BILL ANALYSIS �
SB 131
Page 1
Date of Hearing: June 18, 2013
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Bob Wieckowski, Chair
SB 131 (Beall) - As Amended: May 28, 2013
As Proposed to be Amended
SENATE VOTE : 21-10
SUBJECT : Statute of Limitations: childHOOD sexual abuse
KEY ISSUE : IN ORDER TO ENSURE VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RECOVERING FOR THEIR INJURIES, SHOULD THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE CIVIL ACTIONS
BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY AND SHOULD A SHORT ONE-YEAR REVIVAL OF
CERTAIN OTHERWISE TIME-BARRED CLAIMS BE GRANTED?
FISCAL EFFECT : As currently in print this bill is keyed
non-fiscal.
SYNOPSIS
California, like many states, has special, extended statutes of
limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of the uniqueness
of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may
have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what
has occurred and then coming forward in a timely fashion. In
2002, California enacted a tolling provision for "delayed
discovery," of these types of horrendous abuses against
children. This legislation action was taken to provide that an
action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood
sexual abuse may be commenced after the plaintiff's 26th
birthday against someone other than the direct perpetrator, if
that person or entity knew or had reason to know of any unlawful
sexual conduct by an employee, or other agent, and failed to
take reasonable steps, and implement reasonable safeguards, to
avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. That legislation
by then-Senator John Burton contained a one-year revival period
for claims that had previously been time-barred. This bill,
sponsored by the National Center for Victims of Crime and based
on the Legislatively-approved Burton bill of 2002, seeks to
again protect victims of childhood sexual abuse by allowing, in
very limited instances, adults who were victims of child abuse
to sue third parties who otherwise would be immune to suit due
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to the length of time that has passed since the abuse. This
bill does so by applying retroactively the increases made to the
statute of limitations in 2002 and creating a very limited, new
one-year revival period.
Supporters, including law enforcement and victims' rights
organizations, believe that this bill is necessary for victims
to simply have a fair chance in court to pursue their claims
against those responsible for their abuse. The sponsor, the
National Center for Victims of Crime, notes that those who
committed child abuse decades ago may still be abusing children
today, and holding those accountable for abuse in the past may
help deter continuing perpetrators. Applying increases in the
statute of limitations retroactively and, for a very short
period, reviving some claims are two ways of accomplishing this
goal. It should be noted that the revival of actions against
perpetrators or third parties only assures that a claim can be
heard on its merits. Any other applicable defense would not be
affected, and plaintiffs would still have to prove all elements
of their case.
Opponents, primarily religious organizations and private schools
associations, express concern that this bill may open claims
that organizations assumed were expired after the 2003 revival,
which may be expensive to defend against or settle. Opponents
also claim it would be unfair to permit claims to be revived
against private entities, but not public ones. In reply,
proponents argue that this is a very narrow, targeted revival
aimed only at a specific and presumably small group of victims
who were unreasonably denied a chance to seek redress for the
horrible harms they may have incurred as a result of a
California Supreme Court decision, whose claims are likely to be
covered by the organizations' insurance policies. Proponents
also point to the greater disclosure requirements and
accountability that public entities have already assumed as
reasons to limit this revival to private entities.
SUMMARY : Extends the statute of limitations in limited
instances for civil actions involving childhood sexual abuse.
Specifically, this bill :
1)Retroactively applies the current statute of limitations for
the commencement of civil actions against third parties
regarding recovery of damages suffered as a result of
childhood sexual abuse, which is eight years after the
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plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., 26 years of age) or within
three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that the psychological injury or
illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the
abuse, whichever occurs later. Applies this retroactivity
only to any claim that has not been adjudicated to finality on
the merits as of January 1, 2014.
2)Revives for one year, beginning January 1, 2014, causes of
action that would otherwise be barred solely by the statute of
limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that the
plaintiff's 26th birthday was before January 1, 2003, and the
plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injuries on or
after January 1, 2004.
3)Provides that a plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery
before the court may rule on a motion challenging the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's showing regarding a third
party's knowledge or notice of any unlawful childhood sexual
abuse and failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the
abuse. Specifically states that this discovery rule does not
apply to a cause of action revived by # 1) or 2), above.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action
for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil
Procedure Section 340. All references hereinafter are to this
code unless otherwise noted.)
2)Provides that the time for commencing an action based on
injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse are eight years
after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., 26 years of age)
or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that the psychological
injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was
caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. These time
limits apply to actions against any person committing an act
of childhood sexual abuse and an action against any person or
entity whose wrongful, negligent, or intentional act was a
legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse, as specified.
(Section 340.1(a).)
3)Prohibits an action for childhood sexual abuse against third
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parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person
or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on
notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee,
volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take
reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to
avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that
person, as specified. (Section 340.1(b).)
4)Holds that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of
age to file suit against specified third parties in specified
circumstances does not apply to claims that lapsed under prior
law before # 2) and 3), above, became effective in 2003.
(Quarry v. Doe (2009) 53 Cal.4th 945.)
COMMENTS : Many states have special, extended statutes of
limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of the uniqueness
of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may
have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what
has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion. Six
jurisdictions - Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Connecticut, Maine,
and Guam - have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of
limitations with respect to some or all claims based on
childhood sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy
discovery periods in adulthood. California law, as amended in
1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of
the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3
years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring
after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse,
whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578,
Stats. 1990.) The latter condition - within 3 years of making
the relevant connection - is called a "delayed discovery" rule.
This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it
applies to third parties. Prior to 1998, actions against third
parties who were legal causes of the abuse had to be commenced
within a year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday. In 1998, the
law was amended to allow the same time limits against third
parties as against the abuser, provided that the suits were
commenced before the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (AB 1651
(Ortiz), Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998.) In 2002, the law was amended
again to allow delayed-discovery suits against such third
parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday under specified
conditions and to allow a one-year revival of actions against
third parties that were otherwise expired under the statute of
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limitations. (SB 1779 (Burton), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002.) One
of the perhaps inadvertent results of these repeated amendments
came to light in Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, which
held that claims that had expired as of the 1998 law received
the benefit of the one-year revival in the 2002 law but not the
expansion of the delayed-discovery rule, because the 2002 law
did not have express language of retroactivity; as a result,
many claims were barred because of a former statute of
limitations.
This bill would make the time limits for lawsuits against third
parties in SB 1779 retroactive and, under specified conditions,
revive for one year certain causes of action that would
otherwise be barred solely by the statute of limitations. This
overturns the holding of Quarry. In support of the bill, the
author writes:
The sexual abuse of children in this country, and indeed
around the world, is an epidemic that has, and continues to
burden society morally and financially. According to data
published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1 in 4 girls and 1 in 6 boys will be sexually abuse by the
time they are 18. Approximately three quarters of those
victims will be abused by someone they are acquainted with,
including a family member, teacher, coach, religious leader
and others similarly situated. A multitude of studies,
surveys and published data reveal that survivors of
childhood sexual abuse do not report these crimes until
well into adulthood. There are a variety of reasons,
including threats, shame, self-blame, trust, and fear. In
addition, the very nature of the injuries suffered often
interferes with the victims functioning, and understanding
of the harm done precluding enough awareness to take
action. Unfortunately, the failure to report is not
limited to the child victim. Even when a child does find
the inner strength to report, studies show that most of the
time the authority figure to whom they reported will not
report to law enforcement . . . .
Over the last 27 years the California Legislature has come
to have a better understanding of the insidious and latent
nature of the injuries suffered by a child who has been
sexually abused and the reasons why victims of childhood
sex abuse often wait years before reporting the abuse to
law enforcement or otherwise. California Code of Civil
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Procedure Section 340.1, a remedial statute intended to
provide redress the child sex abuse victims, has been
amended no less than five times since its original
enactment in 1986, consistent with this evolving knowledge
of the latent effects of the original abuse. [This bill]
is the result of lessons learned over the past decade from
litigation of over 1,000 [child sexual abuse] lawsuits in
California and nationwide.
It should be noted that the revival of actions against
perpetrators or third parties only assures that a claim can be
heard on its merits. Any other applicable defense would not be
affected, and plaintiffs would still have to prove all elements
of their case.
Supporters generally argue that these retroactivity and revival
provisions are necessary to give victims of abuse a fair chance
at justice and prevent future abuse. The California Police
Chiefs Association argues that the bill allows victims to "have
their day in court and seek justice against their abusers." The
sponsor, the National Center for Victims of Crime, writes,
It is critically important to allow these old cases to come
forward in order to protect children today. Even when it
takes a victim 30 years to come forward, we often find that
the abuser is continuing to molest children, even at 70 or
80 years old. However, children being abused today may not
be ready to come forward until decades into the future.
When victims of past abuse identify and expose
perpetrators, often more recent victims come forward who
are within the criminal statute of limitations once they
realize that they are not alone.
This bill reverses the decision in Quarry v. Doe I that barred
many lawsuits by victims of abuse, arguably against the intent
of the Legislature in 2002. Quarry v. Doe I involved six
brothers who sued the Oakland Roman Catholic Bishop for sexual
abuse committed against them in the 1970's by a parish priest.
They allege that they did not understand the damages caused by
the abuse they suffered until 2006. Ultimately, the Quarry case
and about 20 others with similar legal issues were taken up by
the California Supreme Court. (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53
Cal.4th 945.) The Court held that the Quarrys' claims were
barred by the statute of limitations.
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Quarry v. Doe I held that the Quarrys' claims had lapsed under
the 1998 law - because they were older than 26 at the time - and
the 2002 law did not revive them under its extended
delayed-discovery rule. That is, this time limit extension in
SB 1779 did not apply retroactively to causes of action that
already had lapsed when the law was enacted, as the Quarry
brothers' claim had. SB 1779 also revived all childhood sexual
abuse claims against third parties that would otherwise be
time-barred for a single year, in 2003, and the court ruled that
the Quarry brothers' claim was revived in 2003 and expired again
in 2004, despite the fact that the Quarry brothers did not
connect their adult problems to their childhood abuse until
2006. The Court effectively held that the Quarry brothers
should have filed a claim before they knew that they had a
claim.
The Court based its decision on the rule of statutory
construction that legislation operates only prospectively,
unless the Legislature clearly states a contrary intent: "Once a
claim has lapsed [under the formerly applicable statute of
limitations], revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive
application of the law under an enlarged statute of limitations.
Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without express
language of revival." (Id. at 956-57.) The majority found the
language of SB 1779 did not satisfy that rule of construction
and must be interpreted prospectively only.
As a result of the Quarry decision, two adults -- one of whom
turned 26 before 2003, while the other turned 26 during or after
2003 -- who make the relevant connection between abuse and adult
psychological problems at the same time have different rights.
The former is barred from suit by Quarry, and the latter has 3
years to sue. After discussing a similar hypothetical in
dissent, Justice Corrigan wrote, "It seems unlikely that the
Legislature would single out one class of plaintiffs for
arbitrary treatment, depriving them of any opportunity to sue
upon discovery of their injuries while allowing other plaintiffs
who suffer the same kind of injury a reasonable time after
discovery to seek redress." (Id. at 994 (dis. opn. of Corrigan,
J.).)
This bill removes that arguably arbitrary distinction in two
ways. First, the retroactivity provision removes this
distinction for future plaintiffs. For example, consider a man
born in 1975 and abused in 1985, but who will not make the
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relevant connection between the abuse and his adult
psychological problems until 2015 (perhaps because he did not
seek counseling until he was 40 years old). Under current law,
his claim against a third party legally responsible for his
abuse expired in 2001 (when he turned 26), was revived in 2003,
and expired again in 2004. These expirations and revivals
occurred without his knowledge, however, because he would not
understand the nature of his claim until over a decade later.
Had he been born just a few years later - for example, in 1977 -
his claim would not have expired by the 2003 extension, so it
would run until 2018, three years after he made the relevant
connection. The retroactivity provision eliminates the
distinction between being born in 1975 and being born in 1977,
thereby providing him the same chance to sue that he would have
had he been born a few years later.
Second, the revival provision removes this distinction for
potential plaintiffs from the recent past. For example,
consider the man in the previous hypothetical, who was born in
1975 and abused in 1985, but now assume that he made the
relevant connection between his abuse and his psychological
problems in 2005. According to the Quarry decision, his claim
expired in 2001, was revived in 2003, and expired again in 2004,
just as in the previous hypothetical; the expirations occurred
before he understood his claim. However, even the retroactivity
clause would not save his claim: if he did not file suit within
three years of making the relevant connection in 2005 (which he
might have chosen not to do because he correctly predicted that
it would fail under Supreme Court majority's interpretation of
the statute of limitations), the retroactivity clause means only
that his claim expired in 2008. The revival provision allows
him to sue, however, because it revives claims for victims who
turned 26 before 2003 and made the relevant connection in 2004
or later. This revival lasts only one year; he must sue in
2014, or else his claim expires again.
There is a third category of plaintiffs who turned 26 before
2003 (and therefore did not get the benefit of the extension of
the delayed-discovery provision in SB 1779), which this bill
leaves untouched: those who made the relevant connection prior
to 2004. Consider the same man again, but now assume that he
realized in 2002 that his psychological problems were related to
his abuse as a child, and assume that he did not sue at that
time. Unlike the previous two examples, this man knew that he
had a claim during the revival period in 2003, and he chose not
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to sue. This bill does not provide this man with another bite
at the apple.
The Legislature has the power to create, extend and change
statutes of limitations as it deems appropriate . While the
Legislature is authorized to revive actions, the policy behind
the statutes of limitation provides that they "are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to
put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." (3 Witkin,
California Procedure � 433, 4th Ed.)
Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that "the need for repose
is not so overarching that the Legislature cannot by express
legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any
time, and it has occasionally done so." (Duty v. Abex Corp.
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749.) The United States Supreme
Court has long held that:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in
necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They
represent expedients, rather than principles. . . .
They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation
does not discriminate against the just and the unjust
claim, or the avoidable or unavoidable delay . . . .
Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is
called a "fundamental right" . . . . [T]he history of
pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by
legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively
large degree of legislative control. (Chase
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304,
314.)
Subsequently, in Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d
828 and Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited
Chase Securities and clearly affirmed the Legislature's power to
revive civil common-law causes of action, even if the actions
were otherwise barred by the running of the statute of
limitations. In both cases, the court upheld against
constitutional attack the retroactive application of prior
legislation amending Section 340.1 to revive childhood abuse
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actions that had lapsed or technically expired under prior law.
Similarly, in Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1049, the court upheld the Legislature's revival of
certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge
Earthquake that were not brought previously and that otherwise
were time-barred, and allowed these claimants a one-year window
to file the revived action. (SB 1899 (Burton) Chap. 1090,
Stats. 2000, enacting Section 340.9.)
Another precedent for reviving civil claims or extending the
statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases is SB
1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004. That bill revived, for a
one-year period commencing on January 1, 2005, a civil cause of
action for child sexual abuse against the perpetrator if a
criminal case filed against the perpetrator for that abuse was
dismissed or overturned pursuant to a United States Supreme
Court decision which held that the underlying statute was an
unconstitutional ex post facto law in authorizing a criminal
prosecution (as opposed to a civil action) after the original
statute of limitations for the offense had run.
Perhaps most importantly for SB 131, the Supreme Court in Quarry
v. Doe I did not say that the Legislature could not revive the
claims by express terms; the majority simply held that the
Legislature had not done so. Two dissenting justices went even
farther and thought the claims satisfied the existing statute of
limitations. Justice Liu went so far as to invite the
Legislature to fix the problem created by the majority, writing:
Although the 2002 amendments to section 340.1 are readily
construed to protect plaintiffs such as the Quarry brothers
. . . the court holds that it is too late for them to
pursue their claims.
It is not too late, however, for the Legislature to give
similarly situated plaintiffs their day in court. Since
1986, when section 340.1 was first enacted, the Legislature
has twice expanded access to court for childhood sexual
abuse victims in response to what it saw as unduly narrow
rules set forth in judicial opinions. [Citations.]
Today's unduly narrow reading of the statute may prompt the
Legislature again to provide a correction that affirms the
statute's remedial purpose. (Quarry at 1002-04 (dis. opn.
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of Liu, J.).)
Thus, the final inquiry is whether the Legislature believes that
there are sufficient public policy reasons to support reviving
otherwise barred claims under this bill, and whether such an
extension would maintain the protections afforded by the statute
of limitations, that is, balancing the interests of the victims
with the defendants' right to defend against the claim.
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time,
documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses' memories fade, and
evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the
statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect
another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty
coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons,
including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear.
It is often difficult for the child victims to understand the
harm done and know how to take action. Current law for younger
victims accommodates these difficulties with its
delayed-discovery rule. However, current law for older victims
(born in 1976 or earlier) does not. This bill would change the
law to provide uniform protection to victims regardless of age.
Discovery before ruling on sufficiency of evidence : Under
existing law, victim plaintiffs making a claim against a third
party (i.e., an employer) must show that the third party "knew
or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any
unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer,
representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps,
and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of
unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including,
but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that
person in a function or environment in which contact with
children is an inherent part of that function or environment."
The author believes that this requirement has, in effect,
resulted in an onerously high pleading standard for plaintiffs.
The author argues that, because relevant evidence as to this
element is typically found in an employer's records, in most
cases plaintiffs cannot plead facts sufficient to show that the
employer "was on notice" prior to discovery being conducted.
Accordingly, this bill allows a plaintiff to conduct discovery
before the court may rule on a motion challenging the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's showing that a person or entity
knew or had reason to know of any unlawful sexual conduct by an
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employee or agent. This would ease suit against parties who are
genuinely responsible for abuse but have concealed their
knowledge by allowing the facts to come out before a case is
unfairly dismissed.
This proposed new rule appropriately does not apply to a cause
of action revived pursuant to the provisions of this bill, since
this provision was not effective previously.
Opponents believe that it is unfair to revive previously expired
claims. The opposition argues that many private entities acted
in reliance on SB 1779, which created the previous one-year
window in which victims of child sex abuse could bring claims.
The California Catholic Conference (CCC) notes, with regard to
the passage of SB 1779:
At that time, the debate in the Legislature made it clear
that the change was understood to be a one-time revival . .
. . Hundreds of claims were filed as a result of that
amendment, and the archdioceses and dioceses of the Roman
Catholic Church in California responded to those actions,
resulting in settlement payments to plaintiffs in excess of
$1.2 billion. Those settlements, however, were predicated
in large part on the assurances that were made when SB 1779
was adopted, and assets that would otherwise have been used
for activities such as Catholic social services in
communities across California were seriously depleted, and
many insurance policies were surrendered in order to
achieve resolution of the revival claims.
Despite these arguments, there are important differences between
this revival of claims and the 2003 revival of claims. The
revival here is not a broad tolling of the statute of
limitations for a year, as the 2003 revival was. This revival
is specifically targeted at those who could not sue because of
the Quarry decision.
It is notable that the defendants during the 2003 revival, which
was broader than this revival, generally were able to pay the
settlements that resulted and did not enter bankruptcy. They
often paid either with cash assets or insurance policies. While
the CCC expresses concern about its insurance status now, the
author of this bill argues:
Most youth[-]serving private institutions that may have
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exposure if [this bill] passes will have insurance coverage
for these claims. The likely policies that will be
triggered by a claim are policies that were bought and paid
for years ago. This does not impact their ability to
obtain insurance in the future . . . . [F]or those who cry
that they will never be able to get insurance, this is a
hollow argument intended to garner sympathy where none
should be given.
Opponents believe that this bill discriminates against private
institutions. One of the bill's opponents, the California
Council of Nonprofit Organizations, a group that chiefly
represents Catholic and other religious organizations, argues
that "although the sponsors claim that this is a bill 'for
victims,' the bill callously disregards any victim who may have
been abused in a public school, or by some other government
employee. Instead, the new retroactive amendments target only
private employers and nonprofit organizations."
This argument stems from the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA),
which generally governs damage claims brought against public
entities. The GTCA requires that a claim relating to a cause of
action for death or for injury to a person be presented in
writing to the public entity not later than six months after the
date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have
accrued within the meaning of the applicable statute of
limitations. In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007)
42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding the childhood sexual abuse statute of
limitations timeframes in CCP Section 340.1 and its delayed
discovery provisions, an abuse victim must follow the six-month
presentation rule in the GTCA and cannot, without having done
so, take advantage of the delayed-discovery rule otherwise
applicable to abuse victims.
However, the Legislature in 2009 provided that, for victims of
child sexual abuse, it has agreed to waive the six-month notice
of claim limitation requirement that applies to all other tort
claims. Thus, victims have the same time period to file a claim
against public entities as against private institutions. This
law is only prospective; it does not revive claims that had been
barred by the GTCA prior to its passage. Thus, the effect of
this bill is to revive old claims against private institutions,
but since such old claims are barred against public institutions
unless they are in compliance with the GTCA, it would not revive
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old claims against public institutions.
Addressing this criticism, the author responds:
This is fair given the history of the differences between
public and private institutions. Public schools and
teachers have been held to a higher standard of care when
it comes to the protection of children and reporting of
child sexual abuse, than have the clergy and private
youth[-]serving institutions. Teachers were mandated
reporters in the State of California decades before clergy,
who became mandatory reporters only in 1997. Public
institutions are subject to greater transparency, under
laws such as the Freedom of Information Act, where they are
required to make certain information available to the
public and the media. Not so for private institutions. In
fact the Catholic Church and many other religious
institutions have argued vehemently that they do not have
to make any disclosure of what they know and have known
because, they argue, the First Amendment to the
Constitution protects them from such disclosure.
We have seen the difference this has made. The Catholic
Church has defiantly refused to make public the documents
it has of the depth and breadth of its knowledge for
decades of the scourge of clergy child sexual abuse within
its institution. Even after agreeing to make these
documents public as part of large group settlements, it has
taken six years of ongoing litigation by steadfast
plaintiffs' lawyers against the Diocese of San Diego and
the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, to force the public
disclosure of these documents under court order.
Author's Technical Amendment. In order to better clarify the
intent of the measure, the author prudently has agreed to make
the following amendment:
On page 3, line 27, strike "plaintiff" and insert "party"
Prior Related Legislation : AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have
extended the statute of limitations in civil cases involving
child sex abuse to 35 years of age, prohibited confidential
settlements, and imposed new duties on private entities. This
bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
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SB 640 (Simitian, Chap. 383, Stats. 2008) provided that child
sex abuse claims arising out of conduct on or after January 1,
2009 are not subject to the Government Tort Claims Act, which
requires that a claim against a public entity be presented
within 6 months of its accrual.
SB 1779 (Burton and Escutia, Chap. 149, Stats. 2002) provided
that claims against a third party did not lapse when the
plaintiff turned 26, but only if specified requirements were
met. It also revived certain expired claims for one year.
SB 674 (Ortiz, Chap. 120, Stats. 1999) made the then-current
statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse cases against
third parties retroactive.
AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chap. 1021, Stats. 1998) extended the statute of
limitations in actions against third parties. However, any
action against a third party had to be commenced before the
plaintiff's 26th birthday.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
National Center for Victims of Crime (sponsor)
American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy
California Association of Chiefs of Police
California Coalition Against Sexual Assault
California Protective Parents Association
Child Abuse Listening Mediation, Inc.
College Democrats at Pacific Union College
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
National Partnership to End Interpersonal Violence
National Safe Child Coalition
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Waste Less Living, Inc.
Thirteen individuals
Opposition
California Association of Private School Organizations
California Association of Student Councils
California Catholic Conference
California Council of Nonprofit Organizations
SB 131
Page 16
California State Alliance of YMCA
Two individuals
Analysis Prepared by : Leora Gershenzon and Tom Watts / JUD. /
(916) 319-2334