BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair A
2011-2012 Regular Session B
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AB 2543 (Alejo)
As Amended June 11, 2012
Hearing date: July 3, 2012
Government Code
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PEACE OFFICER BILL OF RIGHTS: "BRADY LISTS"
HISTORY
Source: Peace Officer Research Association of California (PORAC)
Prior Legislation: SB 638 (DeLeon) - Died, Senate Public Safety
AB 1873 (Koretz) - Ch. 63, Stats. 2002
AB 2040 (Diaz) - Ch. 391, Stats. 2002
AB 2559 (Cardoza) - Ch. 971, Stats. of 2000
AB 1016 (Hertzberg) - Ch. 25, Stats. 1998
AB 3434 (House) - Ch. 1108, Stats. 1996
Support: American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME); Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs; Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs;
Bakersfield Police Officers Association; California
Association of Highway Patrolmen; California Coalition
of Law Enforcement Associations; California Fraternal
Order of Police; California Professional Firefighters;
California State Firefighters Association; Long Beach
Police Officers Association; Los Angeles County
Probation Officers Union; Los Angeles County
Professional Peace Officers Association; Los Angeles
Police Protective League; Los Angeles School Police
Association; Napa Police Officers Association; Newport
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Beach Police Association, Riverside Sheriffs'
Association; Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs
Association; San Bernardino Police Officers Association;
San Francisco Peace Officers Association; San Mateo
County Deputy Sheriffs Association; Santa Ana Police
Officers Association; Southern California Alliance of
Law Enforcement; State Coalition of Probation
Organizations; Vallejo Police Officer's Association
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; California Public
Defenders Association; California State Sheriffs
Association; California State Association of Counties
(CSAC); California Association of Joint Powers
Authorities; League of California Cities; California
Peace Officers Association; California Police Chiefs
Association
KEY ISSUES
SHOULD ANY PUBLIC AGENCY BE PROHIBITED FROM TAKING ANY PUNITIVE
ACTION, OR DENIAL OF PROMOTION ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN MERIT, AGAINST
ANY PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE THAT OFFICER'S NAME HAS BEEN
PLACED ON A BRADY LIST?
SHOULD ANY PUBLIC AGENCY BE PROHIBITED FROM TAKING ANY PUNITIVE
ACTION, OR DENIAL OF PROMOTION ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN MERIT, AGAINST
ANY PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE THAT OFFICER'S NAME MAY BE SUBJECT
TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO BRADY V. MARYLAND?
SHOULD IT BE PROHIBITED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC SAFETY
OFFICER'S NAME HAS BEEN PLACED ON A BRADY LIST, OR MAY OTHERWISE BE
SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO BRADY V. MARYLAND IN ANY
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF A PUNITIVE ACTION, OR IN ANY CIVIL
PROCEEDING BETWEEN THE OFFICE OR THE PUBLIC AGENCY, EXCEPT AS
SPECIFIED?
PURPOSE
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The purpose of this bill is to provide that (1) no punitive
action, or denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall
be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety
officer because that officer's name has been placed on a Brady
list, or that the officer's name may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland ; (2) this shall not
prohibit a public agency from taking punitive action, denying
promotion on grounds other than merit, or taking other personnel
action against a public safety officer based on the underlying
acts or omissions for which that officer's name was placed on a
Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland , if the actions taken by the public agency
otherwise conform to this chapter and to the rules and procedures
adopted by the local agency; (3) evidence that a public safety
officer's name has been placed on a Brady list, or may otherwise
be subject to disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland , shall not
be introduced for any purpose in any administrative appeal of a
punitive action, or in any civil proceeding between the officer
or the public agency, except as follows: (4) evidence that a
public safety officer's name was placed on a Brady list may only
be introduced if, during the administrative appeal of a punitive
action against an officer, the underlying act or omission for
which that officer's name was placed on a Brady list is proven
and the officer is found to be subject to some form of punitive
action. Evidence that a public safety officer's name was placed
on a Brady list pursuant to this subdivision shall only be used
for the sole purpose of determining the type or level of punitive
action to be imposed.
Current law generally governs law enforcement agencies conducting
internal affairs investigations of peace officers. (Gov. Code §§
3300-3313.) This is known as the Public Safety Officers
Procedural Bill of Rights Act: Existing law provide peace
officers with several procedural rights in these investigations.
(Gov. Code § 3304.) Some of those procedural rights include:
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No public safety officer shall be subjected to punitive
action, or denied promotion, or be threatened with any such
treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights
granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights
under any existing administrative grievance procedure.
Nothing in this section shall preclude a head of an
agency from ordering a public safety officer to cooperate
with other agencies involved in criminal investigations. If
an officer fails to comply with such an order, the agency
may officially charge him or her with insubordination.
No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds
other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency
against any public safety officer who has successfully
completed the probationary period that may be required by
his or her employing agency without providing the public
safety officer with an opportunity for administrative
appeal.
Except as specified, no punitive action, nor denial of
promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken
for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if
the investigation of the allegation is not completed within
one year of the public agency's discovery by a person
authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of
an act, omission, or other misconduct. In the event that the
public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it
shall complete its investigation and notify the public
safety officer of its proposed discipline by a Letter of
Intent or Notice of Adverse Action articulating the
discipline that year, except as specified. The public agency
shall not be required to impose the discipline within that
one-year period.
Where a pre-disciplinary response or grievance procedure
is required or utilized, the time for this response or
procedure shall not be governed or limited by this chapter.
If, after investigation and any pre-disciplinary response
or procedure, the public agency decides to impose
discipline, the public agency shall notify the public safety
officer in writing of its decision to impose discipline,
including the date that the discipline will be imposed,
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within 30 days of its decision, except if the public safety
officer is unavailable for discipline.(Gov. Code § 3304.)
Current law provides that no public safety officer shall have any
comment adverse to his interest entered in his personnel file, or
any other file used for any personnel purposes by his employer,
without the public safety officer having first read and signed
the instrument containing the adverse comment indicating he is
aware of such comment, except that such entry may be made if
after reading such instrument the public safety officer refuses
to sign it. Should a public safety officer refuse to sign, that
fact shall be noted on that document, and signed or initialed by
such officer. (Gov. Code § 3305.)
This bill would add the following provisions to the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights:
No punitive action, or denial of promotion on grounds
other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency
against any public safety officer because that officer's
name has been placed on a Brady list, or that the officer's
name may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a public agency
from taking punitive action, denying promotion on grounds
other than merit, or taking other personnel action against a
public safety officer based on the underlying acts or
omissions for which that officer's name was placed on a
Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to disclosure
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, if the
actions taken by the public agency otherwise conform to this
chapter and to the rules and procedures adopted by the local
agency.
Evidence that a public safety officer's name has been
placed on a Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to
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disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83,
shall not be introduced for any purpose in any
administrative appeal of a punitive action, or in any civil
proceeding between the office or the public agency, except
as follows:
Evidence that a public safety officer's name was placed
on a Brady list may only be introduced if, during the
administrative appeal of a punitive action against an
officer, the underlying act or omission for which that
officer's name was placed on a Brady list is proven and the
officer is found to be subject to some form of punitive
action. Evidence that a public safety officer's name was
placed on a Brady list pursuant to this subdivision shall
only be used for the sole purpose of determining the type or
level of punitive action to be imposed.
This bill defines "Brady list" to mean "any system, index, list,
or other record containing the names of peace officers whose
personnel files are likely to contain evidence of dishonesty or
bias, which is maintained by a prosecutorial agency or office in
accordance with the holding in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S.
83."
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
("ROCA")
In response to the unresolved prison capacity crisis, since early
2007 it has been the policy of the chair of the Senate Committee
on Public Safety and the Senate President pro Tem to hold
legislative proposals which could further aggravate prison
overcrowding through new or expanded felony prosecutions. Under
the resulting policy known as "ROCA" (which stands for
"Receivership/Overcrowding Crisis Aggravation"), the Committee
has held measures which create a new felony, expand the scope or
penalty of an existing felony, or otherwise increase the
application of a felony in a manner which could exacerbate the
prison overcrowding crisis by expanding the availability or
length of prison terms (such as extending the statute of
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limitations for felonies or constricting statutory parole
standards). In addition, proposed expansions to the
classification of felonies enacted last year by AB 109 (the 2011
Public Safety Realignment) which may be punishable in jail and
not prison (Penal Code section 1170(h)) would be subject to ROCA
because an offender's criminal record could make the offender
ineligible for jail and therefore subject to state prison. Under
these principles, ROCA has been applied as a content-neutral,
provisional measure necessary to ensure that the Legislature does
not erode progress towards reducing prison overcrowding by
passing legislation which could increase the prison population.
ROCA will continue until prison overcrowding is resolved.
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in California's
prisons has been the focus of evolving and expensive litigation.
On June 30, 2005, in a class action lawsuit filed four years
earlier, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California established a Receivership to take control
of the delivery of medical services to all California state
prisoners confined by the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). In December of 2006, plaintiffs in
two federal lawsuits against CDCR sought a court-ordered limit on
the prison population pursuant to the federal Prison Litigation
Reform Act. On January 12, 2010, a three-judge federal panel
issued an order requiring California to reduce its inmate
population to 137.5 percent of design capacity -- a reduction at
that time of roughly 40,000 inmates -- within two years. The
court stayed implementation of its ruling pending the state's
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
On May 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the three-judge panel in its entirety, giving
California two years from the date of its ruling to reduce its
prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity, subject to
the right of the state to seek modifications in appropriate
circumstances. Design capacity is the number of inmates a prison
can house based on one inmate per cell, single-level bunks in
dormitories, and no beds in places not designed for housing.
Current design capacity in CDCR's 33 institutions is 79,650.
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On January 6, 2012, CDCR announced that California had cut prison
overcrowding by more than 11,000 inmates over the last six
months, a reduction largely accomplished by the passage of
Assembly Bill 109. Under the prisoner-reduction order, the
inmate population in California's 33 prisons must be no more than
the following:
167 percent of design capacity by December 27, 2011
(133,016 inmates);
155 percent by June 27, 2012;
147 percent by December 27, 2012; and
137.5 percent by June 27, 2013.
This bill does not aggravate the prison overcrowding crisis
described above under ROCA.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
Act (POBOR) provides a set of rights and procedural
protections to specified public safety officers. The
Act fails to address a disturbing trend in law
enforcement in which public agencies take punitive
actions against their public safety officer employees
based solely on the officers' inclusion on "Brady"
lists without regard to the underlying facts.
There have been numerous instances where a local public
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agency has taken punitive action, including the denial
of promotions and dismissal, against a public safety
officer employee based on that officer's placement onto
a Brady list for alleged misconduct - whether or not
the misconduct actually occurred. As a result in some
cases, the employment of public safety officers is
terminated based on nothing more than allegations of
misconduct, which renders illusory the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.
The standard for placing public safety officers on
Brady lists varies from county to county. Some
counties implement and maintain a Brady policy with no
discernible standards for inclusion or mechanisms for
appeal, which results in the arbitrary and perpetual
placement of public safety officers on Brady lists.
Because prosecutors enjoy absolute prosecutorial
immunity and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, it
is impossible to challenge one's placement on a Brady
list, even if that placement was malicious or made in
error.
AB 2543 seeks to stop the unfair practice of taking
punitive action against peace officers for the mere
reason of being placed on the list. Instead, this bill
maintains management's authority to take actions
against officers for the underlying action that caused
the officer to be investigated. Lacking uniform
criteria for being placed on the Brady List, public
safety officers should be evaluated based on their
merits and for the underlying reasons they are
investigated.
2. What is a Brady List?
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a prosecutor in a criminal
case withholds material evidence from the accused person that is
favorable to the accused, this violates the Due Process Clause of
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the 14th Amendment. (Ibid at 87, see also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).) Brady and Giglio impose on
prosecutors a duty to disclose to the defendant material evidence
that would be favorable to the accused.
If the prosecutor is aware of misconduct, past or present, on the
part of a police officer who may be called as a witness in a
case, and that misconduct could discredit or "impeach" the
officer's testimony, the prosecutor has an obligation to turn
that evidence over to the defendant. "Impeachment evidence is
exculpatory evidence within the meaning of Brady. Brady/Giglio
information includes 'material . . . that bears on the
credibility of a significant witness in the case.'" (United
States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 387-388 (9th Cir. 2004, citations
omitted).)
Failure to divulge this information may result in a variety of
sanctions being imposed on the prosecution including, e.g.,
striking a witnesses' testimony or complete reversal of a
conviction. "Reversal is required when there is a 'reasonable
possibility' that the error materially affected the verdict."
(United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 790, 99 S. Ct. 1538
(1979).) A federal court recently described why this obligation
is imposed: "Prosecutors are entrusted with the authority and
responsibility to protect public safety and uphold the integrity
of the judicial system. They perform the latter, in part, by
ensuring that criminal defendants are offered all potentially
exculpatory or impeaching information." (Lackey v. Lewis County,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94674 (D. Wash. 2009).)
As a result of this obligation, prosecutors' offices have a duty
to seek that information out from other law enforcement agencies.
Because the prosecution is in a unique position to
obtain information known to other agents of the
government, it may not be excused from disclosing what
it does not know but could have learned." A
prosecutor's duty under Brady necessarily requires the
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cooperation of other government agents who might
possess Brady material. In United States v. Zuno-Arce,
44 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended), we explained
why "it is the government's, not just the prosecutor's,
conduct which may give rise to a Brady violation."
Exculpatory evidence cannot be kept out of the hands of
the defense just because the prosecutor does not have
it, where an investigating agency does. That would
undermine Brady by allowing the investigating agency to
prevent production by keeping a report out of the
prosecutor's hands until the agency decided the
prosecutor ought to have it, and by allowing the
prosecutor to tell the investigators not to give him
certain materials unless he asked for them.
(United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 387-388 (9th Cir. 2004).)
The term "Brady list" refers to a list kept by a prosecutor's
office, of police officers for whom the prosecutor's office has
determined evidence of misconduct exists that would have to be
turned over to the defense pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.
3. The Effect of This Bill
This bill would prevent any public agency from taking any
punitive action or denial of promotion against any public safety
officer because that officer's name has been placed on a Brady
list, or that the officer's name may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. The agency could take
such action, however, as a result of the underlying conduct that
resulted in the officer being placed on, or being subject to
being placed on, a Brady list. For example, if a peace officer
is convicted of petty theft, a misdemeanor, his employing agency
might decide that a 30-day suspension was warranted. However,
the District Attorney's office might decide that, because that
crime involved dishonestly or "moral turpitude," and could
therefore be used to impeach the officer's testimony, in order to
comply with Brady requirements, the fact of that conviction would
have to be disclosed to any defendant in any case in which that
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officer needed to be called as a witness. Therefore, the DA's
office might put that officer's name on a "Brady list" to flag
for any of the deputy DA's the need to disclose this evidence if
they ever need to call that officer as a witness. The fact that
this "Brady material" has to be disclosed, and could be used to
impeach the officer's testimony, could seriously damage the
prosecutor's ability to obtain a conviction in any case in which
that officer was a necessary witness. Consequently, the
officer's employing agency might conclude that that officer could
no longer perform their job duties and needed to be dismissed or,
at a minimum, the officer needed to be transferred to duty that
did not involve making arrests, which the officer would
undoubtedly consider a punitive action.
This bill would prohibit any public agency from taking any
punitive action against the officer based on the fact that he or
she was placed on a "Brady list" but would allow that action so
long as it is based only on the underlying conduct that caused
the officer to be placed on the list. In the hypothetical
example described above, this would mean the officer could be
suspended, transferred or fired for committing the petty theft
but not for the fact that the DA's office placed the officer on
the "Brady list."
In practical terms it would be difficult, if not impossible, for
an employer to establish whether the punitive action, or denial
of promotion, was taken because of the DA's decision to place the
officer on the Brady list or because of the underlying reason the
DA took that action, i.e., the petty theft conviction. This bill
goes farther, however, and provides that no punitive action could
be taken because "the officer's name may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83." In
other words, no punitive action or denial of promotion could be
taken based on the fact that an officer's conduct might result in
their being placed on a Brady list.
It is foreseeable that the effect of this bill would be that in
many instances where an adverse employment action is taken
against an officer for misconduct that has been clearly
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established (e.g. a criminal conviction), the employee could
claim the action was based on the concomitant fact that the
misconduct is subject to disclosure under Brady. It is not clear
how the employer could prove otherwise. By making it more
difficult for agencies to fire officers whose testimony may be
impeached with their own acts of dishonesty, the end result could
be that prosecutors will have a harder time obtaining convictions
in cases involving those officers or may decline to even file
charges in such cases.
Another foreseeable effect could be that police and sheriff's
departments will be forced to retain officers whose misconduct,
for example for use of excessive force, has subjected the
department to liability, and could do so again in the future.
Because that misconduct may be subject to disclosure under Brady,
any attempt by the employing department to terminate the officer,
or even move him or her to a desk job, could be challenged on the
grounds that it was not the misconduct that motivated the
disciplinary action, but the fact that it would be subject to
disclosure under Brady.
The sponsors of the bill have stated that the discretion given to
district attorneys to place an officer on a Brady list allows for
unwarranted personnel action to be taken against peace officers
at the whim of a DA. They state that there are examples of this
being done for malicious reasons and they correctly point out
that the courts have held that DA's have immunity for these
decisions. (Neri v. County of Stanislaus Dist. Attorney's
Office, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99839 (2010).) Members may wish to
consider whether the potential for a DA to act maliciously in
this way justifies the remedy proposed in this bill given the
burden this bill might place on a law enforcement agency in an
employment action against an officer for misconduct, where that
is truly warranted.
WILL POLICE AGENCIES BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT A DISMISSAL OR
DENIAL OF PROMOTION WAS NOT DUE TO THE FACT THAT AN OFFICER'S
MISCONDUCT MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY UNDER BRADY?
WILL THIS RESULT IN MORE OFFICERS WITH RECORDS OF MISCONDUCT
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KEEPING THEIR JOBS OR BEING PROMOTED?
COULD THIS RESULT IN CRIMINAL CASES BEING DISMISSED OR NEVER
FILED DUE TO THE OFFICER'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS?
COULD THIS COMPROMISE PUBLIC SAFETY?
ARE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS PLACING OFFICERS ON BRADY LISTS
MALICIOUSLY?
IF THIS HAS HAPPENED, IS THIS BILL AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE?
4. Recent Amendment Regarding Administrative Appeals
A recent amendment to the bill addresses when evidence that an
officer's name was placed on a Brady list could be introduced at
an administrative appeal of a punitive action against an officer.
Under this provision, such evidence could only be introduced if
"during the administrative appeal of a punitive action against an
officer, the underlying act or omission for which that officer's
name was placed on a Brady list is proven and the officer is
found to be subject to some form of punitive action. Evidence
that a public safety officer's name was placed on a Brady list
pursuant to this subdivision shall only be used for the sole
purpose of determining the type or level of punitive action to be
imposed."
This appears to contemplate a bifurcated administrative hearing
process with one phase to determine the validity of the
misconduct charged, and a second phase to determine the
employer's motive in taking the punitive action. Only in the
second phase could evidence of the officer having been placed on
a Brady list be introduced. This would apply only to
administrative appeals of punitive actions, not in civil actions,
where the total ban on introduction of evidence regarding Brady
would still apply. This exception also states that it only
applies to cases in which an officer's name is actually placed on
a Brady list whereas the prohibitions of the bill would apply to
the broader category of whenever an officer's misconduct is
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subject to disclosure under Brady.
This amendment doesn't appear to alter the basic dilemma
presented by this bill, how would the employer ever be able to
establish that the reason an action was taken against the
employee was the employee's misconduct as opposed to the fact
that the misconduct is disclosable under Brady?
5. Argument in Support
The California Association of Highway Patrolmen state:
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The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
(POBOR) provides a set of rights and procedural
protections to specified public safety officers;
however, the Act fails to address a disturbing trend in
law enforcement in which public agencies take punitive
actions against their public safety officer employees
based solely on the officers' inclusion on "Brady" lists
without regard to the underlying facts.
There have been numerous instances where a local public
agency has taken punitive action, including the denial
of promotions and dismissal, against a public safety
officer employee based on that officer's placement onto
a Brady list for alleged misconduct whether or not the
misconduct actually occurred. As a result in some
cases, the employment of public safety officers is
terminated based on nothing more than allegations of
misconduct, which renders illusory the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.
The standard for placing public safety officers on Brady
lists varies from county to county. Some counties
implement and maintain a Brady policy with no
discernible standards for inclusion or mechanisms for
appeal, which results in the arbitrary and perpetual
placement of public safety officers on Brady lists.
Because prosecutors enjoy absolute prosecutorial
immunity and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, it
is impossible to challenge one's placement on a Brady
list, even if that placement was malicious or made in
error.
6. Argument in Opposition
The California State Association of Counties, League of California
Cities and California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
state:
AB 2543 would prohibit a public agency from taking
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punitive action against a public safety officer or
denying a promotion on grounds other than merit because
the officer's name is placed on a Brady list or the
officer's name is subject to disclosure pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. AB 2543 places
unnecessary restrictions on a public agency's ability to
discipline a public safety officer for the underlying
action that resulted in that officer being placed on the
Brady list because the employer will be required to
prove that the punitive action is not related to the
existence of the Brady list. We believe this to be an
impossible standard since the employee will always argue
his or her discipline is the result of the Brady list.
Recent amendments to AB 2543 further require the public
agency, in order to raise the issue in an administrative
appeal, to prove the underlying act or omission for
which the officer's name was placed on the Brady list
and that, and that, as a result, the officer is found to
be subject to punitive action.
Public agency employers need the authority to
appropriately discipline their workforce in order to
maintain trust and confidence from the community they
serve. AB 2543 simply adds another administrative
process public employers must go through to effectively
manage their employees without citing any evidence that
public safety officers are not sufficiently protected by
the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
Act.
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