BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Senator Noreen Evans, Chair
2013-2014 Regular Session
SB 380 (Padilla)
As Amended April 23, 2013
Hearing Date: May 7, 2013
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
RD
SUBJECT
Communications: Service Interruptions
DESCRIPTION
This bill would require a governmental entity to obtain an
order, signed by a judicial officer, making specified findings,
before it could interrupt communications services for the
purpose of protecting public safety or preventing the use of
those services for an illegal purpose. This bill would also
require that the order meet certain requirements, including,
among other things, that it:
authorize the interruption only for as long as reasonably
necessary;
require the interruption to cease once the danger justifying
the interruption is abated; and
specify a process to immediately serve notice on the
communications service provider to cease the interruption.
This bill would provide a limited exception to the above
requirements, whereby a governmental entity could interrupt
services without obtaining an order in advance.
This bill would, among other things, grant immunity to
communications service providers who comply with an order or
statement of intent in good faith, as specified.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2011, Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) police at
the Civic Center BART station in San Francisco fatally shot a
homeless man, Charles Blair Hill, who was reportedly intoxicated
(more)
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and carrying a knife. (Fagin, Man Shot to Death by BART Police
Identified, S.F. Chronicle (Jul. 8, 2011)
[as of May 1, 2012].) In response, on July 11,
approximately 100 people gathered at the Civic Center platform
in protest and obstructed rush-hour traffic, blocking the doors
to the trains and forcing BART to shut down several stations.
(Ho, BART: Next Time "Zero" Tolerance for Disruptions, S.F.
Chronicle (Jul. 13, 2011)
[as of May. 1, 2013].) Train delays reportedly
averaged only seven minutes, but commuters experienced
substantial delays from missing connections. The group behind
the protest had initially formed two years prior, in protest of
the shooting death of another (unarmed) passenger, Oscar Grant,
by a BART officer. The group's goal was seemingly to disband
the BART police force, but in the short term (at the time of the
protest), it wanted the transit agency to release video of the
incident that resulted in Mr. Hill's shooting. (Id.)
A month later, BART shut down subterranean cell service at
various stations to thwart a second protest, citing organizers'
plans to disrupt BART service using "mobile devices to
coordinate their disruptive activities and communicate about the
location and number of BART Police." (BART Press Release,
Statement on Temporary Wireless Service Interruption in Select
BART Stations on Aug. 11 (Aug. 12, 2011)
[as
of May 1, 2013].) The blackout was reportedly the first of its
kind in the nation.
Wireless-enabled devices facilitate many types of First
Amendment-protected speech, from discussing family dinner plans,
to scheduling business meetings, to seeking assistance, to
making plans to engage in political discourse, and otherwise.
The importance of wireless devices to social and political
discourse and to the free expression of public dissatisfaction
with those in power has been highlighted in the last few years.
From Iran to Egypt to Syria, the world has witnessed the
importance of mobile devices and connection to the Internet for
people seeking to challenge the acts or authority of their
governments. These devices can be vital to social and political
speech, which lies at the core of the First Amendment. They
have also proven to be critical to public safety
efforts-alerting the police or first responders to crimes or
suspected crimes, potentially providing them with a variety of
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essential information about a suspect (or suspects), not to
mention giving the public a glimpse into what really happened in
times of crisis. In fact, approximately 70 percent of all 9-1-1
calls now reportedly originate from cell phones. (See Federal
Communications Commission's Public Notice, Commission Seeks
Comment on Certain Wireless Interruptions, GN Docket No. 12-52
(Mar. 1, 2012)
[as of May. 1, 2013].)
At the same time, cellular phones raise somewhat novel questions
with respect to government regulations and First Amendment law,
particularly with regard to the question of the government's
ability to target specific wireless lines that are tied to a
suspected imminent threat. Whether wireless service can be
shutdown in a targeted fashion equivalent to disconnection of
landline services is a subject of current concern; interruption
of wireless service could, as a matter of infrastructure,
require shutting down of service for a much larger geographic
area than with landlines, and, as a result, infringe on the
protected speech of bystanders in the area as well.
Recognizing the significant legal and policy questions and
concerns surrounding this issue, on March 1, 2012, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) issued a notice seeking public
comment on issues of wireless service interruptions, indicating
that national rules may be issued on this matter in the near
future. The FCC indicated it was seeking public comment, in
part, because of a public agency that temporarily interrupted
wireless service on parts of a mass transit system due to stated
concerns about public safety. As of the date of this analysis,
it is unclear what, if anything has resulted from that public
comment period.
Last year, SB 1160 (Padilla, 2012) was introduced to prohibit
service interruption by a government entity or service provider,
at the direction of a government entity, unless an order is
provided by a judicial officer, as defined, making specified
findings. SB 1160 was approved by this Committee but vetoed by
Governor Brown over public safety concerns.
This bill would similarly require a governmental entity to
obtain an order, as specified, before shutting down
communications services. Unlike SB 1160, this bill would permit
the interruption of communications services without an order in
certain "exceptional emergency situations," provided that the
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governmental entity meets certain requirements and seeks an
order within a certain timeframe.
On April 16, 2013, this bill passed the Senate Committee on
Energy, Utilities & Communications on a vote of 10-0.
CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
Existing federal law , the U.S. Constitution, provides that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
(U.S. Const., 1st Amend., as applied to the states through the
14th Amendment's Due Process Clause; see Gitlow v. New York
(1925) 268 U.S. 652.)
Existing case law provides that prior restraints on speech bear
a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality. (Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan (1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70; New York Times v. U.S.
(1971) 403 U.S. 713, 714.) Existing case law also provides that
a prior restraint cannot be justified based on "the insistence
that the statute is designed to prevent" speech that "tends to
disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the
commission of crime." (Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697,
721-722.)
Existing law provides that, notwithstanding other sections, if a
supervising law enforcement official has probable cause to
believe that a person is holding hostages and committing a
crime, or is barricaded and resisting apprehension through the
use or threatened use of force, the official may order a
pre-designated telephone company employee to arrange to cut,
reroute, or divert telephone lines to prevent telephone
communication by the suspected person with anyone other than a
peace officer or a person authorized by the peace officer.
Among other things, existing law provides that good faith
reliance on an order by a law enforcement official shall
constitute a complete defense to any action brought under this
section. (Pub. Util. Code Sec. 7907.)
This bill would prohibit a governmental entity, and a
communications service provider acting at the request of a
governmental entity, from interrupting communications service
for the purpose of protecting public safety or preventing the
use of the service for an illegal purpose, except pursuant to an
order signed by a judicial officer finding:
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that probable cause exists that the service is being or will
be used for an unlawful purpose or to assist in a violation of
the law;
that absent immediate and summary action to interrupt
communications service, serious, direct, immediate and
irreparable danger to public safety will result; and
that the interruption of communications service is narrowly
tailored to prevent unlawful infringement of speech that is
protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or
Section 2 of Article I of the California Constitution, or a
violation of any other rights under federal or state law.
This bill would require the order to:
clearly describe the specific communications service to be
interrupted, as specified;
be narrowly tailored to the specific circumstances under which
the order is made;
interfere with no more communication than necessary to achieve
the its purposes;
authorize an interruption of service only for as long as is
reasonably necessary;
require the interruption to cease once the danger justifying
the interruption is abated; and
specify a process to immediately serve notice on the
communications service provider to cease the interruption.
This bill would authorize a governmental entity to interrupt
communications service without an order only if it reasonably
determines that an extreme emergency situation exists that
involves immediate danger of death and there is insufficient
time, with due diligence, to first obtain a court order,
provided that the interruption meets the grounds for issuance of
an order (as specified above) and that the entity does all of
the following:
applies for a court order without delay, and no event, later
than two hours after commencement of communications service;
provides to the communications service provider a statement of
intent to apply for a court order, signed by an authorized
official of the governmental entity, that clearly describes
the extreme emergency circumstances, and the specific
communications service to be interrupted, as specified; and
provides conspicuous notice of the application for a court
order authorizing the communications service interruption on
its Internet Web site, without delay, unless the circumstances
that justify an interruption of communications services
without first obtaining a court order justify not providing
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the notice.
This bill would require an order or a signed statement of intent
that falls within the federal Emergency Wireless Protocol to be
served on the California Emergency Management Agency, and would
require that all other orders or statements of intent be served
on the communications service providers' contact, as specified.
This bill would require a communications service provider that
intentionally interrupts communications service pursuant to this
bill to comply with any other applicable federal or state law,
and any other rule or notification requirement, as specified.
This bill would provide that good faith reliance by a
communications service provider upon an order or a signed
statement of intent, as specified, shall constitute a complete
defense for any communications service provider against any
action brought as a result of the interruption of communications
service as directed by that order or statement.
This bill would codify a Legislative finding and declaration
that ensuring that California users of any communications
service not have that service interrupted, and thereby be
deprived of 911 access to emergency services or a means to
engage in constitutionally protected expression, is a matter of
statewide concern.
This bill would make various findings and declarations,
including, among others, that:
interruption of communications service can be a "prior
restraint" on speech; and
such interruption threatens public safety by depriving persons
of the ability to call 911 and communicate with family,
friends, employers, schools and others in an emergency;
deprives persons of the ability to receive wireless emergency
alerts; and impairs the ability of first responders to
communicate with each other.
This bill would provide definitions for various terms.
COMMENT
1. Stated need for the bill
According to the author:
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This bill is a revision of SB 1160 (Padilla, 2012), which the
Governor vetoed with the direction to send him a revised bill
that balances free speech and public safety considerations.
This bill updates current state law specifying when
communications service can be interrupted and does the
following:
Makes current law technology-neutral to apply to any
communications service that interconnects with the public
network and is required by the FCC to provide 911 access.
Maintains the statewide standard allowing service
interruption only as directed by a court order.
Provides an exception to the court order requirement in
extreme emergency circumstances with court review after the
shutdown.
Preserves tools currently available to law enforcement
to promote public safety in hostage, barricade, and other
emergency situations.
Applies only to service interruption by a governmental
entity or by a provider at the request of a governmental
entity and does not affect current law authorizing service
disconnect for nonpayment, restrictions on cell phones in
prisons, and pursuant to contract and tariff provisions.
Preempts conflicting local policies, such as the BART
policy, that allow service interruption based on a lesser
standard.
In support, the American Civil Liberties Union writes, "SB 380
takes a measured approach to protecting First Amendment speech
while permitting the interruption of communications services
based on Constitutional standards."
2. First Amendment considerations of wireless service
interruptions
This bill would seek to prohibit any governmental entity from
interrupting, or ordering interruption of, communications
services, unless a judicial officer provides an order that makes
specified findings, including that the interruption of service
would not suppress constitutionally protected speech or violate
any other rights provided for under federal or state law. This
bill would also require that the order meet certain other
requirements, such as authorizing the interruption for only as
long as is reasonably necessary. By codifying the ability of a
governmental entity to shut off communications services, this
bill raises questions about the ability of government to censor
speech based on concerns with the content of that speech.
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Though "the Supreme Court has never accepted the view that the
First Amendment prohibits all government regulation of
expression," (Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law Principles and
Policies (2006) 3rd Edition, pp. 924-925) the ability for
government to punish speech is limited, and its ability to stop
the speech in advance is rarely, if ever, valid.
In the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 395 U.S. 444, 447, the
U.S. Supreme Court made clear that speech can lose its
protection under rare circumstances when it (1) involves the
likelihood of imminent lawless action and (2) is directed at
inciting or producing that imminent lawless action. However,
the "proper response to potential and actual violence" (or
public safety concerns arising out of protests such as those
seen during last summer at San Francisco BART stations), is "for
the government to ensure an adequate police presence . . . and
to arrest those who actually engage in such conduct, rather than
to suppress legitimate First Amendment conduct as a prophylactic
measure." (Collins v. Jordan (1997) 110 F.3d. 1363, 1372,
citing Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 551 and Kunz v. New
York (1951) 340 U.S. 290, 294-295.) Prior restraints of speech
face even greater scrutiny, because, as the Court has
articulated, "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976) 427 U.S. 539,
559.)
This bill would generally prohibit a governmental entity from
interrupting communications service, unless there is an order by
a judicial officer that finds that the interruption would not
suppress constitutionally protected speech.
a. Prior restraints
Given the importance of mobile devices to a person's exercise
of free speech, any government-ordered interruption of the
communications services would arguably constitute a "prior
restraint" that limits the speech that would occur through
those mobile devices. In an attempt to avoid impermissible
prior restraints upon speech, this bill would require a
governmental entity to first obtain an order from a judicial
officer that essentially finds the interruption to be narrowly
tailored so as to prevent the unlawful infringement of speech.
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The Supreme Court has made clear on numerous occasions that
prior restraints on speech bear a "heavy presumption" of
unconstitutionality. (See e.g. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan
(1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70; New York Times v. U.S. (1971) 403 U.S.
713, 714.) The Court has also stated that a prior restraint
cannot be justified based on "the insistence that the statute
is designed to prevent" speech that "tends to disturb the
public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of
crime." (Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 721-722.)
The Court in Near, however, stopped short of declaring all
court orders prohibiting speech as unconstitutional. It
stated instead that these injunctions would be allowed "only
in exceptional cases." (Id. at 716.)
Recent case law demonstrates that there are two illustrations
that would justify a prior restraint: "The [U.S.] Supreme
Court has offered . . . of the sort of 'exceptional'
situations in which a prior restraint might be justified: to
prevent the dissemination of troop movements during wartime or
to 'suppress [ ] . . . information that would set in motion a
nuclear holocaust.'" (Freedom Communications Inc. v. Superior
Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 150, 153, citing Near v.
Minnesota, supra, 283 U.S. 697, 716 and New York Times v. U.S
(1971) 403 U.S. 713, 726 (J. Brennan concurring).)
Therefore, a circumstance such as that seen by BART in 2011,
or even speech that could be described as incitement (i.e.
directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless activities
that are likely to incite that action) arguably would not
justify a prior restraint; rather, it would call for police
presence to arrest those who violate the law. Moreover,
"[the] Court has made clear however, that mere advocacy of the
use of force or violence does not remove speech from the
protection of the First Amendment." (NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, at 927-928.)
In addition to requiring a judicial officer to find the
interruption is narrowly tailored to prevent unlawful
infringement of speech, this bill would require a judicial
officer to first find that there is probable cause that the
service is being or will be used for an unlawful purpose or to
assist in a violation of the law, and that, absent immediate
and summary action to interrupt service, serious, direct,
immediate and irreparable danger to public safety will result.
Together, these factors would presumably require not only
that the service be tied to an unlawful purpose or to assist
in a violation of the law, but also that the danger to public
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safety that would result absent immediate action would meet
the standard of "exceptional" circumstances to justify a prior
restraint.
b. Content-neutral versus content-based restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently made clear that at the
very core of the First Amendment is the principle that the
government may not regulate speech based on its content, and
that content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid.
(See RAV v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 382.) The
concern here is that government will target particular
messages it does not agree with. Especially where the
government attempts to regulate speech in public places, the
law must be subject matter neutral. As such, these types of
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. This general
rule, however, does not apply to certain categories of speech
that are considered unprotected or less protected by the First
Amendment, such as obscenity, defamation, or even incitement.
This bill appears to be content-neutral as it does not apply
to speech with particular messages or viewpoints or subject
matters-it would apply to any scenario where the service is
being or will be used for any type of unlawful purpose or be
used to assist in any type of violation of the law, so long as
it probable cause exists that absent immediate and summary
action to interrupt communications service, serious, direct,
and immediate danger to public safety, health, or welfare.
3. "Extreme emergency situation" exception intended to address
public safety concerns
In contrast to the bill approved by this Committee last year (SB
1160 (Padilla, 2012)), this bill would include an "extreme
emergency situation" exception to the general prohibition
against interruption of communications service absent a court
order.
Under the proposed exception, a governmental entity would be
permitted to interrupt communications service without an order
if it reasonably determines that an extreme emergency situation
exists that involves immediate danger of death and there is
insufficient time, with due diligence, to first obtain a court
order. Under the exception, the entity must apply for a court
order, without delay, and no later than two hours after
commencement of the communications service interruption. The
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entity must provide a statement of intent to the communications
service provider involved in the interruption to apply for a
court order that clearly describes the extreme emergency
circumstances, and the specific communications service to be
interrupted with sufficient detail, as specified. Finally, the
entity must provide conspicuous notice of the application for a
court order authorizing the communications service interruption
on its Internet Web site without delay, unless the circumstances
that justify an interruption of communications services without
first obtaining a court order also justify not providing this
notice.
a. Continued opposition despite the bill's extreme emergency
situation exception
Last year, law enforcement organizations and BART raised
concerns about their ability to shut down service where
threats are made to public safety-concerns that also were
echoed in Governor Brown's veto message of the bill. (See
Comment 6.)
With respect to the current version of this bill, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office (LADA) argues that
the bill's requirement to obtain an order without delay and in
no event any later than two hours after the interruption of
the service is untenable. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department (Department) also echoed this concern in opposition
to the prior version of this bill, though the basis for the
Department's objection to this two hour requirement appears to
center around public safety emergencies dealing with
situations involving hostages or a barricaded person. The
Department states that "[t]his is a ridiculous requirement
especially when these types of situations are often tedious
and protracted. This requirement would take away personnel
and resources from the public safety emergency. . . . In these
situations, waiting for a court order could contribute to the
endangerment of the public and law enforcement."
The LADA contends that a 48 hour timeframe to apply for the
order is appropriate due to a similar allowance with respect
to situations involving the hostage and barricade situation.
Staff notes that the 48 hour timeline referred to by LADA
applies to intercepted communications in those situations-i.e.
eavesdropping on oral communications, which is arguably
narrower in impact than the interruption of communications
services which may suppress the speech of thousands of
individuals. The LADA additionally argues that "[i]n order to
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apply for an order, the officers involved in an emergency must
complete affidavits to demonstrate that the detailed
procedural requirements of the bill have been met. This would
be difficult in many extreme emergencies since the officers
may be fully engaged [in] attempting to save hostages, prevent
a bomb from blowing up, or protecting the public in a large
scale disaster. Emergencies do not necessarily occur during
business hours. In order to apply for an order at night or on
the weekend, it would be necessary to draft the affidavits,
locate a designated judge and submit the paperwork to that
individual within the two hours." While Staff notes that
these are not necessarily barriers in the warrant situation,
LADA raises the point that this is made more difficult in a
large scale disaster or terrorist situation.
Committee staff also notes that no support has been provided
as to exactly why two full days should be required to submit a
request for an order that, in most situations, would have to
be applied for prior to the shutdown of communications
service. The time limit effectively serves, in part, to
ensure that the shutdown of speech does not continue any
longer than is reasonably necessary-particularly if, upon
court review, it is determined that the governmental entity
did not have the grounds to shut down speech and services must
be re-connected.
In support of this bill, ACLU, AT&T, and the California Cable
& Telecommunications Association argue that this bill strikes
a balance between free speech and legitimate public safety
concerns.
b. Mootness
Whether or not this proposed statute's exception would
impermissibly authorize the prior restraint of speech is
ultimately for the courts. To the extent that the proposed
exception could survive any such review, it is significant
that: (1) the process of review as envisioned by this bill is
effective and (2) that parties have an effective recourse
available if they suffer injuries as a result of an
interruption of services by a governmental entity that was not
approved. Under this bill, if a governmental entity
interrupts service without a prior order, it is to seek an
order without delay and no later than two hours after
commencing the service interruption.
The request to seek a court order justifying the interruption
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of communications service after it has already been
interrupted and restarted raises questions regarding mootness.
Specifically, if the underlying controversy is deemed moot in
that instance, it may potentially render a court unable to
hear the matter and issue an order after the fact. The issue
of mootness is one in which there is no ongoing "case or
controversy" for the court to review. It often arises when
the issue that is being litigated or appealed has resolved
itself, leaving the plaintiff with no current, ongoing
complaint to make before the court.
At the same time, however, under federal law, there is an
exception to the inability of courts to hear moot cases, where
a case is "capable for repetition, yet evading review." That
exception may theoretically apply here and thereby provide the
courts the ability to review the shutdown anyway. California
state courts, which are not bound by the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement in the same way as federal courts,
often have retained the ability to hear on appeal an action
that is rendered moot prior to the appeal if it raises a
question of public interest. That being said, proponents of
this bill also point to the fact that there are instances in
which the courts engage in review of state actions, such as
under the Brown Act. Namely, the Brown Act allows a
declaratory action to determine whether the government has
committed a past violation. (Gov. Code Sec. 54960; see
California Alliance v. City of San Diego 56 Cal.App.4th 1024,
1029-30 (1997) providing that "there can be no serious dispute
that a controversy between the parties exists over city's past
compliance with [open-meeting laws].")
c. Sunset
In light of the significant First Amendment issues raised by
the bill, as well as the public safety concerns, the following
amendment is suggested to include a two-year sunset. That
sunset will allow the Legislature to review how this proposed
section, and its exception, are utilized by governmental
entities and how requests for orders are reviewed by the
courts:
Suggested amendment
On page 6, after line 36, insert: "This section shall
remain in effect only until January 1, 2016, and as of that
date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is
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enacted before January 1, 2016, deletes or extends that
date."
4. Good faith reliance on judicial order
Similar to SB 1160 (Padilla, 2012), this bill provides that any
good faith reliance by a communications service provider upon an
order of a judicial officer or upon a statement of intent, as
specified, shall constitute a complete defense against any
action brought as a result of the interruption to communications
service.
Providing immunity is generally of concern where it bars an
injured person from seeking recovery from the person or entity
that caused the injuries. However, as a matter of public
policy, it is arguably important to provide that security to
communications providers who are required to shut down the
wireless service per a judicial officer's order and at the
direction of law enforcement. Existing law similarly provides
for a complete defense for good faith reliance on an order by a
law enforcement official to disconnect service after finding
probable cause exists that a person is holding hostages and is
committing a crime, or is barricaded and is resisting
apprehension through the use or threatened use of force.
5. Other arguments made by opposition
The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (LADA)
suggests that one of the bill's legislative finding is
inaccurate and overly broad. That particular finding states
that "[t]he California Supreme Court has held that a customer's
telephone service may be interrupted only as directed by a court
order with a finding of probable cause that service is being
used for an illegal purpose and that, absent immediate
interruption of service, significant dangers to public health or
safety will result."
The LADA argues that "the California Supreme Court did not opine
on an emergency situation where there is no time to seek a prior
order" and requests that the findings be conformed to the
holding of the court in that case. The following amendment
would clarify the relevant finding:
Suggested amendment
On page 3, strike lines 21-25, inclusive, and insert: "The
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California Supreme Court, in Sokol v. Public Utilities
Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 265, articulated the standard
that any future commission rule for discontinuation of
telephone services used for illegal purposes must at a minimum
require that police obtain prior authorization to secure the
termination of service by satisfying an impartial tribunal
that they have probable cause to act, in a manner reasonably
comparable to a proceeding before a magistrate to obtain a
search warrant."
The LADA raises several other points in opposition to the bill.
First, it objects to the limitation of existing Section 7907
(which permits an officer to order a telephone provider to
"arrange to cut, reroute, or divert telephone lines for the
purpose of preventing telephone communication by [a] suspected
person with any person other than a peace officer or a person
authorized by the peace officer") in a hostage or barricade
situation to landlines. Second, the LADA argues that the bill's
standard for an extreme emergency order (which requires that
there be an extreme emergency situation involving immediate
danger of death and insufficient time, with due diligence, to
first obtain a court order) is too narrow and that as a result,
"a terrorist threatening to set off a weapon containing a
chemical that causes great bodily injury, but not death, would
not be covered under SB 380. Cell phones can be used to set off
bombs or to communicate with others who are prepared to attack
our citizens. A death or great bodily injury standard is more
appropriate for extreme emergencies." Lastly, the LADA also
argues that the bill should clarify that the Public Utilities
Commission retains authority to terminate communications service
pursuant to an administrative hearing.
6. Governor Brown veto of SB 1160
This bill is similar to the enrolled version of SB 1160
(Padilla, 2012). In vetoing SB 1160, Governor Brown stated:
This bill would require local law enforcement to make certain
findings and determinations within six hours of interruption
of communication service in barricade, hostage and emergency
circumstances. While I applaud the author's efforts to
authorize interruption of service only in the most extreme
cases, the extent of the findings in the bill that must be
made by officers engaged in conflict could divert attention
away from resolving the conflict without further threat to
public safety.
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I encourage the author and law enforcement agencies to engage
in discussion in the upcoming legislative session and send me
a bill that balances protection of speech with the ability of
law enforcement to utilize this tool in the protection of
public health and safety.
7. Technical amendment
The following amendment would address a misplaced comma:
Suggested amendment
On page 5, lines 37-39, strike the comma between "in no event"
and "later"
Support : American Civil Liberties Union; AT&T; California Cable
& Telecommunications Association
Opposition : Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office; Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department
HISTORY
Source : Author
Related Pending Legislation : None Known
Prior Legislation : SB 1160 (Padilla, 2012), See Background,
Comment 3, 4 and 7.
Prior Vote : Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities &
Communications (Ayes 10, Noes 0)
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