BILL ANALYSIS �
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | AB 1389|
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THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1389
Author: Allen (D)
Amended: 7/12/11 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE : 5-2, 7/5/11
AYES: Hancock, Calderon, Liu, Price, Steinberg
NOES: Anderson, Harman
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : Senate Rule 28.8
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 54-22, 5/27/11 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT : Vehicles: sobriety checkpoints: impoundment
SOURCE : Author
DIGEST : This bill codifies the case of Ingersoll v.
Palmer to separate sobriety checkpoints from vehicle
inspection checkpoints.
ANALYSIS : Existing law provides that a board of
supervisors may, by ordinance, establish a combined vehicle
inspection and sobriety checkpoint program to check for
violations of smog standards and to identify drivers who
are driving under the influence (DUI). (Vehicle Code
Section 2814.1.)
Existing law provides that a driver of a motor vehicle
shall stop and submit to an inspection when signs and
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displays are posted requiring that stop. (Vehicle Code
Section 2814.1(b).)
This bill separates vehicle inspection checkpoints from
sobriety checkpoints.
This bill provides that the California Highway Patrol (CHP)
and the governing body of a city, county, or city and
county may adopt an ordinance or resolution to establish on
the highways under its jurisdiction a sobriety checkpoint
program to identify drivers who are DUI.
This bill provides that the selection of the site of the
checkpoint and the procedures for a checkpoint operation,
including but not limited to, time and location shall be
determined by supervisory law enforcement personnel.
This bill provides that the law enforcement agency that
conducts the checkpoints shall employ a neutral methodology
for determining which vehicles to stop at the checkpoint,
or may stop all vehicles that drive through the checkpoint.
This bill provides that the law enforcement agency shall
ensure that there are proper lighting, warning signs and
signals, and clearly identifiable official vehicles, and
uniformed personnel to minimize the risk to motorists and
their passengers and shall only operate a checkpoint where
traffic volume allows for the safe operation of the
program.
This bill provides that each motorist stopped shall be
detained so that the officer may briefly question the
driver and to look for signs of intoxication. If the
driver does not display signs of impairment, he/she should
be permitted to drive on without further delay.
This bill provides that the law enforcement agency shall
provide advance notice of the checkpoint's location to the
public at least 48 hours prior to the checkpoint operation.
This bill provides that a driver who does not wish to
submit to the checkpoint shall not raise probable cause or
reasonable suspicion by simply making a legal turn within
the confines of the existing traffic laws to avoid a
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checkpoint.
This bill provides that the location of the checkpoint
shall be based on a location that has high incidence of DUI
arrests or a high volume of DUI related accidents and shall
be determined by supervisory officers of the law
enforcement agency conducting the sobriety checkpoint.
This bill provides that the time of day and the duration of
checkpoints shall be carefully reviewed and the
effectiveness and safety of checkpoints, as well as
motorists concerns shall be taken into account.
This bill provides that the law enforcement agency shall
conduct the checkpoint after dusk or at a time and for a
duration that are reasonable and effective to the
objective, if deterring DUI offenses.
This bill provides that a driver of a motor vehicle who
elects to drive through the checkpoint shall stop and
submit to an inspection when signs and displays are posted
requiring that stop.
Background
Codification of Ingersoll v. Palmer . In order to create
uniformity for sobriety checkpoints throughout the state,
this bill codifies Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal 3rd
1321, which found DUI checkpoints constitutional if certain
factors are met.
In Ingersoll, we examined the question whether sobriety
checkpoints are permissible under the United States and
California Constitutions. The case involved a challenge
brought by California taxpayers against various law
enforcement officials and cited, as an example, a sobriety
checkpoint program established by the Burlingame Police
Department. As part of that program, law enforcement
officials prepared a manual governing checkpoint
operations, including guidelines established by the
Attorney General, a cost analysis, factors affecting
selection of the checkpoint location, required personnel
and equipment, training, press relations and publicity, and
procedures for a follow-up evaluation. The Burlingame
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sobriety checkpoint operated pursuant to these guidelines.
( Ingersoll , supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1325-1327 supra, 43
Cal.3d at pp. 1325-1327.)
In examining the challenge presented in Ingersoll, we held:
HN8The touchstone for all issues under the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is
reasonableness. (See Terry v. Ohio �1968] 392 U.S. 1, 19
�20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; People v. Hyde �1974]
12 Cal.3d 158, 166 �115 Cal.Rptr. 358, 524 P.2d 830], conc.
opn. �of Wright, C. J.] at pp. 172-173.) �] HN9The federal
test for determining whether a detention or seizure is
justified balances the public interest served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty. ( Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47,
50-51 �61 L.Ed.2d 357, 361-362, 99 S.Ct. 2637].) In
addition, federal constitutional principles require a
showing of either the officer's reasonable suspicion that a
crime has occurred or is occurring or, as an alternative,
that the seizure is 'carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers.' ( Brown v. Texas , supra, 443 U.S. at
p. 51 �61 L.Ed.2d at p. 362], citing Delaware v. Prouse
(1979) 440 U.S. 648, 663 �59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673-674, 99 S.Ct.
1391] and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S.
543, 558-562 �49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1128-1131, 96 S.Ct. 3074].)"
( Ingersoll , supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1329, supra, 43 Cal.3d
at p. 1329.)
The primary purpose of a sobriety checkpoint is to "prevent
and deter conduct injurious to persons and property."
( Ingersoll , supra, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1331, supra, 43 Cal.3d
1321, 1331.) In Ingersoll, in applying Brown's
three-pronged balancing test, we determined that (1)
"�d]eterring drunk driving and identifying and removing
drunk drivers from the roadways undeniably serves a highly
important governmental interest," and (2) sobriety
checkpoints advance this interest. (43 Cal.3d at pp.
1338-1341.) In examining the third prong of the Brown
balancing test, which we rephrased as "the intrusiveness on
individual liberties engendered by the sobriety
checkpoints," we identified eight "factors important in
assessing intrusiveness," noting that such factors "provide
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functional guidelines for minimizing the intrusiveness of
the sobriety checkpoint stop." (Id. at p. 1341 at p.
1341.)
The factors identified in Ingersoll are:
Whether the decision to establish a sobriety checkpoint,
the selection of the site, and the procedures for the
operation of the checkpoint are made and established by
supervisory law enforcement personnel.
Whether motorists are stopped according to a neutral
formula, such as every third, fifth or tenth driver.
Whether adequate safety precautions are taken, such as
proper lighting, warning signs, and signals, and whether
clearly identifiable official vehicles and personnel are
used.
Whether the location of the checkpoint was determined by
a policymaking official, and was reasonable, i.e., on a
road having a high incidence of alcohol-related accidents
or arrests.
Whether the time the checkpoint was conducted and its
duration reflect "good judgment" on the part of law
enforcement officials.
Whether the checkpoint exhibits sufficient indicia of its
official nature (to reassure motorists of the authorized
nature of the stop).
Whether the average length and nature of the detention is
minimized.
Whether the checkpoint is preceded by publicity.
( Ingersoll , supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1341-1347, supra, 43
Cal.3d at pp. 1341-1347.) (People v. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th
926, 935-937 (Cal. 1993).)
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes
Local: No
SUPPORT : (Verified 8/15/11)
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American Civil Liberties Union
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Labor Federation
Causa Justa
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles
Contra Costa Interfaith Supporting Community Organization
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
International Institute of the Bay Area
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
North Bay Organizing Project
Oakland Community Organizations
Pico California
Pomona Habla/Speaks Community Speaks
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
OPPOSITION : (Verified 8/15/11)
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
City of Fresno
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) California
San Bernardino County Sheriff
Supervisor Dianne Jacob, San Diego County Board of
Supervisors
The California Peace Officers' Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : Supporters of the bill believe
that codifying Ingersoll will lead to uniformity of
checkpoints in the state. They also believe that in some
locales sobriety checkpoints have been used more as license
checkpoints and that has taken the focus off the purpose of
sobriety checkpoints, which is to reduce drinking and
driving.
The ACLU states, "�This bill] codifies state and federal
case law governing checkpoints to the California Vehicle
Code. In 1987, the California Supreme Court case Ingersoll
v. Palmer established the requirements on how, when and
where law enforcement agencies can set up sobriety
checkpoints. �This bill] would "codify" the legal language
found in Ingersoll v. Palmer , to provide clarity for law
enforcement and communities. The Ingersoll v. Palmer
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language is already included in the guidelines used by the
California Highway Patrol to determine when, how and where
to set up checkpoints. �This bill] places legal
constraints around how and where checkpoints can be set up
in a local jurisdiction, such as requiring they operate
after dark, in areas with high likelihood of DUIs and
posted with advanced notice for motorists. In addition,
the bill codifies Miranda v. City of Cornelius , which is
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that provides
that a car that can be safely parked by a licensed driver
will not be impounded under the "community caretaker
provision."
The Friends Committee on Legislation also supports this
bill stating, "We are specifically concerned about the
economic hardship that DUI checkpoints are creating for
California's undocumented and low-income residents. As you
are aware, California prohibits undocumented residents from
obtaining driver's licenses. On average, DUI checkpoints
are impounding seven vehicles for every drunk driver arrest
and the number of impoundments is steadily increasing.
Despite good intentions, the increased impoundments for
driving without a license creates the perception that the
police are misusing their authority in order to generate
revenues and are targeting neighborhoods where they are
likely to find more unlicensed drivers. This undermines
respect for the law and for law enforcement, which is
crucial for effective community policing.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION : The opposition disagrees with
the author and supporters that this bill codifies the
Ingersoll and City of Cornelius' cases.
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) opposes this bill
stating, "Sobriety checkpoints are one of the most critical
tool's available for law enforcement to deter drunk
driving. Sobriety checkpoints send a message that if a
motorist chooses to drink and drive, he/she will get
caught. A successful sobriety checkpoint occurs when no
one is arrested for DUI.
"Sobriety checkpoints also help law enforcement find and
arrest those endangering our families' safety. According
to DMV, there are 1 million people in California with a
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suspended or revoked license. In 2009, per DMV there were
170,622 convictions for driving while suspended in
California. Of these convictions 43, 598 were operating
vehicles illegally without a valid driver's license as a
result of a DUI.
"�This bill] condones driving without a valid driver's
license in California as it restricts the ability for law
enforcement to enforce current laws in California that are
meant to protect people on roadways. Specifically, the
bill would make it illegal for police to enforce laws
related by not limited to: drivers licenses, vehicle
registration, and checking for outstanding warrants or
probation violations. If lawmakers want to change the
requirements to operate a vehicle legally on California
roadways, this can be done without compromising law
enforcement's ability to enforce DUI sobriety checkpoints."
The California Peace Officers' Association are among other
law enforcement groups that also oppose this bill stating,
"The sweeping and restrictive provisions of �this bill]
extend beyond the legal standards for sobriety checkpoint
operation established by the California Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court. If enacted, this bill would create
a controversy between what higher courts have held
regarding sobriety checkpoints and what this bill would
require. The disastrous results of the confusion this bill
creates would be increased litigation time and motions from
the criminal defense bar, longer criminal court dockets as
judges struggle to interpret the new statutory guidelines,
and culpable drivers escaping responsibility."
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 54-22, 5/27/11
AYES: Alejo, Allen, Ammiano, Atkins, Beall, Block,
Blumenfield, Bonilla, Bradford, Brownley, Buchanan,
Butler, Charles Calderon, Campos, Carter, Cedillo,
Chesbro, Davis, Dickinson, Eng, Feuer, Fletcher, Fong,
Fuentes, Galgiani, Gatto, Gordon, Hall, Hayashi, Roger
Hern�ndez, Hill, Huber, Hueso, Huffman, Lara, Logue,
Bonnie Lowenthal, Ma, Mendoza, Mitchell, Monning, Norby,
Pan, Perea, V. Manuel P�rez, Portantino, Skinner,
Solorio, Swanson, Torres, Wieckowski, Williams, Yamada,
John A. P�rez
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NOES: Achadjian, Bill Berryhill, Conway, Cook, Donnelly,
Beth Gaines, Garrick, Hagman, Halderman, Harkey,
Jeffries, Jones, Knight, Mansoor, Miller, Morrell,
Nestande, Nielsen, Olsen, Smyth, Valadao, Wagner
NO VOTE RECORDED: Furutani, Gorell, Grove, Silva
RJG:do 8/16/11 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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