BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair S
2013-2014 Regular Session B
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5
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SB 255 (Cannella)
As Amended May 7, 2013
Hearing date: June 4, 2013
Penal Code (Urgency)
JM:mc
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION DEVICES:
PROHIBITED DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
HISTORY
Source: Author
Prior Legislation: AB 919 (Houston) - Ch. 584, Stats. 2008
Support: Crime Victims United of California; California State
Sheriffs' Association
Opposition:American Civil Liberties Union
KEY ISSUE
SHOULD THE ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION OF NUDE IMAGES AND IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION ABOUT THE PERSON DEPICTED BE A MISDEMEANOR WHERE THE
DISTRIBUTION IS DONE WITHOUT CONSENT AND WITH THE INTENT TO
EMOTIONALLY DISTRESS OR HUMILATE?
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PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to provide that a person commits a
misdemeanor where he or she electronically distributes nude
images of and identifying information about another person,
where the distribution is done without consent and with the
intention to cause serious emotional distress or humiliation of
the person depicted.
Stalking, Credible Threats of Harm and Related Crimes
Existing law defines the crime of "stalking" as repeatedly
harassing or following another person in conjunction with the
making of a credible threat against that person or his or her
immediate family. Stalking is an alternate felony-misdemeanor
punishable by up to one year in the county jail and/or a fine of
up to $1000, or by imprisonment in state prison for 16 months, 2
or 3 years, and/or a fine of up to $10,000. (Pen. Code §
646.9.)
Existing law provides that a person who has "suffered
harassment" may seek a temporary restraining order and an
injunction to prevent such harassment. "Harassment" is defined
thus: "[U]nlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct
must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff." (Code. Civ.
Proc. § 527.6.)
Existing law includes the crime of making a credible threat of
death or great bodily injury, which includes the following
elements: The defendant made the threat orally, in writing or
by means of an electronic communication device, with the intent
that it be taken as a threat. The defendant appeared to have
the means and intent to carry out the threat such that the
victim was placed in sustained fear for his own safety or that
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of his immediate family. This crime is an alternate
felony-misdemeanor, punishable by a jail term of up to one year,
a fine of up to $1000, or both, or by imprisonment in a state
prison for 16 months, 2 years or 3 years and a fine of up to
$10,000. (Pen. Code § 422.)
Existing law provides that every person who, with intent to
annoy, telephones or makes contact by means of an electronic
communication device with another and addresses to or about the
other person any obscene language, or addresses to the other
person any threat to inflict injury to the person or property of
the person addressed or any member of his or her family is
guilty of a misdemeanor. The statute does not apply to
communication made in good faith. (Pen. Code § 653m, subd.
(a).)
Existing law provides that every person who makes repeated
telephone calls or makes repeated contacts by means of an
electronic communication device with intent to annoy another
person at his or her residence is guilty of a misdemeanor. The
crime does not include an element that a conversation took place
in the telephone call or electronic contact. The statute does
not apply to communication made in good faith. (Pen. Code §
653m, subd. (b).)
Existing law provides that every person who makes repeated
telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an
electronic communication device with the intent to annoy another
person at his or her place of work is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than $1000, by imprisonment in
a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine
and
imprisonment. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to
telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith. This
subdivision applies only if one or both of the following
circumstances exist:
§ There is a temporary restraining order, an injunction,
or any other court order, or any combination of these court
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orders in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this
section.
§ The person makes repeated telephone calls or contact by
means of an electronic communication device with the intent
to annoy another person at his or her place of work,
totaling more than 10 times in a 24-hour period, whether or
not conversation ensues from the call or contact, and the
calls or contacts are made to the workplace of an adult or
emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse,
cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the
person has a child or has had, or is having, a dating or
engagement relationship. (Pen. Code § 653m, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that a court may issue an ex parte order
enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing,
telephoning, destroying, contacting, coming within a specified
distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party. Upon a
showing of good cause, the order may cover another named family
or household members. (Fam. Code § 6320.) Any willful
violation of such an order is contempt of court, a misdemeanor,
with a maximum jail term of one year, a fine of up to $1000, or
both. (Pen. Code § 166, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that any person who willfully disobeys any
court order is guilty of contempt of court, a misdemeanor,
punishable by up to six months in the county jail, a fine of up
to $1000, or both. (Pen. Code § 16, subd. (a)(4).)
Existing law includes protection for providers, employees,
volunteers and patients of a reproductive health facility, or
persons residing such persons. These provisions included
prohibitions on specified threats and related conduct. A person
covered by this law can seek injunctive relief and money
damages, as specified. (Gov. Code § 6218.)
Existing law provide that every person who, with intent to place
another person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the
safety of the other person's immediate family, by means of an
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electronic communication device without consent of the other
person, and for the purpose of causing that other person
unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment, by a third
party, electronically distributes, publishes, e-mails,
hyperlinks, or makes available for downloading, personal
identifying information, including, but not limited to, a
digital image of another person, or an electronic message of a
harassing nature about another person, is guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in the county jail, by
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000), or by both
that fine and imprisonment. (Pen. Code § 653.2, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that it is a misdemeanor for any person to
intentionally harass a child because of the employment status of
the child's parent or parents. The offense is punishable by a
six month jail term, a $1000 fine, or both. A defendant must
serve a jail term of at least five days for a second conviction,
and at least 30 days for a third or subsequent conviction.
(Pen. Code § 11414, subd. (a).)
Existing law includes the following definitions:
"Harasses" means "knowing and willful conduct directed
at a specific child that seriously alarms, annoys,
torments, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. The conduct must be such as would
cause a reasonable child to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and actually cause the victim to suffer that
distress."
A child, for purposes of this crime, is a person under
the age of 16 years. (Pen. Code
§ 11414, subd. (a).)
Identity Theft and Impersonation
Existing law provides that any person who falsely personates
another person is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor.
False personation involves intentionally assuming the identity
of another person where it is likely that the person whose
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identity was assumed could become liable to prosecution, a
lawsuit or be subject to a debt or penalty. The crime is also
committed where the defendant intentionally assumed the identity
of another person under circumstances where a benefit "might
accrue" to the defendant or any other person. (Pen. Code § 529,
3.)
Existing law provides that one also commits false personation
where he or she assumes the identity of another person to 1)
become a bail or surety for any party, or 2) verify, publish,
acknowledge, or prove any written instrument, with the intent
that the writing be recorded, delivered or used as true. (Pen.
Code § 529, 2.)
Existing law provides that it is an alternative
felony-misdemeanor for a person to willfully obtain the personal
identifying information of another person and to use such
information to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, or
services in the name of the other person without consent. This
alternate felony-misdemeanor is punishable by up to one year in
the county jail, a fine of up to $1000, or both, or by
imprisonment in state prison for 16 months, 2 or 3 years and a
fine of up to $10,000. (Pen. Code § 530.5.)
Existing law provides that every person who, with the intent to
defraud, acquires, transfers, or retains possession of the
personal identifying information, as defined, of another person
is guilty of a public offense; and upon conviction of, shall be
punished by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one
year; a fine not to exceed $1000; or by both that imprisonment
and fine. (Pen. Code § 530.5 (d).)
Production, Distribution and Possession of Child Pornography
Existing law provides that every person who sends, brings,
possesses, prepares, publishes, produces, duplicates or prints
any obscene matter depicting a person under the age of l8 years
engaging in or simulating sexual conduct, with the intent to
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distribute, exhibit, or exchange such material, is guilty of
either a misdemeanor or a felony, punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail up to one year or in the state prison for 16
months, 2 or 3 years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. (Pen.
Code § 311.1.)
Existing law specifies that every person who sends, brings,
possesses, prepares, publishes, produces, duplicates or prints
any obscene matter depicting a person under the age of 18 years
engaging in or simulating sexual conduct for commercial purposes
is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three, or six years and a fine up to $100,000.
(Pen. Code § 311.2, subd. (b).)
Existing law provides that any person who hires or uses a minor
to assist in the preparation or distribution of obscene matter
is guilty of a misdemeanor. If the person has a prior
conviction, the crime is a felony. (Pen. Code § 311.4, subd.
(a).)
Existing law provides that any person who hires or uses a minor
to assist in the possession, preparation or distribution of
obscene matter for commercial purposes is guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six,
or eight years. (Pen. Code § 311.4, subd. (b).)
New Misdemeanor for Electronic Distribution of Nude Images with
the Intent to Humiliate or Cause Emotional Distress
This bill defines a new misdemeanor with the following elements:
The defendant electronically distributed nude images of
another person, along with identifying information about
the other person.
The distribution was done without the consent of the
person depicted.
The defendant intended that the person depicted
experience serious emotional distress or humiliation.
This misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail for up to one year, a fine of up to $1,000, or
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both.
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in California's
prisons has been the focus of evolving and expensive litigation
relating to conditions of confinement. On May 23, 2011, the
United States Supreme Court ordered California to reduce its
prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two
years from the date of its ruling, subject to the right of the
state to seek modifications in appropriate circumstances.
Beginning in early 2007, Senate leadership initiated a policy to
hold legislative proposals which could further aggravate the
prison overcrowding crisis through new or expanded felony
prosecutions. Under the resulting policy known as "ROCA" (which
stands for "Receivership/ Overcrowding Crisis Aggravation"), the
Committee held measures which created a new felony, expanded the
scope or penalty of an existing felony, or otherwise increased
the application of a felony in a manner which could exacerbate
the prison overcrowding crisis. Under these principles, ROCA
was applied as a content-neutral, provisional measure necessary
to ensure that the Legislature did not erode progress towards
reducing prison overcrowding by passing legislation which would
increase the prison population. ROCA necessitated many hard and
difficult decisions for the Committee.
In January of 2013, just over a year after the enactment of the
historic Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, the State of
California filed court documents seeking to vacate or modify the
federal court order issued by the Three-Judge Court three years
earlier to reduce the state's prison population to 137.5 percent
of design capacity. The State submitted in part that the, ". .
. population in the State's 33 prisons has been reduced by over
24,000 inmates since October 2011 when public safety realignment
went into effect, by more than 36,000 inmates compared to the
2008 population . . . , and by nearly 42,000 inmates since 2006
. . . ." Plaintiffs, who opposed the state's motion, argue in
part that, "California prisons, which currently average 150% of
capacity, and reach as high as 185% of capacity at one prison,
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continue to deliver health care that is constitutionally
deficient." In an order dated January 29, 2013, the federal
court granted the state a six-month extension to achieve the
137.5 % prisoner population cap by December 31st of this year.
In an order dated April 11, 2013, the Three-Judge Court denied
the state's motions, and ordered the state of California to
"immediately take all steps necessary to comply with this
Court's . . . Order . . . requiring defendants to reduce overall
prison population to 137.5% design capacity by December 31,
2013."
The ongoing litigation indicates that prison capacity and
related issues concerning conditions of confinement remain
unresolved. However, in light of the real gains in reducing the
prison population that have been made, although even greater
reductions are required by the court, the Committee will review
each ROCA bill with more flexible consideration. The following
questions will inform this consideration:
whether a measure erodes realignment;
whether a measure addresses a crime which is directly
dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there
is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
whether a bill corrects a constitutional infirmity or
legislative drafting error;
whether a measure proposes penalties which are
proportionate, and cannot be achieved through any other
reasonably appropriate remedy; and
whether a bill addresses a major area of public safety
or criminal activity for which there is no other
reasonable, appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
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"Cyber revenge" or "revenge porn" refers to the
posting of illicit pictures of another person without
his or her consent, often as retaliation following a
bitter breakup between partners. Current law is
silent as to the illegality of this disturbing
practice.
While the creation, possession, or distribution of
sexually-charged images of a minor can be charged
according to child pornography prohibitions, the same
actions committed against victims over 18 years old do
not constitute a crime under current statute.
Victims of this cruel act are often so humiliated that
they pose a threat to harming themselves, as evidenced
by numerous examples of cyber revenge victims who have
taken their own lives. Cyber revenge and its ugly
consequences should not be tolerated.
2. Vagueness and Related Issues
Specific Vagueness Issues as to the Terms of the Bill
Both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Due process requires "a reasonable
degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal
law ?" (In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d
786, 792.) "[A] penal statute must define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (Kolender
v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357.)
This bill makes it a misdemeanor to, without consent of the
person depicted, electronically distribute, publish or make
available for downloading any nude images and personal
identifying information of another persons with the intent to
cause the person depicted "substantial emotional distress or
humiliation." The bill does not define the term "nude." The
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term appears to have no special meaning in the law, and thus the
term would be given its ordinary meaning. The New Oxford
American Dictionary (Oxford Univ. Press, 2005) defines nude as
"wearing no clothes, naked." The bill can thus be interpreted
as meaning that the crime has not been committed where the
person depicted is wearing any item of clothing, even an item of
clothing that would perhaps increase the humiliating nature of
the image, such as a depiction of a man wearing an item of
women's lingerie.
The bill does not provide what would constitute "substantial
emotional distress or humiliation." Further, the bill does not
include an element that the person depicted would reasonably
suffer emotional distress or humiliation because of the nature
of the image. The crime is defined in terms of the intent of
the defendant. As such, a person would appear to be guilty of
the crime if he or she intended the person depicted to be
emotionally distressed or humiliated, regardless of whether or
not a reasonable person would be distressed or humiliated by the
image. A person who posts a nude image with the intent to
humiliate the subject of the image could be guilty of the crime
even if the person depicted was pleased or gratified by the
distribution of the image.
Element that the Image be Accompanied by Identifying Information
The requirement that the image be accompanied by "personal
identifying information" about the person depicted also raises
issues about how the bill would be applied. A defendant could
post, send or make available an image of a readily identifiable
person and not be guilty of the crime if no personal identifying
information was included with the image. The defendant could
send the image under circumstances where the person depicted is
particularly likely to be identified and humiliated - such as
sending nude images to the person's spouse, employer, parent or
child. Nevertheless, the defendant could likely have a valid
defense to the crime if the image was not accompanied by
personal identifying information, such as a name and address,
telephone number, driver's license number or other information
defined as "personal identifying information" in Penal Code
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Section 530.55, which is a section in the identity theft law.
Application of the Bill to Non-Sexual Circumstances
The context in which the bill arises indicates that the author
is concerned about the use of sexual images to humiliate the
person depicted. However, the bill could apply in other
contexts, such as an intent to humiliate a person because he or
she is obese, or whose appearance could otherwise be subject to
ridicule.
In sum, the terms of this bill present a number of issues as to
how the bill would be applied and interpreted. It could be
difficult for ordinary citizens to understand what the law
prohibits or requires.
DOES THIS BILL RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF VAGUENESS?
3. First Amendment Issues
This bill makes it a crime for a person to distribute the nude
image of another person with the intent to cause substantial
emotional distress or humiliation. As such, the bill
criminalizes a form of expression, which is included within the
definition of speech. (Texas v. Johnson (1989) 491 U.S. 397.)
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." (Id, at p. 414.)
Unless a particularly narrow exception applies, protection of
expression under the First Amendment is not limited to certain
subjects or ideas. A restriction on the "content" of
expression, as distinguished from the time, place and manner of
expressions is presumptively invalid. A content-based
restriction on expressive conduct is subject to "strict
scrutiny" and must promote a "compelling state interest" by the
"least restrictive means" to achieve the compelling interest.
(Sable Communications v. FCC (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126.)
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A similar bill to this bill was introduced in the Florida
Legislature this year. The bill failed passage.<1> The staff
analysis of the Florida bill stated:
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the United
States Supreme Court stated: "[T]he growth of the
Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As
a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of
ideas than encourage it. The interest in encouraging
freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship."
The bill makes it a crime to knowingly transmit or
post to a website or social networking service any
photograph or video that depicts nudity of an
individual which contains the personal identification
information of that individual. To the extent that
the bill regulates content of speech protected by the
First Amendment, it could be challenged as being
unconstitutional.
A content-based restriction on expression will be struck down as
invalid on its face if it prohibits clearly protected speech, in
addition to conduct that may validly be prohibited. Such a law
is said to be unconstitutionally "overbroad." (U.S. v. Stevens
(2010) 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1587.) Stevens considered a federal
statute that criminalized the sale or possession of "depictions
of animal cruelty," in order to prohibit fetishistic "crush
videos" of the killing of animals for sexual gratification.
Stevens was prosecuted for distribution of videos of dog fights
and the government argued that the law was limited in intent to
such depictions. The Supreme Court found that the statute was
overbroad in that it might reach videos depicting hunting,
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<1>
http://www.tallahassee.com/viewart/20130505/NEWS01/305050029/Bill
s-failed-2013-Fla-Legislature.
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arguably inhumane treatment of livestock, or activities legal in
some jurisdictions but not others, such as cockfighting. (Id,
at pp. 1588-1592.)
Arguably, the crime defined by this bill includes conduct that
is protected under the First Amendment or otherwise legal. The
bill could apply to behavior that involves specified use of a
photograph that the defendant legally possesses, including where
the defendant photographed another person in a public place.
For example, this bill could apply where the defendant took a
photo of a person at a nude beach that is open to the public.
The bill could apply in cases where the person depicted gave the
defendant full consent to take and possess the photograph or
other image, but then does not consent to distribution of the
image. Depending on the context of the distribution, the
defendant could be sued for libel if the image is accompanied by
false information that the person depicted is, for example,
available for sex with strangers.
Courts have long stated that political speech and speech
concerning public issues are entitled to great protection under
the First Amendment. (Burson v. Freeman (1992) 504 U.S. 191,
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1983) 460 U.S.
37, 45.) Political speech can be harsh, and one could conclude
that political speech may be intended to humiliate the target
of the communication or expressive conduct. The Weiner
incident is one example. Anthony Wiener posted a semi-nude
picture of himself on his public Twitter account. Although he
quickly removed the images, political activists captured the
images and re-posted them. Other images Weiner had sent to a
woman in Texas were reposted on the Internet. False identities
were used by activists to target Weiner.<2> Weiner certainly
did not authorize or consent to others, including political
activist, reposting the images. Many of the person who
captured and reposted the images of Weiner could be described
as having an intent to humiliate Wiener and cause him emotional
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<2>
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/nyregion/fake-identities-were-u
sed-on-twitter-to-get-information-on-weiner.html?ref=anthonydwein
er&_r=0.
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distress.
First Amendment issues often overlap vagueness issues. As
concerns this bill, those issues perhaps arise most clearly as
concerns the concept of the intent to cause substantial
emotional distress. Criminal law includes crimes involving true
threats of harm against another person. (See, Pen. Code § 422.)
Civil law includes the tort (wrong against a private person or
entity) of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress involves extreme
and outrageous conduct by the defendant that causes the
plaintiff severe or extreme emotional distress. (Hughes v. Pair
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) Nevertheless, even speech
intended to create substantial emotional distress may be
protected by the First Amendment, particularly where the subject
of the speech concerns a public issue. Further, what
constitutes a matter of public concern is not well defined.
(Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-1216; Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell (1988) 108 S. Ct. 876.)
IS CONDUCT COVERED BY THIS BILL PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
4. Incident that Prompted Introduction of the Bill - Suicide of
Girl who was Sexually Assaulted and Humiliated by Photos of
the Incident - Perpetrators Committed Child Pornography and
Sexual Assault Felonies
There have been numerous publicized incidents of cyber revenge
or humiliation that involved the posting of nude or sexually
explicit photos, including a notorious rape case in
Steubenville, Ohio. However, it appears that this bill was
specifically prompted by an incident involving a
15-year-old girl name Audrie in Saratoga, California. Audrie
became very intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness at a
party. Three boys - Audrie's high school classmates - took off
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some or much of her clothing, sexually assaulted her, wrote
crude and demeaning phrases on her body and took at least one
cell-phone photo of an intimate part of her body. She awoke in
the morning to find her shorts pulled down and the crude
drawings or words on her body. When the photo was shown to
other students at school, Audrie became very distraught.<3>
About a week later, Audrie hung herself.
The boys involved in the incident have been charged in juvenile
court with sexual battery and distribution of child pornography.
<4> Sexual battery is an alternate felony-misdemeanor, with a
felony imprisonment term of two, three or four years.
Possession of child pornography is an alternate
felony-misdemeanor, with a felony imprisonment term of 16
months, two year, or three years. Distribution of child
pornography to a minor is a felony.
Audrie's parents have argued that the boys involved in the
incident should be tried as adults. Assuming that the boys were
at least 16 years old at the time of the incident, the
prosecutor could seek an order transferring the boys to adult
court. To prevail, the prosecutor would be required to show
that boys are un-amenable to treatment in juvenile court under
five factors concerning the nature and sophistication of the
crime, the delinquency records of the boys and their amenability
to rehabilitation. The court shall transfer a minor to adult
court if the prosecutor establishes any one of the factors.
(Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a).) Media reports indicate
that the boys are not likely to be tried as adults, but that is
also not clear. The boys have been released to home detention
---------------------------
<3> Media reports indicated that the photos were widely
distributed at school and uploaded to social media. However,
the school paper reported that about 10 students saw the photo,
which was not uploaded to social media.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2331089/Audrie-Pott-Famil
y-girl-killed-maintains-subjected-humiliation-cyber-bullying.html
?ito=feeds-newsxml.
<4>
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/localnews/ci_23322813/girls-suic
ide-after-alleged-attack-troubles-town.
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pending the jurisdictional hearing (trial) in juvenile court.<5>
WHERE A PERSON DISTRIBUTES NUDE IMAGES OF A MINOR, HAS THE
PERSON LIKELY COMMITTED MULTIPLE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CRIMES?
5. Cyber Revenge Case from Tulare County
An unpublished appellate case in Tulare County illustrates the
use of cyber revenge to harass, defame and humiliate a former
spouse or partner.<6> Michael Rosa sought revenge against his
former spouse Jennifer. Ross threatened to kill Jennifer if she
left him and threatened to kill Jennifer's new husband. Rosa
posted false Internet ads that included nude photos of Jennifer
and false solicitations for men to meet her for oral sex.
Numerous men telephoned and came to her place of employment at a
bank. Rosa was charged with and convicted of numerous counts of
stalking, false personation, identity theft and unauthorized
electronic distribution of identifying information.
The decision also noted that Rosa was civilly liable for
defaming Jennifer because of the false sexual solicitations. In
many cases of the posting of nude images of another with the
intent to distress or humiliate, the person who posted the
images may be civilly liable for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
WHERE A PERSON FRADULENTLY POSTS NUDE PHOTOS AND FALSE
SOLICITATIONS IN THE IMAGE OF ANOTHER PERSON, CAN THE PERSON WHO
POSTED THE MATERIAL BE CHARGED WITH IDENTITY THEFT AND RELATED
CRIMES?
CAN SUCH BEHAVIOR ALSO BE THE GROUNDS FOR CIVIL SUITS ALLEGING
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<5>
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2331089/Audrie-Pott-Famil
y-girl-killed-maintains-subjected-humiliation-cyber-bullying.html
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<6>
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=eb1aa980bb8720dcd21b0e4
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SB 255 (Cannella)
PageR
DEFAMATION AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?
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