BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Senator Noreen Evans, Chair
2011-2012 Regular Session
SB 603 (Berryhill)
As Amended March 31, 2011
Hearing Date: May 10, 2011
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
SK
SUBJECT
Vexatious Litigants: Represented Plaintiffs
DESCRIPTION
Existing law authorizes a court to declare a person to be a
vexatious litigant when that person has repeatedly abused the
judicial process by bringing meritless lawsuits in propria
persona (for one's self) (pro per). This bill would remove the
requirement that the action be brought in pro per so that a
plaintiff represented by an attorney could be declared a
vexatious litigant if he or she met existing statutory
requirements.
BACKGROUND
Under existing law, a court may declare a person to be a
vexatious litigant when that person represents himself or
herself and has repeatedly abused the legal system by doing any
of the following: (1) filed at least five unmeritorious lawsuits
in the past seven years; (2) repeatedly relitigates, after a
final adverse finding, the validity of the final determination
or the actual cause of action against the same defendant; (3)
repeatedly engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay; and (4) has previously been
declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court
in an action based upon the same or substantially similar facts.
Current law permits a court to enter a prefiling order which
prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in
pro per ("pro per" refers to a plaintiff who represents himself
or herself) without first obtaining permission of the presiding
judge of the court where the litigation is to be filed.
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 2 of ?
Existing law permits the judge to allow the filing of that
litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit and
has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. The
court may also require the plaintiff to furnish a security to
assure payment of reasonable expenses.
In the spring of 2010, the Policy Coordination and Liaison
Committee, the Trial Court Presiding Judges Advisory Committee,
and the Civil and Small Claims Advisory Committee of the
Judicial Council proposed legislation to improve the practice
and procedure for courts dealing with vexatious litigants. That
proposed legislation has been introduced by this Committee (SB
731 (Committee on Judiciary)), and is currently pending in the
Assembly. As a part of its process, the Judicial Council
committees circulated the proposal that would eventually become
SB 731 during its spring 2010 invitation-to-comment cycle.
Several of the comments received concerned "whether section
391.7 should be expanded to apply to a vexatious litigant
represented by an attorney." The advisory committees did not
incorporate such a provision in the legislative proposal and
instead "decided to defer recommending legislation that would
expand the applicability of section 391.7 to a vexatious
litigant represented by counsel."
This bill, sponsored by the Civil Justice Association of
California, would expand the applicability of California's
vexatious litigant statute to include plaintiffs represented by
counsel.
CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
1.Existing law defines "vexatious litigant" to mean a person who
does any of the following:
a. In the immediately preceding seven years, filed, in pro
per, at least five actions, other than in small claims
court, that have been either: (1) finally determined
adversely to the person or (2) unjustifiably permitted to
remain pending at least two years without having been
brought to trial or hearing;
b. After a final adverse ruling against the person,
repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in pro
per, either: (1) the validity of the final determination or
(2) the actual cause of action against the same defendant;
c. In any litigation while acting in pro per, repeatedly
files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers,
conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 3 of ?
that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay; and
d. Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by
a state or federal court in an action based upon the same
or substantially similar facts. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec.
391.)
Existing law provides that a defendant may make a motion for
an order requiring a plaintiff to provide security when it can
be shown that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and there
is not a reasonable probability that he or she will prevail in
the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 391.1.) After hearing
the evidence upon the motion, if the court determines that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no
reasonably probability that he or she will prevail, the court
must order the plaintiff to furnish security in an amount
determined by the court and for the benefit of the defendant.
(Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 391.3.) If that security is not
furnished, the lawsuit shall be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc.
Sec. 391.4.)
This bill would delete "in pro per" from (b) and (c) above,
thus expanding the applicability of these sections to include
plaintiffs represented by counsel.
This bill would specify that a vexatious litigant designation
shall not attach to an attorney representing a vexatious
client.
2.Existing law permits the court to enter a prefiling order
which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new
litigation in pro per without first obtaining permission of
the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is to be
filed. Existing law permits the judge to allow the filing of
that litigation only if it appears that the litigation has
merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or
delay. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 391.7.)
This bill would delete "in pro per" from this provision, thus
expanding the applicability of this sections to include
plaintiffs represented by counsel.
3.Existing law permits a trial court to order a party or the
party's attorney to pay any reasonable expenses incurred by
another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that
are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 4 of ?
(Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 128.5.)
Existing law provides that by presenting to the court a
pleading, petition, written notice of motion or similar paper,
an attorney is representing to the best of his or her
knowledge, information, and belief that the following
conditions are true:
a. it is not being presented primarily for an improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;
b. the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal or existing
law or the establishment of new law;
c. the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support, or are likely to have that support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
d. the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or are reasonably based on a lack of information
or belief. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 128.7(b).)
Existing law authorizes a court to impose sanctions against an
attorney if the court determines that any of the above
provisions in Section 128.7(b) have been violated. Existing
law provides that a motion for sanctions shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate Section 128.7(b). The
court may also impose sanctions on its own motion, as
specified. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 128.7(c).)
This bill would require a court to make its decision on the
record regarding a motion for sanctions pursuant to the above
and to specify the reasons for the decision.
4.Existing law provides in family law cases that a court may
base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to
which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or
frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of
litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of
litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and
attorneys. Existing law requires the court in making an award
of attorney's fees and costs-which are in the nature of a
sanction-to take into consideration all evidence concerning
the parties' incomes, assets, and liabilities. Under existing
law, the court may not impose a sanction that imposes an
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 5 of ?
unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the
sanction is imposed. (Fam. Code Sec. 271.)
This bill would provide that when a court is requiring security
of a vexatious litigant in family court litigation, the
court's determination of that security shall be based on the
same considerations as used in the section above.
This bill would provide that the vexatious litigant statutes do
not apply to litigation involving domestic violence, child
custody, or child support.
COMMENT
1.Stated need for the bill
In support of the bill, the author writes:
Excessive and unwarranted lawsuits have been identified as a
significant problem in California that greatly hinders the
state's economy. . . . Case law has held that once a person
receives a vexatious litigant designation, thereafter they are
still subject to having to file a bond if they hire an
attorney but not prefiling approval by a judge. Additionally,
there have been cases where a vexatious litigant gets someone
to be their attorney to file a case, to only come off the case
just to help the litigant get around the procedural
requirements so that the harassment can continue. Just
because someone has an attorney does not mean he or she is not
acting as a vexatious litigant. A vexatious litigant status
is imposed sparingly by judges and is a good tool to help
control uncontrollable filings in a case; this bill would
remove this distinction and allow a judge to find a person a
vexatious litigant irrespective of whether he or she has an
attorney if the level of abuse has reached such a level.
Although there are some provisions on the books to protect
against this problem, courts are often reluctant to employ
them, moreover, when denying motions that would otherwise stop
this conduct, they are not required to make written findings
on their decisions which means there is no appeal of that
issue. Wronged parties often have no recourse when an
attorney acts on behalf of a client in bringing these claims
but to engage in settlement (thereby encouraging nuisance
suits) or pay for expensive litigation to take a principled
stand. California's court system is already overwhelmed by
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 6 of ?
the number of cases it has to deal with, so providing more
scrutiny and authority to manage these cases will help reduce
needless filings.
Lawsuit abuse costs Californians millions of dollars every
year and perpetuates a climate of fear for many small business
owners. Consumers pay for frivolous lawsuits as businesses
increase prices to cover their legal costs or shut down
entirely.
Sponsor Civil Justice Association of California writes:
The vexatious litigant statute was enacted in 1963 in order to
curb unwarranted litigation within California by allowing
courts to require a security bond or approval of the court to
file additional litigation (The California Vexatious Litigant
Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever
Obstructionists Access?, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 275, First Western
Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d
860) Courts and commentators have observed that those who are
found to be vexatious litigants cannot avoid the statute by
thereafter hiring counsel because the purpose of the statute
would be frustrated (The Vexatious Litigant, (1966) 54 Cal. L.
Rev. 1769, Forrest v. Dept. of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.
App. 4th 183, Camerado Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 838, and In re Shieh (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 1154). However, this has not been consistently
applied, for example, a court recently found that the
requisite approval to file additional litigation did not apply
after a person hired an attorney (Flores v. Georgeson (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 881) and in another the filing requirement was
held to apply at the very beginning of a case, so that as long
as an attorney represented the vexatious litigant at the
beginning of a lawsuit it did not matter that the attorney
withdrew (Shalant v. Girardi, 183 Cal.App.4th 545 (2010),
review granted).
Many vexatious litigants, even those with lawyers, file
unwarranted lawsuits. Excessive and unwarranted lawsuits drive
up business expenses, cost government additional money and
increase the cost of goods and services for all Californians.
Consumers pay for unjustified lawsuits as businesses increase
their prices to cover legal costs or shut down. Additionally,
employers cannot hire new employees or grow their business
when they are spending precious capital in defending against
meritless actions in litigation.
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 7 of ?
This bill stems from one business' attempt to fight abusive
tactics that have included legal threats, irrational motions
to disqualify multiple judges, meritless ex-parte motions, and
claims against unrelated third parties. It will cost this
local business well over $300,000, even though the dispute is
over a $6,500 claim. Businesses who are already struggling to
stay afloat in this economic downturn should not have to waste
resources on shakedown lawsuits instead of keeping their doors
open or hiring more employees.
2.Purpose of vexatious litigant statute/current law already
addresses improper behavior by lawyers
Under existing law, a court may declare a person to be a
vexatious litigant when that person has repeatedly abused the
judicial process by bringing meritless lawsuits in pro per.
This bill would remove the requirement that the action be
brought in pro per, thus allowing a plaintiff represented by an
attorney to be declared a vexatious litigant if he or she met
existing statutory requirements.
a. Statutory requirements
Those statutory requirements law define a "vexatious
litigant" to mean a person who does any of the following: (1)
in the immediately preceding seven years, filed, in pro per,
at least five actions, other than in small claims court, that
have been either (a) finally determined adversely to the
person or (b) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at
least two years without having been brought to trial or
hearing; (2) after a final adverse ruling against the person,
repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in pro per,
either (a) the validity of the final determination or (b) the
actual cause of action against the same defendant; (3) in any
litigation while acting in pro per, repeatedly files
unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts
unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay; or
(4) has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by
a state or federal court in an action based upon the same or
substantially similar facts.
Once a plaintiff is declared to be a vexatious litigant, a
defendant may make a motion for an order requiring a plaintiff
to provide security when it can be shown that the plaintiff is
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 8 of ?
a vexatious litigant and there is not a reasonable probability
that he or she will prevail in the litigation. After hearing
the evidence upon the motion, if the court determines that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no
reasonable probability that he or she will prevail, the court
must order the plaintiff to furnish security in an amount
determined by the court and for the benefit of the defendant
to assure payment of reasonable expenses. If that security is
not furnished, the lawsuit shall be dismissed.
A vexatious litigant may also be subject to a prefiling order
which prohibits that litigant from filing any new litigation
in pro per without first obtaining permission of the presiding
judge of the court where the litigation is to be filed.
Existing law permits the judge to allow the filing of that
litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit
and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or
delay.
b. Purpose of vexatious litigant statute
The vexatious litigant statute was enacted in 1963 to "curb
the abuse of vexatious litigation" (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(5th) Actions Sec. 365), and to prevent abuse of the judicial
process. In First Western Development Corp. v. Superior Court
(1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 860, the court noted:
The vexatious litigant statutes were enacted to require a
person found a vexatious litigant to put up security for the
reasonable expenses of a defendant who becomes the target of
one of these obsessive and persistent litigants whose
conduct can cause serious financial results to the
unfortunate object of his attack. The purpose of the
statutory scheme is to deal with the problem created by the
persistent and obsessive litigant who has constantly pending
a number of groundless actions, often against the judges and
other court officers who decide or were concerned in the
decision of previous actions adversely to him. . . .
A litigant who loses then burdens the courts with new
actions and repeated appeals based on the same controversy
and with no reasonable possibility of prevailing wastes
valuable court time. It is axiomatic in our system of
justice that every person is entitled to his day in court;
however, a litigant is not entitled to two days in court.
Ýcitations omitted] (Id. at 867-870).
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 9 of ?
By applying only to pro per plaintiffs, the vexatious litigant
statute distinguishes between plaintiffs who bring their cases
in pro per and those who are represented by attorneys. In
upholding this distinction, the First District Court of Appeal
held that the statute's application "to persons proceeding in
propria persona is not arbitrary or unreasonable. Attorneys
are governed by prescribed rules of ethics and professional
conduct, and, as officers of the court, are subject to
disbarment, suspension, and other disciplinary sanctions not
applicable to litigants in propria persona." (Taliaferro v.
Hoogs, (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 521.)
c. Current already law addresses improper behavior by lawyers
As the court in Taliaferro noted, current law already contains
a number of sanctions that may be imposed on attorneys when
they engage in improper conduct. As a result, limiting the
vexatious litigant statute to actions brought by pro per
plaintiffs is appropriate. For example, Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.5 permits a trial court to order a party
or the party's attorney to pay any reasonable expenses
incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or
tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7 authorizes a court to
impose sanctions against an attorney if the court determines
that the attorney has violated any of the following by
presenting to the court a pleading, petition, written notice
of motion or similar paper: (1) the filing is primarily filed
for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are not warranted by existing law or a
frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal or existing law or the establishment of new law; (3)
the allegations and other factual contentions do not have
evidentiary support, or are not likely to have that support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are not
warranted on the evidence or are not reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief.
Existing law also permits a court to impose sanctions against
an attorney or a party for engaging in conduct that is a
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 10 of ?
misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. Secs.
2023.010 - 2023.040.) Finally, existing law, the State Bar
Act, provides that it is the duty of an attorney to do, among
other things, the following and subjects the attorney to
possible discipline for violation: (1) maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; (2)
counsel or maintain those actions, proceedings, or defenses
only as appear to him or her legal or just, except the defense
of a person charged with a public offense; and (3) employ, for
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her
those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law. (Bus. & Prof.
Code Sec. 6068.)
On these points, the Consumer Attorneys of California write in
opposition, ". . . sanctions law is carefully designed to
punish bad tactics without discouraging innovative, cutting
edge legal theories such as those involving civil rights. . .
. The vexatious litigant statute was enacted to restrict the
ability of unrepresented individuals to repeatedly initiate
unmeritorious claims. The problem of attorney initiated
vexatious litigation, although real, has already been
addressed. The legislature has carefully reviewed
California's sanctions statutes, and in 1994 enacted ÝSection
128.7] . . . to provide additional checks against
'frivolous' actions. The amendments were carefully crafted to
permit sanctions against attorneys' improper conduct, and to
address tactics whether engaged in by a plaintiff or defense
attorney. Most importantly, the legislature strove to strike
a balance in deterring bad tactics without chilling legitimate
advocacy."
IS THIS BILL NECESSARY GIVEN THAT OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW
ALREADY DEAL WITH IMPROPER TACTICS BY LAWYERS?
1.Does this bill have a possible chilling effect?
By extending the vexatious litigant statute to represented
plaintiffs, this bill would prevent a vexatious litigant from
filing any new actions with or without a lawyer if a prefiling
order was in place. Organizations that represent low-income
clients raise concerns about the possible effects of the bill
given that they may be testing novel legal theories to vindicate
an important public right. On this point, California Rural
Legal Assistance Foundation and Western Center on Law & Poverty
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 11 of ?
write:
. . . we believe that to extend this statute to counsel would
have a chilling effect on vindicating important rights. Our
clients benefit from private attorneys willing to take their
cases; legal aid organizations lack the resources to handle
all the cases presented to them. Sometimes they propose novel
legal theories, perhaps after the in pro per litigant has
tried and failed.
DOES THIS BILL HAVE A POSSIBLE CHILLING EFFECT? COULD THIS BILL
CHILL LEGITIMATE ADVOCACY?
2.Is this bill premature given that the California Supreme Court
is currently considering this issue?
Existing law provides that a vexatious litigant plaintiff may be
subject to a prefiling order which prohibits him or her from
filing any new litigation in pro per without first obtaining the
judge's permission in the court where the litigation is to be
filed. This bill would delete the term "in pro per." The
effect of this change is to provide that a prefiling order would
prohibit the vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation
whether he or she is bringing the action in pro per or is
represented by an attorney.
As the sponsor notes, the recent decision in Shalant v. Girardi
(2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 545, review granted, is currently under
review by the California Supreme Court. In Shalant, the
vexatious litigant plaintiff was subject to a prefiling order
that prohibited him from "filing any new litigation in propria
persona in the courts of California without approval of the
presiding judge of the court in which the action is to be
filed." (Id. at 549.) While represented by counsel, the
plaintiff Shalant filed an action alleging, among other things,
breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Beginning about five months after the filing of
the case and over the next year and a half, the plaintiff was
represented by his original counsel, new counsel, the plaintiff
himself, original counsel, and the plaintiff himself, in that
order. At that point, the defendants filed a notice of the
plaintiff's status as a vexatious litigant subject to a
prefiling order, and a motion to dismiss the case on that basis.
The trial court granted that motion, and the Second District
Court of Appeal reversed the ruling, holding that a prefiling
order issued under the vexatious litigant statute "governs only
the initiation of a lawsuit, not what occurs during the
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 12 of ?
prosecution of the litigation." (Id. at 554.)
The California Supreme Court granted review of this case to
decide the following question: If a vexatious litigant subject
to a prefiling order files a lawsuit while represented by
counsel, but counsel substitutes out or is otherwise relieved,
may the litigant proceed in propria persona without first
obtaining the approval of the presiding judge under Code of
Civil Procedure section 391.7?
As a result, the Court will decide whether or not a vexatious
litigant plaintiff is in violation of a prefiling order if he or
she is represented by counsel at the time the litigation is
commenced but at some point during the litigation he or she
becomes self-represented. This bill, by providing that a
prefiling order would prohibit a vexatious litigant from filing
any new litigation whether he or she is bringing the action in
pro per or is represented by an attorney, generally concerns the
issues to be decided by the Court.
Proponents of the bill have raised the concern that vexatious
litigants can "game" the system by filing an action while
represented by counsel, then substituting out or relieving that
counsel, and still proceeding with their action despite a
prefiling order that may be in place. In deciding to review
Shalant v. Girardi, the California Supreme Court is deciding
just that question. As a result, the Committee should consider
whether it is appropriate to approve of this measure while the
Court decides the matter.
On this point, the Consumer Attorneys of California, in
opposition, write that because the court "is already reviewing
this general issue in Shalant v. Girardi . . . Ýi]t is better
policy to await a decision, review that decision, and then
review changes if necessary."
IS THIS BILL PREMATURE GIVEN THAT THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE?
5. Additional support arguments
California Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA) writes in
support of the bill, stating that the bill "will tackle the
ongoing issue of vexatious litigants who continually re-litigate
decided issues or file meritless and harassing claims. SB 603
is a vehicle that will tackle the excessive and unwarranted
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 13 of ?
lawsuits in our state, which have been identified as a
significant problem that greatly hinders the state's economy.
Lawsuit abuse costs Californians millions of dollars every year
and perpetuates a climate of fear among small business owners.
Consumers pay for frivolous lawsuits too. Businesses simply
increase prices to cover their legal costs or they shut down
entirely."
Supporter Crusader Insurance Company offers the following
example in support of the bill:
One of our policyholders was recently involved in an
automobile accident, causing damage to a 1973 Chevy pickup
truck camper. Based on our appraisal, we accepted liability
and promptly offered $3,993.14 for the truck's damage. The
truck's owner rejected that offer and demanded payment of
$13,000. Rather than provide evidence in support of his
demand, the truck's owner, through his counsel, threatened to
inflict financial hardship through various forms of litigation
activity, citing "You will spend over $100,000 in litigation
so it would be less expensive for you to simply pay $13,000
now." Our company has since spent over $300,000 in defending
against the incessant barrage of improper filings, motions and
actions brought by that truck owner. . . . like all other
expenses in the business world, those defense costs will be
passed on to consumers; and the expense to the justice system
will be borne by the taxpayers.
Support : American Council of Engineering Companies; Association
of California Insurance Companies; California Association of Bed
and Breakfast Inns; California Chamber of Commerce; California
Chapter of the American Fence Association; California Citizens
Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA); California Fence Contractors'
Association; California Grocers Association; California
Independent Grocers Association; California Hotel & Lodging
Association; Crusader Insurance Company; Engineering
Contractors' Association; Flasher Barricade Association; Marin
Builders' Association; Valley Industry and Commerce Association;
Western Electrical Contractors Association; one individual
Opposition : California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation;
Consumer Attorneys of California; Consumer Federation of
California; Western Center on Law & Poverty
HISTORY
SB 603 (Berryhill)
Page 14 of ?
Source : Civil Justice Association of California
Related Pending Legislation : SB 731 (Committee on Judiciary),
which would clarify that existing law relating to vexatious
litigants applies to matters in the Courts of Appeal and would
create a process for the courts to follow when a vexatious
litigant seeks removal from Judicial Council's vexatious
litigant list, is pending in the Assembly.
Prior Legislation :
AB 1340 (Jones, Ch. 293, Stats. 2008), provided, among another
things, that if a person who is not the conservatee and who has
previously filed unmeritorious or harassing pleadings in a
conservatorship proceeding, files an unmeritorious petition to
terminate the conservatorship intended to harass or annoy the
conservator, the petition is grounds for the court declare the
person a vexatious litigant.
AB 1891 (Niello, 2008), would have required a trial court to
order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by another party as a result of any filing,
action, or tactic that is frivolous, clearly unjustified, or
otherwise substantially devoid of merit. AB 1891 failed passage
in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 1861 (Harman, 2002), would have enacted a new "Special Motion
to Strike" to strike all or any part of a civil action complaint
based on any privileged statement, testimony, or evidence made
or offered at a parole hearing, if the complaint against the
defendant, or any portion of that complaint, is filed by a
plaintiff unrepresented by counsel and incarcerated as specified
by the bill. AB 1861 failed passage in the Senate Public Safety
Committee.
**************