BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    Ó          1





                SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
                                 ALEX PADILLA, CHAIR
          

          SB 611 -  Hill                     Hearing Date:  April 30, 2013  
                S
          As Amended:         April 15, 2013           FISCAL       B
                                                                        
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                                      DESCRIPTION
           
           The California Constitution  establishes the California Public  
          Utilities Commission (CPUC) with five members appointed by the  
          Governor and approved by the Senate for staggered six-year terms  
          and grants the CPUC authority to regulate public utilities  
          subject to control by the Legislature.  (Cal. Const. Article II,  
          Section 1)

           Current law  requires the Governor to designate one of the  
          commissioners as president who is authorized to direct and  
          prescribe duties of an attorney (general counsel), executive  
          director, and other staff and preside at CPUC meetings.  (Public  
          Utilities Code 305)

           This bill  reduces the president's duties to presiding at CPUC  
          meetings.

           Current law  authorizes the CPUC to appoint a general counsel to  
          represent the CPUC in all actions, to commence, prosecute or  
          intervene in proceedings as directed by the president, and to  
          advise the commission and each commissioner on all matters.  
          (Public Utilities Code 307)

           This bill  prohibits any CPUC employee or officer that is  
          assigned to prosecution of an adjudication case from  
          participating in, or advising the commission on, the decision of  
          that case and makes the general counsel subject to laws and  
          rules of professional conduct applicable to attorneys licensed  
          to practice law in California. 












           Current law  establishes within the CPUC a Division of Ratepayer  
          Advocates (DRA) to advocate on behalf of utility customers, with  
          a director appointed by the Governor, a lead attorney designated  
          by the director, and funding, attorneys and other staff provided  
          by the CPUC.  (Public Utilities Code 309.5)

           This bill  changes DRA to the Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA)  
          within the commission, provides ORA more autonomy in its budget  
          and staff, including attorneys, and authorizes ORA to seek  
          rehearing and judicial review of CPUC decisions the same as  
          other parties to a CPUC proceeding.

           Current law  requires the CPUC to annually submit to the  
          Legislature financial reports, including any ratepayer costs, on  
          specified nonprofit entities that were established as a result  
          of CPUC decisions for various public benefit purposes. (Public  
          Utilities Code 326.5)

           This bill  prohibits the CPUC from establishing a "nonstate  
          entity," defined to be any for profit or nonprofit company,  
          corporation, partnership, or other entity or group of entities.

           Current law  prohibits a public official or a body on which the  
          official is a member from entering into a contract with an  
          entity in which the official has a financial interest and deems  
          such contract invalid. (Government Code 1090)

           This bill  prohibits the CPUC from entering into a contract with  
          a nonstate entity in which a commissioner is an owner, director,  
          or officer and invalidates prior contracts with that entity if a  
          commissioner ever becomes an owner, director or officer.

           The California Constitution  provides that the Legislature may  
          remove a commissioner for "incompetence, neglect of duty, or  
          corruption," with two-thirds vote of each house concurring.  
          (Cal. Const. Article XII, Section 1)

           This bill  provides that a commissioner "is negligent of his or  
          her duty" and may be removed pursuant to this constitutional  
          provision if he or she acts as an owner, director, or officer of  
          a nonstate entity established prior to January 1, 2014, by CPUC  
          action in which the commissioner participated.

           Current law  specifies various responsibilities of the CPUC's  










          consumer protection and safety division.  (e.g. Public Utilities  
          Code 309.7)

           This bill  changes these references to the safety and enforcement  
          division.

           Current law  requires the CPUC to provide the Legislature and the  
          Governor an annual workplan, accounting of its transactions, and  
          a report on the number of cases where resolution took longer  
          than expected in scoping memos, and requires the CPUC president  
          to annually report to the policy committees of the Legislature.   
          (Public Utilities Code 321.6)

           This bill  would require the report to include information on the  
          disposition of applications for rehearing.

           This bill  changes various statutory references to commission  
          "regulations" to commission "rules."

                                      BACKGROUND

           CPUC Independent but Accountable to Legislature - The basic  
          structure of the CPUC was established in the early 1900s by  
          adding Article XII to the state constitution, which was one of  
          Governor Hiram Johnson's reform efforts to curb undue influence  
          of railroads in politics and government.  Article XII grants the  
          CPUC authority to regulate public utilities "subject to control  
          of the Legislature" and grants the Legislature "plenary power"  
          to confer authority and jurisdiction upon the CPUC, with the  
          intent that the CPUC be accountable to the Legislature.
           
          The CPUC has historically been afforded much independence.  
          Commissioners are appointed for staggered six-year terms to  
          limit the potential for a single Governor to appoint a majority  
          of commissioners within a four-year term.  The Legislature, not  
          the Governor, may remove a commissioner.  The CPUC has been  
          given broad latitude to set its own procedures, and any review  
          of CPUC decisions has historically been limited to review only  
          by courts of appeal and the Supreme Court, not trial courts.
           
          Current Commissioners - The current Governor has appointed four  
          of the five current commissioners, a majority, as follows:

                 Michael R. Peevey, President, originally appointed by  










               Governor Davis in March 2002, appointed President by  
               Governor Davis in December 2002, reappointed by Governor  
               Schwarzenegger in December 2008, retained as President by  
               Governor Brown, term expires in December 2014.
                 Michael Florio, appointed by Governor Brown in January  
               2011.
                 Catherine J.K. Sandoval, appointed by Governor Brown in  
               January 2011.
                 Commissioner Mark J. Ferron, appointed by Governor Brown  
               in March 2011.
                 Carla J. Peterman, appointed by Governor Brown in  
               December 2012.

          CPUC Safety and Budget Problems - The CPUC has been under  
          intense scrutiny the past year in connection with its oversight  
          of utility infrastructure safety and, more recently, its  
          internal budget operations.  On the evening of September 9, 2010  
          a 30-inch natural gas transmission line ruptured in a  
          residential neighborhood in the City of San Bruno.  The rupture  
          caused an explosion and fire which took the lives of eight  
          people and injured dozens more; destroyed 37 homes and damaged  
          70.  Gas service was also disrupted for 300 customers.  The  
          National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which has primary  
          jurisdiction for investigating pipeline failures, issued its  
          Pipeline Accident Report on the San Bruno tragedy in August 2011  
          and concluded that, in addition to numerous PG&E violations, the  
          CPUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipeline  
          integrity management program contributed to the accident.  The  
          CPUC initiated three separate proceedings to consider the  
          alleged violations arising from the San Bruno tragedy.  
          Evidentiary hearings were suspended in October 2012 but later  
          resumed.
          
          On January 10, 2013, the Department of Finance (DOF) Office of  
          State Audits and Evaluations (OSAE) released its performance  
          audit of the CPUC budget process. The audit identified  
          significant weaknesses with CPUC's budget operations that  
          negatively affect the commission's ability to prepare and  
          present reliable and accurate budget information. 
          Specifically, the audit found that:

                 The organizational structure of CPUC does not facilitate  
               cohesive budgeting practices;
                 The CPUC's budget forecasting methodologies produced  










               results that differed significantly from actual results,  
               with most of these differences unexplainable;
                 Cases of fiscal mismanagement in which accounting  
               records for certain funds were misrepresented and  
               incorrect. For example, OSAE identified records that did  
               not include certain fund transactions that ranged from  
               roughly $40,000 to $275 million; and
                 The CPUC's reconciliations of certain funds-where there  
               were differences between DOF and State Controller's Office  
               records-were inaccurate, requiring adjustments in the  
               hundreds of millions of dollars.

          According to the audit, CPUC must implement and strengthen the  
          fiscal controls over its budgeting practices and procedures in  
          order to produce reliable and accurate budgetary information for  
          the Governor, the Legislature, DOF, and other stakeholders.

          In the Fall of 2012, the CPUC engaged an independent consulting  
          firm to facilitate its "Safety Culture Change" project. This  
          project began with an initial discovery phase, which consisted  
          of a document review, interviews and focus groups. The purpose  
          of this phase was to uncover the existing culture, identify  
          culture changes needed, and to develop a draft problem statement  
          that would allow the CPUC to plan its culture change strategy.   
          A consultant's summary of focus groups and interviews with  
          employees was reported to the commission and included a few of  
          the prevailing perceptions of the employees at the CPUC:

                 "For the past ten years we have been mostly focused on  
               climate change policies. Everything else takes a back seat.  
               We have not been focused on creating the safety  
               infrastructure."
                 "There has been a lot of lip service to safety. I have  
               not seen enough action yet to back up the talk."
                 "When Commissioners vote, they don't support safety, so  
               there's no incentive for the utilities to be safer. If they  
               knew they were 100 percent liable for safety problems,  
               they'd take it more seriously. If the commission lets them  
               put the burden on ratepayers, rather than shareholders,  
               there is no incentive for the utilities to change."

          Nonprofits Resulting from CPUC Decisions - In a variety of  
          contexts over the years, CPUC decisions have ordered funding for  
          nonprofit organizations that serve public benefits related to  










          entities it regulates.  For example, the Pacific Forest and  
          Watershed Lands Stewardship Council was formed as a result of a  
          December 2003 decision that ordered PG&E to provide $100 million  
          over 10 years to be recovered in retail rates.  In a bankruptcy  
          settlement in 2003, PG&E was ordered to pay $30 million in  
          shareholder funds over five years to a nonprofit the California  
          Clean Energy Fund (CalCEF) to support clean technology  
          development.  In 2005, as a condition of approval of mergers of  
          SBC and AT&T and Verizon and MCI, AT&T and Verizon were required  
          to contribute a total of $60 million in shareholder funds over  
          five years to a nonprofit the California Emerging Technology  
          Fund (CETF) to promote broadband deployment and adoption to  
          close the digital divide.  The 2008 Budget Act enacted Section  
          326.5 of the Public Utilities Code, which requires the CPUC to  
          annually submit to the Legislature financial reports, including  
          any ratepayer costs, on these nonprofit entities that were  
          established as a result of CPUC decisions.

          Changing Role of President - Legislation proposed over the  
          years, and some enacted, has been aimed at improving CPUC  
          accountability.  Concurrent with 1996 electric restructuring, a  
          series of procedural reforms were enacted to improve the  
          accountability of individual commissioners to spend more time in  
          hearings and to take ownership of draft decisions.  

          SB 33 (Peace, 1999) attempted to address a perceived lack of  
          accountability by commissioners by centralizing more authority  
          with the president.  Prior to that time, the CPUC president was  
          elected by commissioners.  The commissioners also appointed the  
          general counsel and executive director, who performed at the  
          direction of the commission.  SB 33 put the executive director  
          and general counsel directly under the control of the president  
          and authorized the Governor to appoint the president.

          Since then, a series of bills have sought to limit the power of  
          the CPUC president.  AB 1157 (Ruskin, 2007) provided that  
          commissioners elect a president rather than the Governor appoint  
          one.  AB 1973 (Ruskin, 2008) and AB 1315 (Ruskin, 2009) required  
          Senate confirmation of a Governor-appointed president, and had  
          the executive director and attorney take direction from the  
          commission rather than the president.  SB 1403 (Yee, 2012) also  
          put the executive director and attorney under the direction of  
          the commission and required that assignment of proceedings be by  
          a majority vote of the full commission.  None of these bills  










          were chaptered.

          Public Meeting Required - The CPUC is subject to the  
          Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, which requires a state body to  
          take "action" (collective decision or an actual vote) only at a  
          public meeting following the public posting of an agenda  
          describing the item for proposed action at least 10 days prior  
          to the meeting. Any private congregation of a majority of the  
          members of a state body at the same time and place to hear,  
          discuss, or deliberate upon any item that is within its  
          jurisdiction is unlawful.  Violations of the act can result in  
          members of the state body facing misdemeanor penalties and  
          action taken rendered invalid, with attorney's fees awarded to  
          prevailing plaintiffs.

          Division of Ratepayer Advocates - The DRA is an independent  
          division within the CPUC that advocates solely on behalf of  
          residential and small commercial utility ratepayers.  First  
          established in 1984, DRA was later codified in SB 960 (Leonard,  
          1996), which also required that its director be appointed by the  
          Governor subject to Senate confirmation.  The statutory goal of  
          DRA is "to obtain the lowest possible rate for service  
          consistent with reliable and safe service levels."  DRA  
          advocates for consumers in industry-wide proceedings, individual  
          rate cases, and before the Legislature.

          DRA has been without an official director for nearly three  
          years. Dana Appling was DRA director from Aug 2004 through July  
          2010, and Joe Como has served as acting director since August  
          2010. 

          DRA's staff consists of 137 technical, policy, and financial  
          analysts with professional backgrounds as engineers, auditors,  
          and economists with expertise in regulatory issues related to  
          electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and water  
          industries in California. DRA has a separate budget account  
          controlled by the director but subject to final approval of the  
          commission.  DRA has a lead attorney appointed by the director,  
          with other staff attorneys assigned by the CPUC's general  
          counsel from the CPUC's Legal Division.  Currently, attorneys  
          are assigned on a case-by-case basis, although prior practice  
          included Legal Division attorneys assigned to DRA on long-term  
          basis. 











          According to DRA's 2012 annual report:  "DRA participated in 176  
          CPUC proceedings and filed more than 600 pleadings to aid the  
          CPUC in developing the record from which Commissioners  
          formulated their final decisions. DRA lobbied decision-makers on  
          behalf of ratepayers nearly 250 times in 2012 to ensure that the  
          consumer perspective was heard. DRA's $27,535,000 budget  
          represents a small fraction of ratepayer's investment compared  
          with the nearly $4 billion in savings DRA's work was  
          instrumental in achieving for Californians in the form of lower  
          utility rates and avoided rate increases. For every dollar  
          customers spent on DRA in 2012, they saved approximately $153  
          across their utility bills. Additionally, DRA influenced the  
          outcome of numerous CPUC policies, decisions, and California  
          legislation that will impact ratepayers."

          The DOF audit released in December identified CPUC noncompliance  
          with statutory requirements specific to DRA's budget.  The DOF  
          report stated that, "with minimal input from DRA, the CPUC  
          Budget Office prepares and communicates the budget to DRA and  
          Finance.  However, this process has lacked transparency and CPUC  
          has not been able to explain or support to DRA's satisfaction  
          how the various budgeted cost categories were determined.  As a  
          result, DRA is not able to adequately explain or defend its own  
          budget."<1>
           
                                       COMMENTS
           
              1.   Author's Purpose  . According to the author:  "The CPUC  
               has run amok, diverting the attention of top staff away  
               from the CPUC's core responsibilities of ensuring safe  
               delivery of energy and managing the public's money.  The  
               Department of Finance has found that the CPUC poorly  
               managed its internal accounts, and the Legislative Analyst  
               has questioned its ability to oversee the proper management  
               of customer money in utility hands.  Finally-and most  
               importantly to the author-the 2010 explosion in San Bruno  
               has shown the CPUC to have utterly failed to ensure the  
               safety of utility infrastructure.  Instead, the CPUC has  
               focused in the last several years on discretionary  
             --------------------------
          <1> "California Public Utilities Commission Budget Process  
          Performance Audit." Office of State Audits and Evaluations,  
          Department of Finance, December 2012, p. 13.  
           http://www.dof.ca.gov/osae/audit_reports/documents/FinalReport-Ca 
          liforniaPublicUtilitiesCommissionPerformanceAuditWEB.pdf  









               activities and commissioner pet projects, including  
               multiple activities that Legislative Counsel has determined  
               to be illegal or unconstitutional.  This bill takes small  
               but necessary steps to rehabilitate the CPUC."
                
                The author also states that a major impetus for this bill  
               is objection to the general counsel's actions in October  
               2012 to suspend evidentiary hearings and cross-examination  
               of PG&E regarding the utility's potential violations  
               relating to the San Bruno explosion in order to facilitate  
               a settlement of the proceeding.  The suspension was later  
               lifted and the hearings scheduled.

              2.   In Search of Institutional Reform or New Leadership  ? In  
               public statements and information provided to the  
               committee, the author indicates that this bill stems, in  
               large part, from his dissatisfaction with activities of the  
               current president.  The section of the bill identifying  
               conduct that makes a commissioner subject to removal from  
               office, according to the author's office, "only applies to  
               one person."  If enacted, this bill would take effect on  
               January 1, 2014.  The current president's term expires in  
               December 2014.  The challenge for the Legislature is to  
               consider whether each reform proposed in this bill is  
               beneficial to the institution for the long-term regardless  
               of who the president and commissioners are. 

              3.   Diminishing the Power of the President  .  This bill  
               provides for the full commission, rather than just the  
               president, to direct the general counsel, executive  
               director and other staff in the performance of their duties  
               and would reduce the president's authority to presiding at  
               commission meetings.  This would scale back the current  
               authority of the president to what it was for decades prior  
               to enactment of SB 33 in 1999.  It would potentially  
               enhance the role of the other four commissioners, both in  
               directing routine day-to-day operations and more  
               significant matters such as dismissing complaints or  
               applications and intervening in legal actions.  Increased  
               participation by all commissioners also invokes the  
               Bagley-Keene Act, which requires state bodies to take  
               action only in a public meeting after the matter for action  
               is on a meeting agenda made public at least 10 days before  
               the meeting.  Thus, to the extent commission direction of  










               the attorney and executive director constitutes an "action"  
               of the commission, the public meeting and agenda  
               requirements would apply.

               According to the CPUC, this change would create operational  
               delays, increase costs, and "directly interfere with the  
               CPUC's ability to perform its duties in a timely manner or  
               act in response to immediate demands." A structure that  
               slows down decision-making could be especially problematic  
               at this time when the CPUC faces intense pressure for a  
               culture change and redirection of focus on public safety.

               The Utility Reform Network (TURN), on the other hand,  
               states that this change of the president's powers would  
               result in a more robust debate of issues and equalize the  
               influence of all commissioners in setting the agency's  
               priorities and its allocation of resources.  Centralized  
               power in the president creates the risk that other  
               commissioners will be inhibited in their decision-making  
               for fear of being marginalized by the president by limiting  
               their access to CPUC legal, analytic, and other resources,  
               states TURN.

              4.   Enhancing the Power of DRA  . This bill enhances the  
               independence and authority of DRA in three significant ways  
               - allows DRA to submit its own budget directly to DOF  
               rather than through the CPUC, allows DRA to employ its own  
               staff including attorneys, and authorizes DRA to seek  
               judicial review of CPUC decisions.  DRA states that these  
               changes will "better situate DRA to more effectively and  
               efficiently utilize its resources to advocate for  
               affordable, safe and reliable IOU services."  TURN states  
               that these changes will empower DRA to advocate for  
               ratepayers "without fear of reprisal by a commission that  
               currently has ultimate power to determine its budget and  
               personnel."  
                
                DRA's status as a division of the CPUC has been a barrier  
               to appealing CPUC decisions in a court of law because that  
                                                                                      would essentially be suing itself. This bill puts DRA on  
               the same footing as other parties to CPUC proceedings,  
               thereby putting more teeth in its advocacy by having the  
               threat to appeal.  TURN states that this helps address "the  
               tremendous disparity of resources between the regulated  










               entities and the parties representing consumers and other  
               public interest concerns."  It is possible this change  
               could raise questions about the need for ratepayer-funded  
               intervenor compensation for groups like TURN if DRA also  
               has use of ratepayer funds to represent ratepayers all the  
               way through appeal.  However, according to TURN, these  
               groups' collective resources typically are only a fraction  
               of that devoted to a case by regulated entities. 

               Despite this bill's express grant of authority to the newly  
               named ORA to seek judicial review of CPUC decisions, it  
               retains the reference to the Office as "within the  
               commission."  This creates ambiguity as to whether ORA is  
               sufficiently independent to have standing to seek judicial  
               review.
                
             5.   Prohibiting Nonstate Entities  . The author seeks to stop  
               the CPUC from establishing nonprofit entities because, even  
               if they deliver public benefits, the CPUC "can accomplish  
               its mission either through convincing settling entities to  
               contribute to state programs or by contracting with  
               existing non-profits."  CPUC decisions that establish  
               nonstate entities move funds outside state oversight and  
               circumvent government contract requirements, the author  
               states.   The author particularly objects to two nonprofits  
               that were created as a result of CPUC decisions in which  
               the current president was the assigned commissioner and  
               that have governing boards of which the current president  
               subsequently became chair - CalCEF and CETF.  The author  
               does not assert an improper financial interest, but  
               describes the current president's activities as "unseemly"  
               and "inviting the appearance of bias." The author states  
               that the bill's provisions on nonstate entities "is to  
               induce the commissioner to choose between his overlapping  
               public and private interests."  
                
                These provisions raise several issues the committee may  
               wish to consider. First, "nonstate entity" is defined so  
               broadly that the bill may prohibit more than intended,  
               including, for example, a separate affiliate in a merger  
               proceeding or a program administrator in the  
               billion-dollar-per-year energy efficiency portfolios. Also,  
               the CPUC did not necessarily "establish" the nonprofits to  
               which the author objects but, rather, ordered regulated  










               entities to fund them.  Significantly, the bill makes no  
               distinction between a nonstate entity for which the CPUC  
               has ordered ongoing funding from ratepayer surcharges  
               versus one-time shareholder contributions. For example,  
               CalCEF and CETF both received sharedholder funding as a  
               result of a CPUC decision, which is not funding that  
               otherwise would have been available in the state budget for  
               award of a state contract for the same public benefit  
               purpose.

               Second, the bill prohibits the CPUC from entering into a  
               contract with an entity where a sitting commissioner is an  
               owner, director, or officer, even in the absence of any  
               financial interest.  This makes CPUC commissioners subject  
               to more stringent requirements than any other state  
               officials.  Why are existing conflict of interest laws  
               insufficient for CPUC commissioners?
                
               Third, the provision that makes acting as an owner,  
               director or officer of a nonstate entity conduct sufficient  
               to remove a commissioner from office raises concerns.  The  
               Constitution makes "neglect of duty" a basis for removal  
               from office, and this bill deems the connection to a  
               nonstate entity as being "negligent" of duty.  But, even  
               assuming this is a drafting error, the language could  
               potentially be interpreted to make a commissioner subject  
               to removal the moment this bill is effective for conduct  
               prior to its effective date, raising due process concerns.   
               In any event, this provision appears to be  
               precedent-setting in that the committee could not identify  
               any existing statute that specifies particular conduct as  
               automatically constituting one of the grounds for  
               commissioner removal from office under the Constitution. 
                
             6.   Separation of Advisory and Prosecutorial Duties  . This  
               bill prohibits any CPUC employee who is involved in the  
               prosecution of an adjudication case from participating in  
               the decision of that case or advising a commissioner on how  
               it should be decided.  The state Administrative Procedures  
               Act requires a state agency's adjudicative function to be  
               separated from the investigative, prosecutorial, and  
               advocacy functions (Sections 11425.10 and 11425.30 of the  
               Government Code). But the CPUC has long been exempt from  
               the APA.  In fact, current law provides that the General  










               Counsel's duties include prosecuting proceedings and  
               advising the commission and each commissioner on all  
               matters (PU Code Section 307).

               Current law establishing DRA, however, requires the  
               commission to develop a code of conduct and procedures to  
               ensure employees do not both advocate and advise  
               decisionmakers in the same case (PU Code 309.5(d)).  The  
               CPUC provided the committee a copy of a 1997 memorandum on  
               "Conflict of Roles: Guidelines & Procedures" that requires  
               separation of functions for CPUC staff, but the memo  
               emphasizes that these are only guidelines and gives the  
               executive director and general counsel some authority to  
               waive the guidelines. The CPUC nonetheless states that it  
               complies with the California Supreme Court's 2009 decision  
               in Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources  
               Control Board, which requires separation of advocacy and  
               advisory functions in state agency enforcement proceedings.  


               This bill prohibits any employee who prosecutes a case, or  
               "supervises" the prosecution of a case from advising the  
               commission on that case.  Assuming the general counsel  
               supervises all attorneys in the Legal Division, including  
               those assigned to prosecute cases, this provision  
               potentially conflicts with the general counsel's statutory  
               duty to advise each commissioner on any matter.  

             7.   CPUC General Counsel Subject to State Bar  . This bill  
               provides that the CPUC's general counsel shall be subject  
               to the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct  
               of the State Bar of California, which apply to any attorney  
               licensed to practice law in California.  This provision is  
               redundant with current law that specifies that the general  
               counsel be "an attorney at law of this state."

              8.   Report on Applications for Rehearing  . Current law  
               requires the CPUC to act within 60 days on an application  
               for rehearing of a CPUC decision, which is a prerequisite  
               to seeking judicial review.  Parties complain that the CPUC  
               rarely meets this timeframe and that extended delay  
               effectively denies parties the right to seek judicial  
               review.  SB 1414 (Kehoe, 2010) sought to correct this  
               problem by deeming an application as deemed denied after a  










               certain date, but it was vetoed.  This bill seeks to  
               increase legislative oversight of the problem by adding to  
               an existing CPUC report a requirement to report on  
               disposition of applications for rehearing.

              9.   Changes in Name Only  ?  Sections 5, 8, and 15 of this  
               bill change statutory references to the CPUC division  
               responsible for "consumer protection and safety" to "safety  
               and enforcement."  The author states that this is to  
               conform to the CPUC's action in January 2013 to rename the  
               division.  The CPUC, however, raises a question about the  
               potential impact on its jurisdiction of removing the  
               statutory reference to "consumer protection."

               Sections 9, 10, and 11 change references to commission  
               "regulations" to "rules," which the author states is a  
               clarification to conform to the constitutional provision  
               authorizing the CPUC to establish "rules" for public  
               utilities within its jurisdiction.  
           
                                       POSITIONS
           
           Sponsor:
           
          Author

           Support:
           
          Division of Ratepayer Advocates
          The Utility Reform Network

           Oppose:
           
          California Public Utilities Commission

          

































          Jacqueline Kinney
          SB 611 Analysis
          Hearing Date:  April 30, 2013