BILL ANALYSIS �
AB 915
Page 1
Date of Hearing: May 1, 2013
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Mike Gatto, Chair
AB 915 (Jones-Sawyer) - As Amended: April 16, 2013
Policy Committee: Public
SafetyVote: >
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program:
Yes Reimbursable: Yes
SUMMARY
This bill requires the state to provide counties 75% of the
savings from any year-to-year juvenile ward population decline
of the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). Specifically, this
bill:
1)Requires the Department of Finance (DOF) to determine the cost
of housing and supervising DJF wards for the 2012-13 fiscal
year and to annually determine the cost of housing and
supervising DJF wards in the preceding fiscal year.
Requires DOF to determine any state savings as a result of
declining ward population, and requires the Controller to
transfer 75% of this GF "savings" to the Youthful Offender
Block Grant Fund Part B (Fund) created by this bill for
allocation as follows:
a) 40% allocated proportionally to counties with net
decreases in new admissions of juvenile offenders to the
DJF from the 2012-13 fiscal-year baseline, for county
probation services, emphasizing best practices, as defined
in the bill.
b) 40% to fund a competitive block grant program, overseen
by the Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC),
open to all counties, "to increase capacity for serving the
county's population of DJF-eligible youth, using best
practices."
c) 20% to fund technical assistance, including a full-time
position within the BSCC to administer this process, for
implementation of best practices for serving DJF-eligible
youth, or a combination of DJF-eligible and
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non-DJF-eligible offenders.
2)Specifies that if the amount transferred to the Fund in any
year is less than $3 million, the entire amount shall be
available to fund technical assistance to county probation in
the ongoing implementation of best practices for serving young
offenders.
3)Prohibits a county from receiving any funding pursuant to this
bill if discretionary prosecutorial direct filings to adult
court, as specified, for that county increase by more than 5%
from the 2012-13 fiscal-year baseline.
4)Requires the chief probation officer to submit a comprehensive
annual report regarding any funding received through the
Youthful Offender Block Grant Fund Part B to the BSCC.
FISCAL EFFECT
1)Unknown annual GF cost, likely in the low millions of dollars,
for providing 75% of the savings from an already declining DJF
population to counties.
If, for example, the DJF population decreased by 50 wards in
2013-14 from the 2012-13 baseline assuming the current per
capita cost of $200,000, as stated in the 2013-14 budget, the
cost to the state would be $7.5 million.
There are problems, however, with assuming this per capita
cost is accurate, and that it will be sufficient, or
calculated in such a way that the state could share the
differential with counties. As a result of a sliding scale of
county payments for commitments to DJF (then the California
Youth Authority) initiated in 1997, followed by DJF
realignment in 2007, the DFJ population has continued to
decline, from a high of about 9,000 in 1996, to the current
population of 750. As a result, the administration will likely
consider changing from a per capita cost to a fixed-cost
model, meaning the addition or reduction of a small number of
wards would not affect the division's budget significantly,
and that the per capita cost is essentially no longer
relevant.
1)Attributing further DJF population reduction to this bill is
difficult, as the DJF population has been decreasing for years
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without the incentives proposed by this bill. Moreover, with
only 750 wards remaining, the population is likely to
stabilize as the DJF houses mostly wards the counties are
unable or unwilling to handle.
COMMENTS
1)Rationale . The author's intent is to provide a local incentive
for not sending juvenile offenders to the DJF, similar to the
successful SB 678 (Leno, 2009) program, which created a fiscal
incentive to reduce the number of probationers sent to state
prison, providing counties with half of the state's savings.
2)2011 correctional realignment has significantly altered SB 678
utilization. In 2011 - pre realignment - SB 678 reduced the
state prison population by about 9,500 inmates, saving about
$278 million and providing counties with $139 million for
probation services. Post-realignment, however, things have
changed. The state has reduced its funding for SB 678 grants,
from $139 million in 2012-13, to $36 million for 2013-14 as
most of the probationers who were diverted from state prison
are no longer eligible for state prison. Also, because the
state changed from an inmate-to-staff ratio-driven staffing
system to a standardized staffing model, relatively minor
reductions in the state prison population result in smaller
state savings.
Given that the realignment of the state juvenile detention
system is in its sixth year, and that the DJF population has
decreased from 10,000 to 750, the timing for this incentive
model may not be optimal.
3)Support . According to the Prison Law Office, "California
counties are steadily decreasing their new admissions of youth
offenders to the state's youth correctional system and
assuming greater local responsibility for these youth, without
necessary support or accountability from the state. AB 915
channels the savings from these decreased DJF commitments to
promote county best practices."
4)Opposition : According to the California District Attorneys
Association, "Over the last several years, the population of
DJF has dropped precipitously, due in large part to the
realignment of many types of youthful offenders. ? Today,
only juveniles who are sex offenders or whose current offense
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is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707(b) can
be sent to DJF. In other words, only the most serious and
violent offenders may be considered for commitment to state
facilities; counties provide the lion's share of services to
juveniles.
"Further, we are very concerned about the bill's provision
that disqualifies a county for funding if discretionary
prosecutorial direct filings to adult court increase by more
than 5 percent. It is inappropriate to fiscally penalize a
county based on lawful charging decisions made by the district
attorney. Additionally, in a county that sends very few
juvenile offenders to DJF, even the slightest uptick in
juvenile criminality could prejudice a county in terms of the
funding contemplated by the bill."
Analysis Prepared by : Geoff Long / APPR. / (916) 319-2081