BILL NUMBER:  SB 131
  VETOED	DATE: 10/12/2013




To the Members of the California State Senate:

I am returning Senate Bill 131 without my signature.

This bill makes amendments to the statute of limitations relating to
claims of childhood sexual abuse.  Specifically, it amends and
significantly expands a 2002 law to "revive" certain claims that
previously had been time barred.

Statutes of limitation reach back to Roman law and were specifically
enshrined in the English common law by the Limitations Act of 1623.
Ever since, and in every state, including California, various limits
have been imposed on the time when lawsuits may still be initiated.
Even though valid and profoundly important claims are at stake, all
jurisdictions have seen fit to bar actions after a lapse of years.

The reason for such a universal practice is one of fairness.  There
comes a time when an individual or organization should be secure in
the reasonable expectation that past acts are indeed in the past and
not subject to further lawsuits. With the passage of time, evidence
may be lost or disposed of, memories fade and witnesses move away or
die.

Over the years, California's laws regarding time limits for childhood
sexual abuse cases have been amended many times.  The changes have
affected not only how long a person has to make a claim, but also who
may be sued for the sexual abuse.  The issue of who is subject to
liability is an important distinction as the law in this area has
always and rightfully imposed longer periods of liability for an
actual perpetrator of sexual abuse than for an organization that
employed that perpetrator.  This makes sense as third parties are in
a very different position than perpetrators with respect to both
evidence and memories.

For claims against a perpetrator of abuse, the current law is that a
claimant must sue within eight years of attaining the age of majority
(i.e. age 26) or "within three years of the date the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological
injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by
the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later?"  However, for
claims against a third party ? e.g. an organization that employed the
perpetrator of the abuse ? the general rule since 1998 was that a
claimant must sue before he or she turns 26.  A later discovered
psychological injury ? no matter how compelling ? could not be
brought against a third party by a person older than 26.

When a number of high profile sex abuse scandals in both public and
private institutions came to light, many felt that the third party
limitation rule described above was too harsh and that claimants over
26 should be able to recover damages for later discovered injuries
from certain, more culpable entities.

In 2002, the California Legislature weighed the competing
considerations on this issue and enacted SB 1779, which did the
following: (1) It identified for the first time a new subcategory of
third party defendants which no longer would have the protection of
the age 26 cutoff for claims.  Going forward these defendants ?
entities who knew or should have known of the sexual abuse and failed
to take action ? now could be sued within three years of the date of
discovery of a claim.  (2) Looking backwards, SB 1779 also revived
for one year only (2003) all claims that had previously lapsed
because of the statute of limitation.  This very unusual "one year
revival" of lapsed claims allowed victims relief but also set a
defined cut-off time for these lapsed claims.

In reliance on the clear language and intent of this statute, the
private third party defendants covered by this bill took actions to
resolve these legacy claims of victims older than 26.  Over 1,000
claims were filed against the Catholic Church alone, some involving
alleged abuse as far back as the 1930s.  By 2007, the Catholic Church
in California had paid out more than $1.2 billion to settle the
claims filed during this one year revival period.  Other private and
non-profit employers were sued and paid out as well.

For the public third parties covered by this bill, however, a very
different result occurred.  There is no doubt that in 2002, when SB
1779 was enacted, it was intended to apply to both public and private
entities.  Indeed, it would be unreasonable, if not shocking, for
the Legislature to intentionally discriminate against one set of
victims, e.g. those whose abusers happened to be employed by a public
instead of a private entity.  However, due to a drafting error, the
California Supreme Court held in 2007 that SB 1779 did not actually
apply to public or governmental agencies.  So, unlike private
institutions, public schools and government entities were shielded
from the one year revival of lapsed claims.  As a result, the
similarly situated victims of these entities were not accorded the
remedies of SB 1779.

In 2008, the Legislature addressed this unfair distinction between
victims of public as opposed to private institutions.  Note, however,
that the bill enacted, SB 640, did not restore equity between these
two sets of victims.  Instead of subjecting public/governmental
entities to all of the provisions of the 2002 law, the Legislature
only allowed victims of public institutions to sue under the new
rules prospectively-from 2009 forward-and provided no "one year
revival" period.

In passing this 2008 law, I can't believe the legislature decided
that victims of abuse by a public entity are somehow less deserving
than those who suffered abuse by a private entity.  The children
assaulted by Jerry Sandusky at Penn State or the teachers at
Miramonte Elementary School in Los Angeles are no less worthy because
of the nature of the institution they attended.  Rather, I believe
that legislators, in good faith, weighed the merits of such claims
against the equities of allowing claims to be brought against third
parties years after the abuse occurred.  The Legislature concluded
that fairness required that certain claims should be allowed, but
only going forward.

This brings us to the bill now before me, SB 131.  This bill does not
change a victim's ability to sue a perpetrator.  This bill also does
not change the significant inequity that exists between private and
public entities.  What this bill does do is go back to the only
group, i.e. private institutions, that have already been subjected to
the unusual "one year revival period" and makes them, and them
alone, subject to suit indefinitely.  This extraordinary extension of
the statute of limitations, which legislators chose not to apply to
public institutions, is simply too open-ended and unfair.

For all these reasons, I am returning SB 131 without my signature.

Sincerely,



Edmund G. Brown Jr.