BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Senator Noreen Evans, Chair
2013-2014 Regular Session
AB 729 (Hernández)
As Amended June 10, 2013
Hearing Date: July 2, 2013
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
TMW
SUBJECT
Evidentiary Privileges: Union Agent-Represented Worker
Privilege
DESCRIPTION
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege from
disclosure for communications between a union agent and a
represented employee or represented former employee. That
privilege could be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or
to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or
other proceeding, any confidential communication between the
employee or former employee and the union agent made while the
union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege if disclosure
is necessary to prevent a criminal act reasonably believed is
likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to,
an individual or if the communication was made to help a person
commit a crime or fraud. This bill would additionally provide
that the union agent-represented worker privilege could be
waived in accordance with existing law.
BACKGROUND
An evidentiary privilege permits an otherwise competent witness
to refuse to testify and/or prevent another from testifying.
Privileges are policy exclusions, unrelated to the reliability
of the information involved, which are granted because it is
considered more important to keep that information confidential
than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant
to the issues in a pending proceeding. For example, to protect
(more)
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the lawyer-client relationship, it is necessary to prevent
disclosure of confidential communications made in the course of
that relationship. (Comments to Evid. Code Sec. 910.) Whereas
privileges of a witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence are
governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by
United States district courts in light of "reason and
experience," the only privileges that are recognized in
California are those statutory privileges expressly codified in
the Evidence Code. (See Fed. Rules of Evid., Rule 501; Evid.
Code Sec. 911.)
To date, California has codified several evidentiary privileges,
recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of certain
communications. Among those are the: lawyer-client privilege,
spousal privilege, confidential marital communications
privilege, physician-patient privilege, psychotherapist-patient
privilege, clergyman-penitent privilege, sexual assault
counselor-victim privilege, domestic violence counselor-victim
privilege, and human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege.
Yet other statutory privileges protect official information
acquired in confidence by a public employee and the identity of
informants, protect persons from having to reveal their votes in
public elections, and protect against disclosure of trade
secrets. (Evid. Code Sec. 930 et seq.)
This bill seeks to create an evidentiary privilege for union
agent-represented worker communications. Case law has held that
no such privilege exists. In American Airlines, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881, the court held that
California law does not expressly provide for any such
privilege; rather, the creation of evidentiary privileges is a
legislative responsibility. (Id. at p. 890.) This bill would
follow a recent court case, Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d
559, 565, decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, which extended
by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary
privilege from the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act.
CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
1. Existing law governs the admissibility of evidence in court
proceedings and generally provides a privilege to refuse to
testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made
in the course of certain relationships, including the
following:
attorney-client (Evid. Code Sec. 954);
spouses (Evid. Code Sec. 980);
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physician-patient (Evid. Code Sec. 994);
psychotherapist-patient (Evid. Code Sec. 1014);
clergy-penitent (Evid. Code Sec. 1033, 1034);
sexual assault counselor-victim (Evid. Code Sec.
1035.8); and
domestic violence counselor-victim (Evid. Code Sec.
1037.5).
This bill would establish the union agent-represented worker
privilege and provide that a union agent and a represented
employee or represented former employee have a privilege to
refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative
board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding,
any confidential communication between the employee or former
employee and the union agent made while the union agent was
acting in his or her representative capacity.
This bill would specify that a represented employee or
represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent
another from disclosing a confidential communication between
the employee and a union agent that is privileged.
This bill would authorize a union agent to use or reveal a
confidential communication made to the union agent while the
union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity
in either of the following circumstances:
in actions against the union agent in his or her
personal or official representative capacity, or against
the local union or subordinate body thereof or
international union of affiliated or subordinate body
thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official
representative capacities; or
when, after full disclosure has been provided, the
written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has
been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased
or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining
unit member's estate or guardian or conservator.
This bill would require a union agent to use or reveal a
confidential communication made to the union agent while the
union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity
if required to do so by a court order.
This bill would define "confidential communication" to mean
information transmitted, by oral or written communication,
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between a represented employee or represented former employee
and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far
as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware,
discloses the information to no third persons other than those
who are present to further the interest of the employee,
former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information
or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
communication was made, and includes advice given by a union
agency in the course of a representational relationship.
This bill would define "union agent" to mean a person
employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and
whose duties include the representation of employees in a
bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations
for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed
employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a
represented employee or represented former employee
communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a
grievance or potential grievance.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege if the
union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any
confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal
act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to
result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an
individual.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege with
respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid
a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or
fraud.
This bill would provide that the union agent-represented
worker privilege would not apply in criminal proceedings.
2. Existing law provides that no person has a privilege to
refuse to be a witness; to refuse to disclose any matter or to
refuse to produce any writing, object, or thing, or prevent
another person from the same unless otherwise provided by
statute. (Evid. Code Sec. 911.)
Existing law provides that the right of a person to claim
specified privileges is waived with respect to a protected
communication if the holder of the privilege has disclosed a
significant part of that communication or consented to
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disclosure, without coercion. Existing law provides that a
disclosure does not constitute a waiver where it was
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the
services of a lawyer, physician, psychotherapist, sexual
assault counselor, or domestic violence counselor was
consulted. (Evid. Code Sec. 912(a), (d).)
Existing law provides that if two or more persons are joint
holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular
joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not
affect the right of another joint holder to claim the
privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of
one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of
the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code Sec. 912
(b).)
Existing law provides that if a privilege is claimed on the
ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a
communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized
privileged relation, the communication is presumed to have
been made in confidence, and the opponent of the claim of
privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the
communication was not confidential. A communication does not
lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was
communicated by electronic means or because persons involved
in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic
communication may have access to the content of the
communication. (Evid. Code Sec. 917.)
This bill would apply these and other related provisions to
the union agent-represented worker privilege.
COMMENT
1. Stated need for the bill
The author writes:
Most employees, when they discuss issues affecting their
employment with their official union representative (such as
involving workplace discipline or other grievance-related
issues)[,] assume that such communications are confidential
and that information may not be disclosed to the employer or
other third parties.
However, no California statute provides such communications
with an evidentiary privilege - nor does case law recognize
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such a privilege. In 2003, the California Court of Appeal
declined to recognize such a privilege. American Airlines,
Inc. v. Superior Court (DiMarco) (2003) Case No. B162513.
At least two other states have enacted legislation
establishing a statutory privilege for communications between
an employee and their union representative - Illinois (735
ILCS 735 [Sec.] 5/8-803.5) and Maryland (MD Code, Courts and
Judicial Proceedings [Sec.] 9-124).
In addition, the State of Alaska has established such a
privilege for public employees via a recent decision of the
Alaska Supreme Court. Petersen v. State of Alaska, 280 P.3d
559 (Sup. Ct. Alaska, 2012).
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has held that an
employer's demand to discover grievance-related confidential
communications between an employee and his union
representative interfered with the employee's right to union
representation. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 NLRB 646
(1979). However, the NLRB limited this ruling to situations
falling under the National Labor Relations Act.
In 2011, a United States District Court in Illinois held that
a full employee-union representative privilege existed in
common law, and was not limited to the public sector. Bell v.
Village of Steamwood, 806 F.Supp.2d 1052 (2011). Thus, for
the first time, a federal court recognized that an
employee-union representative evidentiary privilege existed
outside of a labor context and not attached to a specific
statute.
The California Labor Federation (CLF), AFL-CIO, sponsor, writes:
Under existing law, confidences shared with a lawyer, a
psychiatrist, or a domestic violence counselor are protected,
but those shared with a union representative are not. That
just does not reflect the realities of labor relations or
promote early settlement of labor disputes. Instead, it
creates the potential for a company to subpoena a union
representative and demand access to confidential
communications that the union representative had with his or
her members.
There are many important reasons to extend this privilege. An
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employee may confide to a union representative information
that is sensitive, explaining that they were late due to a
medical condition or missed work to obtain a domestic violence
restraining order. They may want to report employer
harassment without fearing retaliation if they came forward
publically. AB 729 simply extends a privilege to confidential
communications shared with a union representative.
2. Communications between a union agent and a represented
employee
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege from
disclosure for communications between a union agent and a
represented employee or represented former employee. That
privilege could be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or
to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or
other proceeding, any confidential communication between the
employee or former employee and the union agent made while the
union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
The author argues that most employees, when discussing issues
affecting their employment with their union representative,
assume that such communications are confidential and that the
information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third
parties. The author notes that these communications are similar
to those between an attorney and client and should be afforded
the same protection from disclosure as with the attorney-client
privilege. Further, Illinois and Maryland have a union
agent-representative worker privilege, but California courts do
not recognize any such privilege.
The California Teachers Association, in support, argues that
"[t]he role of a union representative is to represent members
and they should not be hindered in that role. This proposal
represents an improvement to collective bargaining law in
California, and supports settling disputes more efficiently.
There are times when our staff and elected leaders might be the
preferred individual to resolve a dispute, but they make
referrals to an attorney simply to establish attorney-client
privilege. Members should feel comfortable and confident with
their union representative and being able to confide all
elements of their situation with the union representative is
essential."
Various cases involving union agent-represented employee
communications demonstrate the conflict between providing an
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employee with appropriate safety in communications with the
union representative and the employer's right to information
regarding employment disputes. In Cook Paint & Varnish Co.
(1979) 246 NLRB 646, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
recognized the need for a represented employee's communications
with the union agent to be confidential. The NLRB analyzed the
balance necessary between the employer's right to investigate
employment-related allegations and the employee's right to
confidentiality in union communications. The NLRB reiterated
that during the employer's investigation of misconduct by an
employee, the employer is entitled to disclosure. However, the
NLRB held that after disciplinary proceedings have been
finalized but the employer's decision has been submitted to
arbitration, an employee has a privilege against disclosing
union-related communications because the employer is seeking to
validate its disciplinary decision and obtain the union's
arbitration position. (Ibid.) Notably, this decision was
limited to cases involving the National Labor Relations Act.
However, for California labor disputes, American Airlines, Inc.
v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881 is controlling. In
that case, the court analyzed the balance between the employer's
right to information and the union representative's privilege
for non-disclosure of communications with employees:
Indeed, creating the type of evidentiary privilege proposed by
DiMarco could severely compromise the ability of employers to
conduct investigations pertaining to claims of harassment,
discrimination, unlawful conduct, or other employer rules
violations, all to the detriment of union members. For
example, the [Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)]
enunciates this state's public policy to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace. (See Gov. Code [Secs.] 12920
[and] 12920.5; Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 345, 366-367 [ ].) Under FEHA, an employer, as
well as a labor union, has an obligation to "take all
reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring" in the workplace. (Gov. Code
[Sec.] 12940, subd. (k).) The affirmative and mandatory duty
to ensure a discrimination-free work environment requires the
employer to conduct a prompt investigation of a discrimination
claim. (See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035-1036 [ ].) To carry out
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its obligation to prevent discrimination by investigating
claims, an employer likely will need to obtain information
from a wrongdoer's co-workers who were in a position to
witness the misconduct and identify the wrongdoer. In a
unionized workplace, an employer's investigation could be
hampered by a union representative-union member privilege,
thus conceivably undermining an employer and a labor union's
statutory obligation to ensure a discrimination-free work
environment.
Although there may be various countervailing policy reasons
why a union representative should not be compelled during
civil litigation to disclose factual information obtained from
other union members he or she represents, that policy
determination (and the parameters of any concomitant
evidentiary privilege) is the province of the Legislature, not
this court. [Citations omitted.] This is especially true in
an area where the Legislature has declared the state's public
policy in such detail. (See Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d
65, 80 [ ] [describing FEHA as "comprehensive scheme" for
combating employment discrimination].) (Id. at pp. 890-891;
emphasis in original.)
The court further held that California law does not expressly
provide for any such privilege; rather, the creation of
evidentiary privileges is a legislative responsibility. (Id. at
p. 890.) This bill seeks to provide such a privilege.
By following a recent court case, Peterson v. State (2012) 280
P.3d 559, 565, decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, which
extended by implication the union agent-represented worker
evidentiary privilege from the Alaska Public Employment
Relations Act (PERA). In Peterson, the court held that:
We emphasize that the expectation of confidentiality is
critical to the privilege because without it "union members
would be hesitant to be fully forthcoming with their
representatives, detrimentally impacting a union
representative's ability to advise and represent union members
with questions or problems." Thus, "[a]bsent an expectation
of confidentiality, there is little need to protect the
communications." We also emphasize that the privilege is only
applicable when the union representative is acting in an
official union role because "[p]rotecting informal
conversations would extend the privilege too far,
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unnecessarily burdening the search for truth." (Id. at p.
567.)
The Peterson court clarified that the union agent-represented
worker privilege "extends to communications made: (1) in
confidence; (2) in connection with representative services
relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance
proceedings; (3) between an employee (or the employee's
attorney) and union representatives; and (4) by union
representatives acting in official representative capacity. The
privilege may be asserted by the employee or by the union on
behalf of the employee. Like the attorney-client privilege, the
union-relations privilege extends only to communications, not to
underlying facts." (Id.)
Similarly, this bill would provide the evidentiary privilege for
certain communications between the union agent and represented
worker. This bill would apply the privilege to confidential
communications between the employee and union representative
that are made while the union representative is acting in his or
her representative capacity. The privilege could be asserted by
either the employee or the union representative, and the
employee could prevent another from disclosing the confidential
information between the employee and union representative.
3. The policy goals of a privilege must be sufficiently important
to outweigh the public's right to evidence
As a general matter, privileges function to exclude evidence, no
matter how relevant or reliable that evidence might be, in order
to promote some other extrinsic policy. Because they tend to
suppress otherwise relevant evidence, statutory privileges are
strictly construed and in California, unlike under federal law,
the courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter of
judicial policy; they may only apply those privileges created by
statute or those that arise out of state or federal
constitutional law. (Evid. Code Sec. 911; Sullivan v. Superior
Court (Spingola) 29 Cal.App.3rd 64 (1972).)
As noted in the Background, privileges are policy-based
exclusions that are granted because it is considered more
important to keep that information confidential than it is to
require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues
in a pending proceeding. Thus, the central policy consideration
raised by this bill is whether or not the policy promoted by the
proposed union agent-represented worker privilege outweighs the
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public's right to truth in evidence.
a. Ensuring confidentiality of information shared with a
union agent
While the public does have a right to all evidence, in
codifying other evidentiary privileges, such as the
attorney-client privilege, the Legislature has previously
judged that the importance of ensuring that people obtain
effective counsel to protect their legal rights may outweigh
that interest. (See Comment 2.)
Proponents assert that the lack of evidentiary privilege for
union agent-represented worker communications has a chilling
effect on these communications. The California Professional
Firefighters explain that "[w]hen a union member confides in a
union representative, he or she has every expectation that the
conversation will remain private. A union member who is
unfairly fired or disciplined could be in danger of losing his
or her right to due process, absent the protection to speak
confidentially to his or her representative. The ability to
speak confidentially is essential to a union representative's
ability to provide effective representation. It is also
important to resolving workplace conflicts expeditiously,
fairly and without litigation. If unions are to function free
from harassment and undue influence from employers, leaders
must be free to communicate with their members about the
problems and complaints of union members."
Because a workers union is authorized under California law to
represent the concerns and needs of employees, and free
communication between the union agents and members is
essential to providing adequate representation in employment
contracts and labor concerns, a limited privilege is arguably
appropriate to assure the union members and agents of the
confidentiality of these communications. Pursuant to this
bill, the employee, as the holder of the privilege, could
claim the privilege to refuse disclosure or prevent any other
person from disclosing those confidential communications. The
union representative would also be authorized to claim the
privilege and would be required to do unless otherwise
permitted by the employee.
b. This bill largely models the existing lawyer-client
privilege and its limits
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It should be noted that evidentiary privileges have been
carefully limited to balance the need for confidentiality with
the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this end,
existing law outlines both situations in which no privilege
applies at all, and circumstances in which an otherwise valid
claim of privilege will be deemed waived. Additionally,
certain other elements, such as the definitions provided for
"the holder of the privilege" and for "confidential
communication," serve as inherent limits on a privilege as
well. As a result, not just anyone is authorized to claim or
waive the privilege, and not all communications are considered
confidential. In establishing a union agent-represented
worker privilege, this bill largely models the lawyer client
privilege, including limits to that privilege.
For example, under existing law, there is no lawyer-client
privilege where either the services of the lawyer were sought
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit a crime or a fraud, or the lawyer reasonably believes
that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to
representation of a client is necessary to prevent a criminal
act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in
the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
This bill would apply those same exceptions to the proposed
union agent-represented worker privilege.
Similarly, the term "confidential communication between client
and lawyer" is defined under existing law as the information
transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the
course of that relationship and in confidence by a means that,
so far as the client is aware, does not disclose the
information to third persons other than those who are present
to further the interest of the client in the consultation or
those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer is consulted. In other words,
communications made in an open elevator full of third parties
would not be privileged, nor would communications that are
irrelevant to the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted.
This bill would similarly track that definition, among others,
thereby ensuring that the proposed privilege would also
operate in a limited fashion.
Furthermore, this bill would authorize a union agent to use or
reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent
while the union agent was acting in his or her representative
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capacity in either of the following circumstances:
in actions against the union agent in his or her
personal or official representative capacity, or against
the local union or subordinate body thereof or
international union of affiliated or subordinate body
thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official
representative capacities; or
when, after full disclosure has been provided, the
written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has
been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased
or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining
unit member's estate or guardian or conservator.
Arguably, these limitations on the evidentiary privilege
provide an appropriate balance of the need for confidentiality
with the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this
end, existing law outlines both situations in which no
privilege applies at all, and circumstances in which an
otherwise valid claim of privilege will be deemed waived.
4. Opposition concerns
The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, in opposition,
asserts that this bill "creates a new privilege and that is more
expansive than other existing authority. Under this bill, union
representatives could misuse this privilege by precluding
employees who wish to voluntarily report or testify. This would
make it more difficult to perform investigations of wrongdoing.
As a result, local agencies would need to increase the resources
spent on crucial investigations."
The California State Association of Counties, also in
opposition, argues that "[c]ounties do not object to an earlier
version of AB 729 which only provided the privilege to employees
of a union and a county employee. We do not think it is
appropriate to allow two county employees to communicate
regarding a workplace incident or other investigation where one
employee can claim privilege and not fully and truthfully report
to the county about an issue for which the county could have
liability."
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC), in
opposition, asserts that "RCRC recognizes there should be a
public policy conversation about extending [the] client
communication privilege to an agent of the union and represented
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employees. If such a privilege is granted, we would strongly
encourage the Legislature to require minimum qualifications
based on education levels and licensure just as California law
provides for members of the State Bar, physicians and other
health professionals, and licensed counselors. Furthermore, we
would insist that such privilege only be extended to employees
of the union and the represented employees. Unfortunately, as
currently constructed, AB 729 would allow county employees who
are not a direct employee of the union (i.e. a shop steward) to
enjoy the privilege when engaged with another county employee
who is represented by a union. Unless these two aspects of AB
729 are addressed, we must respectfully oppose AB 729."
(Emphasis in original.)
Further, the California Chamber of Commerce and other business
groups, in opposition, argue:
Evidentiary privileges are limited and narrowly tailored in
recognition of the fact that such privileges suppress relevant
facts that may lead to an unjust decision. See Tanzola v.
DeRita, 45 Cal.2d [1] (1955); American Airlines v. Superior
Court, 114 Cal.App.4th 881 (2003). Despite this general
public policy of access to the truth during a proceeding in
order to evaluate a dispute upon all relevant information, AB
729 seeks to preclude disclosure of any "confidential
communication" between an employee and union agent that was
made while the agent was acting in his/her representative
capacity.
Notably, this privilege is only one-sided. Unlike other
privileges that apply to both sides of the
litigation/proceedings such as the attorney-client privilege,
AB 729 only protects the union agent and employee
communication. It does not equally protect the
management-employee communication, or communications between
members of management regarding labor union disputes or
grievance issues. Accordingly, in labor related proceedings,
an employer would be forced to disclose all related
communications, while the union agent or employee could pick
and choose which communications they wanted to disclose. Such
a lopsided proposal will result in the miscarriage of justice.
Finally, to the extent AB 729 interferes with the disclosure
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act with regard
to collective bargaining, it would be preempted by federal
law.
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5. Chaptering-out issues
Staff notes that AB 267 (Chau), relating to evidentiary
privileges, would amend a section amended by this bill and
language must be added to the bill before it leaves the Senate
to avoid any chaptering-out of this bill's provisions.
Support : American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO; Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs;
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians; California
Conference Board of the Amalgamated Transit Union; California
Conference of Machinists; California Correctional Peace Officers
Association; California Correctional Supervisors Organization;
California Professional Firefighters; California School
Employees Association; California Statewide Law Enforcement
Association; California Teachers Association; California
Teamsters Public Affairs Council; Engineers and Scientists of
California; Glendale City Employees Association; International
Longshore & Warehouse Union; Los Angeles Police Protective
League; Los Angeles Probation Officers Union, AFSCME, Local 685;
Orange County Employees Association; Organization of SMUD
Employees; Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21;
Riverside Sheriffs' Association; San Bernardino Public Employees
Association; San Luis Obispo County Employees Association; Santa
Rosa City Employees Association; State Coalition of Probation
Organizations; UC Student Workers' Union, UAW Local 2865; UNITE
HERE!; United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Western States
Council; Utility Workers Union of America, Local 132
Opposition : Air Conditioning Trade Association; ALPHA Fund;
Associated Builders and Contractors of California; Association
of California Health Districts; California Association of Joint
Powers Authorities; California Chamber of Commerce; California
Grocers Association; California Manufacturers and Technology
Association; California Special Districts Association;
California State Association of Counties; Civil Justice
Association of California; Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors; National Federation of Independent Business;
Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors Association of California;
Rural County Representatives of California; School Employers
Association of California; Schools Excess Liability Fund;
Western Electrical Contractors Association; Western Growers
Association
HISTORY
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Source : California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO
Related Pending Legislation : AB 267 (Chau) would establish an
evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between
a person who consults a lawyer referral service. AB 267 passed
out of this Committee on a vote of 6-0 and is currently on the
Senate Floor.
Prior Legislation : SB 1473 (Soto, 2004) would have established
an evidentiary privilege with respect to communications made in
the course of an employee assistance professional-client
relationship. SB 1473 was held in this Committee.
Prior Vote :
Assembly Floor (Ayes 48, Noes 27)
Assembly Committee on Judiciary (Ayes 7, Noes 3)
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