BILL NUMBER: SB 131	AMENDED
	BILL TEXT

	AMENDED IN SENATE  MAY 28, 2013
	AMENDED IN SENATE  MAY 9, 2013
	AMENDED IN SENATE  MAY 2, 2013
	AMENDED IN SENATE  APRIL 4, 2013

INTRODUCED BY   Senators Beall and Lara
   (Coauthor: Assembly Member Skinner)

                        JANUARY 24, 2013

   An act to amend Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
relating to damages.


	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST


   SB 131, as amended, Beall. Damages: childhood sexual abuse:
statute of limitations.
   Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages
suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be
commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of
majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or
illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual
abuse, whichever occurs later. Existing law provides that certain
actions may be commenced on and after the plaintiff's 26th birthday
if  specified conditions are met   the person or
entity against whom the action is commenced knew or had reason to
know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by
an employee, volunteer,   representative, or agent, and
failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
that person.   For a period of one year commencing January
1, 2003, existing law revived certain actions that would otherwise be
barred solely because the applicable statute of limitations had
expired  .
    This bill would instead require that an action for
recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse be
commenced within 12 or 25 years, as applicable, of the date the
plaintiff attains the age of majority, or within 5 years of the date
the fact of the psychological injury or illness occurring after the
age of majority and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is
first communicated to the plaintiff by a licensed mental health
practitioner practicing within the state, whichever period expires
later.  This bill would provide that  these
  the  time limits for commencement of an action
 for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse  shall be applied retroactively to any claim that has not
been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January 1, 2014.
This bill would revive, for a period of one year, a cause of action,
as specified, that would otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that  the plaintiff's
26th birthday was before January 1, 2003, and  the plaintiff
discovered the cause of his or her injury on or after January 1,
2004.
   This bill would  also  provide that a plaintiff
shall be entitled to conduct discovery before the court may rule on a
motion challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff's showing that a
person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on
notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct and failed to take reasonable
steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid those act in
the future.  This bill would specify that this entitlement shall
not apply to a cause of action revived pursuant to these provisions.

   Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

   SECTION 1.    Section 340.1 of the   Code of
Civil Procedure   is amended to read: 
   340.1.  (a) In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a
result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the
action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains
the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological
injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by
the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the
following actions:
   (1) An action against any person for committing an act of
childhood sexual abuse.
   (2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by
that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual
abuse  which   that  resulted in the injury
to the plaintiff.
   (3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an
intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the
childhood sexual abuse  which   that
resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
   (b) (1) No action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision
(a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiff's 26th birthday.
   (2) This subdivision does not apply if the person or entity knew
or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful
sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding
placement of that person in a function or environment in which
contact with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring
counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a
reasonable step or reasonable safeguard. 
   (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a plaintiff shall
be entitled to conduct discovery before the court may rule on a
motion challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff's showing under
paragraph (2).  
   (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for
damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) that is
permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b)
that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because
the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived,
and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one
year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be
construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an
action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.  

   (c) The time limits for commencement of actions described in
subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be applied retroactively to any claim
that has not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January
1, 2014. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any cause of
action for damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision
(a) that would otherwise be barred solely by the statute of
limitations as of January 1, 2014, is revived, and, in that case, a
cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2014,
provided that the plaintiff's 26th birthday was before January 1,
2003, and the plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injuries
on or after January 1, 2004. Paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) shall
not apply to a cause of action revived pursuant to this subdivision.

   (d) Subdivision (c) does not apply to either of the following:
   (1) Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in
any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 
2003   2014  . Termination of a prior action on the
basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that
has been litigated to finality on the merits.
   (2) Any written, compromised settlement agreement  which
  that  has been entered into between a plaintiff
and a defendant where the plaintiff was represented by an attorney
who was admitted to practice law in this state at the time of the
settlement, and the plaintiff signed the agreement.
   (e) "Childhood sexual abuse" as used in this section includes any
act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff
was under  the age of  18 years  of age 
and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal
Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of
subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal
Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code;
paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of
Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of
Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or
any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act
was committed. Nothing in this subdivision limits the availability of
causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes
of action against persons or entities other than the alleged
perpetrator of the abuse.
   (f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the
otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of
the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to
this section.
   (g) Every plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the
action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in
subdivision (h).
   (h) Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for
the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected
by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth
the facts  which   that  support the
declaration:
   (1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the
attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner
who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the
attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts
and issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney
has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there
is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation.
   (2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to
practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the
action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the
plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff
and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the
particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her
knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional
opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had
been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
   (3) That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation
required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would
impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the
action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the
certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within
60 days after filing the complaint.
   (i) Where certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g),
the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate
of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
   (j) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not
attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed
pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has
found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that
there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the
action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that
defendant with process shall attach.
   (k) A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional
conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.
   (  l  ) The failure to file certificates in accordance
with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section
430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
   (m) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
named except by "Doe" designation in any pleadings or papers filed in
the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as
to the charging allegations against that defendant.
   (n) At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply
to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the
name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation,
as follows:
   (1) The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of
corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The
certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or
more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations
against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and
concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If
the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or
the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the
attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of
the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the
witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For
purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if
it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental
health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a
corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
   (2) Where the application to name a defendant is made prior to
that defendant's appearance in the action, neither the application
nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be
served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or
their counsel of record.
   (3) Where the application to name a defendant is made after that
defendant's appearance in the action, the application shall be served
on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the
certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served
on any party or their counsel of record.
   (o) The court shall review the application and the certificate of
corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and
any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall,
if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging
allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the
complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or
defendants.
   (p) The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the
public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff,
any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to
subdivision (n).
   (q) Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect
to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for
whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this
section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the court'
s own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the
attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to
execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone
number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to
subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation
of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number
shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of
the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to
comply with this section, the court may order a party, a party's
attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney'
s fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit
should have been filed.
   (r) The amendments to this section enacted at the 1990 portion of
the 1989-90 Regular Session shall apply to any action commenced on or
after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the
period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby
reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically
expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.
   (s) The Legislature declares that it is the intent of the
Legislature, in enacting the amendments to this section enacted at
the 1994 portion of the 1993-94 Regular Session, that the express
language of revival added to this section by those amendments shall
apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.
   (t) Nothing in the amendments to this section enacted at the 1998
portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session is intended to create a new
theory of liability.
   (u) The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at
the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any
action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed
prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including
any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the
laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision
is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there
has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999. 
  SECTION 1.    Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is amended to read:
   340.1.  (a) In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a
result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the
action shall be as follows:
   (1) Within 25 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of
majority, or within five years of the date the fact of the
psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority
and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated
to the plaintiff by a licensed mental health practitioner practicing
within the state, whichever period expires later, for an action
against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse.
   (2) Within 12 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of
majority, or within five years of the date the fact of the
psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority
and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated
to the plaintiff by a licensed mental health practitioner practicing
within the state, whichever period expires later, for either of the
following actions:
   (A) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by
that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual
abuse that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
   (B) An action for liability against any person or entity where an
intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the
childhood sexual abuse that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
   (b) (1) No action described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a)
may be commenced on or after the plaintiff's 30th birthday.
   (2) This subdivision does not apply if the person or entity knew
or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful
sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding
placement of that person in a function or environment in which
contact with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring
counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a
reasonable step or reasonable safeguard. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a plaintiff shall be entitled to conduct discovery
before the court may rule on a motion challenging the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's showing under this subparagraph.
   (c) The time limits for commencement of actions described in
subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be applied retroactively to any claim
that has not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January
1, 2014. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any cause of
action for damages described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) that
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations as of
January 1, 2014, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may
be commenced within one year of January 1, 2014, provided that the
plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injuries, as described
in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), on or after January 1, 2004.
   (d) Subdivision (c) does not apply to either of the following:
   (1) Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in
any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2014.
Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of
limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to
finality on the merits.
   (2) Any written, compromised settlement agreement that has been
entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant where the plaintiff
was represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in
this state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed
the agreement.
   (e) "Childhood sexual abuse" as used in this section includes any
act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff
was under 18 years of age and that would have been proscribed by
Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code;
paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of
Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288
of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of
subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h),
(i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the
Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the
time the act was committed. Nothing in this subdivision limits the
availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a),
including causes of action against persons or entities other than the
alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
   (f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the
otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of
the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to
this section.
   (g) Every plaintiff 30 years of age or older at the time the
action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in
subdivision (h).
   (h) Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for
the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected
by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth
the facts that support the declaration:
   (1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the
attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner
who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the
attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts
and issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney
has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there
is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation.
   (2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to
practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the
action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the
plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff
and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the
particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her
knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional
opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had
been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
   (3) That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation
required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would
impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the
action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the
certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within
60 days after filing the complaint.
   (i) Where certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g),
the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate
of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
   (j) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not
attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed
pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has
found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that
there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the
action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that
defendant with process shall attach.
   (k) A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional
conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.
   (  l  ) The failure to file certificates in
accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant
to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
   (m) In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be
named except by "Doe" designation in any pleadings or papers filed in
the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as
to the charging allegations against that defendant.
   (n) At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply
to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the
name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation,
as follows:
   (1) The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of
corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The
certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or
more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations
against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and
concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If
the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or
the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the
attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of
the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the
witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For
purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if
it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental
health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a
corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
   (2) Where the application to name a defendant is made prior to
that defendant's appearance in the action, neither the application
nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be
served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or
their counsel of record.
   (3) Where the application to name a defendant is made after that
defendant's appearance in the action, the application shall be served
on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the
certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served
on any party or their counsel of record.
   (o) The court shall review the application and the certificate of
corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and
any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall,
if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging
allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the
complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or
defendants.
   (p) The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the
public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff,
any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to
subdivision (n).
   (q) Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect
to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for
whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this
section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the court'
s own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the
attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to
execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone
number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to
subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation
of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number
shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of
the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to
comply with this section, the court may order a party, a party's
attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney'
s fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit
should have been filed.
                                                         (r) The
amendments to this section enacted at the 1990 portion of the 1989-90
Regular Session shall apply to any action commenced on or after
January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period
of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving
those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under
the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.
   (s) The Legislature declares that it is the intent of the
Legislature, in enacting the amendments to this section enacted at
the 1994 portion of the 1993-94 Regular Session, that the express
language of revival added to this section by those amendments shall
apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.
   (t) Nothing in the amendments to this section enacted at the 1998
portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session is intended to create a new
theory of liability.
   (u) The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at
the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any
action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed
prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including
any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the
laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision
is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there
has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.