AB 65, as introduced, Achadjian. Crimes: rape.
Existing law provides various circumstances that constitute rape, including an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator where the person submits under the belief that the person committing the act is the victim’s spouse, and this belief is induced by artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with the intent to induce the belief.
This bill would additionally provide that this type of rape occurs where the person submits under the belief that the person committing the act is the victim’s cohabitant, fianće, fianćee, or someone with whom the victim has a dating relationship.
By expanding the definition of a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated local program: yes.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 261 of the Penal Code is amended to
2read:
(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
4with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the
5following circumstances:
6(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder
7or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent,
8and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person
9committing the act. Notwithstanding the existence of a
10conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of the
11Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1 (commencing with Section
125000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code), the
13prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of the crime, that
14a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability rendered
15the alleged victim incapable of giving
consent.
16(2) Where it is accomplished against a person’s will by means
17of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
18unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.
19(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any
20intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance,
21and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been
22known by the accused.
23(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of
24the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph,
25“unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of resisting
26because the victim meetsbegin insert anyend insert one of the following conditions:
27(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
P3 1(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the
2act occurred.
3(C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
4essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraud in
5fact.
6(D) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
7essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent
8representation that the sexual penetration served a professional
9purpose when it served no professional purpose.
10(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person
11committing the act is the victim’s spouse,begin insert cohabitant, fiancé, end insert
12begin insertfiancée, or someone with whom the victim has a dating end insert
13begin insertrelationship, as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 243,end insert and this
14belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced
15by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.
16(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by
17threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other
18person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator
19will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph, “threatening to
20retaliate” means a threat to kidnap or falsely imprison, or to inflict
21extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.
22(7) Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by
23threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate,
24arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a
25reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used
26in this paragraph, “public official” means a
person employed by
27a governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that
28position, to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator
29does not actually have to be a public official.
30(b) As used in this section, “duress” means a direct or implied
31threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce
32a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act
33which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in
34an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total
35circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
36relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising
37the existence of duress.
38(c) As used in this section, “menace” means any threat,
39declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury
40upon another.
No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
2Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
3the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
4district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
5infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
6for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of
7the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within
8the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
9Constitution.
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