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline 
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          facilities which include gas corporations, master-metered 
          mobile home parks, and propane operators.

          Existing federal law and general orders of the PUC 
          establish safety requirements pertaining to the design, 
          construction, testing, operation, and maintenance of 
          utility gas gathering, transmission, and distribution 
          piping systems, and for the safe operation of such lines 
          and equipment.

          Existing federal law requires the Secretary of the United 
          States Department of Transportation (DOT) to respond to 
          safety recommendations of the NTSB within 90 days of 
          receipt and indicate the Secretary's intended actions as a 
          result of the recommendations.  

          Existing law grants the PUC the power and obligation to 
          determine not only that any rate or increase in a rate is 
          just and reasonable, but also the authority to supervise 
          and regulate every public utility in the state and 
          determine whether costs incurred are reasonable and 
          prudent.

          This bill requires the PUC, within 90 days, to provide the 
          NTSB, when the federal NTSB submits a safety recommendation 
          letter concerning gas pipeline safety to the PUC, with a 
          formal written response to each recommendation stating (1) 
          the PUC's intent to implement the recommendations in full, 
          with a proposed timetable for implementation of the 
          recommendations, (2) the PUC's intent to implement part of 
          the recommendations, with a proposed timetable for 
          implementation of those recommendations, and detailed 
          reasons for the PUC's refusal to implement those 
          recommendations that the PUC does not intend to implement, 
          or (3) the PUC's refusal to implement the recommendations, 
          with detailed reasons for the PUC's refusal to implement 
          the recommendations.  When the NTSB issues a safety 
          recommendation letter concerning any PUC-regulated gas 
          pipeline facility to the United States Department of 
          Transportation, the federal PHMSA, a gas corporation, or to 
          the PUC, or the PHMSA issues an advisory bulletin 
          concerning any commission-regulated gas pipeline facility; 
          requires the PUC to determine if implementation of the 
          recommendation or advisory is appropriate and further 

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          requires that the basis for the PUC's determination be 
          detailed in writing and be approved by a majority vote of 
          the PUC.  If the PUC determines that a safety 
          recommendation made by the NTSB is appropriate or that 
          action concerning an advisory bulletin by the PHMSA is 
          necessary, requires that the PUC issue orders or adopt 
          rules to implement the safety recommendations or advisory 
          as soon as practical and to consider whether a more 
          effective, or equally effective and less costly, 
          alternative exists to address the safety issue that the 
          recommendation or advisory addresses; and requires the PUC 
          to include a detailed description of any action taken on an 
          NTSB safety recommendation, or to implement an advisory 
          bulletin, in a specified annual report the PUC is required 
          to make to the Legislature.

           Background  

          The PHMSA, acting through the Office of Pipeline Safety 
          (OPS), administers the national regulatory program to 
          assure safe transportation of natural gas, petroleum, and 
          other hazardous materials by pipeline.  The statutes under 
          which OPS operates provide for state assumption of all or 
          part of the intrastate regulatory and enforcement 
          responsibility through annual certifications and 
          agreements.  This cooperative, collaborative relationship 
          between the federal and state government - the 
          Federal/State Partnership - forms the cornerstone of the 
          pipeline safety program for which the PUC has assumed most 
          of the responsibility.  The PUC does not exercise 
          jurisdiction over municipal operators which are under the 
          direct authority of the OPS.  State pipeline safety 
          programs adopt the federal regulations and may issue more 
          stringent regulations for intrastate pipeline operators 
          under state law.  

           San Bruno Tragedy  .  On the evening of September 9, 2010, a 
          30-inch natural gas transmission line ruptured in a 
          residential neighborhood in the City of San Bruno.  The 
          rupture caused an explosion and fire which took the lives 
          of eight people and injured dozens more; destroyed 37 homes 
          and damaged 70.  Gas service was also disrupted for 300 
          customers.


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          The NTSB, which has primary jurisdiction for investigating 
          pipeline accidents in which there is a fatality, 
          substantial property damage, or significant environmental 
          impacts, issued its Pipeline Accident Report on the San 
          Bruno tragedy in August, 2011 and determined that: 

          1. The probable cause of the accident was PG&E's (a) 
             inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 
             during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed 
             the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe 
             section with a visible seam weld flaw that, over time 
             grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture 
             during a pressure increase stemming from poorly planned 
             electrical work at the Milpitas Terminal; and (b) 
             inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which 
             failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe 
             section;

          2. Contributing to the accident were the PUC's and the 
             DOT's exemptions of existing pipelines from the 
             regulatory requirement for pressure testing, which 
             likely would have detected the installation defects. 
             Also contributing to the accident was the PUC's failure 
             to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipeline integrity 
             management program; and

          3. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the 
             lack of either automatic shutoff valves or remote 
             control valves on the line and PG&E's flawed emergency 
             response procedures and delay in isolating the rupture 
             to stop the flow of gas.

           NTSB Safety Recommendations  .  In an accident investigation, 
          the NTSB will often make recommendations to the parties 
          involved in the accident, such as the gas utility operator, 
          local first responders, and regulatory agencies such as the 
          PHMSA and the PHMSA-certified state entity responsible for 
          enforcement such as the PUC.  Recommendations usually 
          identify a specific problem uncovered during an 
          investigation and specify how to correct the situation.  
          Letters containing the recommendations are directed to the 
          organization best able to act on the problem, whether it is 
          public or private.  The NTSB does not, however, make 
          recommendations to pipeline safety regulators in other 

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          states.  Regulators in other states are therefore only 
          compelled to consider NTSB recommendations if they result 
          in a PHMSA rulemaking or a change in the certification 
          process.  More than 13,000 recommendations have been issued 
          by the NTSB since 1967.  In response to San Bruno, in 2010 
          and 2011 the NTSB issued 39 safety recommendations in 11 
          letters directed to the DOT, PHMSA, PG&E, PUC, Governor 
          Brown and the American Gas Association.    

           Comments  

          The author asserts that this bill 578 addresses a 
          deficiency in the regulatory oversight of natural gas 
          pipeline operations in California wherein the PUC 
          frequently ignores and fails to act upon pipeline safety 
          recommendations issued by the NTSB.  This bill requires the 
          PUC to determine, upon the adoption of a natural gas 
          pipeline safety recommendation by NTSB, whether that 
          recommendation is appropriate for California.  If so, the 
          PUC must implement that recommendation in a cost-effective 
          manner.  If not, the PUC must detail in writing the reason 
          for not doing so.  

           FISCAL EFFECT  :    Appropriation:  No   Fiscal Com.:  Yes   
          Local:  Yes

          According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, on-going 
          costs of $130,000 annually from the Public Utilities 
          Commission Utilities Reimbursement Account, beginning in 
          2013-14 for staff to respond to NTSB safety recommendations 
          and PHMSA advisory bulletins.

           SUPPORT  :   (Verified  8/16/12)

          California Professional Firefighters
          San Mateo County Board of Supervisors


           ASSEMBLY FLOOR  :  57-19, 1/30/12
          AYES:  Achadjian, Alejo, Allen, Ammiano, Atkins, Beall, 
            Bill Berryhill, Block, Blumenfield, Bonilla, Bradford, 
            Brownley, Buchanan, Butler, Charles Calderon, Campos, 
            Carter, Cedillo, Chesbro, Davis, Dickinson, Eng, Feuer, 
            Fletcher, Fong, Fuentes, Furutani, Galgiani, Gatto, 

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            Gordon, Hall, Hayashi, Roger Hernández, Hill, Huber, 
            Hueso, Huffman, Jeffries, Bonnie Lowenthal, Ma, Mendoza, 
            Mitchell, Monning, Nestande, Olsen, Pan, Perea, 
            Portantino, Skinner, Solorio, Swanson, Torres, Valadao, 
            Wieckowski, Williams, Yamada, John A. Pérez
          NOES:  Conway, Donnelly, Beth Gaines, Garrick, Grove, 
            Hagman, Halderman, Harkey, Jones, Knight, Logue, Mansoor, 
            Miller, Morrell, Nielsen, Norby, Silva, Smyth, Wagner
          NO VOTE RECORDED:  Cook, Gorell, Lara, V. Manuel Pérez


          RM:m  8/17/12   Senate Floor Analyses 

                         SUPPORT/OPPOSITION:  SEE ABOVE

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