SB 59, as introduced, Evans. Crimes: rape.
Existing law provides various circumstances that constitute rape, including an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with an individual who is not the spouse of the perpetrator where the individual submits under the belief that the individual committing the act is the victim’s spouse, and this belief is induced by artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with the intent to induce the belief.
This bill would instead provide that this type of rape occurs where the individual submits under the belief that the individual committing the act is the victim’s sexually intimate partner.
By expanding the definition of a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.
Vote: 2⁄3. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated local program: yes.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 261 of the Penal Code is amended to
2read:
(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
4with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the
5following circumstances:
6(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder
7or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent,
8and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person
9committing the act. Notwithstanding the existence of a
10conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of the
11Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1 (commencing with Section
125000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code), the
13prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of the crime, that
14a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability rendered
15the alleged victim incapable of giving
consent.
16(2) Where it is accomplished against a person’s will by means
17of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
18unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.
19(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any
20intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance,
21and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been
22known by the accused.
23(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of
24the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph,
25“unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of resisting
26because the victim meetsbegin insert anyend insert one of the following conditions:
27(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
28(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the
29act occurred.
30(C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
31essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraud in
32fact.
33(D) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
34essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent
P3 1representation that the sexual penetration served a professional
2purpose when it served no professional purpose.
3(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person
4committing the act is the victim’sbegin delete spouseend deletebegin insert sexually
intimate partnerend insert,
5and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment
6practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.
7(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by
8threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other
9person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator
10will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph, “threatening to
11retaliate” means a threat to kidnap or falsely imprison, or to inflict
12extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.
13(7) Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by
14threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate,
15arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a
16reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used
17in this paragraph, “public official” means a person employed by
18a
governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that
19position, to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator
20does not actually have to be a public official.
21(b) As used in this section, “duress” means a direct or implied
22threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce
23a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act
24which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in
25an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total
26circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
27relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising
28the existence of duress.
29(c) As used in this section, “menace” means any threat,
30declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury
31upon another.
No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
33Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
34the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
35district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
36infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
37for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of
38the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within
39the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
40Constitution.
This act is an urgency statute necessary for the
2immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within
3the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into
4immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are:
5In order to protect the public safety by minimizing the threat
6posed by sexual predators at the earliest possible time, it is
7necessary that this act take effect immediately.
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