BILL ANALYSIS �
SB 131
Page 1
SENATE THIRD READING
SB 131 (Beall and Lara)
As Amended June 19, 2013
Majority vote
SENATE VOTE :21-10
JUDICIARY 6-1 APPROPRIATIONS 11-3
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|Ayes:|Wieckowski, Chau, |Ayes:|Gatto, Bradford, Ian |
| |Dickinson, Garcia, | |Calderon, Campos, Eggman, |
| |Muratsuchi, Stone | |Gomez, Hall, Linder, Pan, |
| | | |Quirk, Weber |
| | | | |
|-----+--------------------------+-----+--------------------------|
|Nays:|Wagner |Nays:|Harkey, Donnelly, Wagner |
| | | | |
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SUMMARY : Extends the statute of limitations in limited instances
for civil actions involving childhood sexual abuse. Specifically,
this bill :
1)Retroactively applies the current statute of limitations for the
commencement of civil actions against third parties regarding
recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse, which is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority
(i.e., 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the
psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of
majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. Applies
this retroactivity only to any claim that has not been adjudicated
to finality on the merits as of January 1, 2014.
2)Revives for one year, beginning January 1, 2014, causes of action
that would otherwise be barred solely by the statute of
limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that the plaintiff's
26th birthday was before January 1, 2003, and the plaintiff
discovered the cause of his or her injuries on or after January 1,
2004.
3)Provides that a party is entitled to conduct discovery before the
court may rule on a motion challenging the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's showing regarding a third party's knowledge or notice
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of any unlawful childhood sexual abuse and failure to take
reasonable steps to prevent the abuse. Specifically states that
this discovery rule does not apply to a cause of action revived by
1) or 2), above.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Provides, generally, that the time for commencing a civil action
for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by
the wrongful act or neglect of another.
2)Provides that the time for commencing an action based on injuries
resulting from childhood sexual abuse are eight years after the
plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., 26 years of age) or within three
years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring
after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever
occurs later. These time limits apply to actions against any
person committing an act of childhood sexual abuse and an action
against any person or entity whose wrongful, negligent, or
intentional act was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse,
as specified.
3)Prohibits an action for childhood sexual abuse against third
parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or
entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of
any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer,
representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and
to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful
sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified.
4)Holds that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age
to file suit against specified third parties in specified
circumstances does not apply to claims that lapsed under prior law
before 2) and 3), above, became effective in 2003. (Quarry v. Doe
(2009) 53 Cal.4th 945.)
FISCAL EFFECT : According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
1)Unknown annual state trial court costs, potentially up to hundreds
of thousands of dollars, to the extent extending the statute of
limitations results in additional civil cases. For example, if
this bill results in 10 additional cases that average two weeks of
court time, annual costs could be in the range of $400,000.
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Court costs would be higher or lower depending on the number of
cases, the types of cases, and how cases are handled. Some cases
would be settled without significant court time. Some may be
grouped together. Others may require lengthier hearings and
trials.
2)Opponents of this measure - presumably the Catholic Church, as the
report was contained in a letter addressed to a representative of
the Sacramento Diocese - contracted for a study to determine the
potential fiscal impact on public education costs should this bill
lead to numerous and successful judgments against Catholic
dioceses, forcing the church to close schools. The study
concluded that, while there is no way to determine the probability
or magnitude of the events, the closure of even 10 schools per
year could result in increased costs to the state in the tens of
millions of dollars.
Such a conclusion, however, assumes facts beyond the scope of this
study or this analysis. Issues such as availability of insurance,
whether funds could be redirected to protect parochial schools in
the event of major civil judgments, the condition of diocesan
budgets, the recent history of parochial school closures across
the country, and to what extent closures are related to sexual
abuse settlements, would need to be studied prior to a credible
conclusion that California's General Fund (GF) may be jeopardized
by this bill. To this point, the New York Times recently reported
on files released by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee
on July 1, which revealed that in 2007, Cardinal Timothy F. Dolan,
then Milwaukee archbishop, requested permission from the Vatican
to move nearly $57 million into a cemetery trust fund specifically
to protect the assets from victims of clergy sexual abuse who were
demanding compensation.
COMMENTS : Many states have special, extended statutes of
limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of the uniqueness of
childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have
fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has
occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion. Six
jurisdictions - Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Connecticut, Maine, and
Guam - have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of
limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood
sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy discovery periods
in adulthood. California law, as amended in 1990, requires that
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such actions be brought within eight years of the age of majority
(generally up to 26 years old) or within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that
psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority
was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB
108 (Lockyer), Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990.) The latter
condition - within three years of making the relevant connection -
is called a "delayed discovery" rule.
This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it
applies to third parties. Prior to 1998, actions against third
parties who were legal causes of the abuse had to be commenced
within a year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday. In 1998, the law
was amended to allow the same time limits against third parties as
against the abuser, provided that the suits were commenced before
the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (AB 1651 (Ortiz), Chapter 1032,
Statutes of 1998.) In 2002, the law was amended again to allow
delayed-discovery suits against such third parties after the
plaintiff's 26th birthday under specified conditions and to allow a
one-year revival of actions against third parties that were
otherwise expired under the statute of limitations. (SB 1779
(Burton), Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002.) One of the perhaps
inadvertent results of these repeated amendments came to light in
Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, which held that claims that
had expired as of the 1998 law received the benefit of the one-year
revival in the 2002 law but not the expansion of the
delayed-discovery rule, because the 2002 law did not have express
language of retroactivity; as a result, many claims were barred
because of a former statute of limitations.
This bill would make the time limits for lawsuits against third
parties in SB 1779 retroactive and, under specified conditions,
revive for one year certain causes of action that would otherwise be
barred solely by the statute of limitations. This bill overturns
the holding of Quarry.
It should be noted that the revival of actions against perpetrators
or third parties only assures that a claim can be heard on its
merits. Any other applicable defense would not be affected, and
plaintiffs would still have to prove all elements of their case.
Quarry v. Doe I involved six brothers who sued the Oakland Roman
Catholic Bishop for sexual abuse committed against them in the
1970's by a parish priest. They allege that they did not understand
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the damages caused by the abuse they suffered until 2006.
Ultimately, the Quarry case and about 20 others with similar legal
issues were taken up by the California Supreme Court (Court). The
Court held that the Quarrys' claims were barred by the statute of
limitations.
Quarry v. Doe I held that the Quarrys' claims had lapsed under the
1998 law - because they were older than 26 at the time - and the
2002 law did not revive them under its extended delayed-discovery
rule. That is, this time limit extension in SB 1779 did not apply
retroactively to causes of action that already had lapsed when the
law was enacted, as the Quarry brothers' claim had. SB 1779 also
revived all childhood sexual abuse claims against third parties that
would otherwise be time-barred for a single year, in 2003, and the
court ruled that the Quarry brothers' claim was revived in 2003 and
expired again in 2004, despite the fact that the Quarry brothers did
not connect their adult problems to their childhood abuse until
2006. The Court effectively held that the Quarry brothers should
have filed a claim before they knew that they had a claim.
The Court based its decision on the rule of statutory construction
that legislation operates only prospectively, unless the Legislature
clearly states a contrary intent: "Once a claim has lapsed [under
the formerly applicable statute of limitations], revival of the
claim is seen as a retroactive application of the law under an
enlarged statute of limitations. Lapsed claims will not be
considered revived without express language of revival." (Id. at
956-57.) The majority found the language of SB 1779 did not satisfy
that rule of construction and must be interpreted prospectively
only. The Supreme Court in Quarry v. Doe I did not say that the
Legislature could not revive the claims by express terms; the
majority simply held that the Legislature had not done so. Two
dissenting justices went even farther and thought the claims
satisfied the existing statute of limitations. Justice Liu went so
far as to invite the Legislature to fix the problem created by the
majority.
As a result of the Quarry decision, two adults -- one of whom turned
26 before 2003, while the other turned 26 during or after 2003 --
who make the relevant connection between abuse and adult
psychological problems at the same time have different rights. The
former is barred from suit by Quarry, and the latter has three years
to sue. After discussing a similar hypothetical in dissent, Justice
Corrigan wrote, "It seems unlikely that the Legislature would single
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out one class of plaintiffs for arbitrary treatment, depriving them
of any opportunity to sue upon discovery of their injuries while
allowing other plaintiffs who suffer the same kind of injury a
reasonable time after discovery to seek redress." (Id. at 994 (dis.
opn. of Corrigan, J.).)
This bill removes that arguably arbitrary distinction in two ways.
First, the retroactivity provision removes this distinction for
future plaintiffs. For example, consider a man born in 1975 and
abused in 1985, but who will not make the relevant connection
between the abuse and his adult psychological problems until 2015
(perhaps because he did not seek counseling until he was 40 years
old). Under current law, his claim against a third party legally
responsible for his abuse expired in 2001 (when he turned 26), was
revived in 2003, and expired again in 2004. These expirations and
revivals occurred without his knowledge, however, because he would
not understand the nature of his claim until over a decade later.
Had he been born just a few years later - for example, in 1977 - his
claim would not have expired by the 2003 extension, so it would run
until 2018, three years after he made the relevant connection. The
retroactivity provision eliminates the distinction between being
born in 1975 and being born in 1977, thereby providing him the same
chance to sue that he would have had he been born a few years later.
Second, the revival provision removes this distinction for potential
plaintiffs from the recent past. For example, consider the man in
the previous hypothetical, who was born in 1975 and abused in 1985,
but now assume that he made the relevant connection between his
abuse and his psychological problems in 2005. According to the
Quarry decision, his claim expired in 2001, was revived in 2003, and
expired again in 2004, just as in the previous hypothetical; the
expirations occurred before he understood his claim. However, even
the retroactivity clause would not save his claim: if he did not
file suit within three years of making the relevant connection in
2005 (which he might have chosen not to do because he correctly
predicted that it would fail under Supreme Court majority's
interpretation of the statute of limitations), the retroactivity
clause means only that his claim expired in 2008. The revival
provision allows him to sue, however, because it revives claims for
victims who turned 26 before 2003 and made the relevant connection
in 2004 or later. This revival lasts only one year; he must sue in
2014, or else his claim expires again.
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Analysis Prepared by : Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
FN: 0001863