BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair S
2013-2014 Regular Session B
3
1
3
SB 313 (De León)
As Introduced February 15, 2013
Hearing date: April 9, 2013
Government Code
SM:mc
POLICE MISCONDUCT AND "BRADY LISTS"
HISTORY
Source: Peace Officer Research Association of California
(PORAC)
California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP)
Prior Legislation:AB 2543 (Alejo) - Failed passage, Senate
Public Safety
SB 638 (De León) - Died in Senate Public Safety,
2011
AB 1873 (Koretz) - Ch. 63, Stats. 2002
AB 2040 (Diaz) - Ch. 391, Stats. 2002
AB 2559 (Cardoza) - Ch. 971, Stats. 2000
AB 1016 (Hertzberg) - Ch. 25, Stats. 1998
AB 3434 (House) - Ch. 1108, Stats. 1996
Support: Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs;
Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs;
California Correctional Peace Officers Association;
California Fraternal Order of Police; California
Statewide Law Enforcement Association; Long Beach
Police Officers Association; Los Angeles County
Probation Officers Union; Los Angeles County
Professional Peace Officers Association; Los Angeles
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 2
Police Protective League; Riverside Sheriffs
Association; Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff's
Association; Santa Ana Police Officers Association
Opposition:American Civil Liberties Union; California
Association of Joint Powers Authorities (CAJPA);
California Police Chiefs Association; California State
Association of Counties (CSAC); California State
Sheriffs' Association; League of California Cities
(LCC); Marin County Council of Mayors and
Councilmembers
KEY ISSUES
SHOULD ANY PUBLIC AGENCY BE PROHIBITED FROM TAKING ANY PUNITIVE
ACTION, OR DENIAL OF PROMOTION ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN MERIT, AGAINST
ANY PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE THAT OFFICER'S NAME HAS BEEN
PLACED ON A BRADY LIST?
SHOULD ANY PUBLIC AGENCY BE PROHIBITED FROM TAKING ANY PUNITIVE
ACTION, OR DENIAL OF PROMOTION ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN MERIT, AGAINST
ANY PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE THAT OFFICER'S NAME MAY BE SUBJECT
TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO BRADY V. MARYLAND?
SHOULD IT BE PROHIBITED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC SAFETY
OFFICER'S NAME HAS BEEN PLACED ON A BRADY LIST, OR MAY OTHERWISE BE
SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO BRADY V. MARYLAND IN ANY
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF A PUNITIVE ACTION, OR IN ANY CIVIL
PROCEEDING BETWEEN THE OFFICE OR THE PUBLIC AGENCY, EXCEPT AS
SPECIFIED?
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to provide that (1) no punitive
action, or denial of promotion on grounds other than merit,
shall be undertaken by any public agency against any public
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 3
safety officer because that officer's name has been placed on a
Brady list, or that the officer's name may otherwise be subject
to disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland ; (2) this shall not
prohibit a public agency from taking punitive action, denying
promotion on grounds other than merit, or taking other personnel
action against a public safety officer based on the underlying
acts or omissions for which that officer's name was placed on a
Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland , if the actions taken by the public agency
otherwise conform to this chapter and to the rules and
procedures adopted by the local agency; and (3) evidence that a
public safety officer's name has been placed on a Brady list, or
may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland , shall not be introduced for any purpose in any
administrative appeal of a punitive action, or in any civil
proceeding between the officer or the public agency, except as
follows: evidence that a public safety officer's name was placed
on a Brady list may only be introduced if, during the
administrative appeal of a punitive action against an officer,
the underlying act or omission for which that officer's name was
placed on a Brady list is proven and the officer is found to be
subject to some form of punitive action. Evidence that a public
safety officer's name was placed on a Brady list pursuant to
this subdivision shall only be used for the sole purpose of
determining the type or level of punitive action to be imposed.
Current law generally governs law enforcement agencies
conducting internal affairs investigations of peace officers.
(Gov. Code §§ 3300-3313.) This is known as the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. Existing law provide
peace officers with several procedural rights in these
investigations. (Gov. Code § 3304.) Some of those procedural
rights include:
No public safety officer shall be subjected to punitive
action, or denied promotion, or be threatened with any such
treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights
granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights
under any existing administrative grievance procedure.
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 4
Nothing in this section shall preclude a head of an
agency from ordering a public safety officer to cooperate
with other agencies involved in criminal investigations.
If an officer fails to comply with such an order, the
agency may officially charge him or her with
insubordination.
No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds
other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency
against any public safety officer who has successfully
completed the probationary period that may be required by
his or her employing agency without providing the public
safety officer with an opportunity for administrative
appeal.
Except as specified, no punitive action, nor denial of
promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken
for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if
the investigation of the allegation is not completed within
one year of the public agency's discovery by a person
authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation
of an act, omission, or other misconduct. In the event that
the public agency determines that discipline may be taken,
it shall complete its investigation and notify the public
safety officer of its proposed discipline by a Letter of
Intent or Notice of Adverse Action articulating the
discipline that year, except as specified. The public
agency shall not be required to impose the discipline
within that one-year period.
Where a pre-disciplinary response or grievance procedure
is required or utilized, the time for this response or
procedure shall not be governed or limited by this chapter.
If, after investigation and any pre-disciplinary
response or procedure, the public agency decides to impose
discipline, the public agency shall notify the public
safety officer in writing of its decision to impose
discipline, including the date that the discipline will be
imposed, within 30 days of its decision, except if the
public safety officer is unavailable for discipline. (Gov.
Code § 3304.)
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 5
Current law provides that no public safety officer shall have
any comment adverse to his interest entered in his personnel
file, or any other file used for any personnel purposes by his
employer, without the public safety officer having first read
and signed the instrument containing the adverse comment
indicating he is aware of such comment, except that such entry
may be made if after reading such instrument the public safety
officer refuses to sign it. Should a public safety officer
refuse to sign, that fact shall be noted on that document, and
signed or initialed by such officer. (Gov. Code § 3305.)
This bill would add the following provisions to the Public
Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights:
No punitive action, or denial of promotion on grounds
other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency
against any public safety officer because that officer's
name has been placed on a Brady list, or that the officer's
name may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a public agency
from taking punitive action, denying promotion on grounds
other than merit, or taking other personnel action against
a public safety officer based on the underlying acts or
omissions for which that officer's name was placed on a
Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to disclosure
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, if the
actions taken by the public agency otherwise conform to
this chapter and to the rules and procedures adopted by the
local agency.
Evidence that a public safety officer's name has been
placed on a Brady list, or may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S.
83, shall not be introduced for any purpose in any
administrative appeal of a punitive action, or in any civil
proceeding between the office or the public agency, except
as follows:
Evidence that a public safety officer's name was placed
on a Brady list may only be introduced if, during the
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 6
administrative appeal of a punitive action against an
officer, the underlying act or omission for which that
officer's name was placed on a Brady list is proven and the
officer is found to be subject to some form of punitive
action. Evidence that a public safety officer's name was
placed on a Brady list pursuant to this subdivision shall
only be used for the sole purpose of determining the type
or level of punitive action to be imposed.
This bill defines "Brady list" to mean "any system, index, list,
or other record containing the names of peace officers whose
personnel files are likely to contain evidence of dishonesty or
bias, which is maintained by a prosecutorial agency or office in
accordance with the holding in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S.
83."
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in California's
prisons has been the focus of evolving and expensive litigation
relating to conditions of confinement. On May 23, 2011, the
United States Supreme Court ordered California to reduce its
prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two
years from the date of its ruling, subject to the right of the
state to seek modifications in appropriate circumstances.
Beginning in early 2007, Senate leadership initiated a policy to
hold legislative proposals which could further aggravate the
prison overcrowding crisis through new or expanded felony
prosecutions. Under the resulting policy known as "ROCA" (which
stands for "Receivership/ Overcrowding Crisis Aggravation"), the
Committee held measures which created a new felony, expanded the
scope or penalty of an existing felony, or otherwise increased
the application of a felony in a manner which could exacerbate
the prison overcrowding crisis. Under these principles, ROCA
was applied as a content-neutral, provisional measure necessary
to ensure that the Legislature did not erode progress towards
reducing prison overcrowding by passing legislation which would
increase the prison population. ROCA necessitated many hard and
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 7
difficult decisions for the Committee.
In January of 2013, just over a year after the enactment of the
historic Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, the State of
California filed court documents seeking to vacate or modify the
federal court order to reduce the state's prison population to
137.5 percent of design capacity. The State submitted in part
that the, ". . . population in the State's 33 prisons has been
reduced by over 24,000 inmates since October 2011 when public
safety realignment went into effect, by more than 36,000 inmates
compared to the 2008 population . . . , and by nearly 42,000
inmates since 2006 . . . ." Plaintiffs, who oppose the state's
motion, argue in part that, "California prisons, which currently
average 150% of capacity, and reach as high as 185% of capacity
at one prison, continue to deliver health care that is
constitutionally deficient."
In an order dated January 29, 2013, the federal court granted
the state a six-month extension to achieve the 137.5 % prisoner
population cap by December 31st of this year.
The ongoing litigation indicates that prison capacity and
related issues concerning conditions of confinement remain
unsettled. However, in light of the real gains in reducing the
prison population that have been made, although even greater
reductions are required by the court, the Committee will review
each ROCA bill with more flexible consideration. The following
questions will inform this consideration:
whether a measure erodes realignment;
whether a measure addresses a crime which is directly
dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there
is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
whether a bill corrects a constitutional infirmity or
legislative drafting error; whether a measure proposes
penalties which are proportionate, and cannot be achieved
through any other reasonably appropriate remedy; and
whether a bill addresses a major area of public safety
or criminal activity for which there is no other
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 8
reasonable, appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
Act (POBOR) provides a set of rights and procedural
protections to specified public safety officers.
However, the Act fails to address a disturbing trend
in law enforcement in which public
agencies take punitive actions against their public
safety officer employees based solely on the officers'
inclusion on Brady lists, without regard for
underlying facts.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that withholding exculpatory
evidence violates due process "where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment." Courts
have interpreted this to mean that prosecutors are
required to disclose to the defense evidence favorable
to a defendant that is either exculpatory or
impeaching and is material to either guilt or
punishment. In recent years, several District
Attorneys and Public Defenders have established "Brady
lists" containing the names of public safety officers
whom they believe have committed some act that, when
presented to a jury, might be used for impeachment
purposes or as exculpatory evidence in criminal
trials.
The standard for placing public safety officers on
Brady lists varies from county to county. Some
counties implement and maintain a Brady policy with no
discernible standards for inclusion or mechanisms for
appeal, which results in the arbitrary and perpetual
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 9
placement of public safety officers on Brady lists.
Because prosecutors enjoy absolute prosecutorial
immunity and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, it
is impossible to challenge one's placement on a Brady
list, even if that placement was malicious or made in
error.
There have been several instances where a local public
agency has taken punitive action against a public
safety officer employee based on that officer's
placement on a Brady list for alleged misconduct -
whether or not the misconduct actually occurred.
For example, in Neri v. County of Stanislaus District
Attorney's Office, No. 10-823, slip op., 2010 WL
3582575 (E.D. Cal 2010), a police officer's employment
was terminated because the County District Attorney
placed him on the County's Brady list. The court
acknowledged that the allegations for which the
officer had been placed on the list were unsustained
and unfounded, yet dismissed the officer's lawsuit
based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
Another one of PORAC's legal representatives is
currently litigating a case involving a Torrance
police officer terminated for placement on the Los
Angeles County Brady list. The Police Department
investigated the underlying incident (a wall stop for
narcotics) four years earlier and decided that no
discipline was warranted. The Department now admits
that it is terminating him for the sole fact that his
name is on the Brady list, not because of the
underlying incident (Nazir v. County of Los Angeles et
al., No. 10-6546 (C.D. Cal filed Sept. 1, 2010). Just
as in all of the other cases, the County of Los
Angeles has asserted absolute prosecutorial immunity
and Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 10
These types of cases render illusory the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act because public
safety officers are being terminated on the basis of
nothing more than allegations. Without uniform
criteria for placement on the Brady List, public
safety officers should be evaluated based on their
merits and for the underlying reasons they are
investigated.
2. What is a Brady List?
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a prosecutor in a
criminal case withholds material evidence from the accused
person that is favorable to the accused, this violates the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. (Ibid at 87, see also
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).) Brady and Giglio
impose on prosecutors a duty to disclose to the defendant
material evidence that would be favorable to the accused.
If the prosecutor is aware of misconduct, past or present, on
the part of a police officer who may be called as a witness in a
case, and that misconduct could discredit or "impeach" the
officer's testimony, the prosecutor has an obligation to turn
that evidence over to the defendant. "Impeachment evidence is
exculpatory evidence within the meaning of Brady. Brady/Giglio
information includes 'material . . . that bears on the
credibility of a significant witness in the case.'" (United
States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 387-388 (9th Cir. 2004,
citations omitted).)
Failure to divulge this information may result in a variety of
sanctions being imposed on the prosecution including, e.g.,
striking a witnesses' testimony or complete reversal of a
conviction. "Reversal is required when there is a 'reasonable
possibility' that the error materially affected the verdict."
(United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 790, 99 S. Ct. 1538
(1979).) A federal court recently described why this obligation
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 11
is imposed: "Prosecutors are entrusted with the authority and
responsibility to protect public safety and uphold the integrity
of the judicial system. They perform the latter, in part, by
ensuring that criminal defendants are offered all potentially
exculpatory or impeaching information." (Lackey v. Lewis
County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94674 (D. Wash. 2009).)
As a result of this obligation, prosecutors' offices have a duty
to seek that information out from other law enforcement
agencies.
Because the prosecution is in a unique position to
obtain information known to other agents of the
government, it may not be excused from disclosing what
it does not know but could have learned." A
prosecutor's duty under Brady necessarily requires the
cooperation of other government agents who might
possess Brady material. In United States v.
Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended),
we explained why "it is the government's, not just the
prosecutor's, conduct which may give rise to a Brady
violation." Exculpatory evidence cannot be kept out
of the hands of the defense just because the
prosecutor does not have it, where an investigating
agency does. That would undermine Brady by allowing
the investigating agency to prevent production by
keeping a report out of the prosecutor's hands until
the agency decided the prosecutor ought to have it,
and by allowing the prosecutor to tell the
investigators not to give him certain materials unless
he asked for them. (United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d
382, 387-388 (9th Cir. 2004).)
The term "Brady list" refers to a list kept by a prosecutor's
office, of police officers for whom the prosecutor's office has
determined evidence of misconduct exists that would have to be
turned over to the defense pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.
3. The Effect of This Bill
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 12
This bill would prevent any public agency from taking any
punitive action or denial of promotion against any public safety
officer because that officer's name has been placed on a Brady
list, or that the officer's name may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. The agency could take
such action, however, as a result of the underlying conduct that
resulted in the officer being placed on, or being subject to
being placed on, a Brady list. For example, if a peace officer
is convicted of petty theft, a misdemeanor, his employing agency
might decide that a 30-day suspension was warranted. However,
the District Attorney's office might decide that, because that
crime involved dishonestly or "moral turpitude," and could
therefore be used to impeach the officer's testimony, in order
to comply with Brady requirements, the fact of that conviction
would have to be disclosed to any defendant in any case in which
that officer needed to be called as a witness. Therefore, the
DA's office might put that officer's name on a "Brady list" to
flag for its deputy DA's the need to disclose this evidence if
they ever need to call that officer as a witness. The fact that
this "Brady material" has to be disclosed, and could be used to
impeach the officer's testimony, could seriously damage the
prosecutor's ability to obtain a conviction in any case in which
that officer was a necessary witness. Consequently, the
officer's employing agency might conclude that that officer
could no longer perform their job duties and needed to be
dismissed or, at a minimum, the officer needed to be transferred
to duty that did not involve making arrests, which the officer
would undoubtedly consider a punitive action.
This bill would prohibit any public agency from taking any
punitive action against the officer based on the fact that he or
she was placed on a "Brady list" but would allow that action so
long as it is based only on the underlying conduct that caused
the officer to be placed on the list. In the hypothetical
example described above, this would mean the officer could be
suspended, transferred or fired for committing the petty theft
but not for the fact that the DA's office placed the officer on
the "Brady list."
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 13
In practical terms it would be difficult, if not impossible, for
an employer to establish whether the punitive action, or denial
of promotion, was taken because of the DA's decision to place
the officer on the Brady list or because of the underlying
reason the DA took that action, i.e., the petty theft
conviction. This bill goes farther, however, and provides that
no punitive action could
be taken because "the officer's name may otherwise be subject to
disclosure pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83."
In other words, no punitive action or denial of promotion could
be taken based on the fact that an officer's conduct might
result in their being placed on a Brady list.
It is foreseeable that the effect of this bill would be that in
many instances where an adverse employment action is taken
against an officer for misconduct that has been clearly
established (e.g. a criminal conviction), the employee could
claim the action was based on the concomitant fact that the
misconduct is subject to disclosure under Brady. It is not
clear how the employer could prove otherwise. By making it more
difficult for agencies to fire officers whose testimony may be
impeached with their own acts of misconduct, the end result
could be that prosecutors will have a harder time obtaining
convictions in cases involving those officers or may decline to
even file charges in such cases.
Another foreseeable effect could be that police and sheriff's
departments will be forced to retain officers whose misconduct,
for example for use of excessive force, has subjected the
department to liability, and could do so again in the future.
Because that misconduct may be subject to disclosure under
Brady, any attempt by the employing department to terminate the
officer, or even move him or her to a desk job, could be
challenged on the grounds that it was not the misconduct that
motivated the disciplinary action, but the fact that it would be
subject to disclosure under Brady. Again, because the misconduct
would be subject to disclosure under Brady, the employer would
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 14
be put in the near impossible position of having to establish
that its reason for taking the disciplinary action was based on
the officer's use of excessive force but not based on the fact
that that misconduct was subject to disclosure under Brady.
The sponsors of the bill have stated that the discretion given
to district attorneys to place an officer on a Brady list allows
for unwarranted personnel action to be taken against peace
officers at the whim of a DA. They state that there are
examples of this being done for malicious reasons and they
correctly point out that the courts have held that DA's have
immunity for these decisions. (Neri v. County of Stanislaus
Dist. Attorney's Office, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99839 (2010).)
Members may wish to consider whether the potential for a DA to
act maliciously in this way justifies the remedy proposed in
this bill given the burden this bill might place on a law
enforcement agency in an employment action against an officer
for misconduct, where that action is truly warranted.
4. Disclosure in Administrative Appeals
The bill addresses when evidence that an officer's name was
placed on a Brady list could be introduced at an administrative
appeal of a punitive action against an officer. Under this
provision, such evidence could only be introduced if "during the
administrative appeal of a punitive action against an officer,
the underlying act or omission for which that officer's name was
placed on a Brady list is proven and the officer is found to be
subject to some form of punitive action. Evidence that a public
safety officer's name was placed on a Brady list pursuant to
this subdivision shall only be used for the sole purpose of
determining the type or level of punitive action to be imposed."
(More)
This appears to contemplate a bifurcated administrative hearing
process with one phase to determine the validity of the
misconduct charged, and a second phase to determine the
employer's motive in taking the punitive action. Only in the
second phase could evidence of the officer having been placed on
a Brady list be introduced. This would apply only to
administrative appeals of punitive actions, not in civil
actions, where the total ban on introduction of evidence
regarding Brady would still apply. This exception also states
that it only applies to cases in which an officer's name is
actually placed on a Brady list whereas the prohibitions of the
bill would apply to the broader category of whenever an
officer's misconduct is subject to disclosure under Brady.
This amendment doesn't appear to alter the basic dilemma
presented by this bill, how would the employer ever be able to
establish that the reason an action was taken against the
employee was the employee's misconduct as opposed to the fact
that the misconduct is disclosable under Brady?
5. Argument in Support
The L.A. County Probation Officers Union states:
The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
(POBOR) provides a set of rights and procedural
protections to peace officers. There have been
numerous instances where a local public agency has
taken punitive action, including the denial of
promotions and dismissal, against a public safety
officer employee based on that officer's placement
onto a Brady list for alleged misconduct - even if the
misconduct had not actually occurred. As a result,
the employment of public safety officers can be
terminated based on nothing more than allegations of
misconduct, once an officer is placed on the "Brady
list."
The standard for placing public safety officers on
(More)
SB 313 (De León)
Page 16
Brady lists varies from county to county. Some
counties implement and maintain a Brady policy with no
discernible standards for inclusion or mechanisms for
appeal, which can result in the arbitrary and
perpetual placement of public safety officers on Brady
lists. Because prosecutors enjoy absolute
prosecutorial immunity and immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, it is impossible to challenge one's
placement on a Brady list, even if that placement was
malicious or made in error.
SB 313 seeks to stop the unfair practice of punitive
action against peace officers for the mere reason of
being placed on the Brady list. SP 313 allows
management to take actions against officers for the
underlying action that caused the officer to be
investigated based on merit and for the underlying
reason they are investigated.
Placement on a "Brady List" is a "scarlet letter" for
peace officers. Taking disciplinary action against an
officer, up to and including firing that officer,
should never occur unless the underlying cause is both
proven true, and the conduct warrants such action.
6. Argument in Opposition
The California State Sheriff's Association states:
Once a law enforcement officer has engaged in
misconduct that requires law enforcement agencies
and/or district attorneys' offices to make disclosures
under the United States Constitution pursuant to
Brady, the ability of that officer to serve a
department is compromised. An officer may no longer
be allowed to testify in court because doing so could
subject a criminal case to reversal or subject a
county to civil liability if a wrongful conviction
SB 313 (De León)
Page 17
results. Unfortunately, if an officer is no longer
able to testify under oath, he or she is no longer
able to serve reliably on patrol, effectuate arrests,
or file reports. However, SB 313 would prohibit the
reassignment of that officer to other departmental
functions, because that could be considered punitive.
Ultimately this may result in untrustworthy and
unreliable officers patrolling the community,
undermining the public trust and credibility of the
rest of the department.
***************