BILL ANALYSIS Ó
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | SB 924|
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UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 924
Author: Beall (D) and Lara (D), et al.
Amended: 6/11/14
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE : 5-2, 5/6/14
AYES: Jackson, Corbett, Lara, Leno, Monning
NOES: Anderson, Vidak
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : 5-2, 5/23/14
AYES: De León, Hill, Lara, Padilla, Steinberg
NOES: Walters, Gaines
SENATE FLOOR : 23-11, 5/28/14
AYES: Beall, Block, Corbett, De León, DeSaulnier, Evans,
Hancock, Hernandez, Hill, Hueso, Jackson, Lara, Leno, Lieu,
Liu, Mitchell, Monning, Padilla, Pavley, Roth, Steinberg,
Torres, Wolk
NOES: Anderson, Berryhill, Correa, Fuller, Gaines, Huff,
Knight, Morrell, Nielsen, Vidak, Walters
NO VOTE RECORDED: Calderon, Cannella, Galgiani, Wright, Wyland,
Yee
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 55-19, 8/25/14 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT : Childhood sexual abuse: statute of limitations
SOURCE : Author
DIGEST : This bill provides that an action for recovery of
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damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse that
occurred on or after January 1, 2015, shall be commenced within
22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority
or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or
illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the
sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. This bill applies
to local public entities.
Assembly Amendments apply the extended statute to all public
local entities.
ANALYSIS : Existing law generally provides that the time for
commencing a civil action for damages shall be within two years
of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another.
Existing law provides that the time for commencing an action
based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as
defined, shall be eight years after the plaintiff reaches
majority (i.e., 26 years of age) or within three years of the
date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring
after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever
occurs later.
Existing law provides that in the civil actions described above
against persons or entities other than the perpetrator, whose
intentional, negligent, or wrongful act was the legal cause of
the sex abuse, the plaintiff must show that the person or entity
knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of
unlawful sexual conduct of an employee or agent, and failed to
take reasonable steps, as specified, to avoid acts of unlawful
sexual conduct in the future.
The Government Claims Act sets forth the general procedure for
presentation of a claim for money or damages against local
public entities. This Act also enumerates excepted categories
of claims, including certain claims for the recovery of damages
suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse arising out of
conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill provides that an action for recovery of damages
suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse that occurred on
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or after January 1, 2015, shall be commenced within 22 years of
the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within
three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that psychological injury or illness
occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual
abuse, whichever period expires later.
This bill clarifies that the same exception, for categories of
claims for money or damages against public entities, applies
regardless of which statute of limitation is controlling.
Background
Before 1990, claims of childhood sexual abuse were governed by a
one year statute of limitations. (Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)
Section 340(3).) However, if the cause of action accrued while
the plaintiff was a minor, the statute was tolled until he/she
became an adult. (CCP Section 352(a).) Thus, any complaint had
to be filed within one year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday.
In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the statute of limitations for
cases involving adult trauma caused by childhood sexual abuse.
(SB 108, Lockyer, Chapter 1578.) That law provides that the
time limit for commencing an action based on injuries resulting
from "childhood sexual abuse" shall be eight years after the
plaintiff reaches the age of majority (i.e., age 26) or within
three years of the date of the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness
occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse,
whichever occurs later. As subsequently interpreted by the
courts, SB 108 changed the statute of limitations for actions
against the perpetrators, but did not change it for actions
against other responsible third parties. (See Debbie Reynolds
Prof. Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
222; Tietge v. Western Province of the Services (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 382.)
In 1998, the Legislature responded to this interpretation and
enacted AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chapter 1021) to apply the extended
statute of limitations to actions against third parties.
However, any action against any person or entity other than the
sexual abuser would have to be commenced before the plaintiff's
26th birthday. (CCP Section 340.1(b).) In 2002, SB 1779
(Burton and Escutia, Chapter 149) was enacted to extend the
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statute of limitations in cases against a third party who was
not the perpetrator of the sexual abuse beyond age 26, when the
third party knew or had reason to know of complaints against an
employee or agent for unlawful sexual conduct and failed to take
reasonable steps to avoid similar unlawful conduct by that
employee or agent in the future. SB 1779 also created a one
year window in which victims could bring a claim against a third
party when that claim would have otherwise been barred solely
because the statute of limitations had expired.
Almost 1,000 cases were filed in California during the one year
window in 2003. However, between 2005 and 2012, about 50 cases
were filed by victims who were over the age of 26 in 2003, but
did not make a causal connection between childhood abuse and
problems as an adult until after 2003. The Quarry brothers, who
filed suit in 2007, were among those who filed one of these
cases. The trial court dismissed the case based on their age in
2003 (over 26 years of age), stating that the brothers should
have brought their case within the one year window under SB
1779. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's decision, and held that the one year window only applied
to victims who were both over the age of 26, and had made the
required causal connection more than three years prior to
January 1, 2003. It held that victims like the Quarry brothers
were not barred as of January 1, 2003, and could avail
themselves of the option of filing a claim within three years
from discovery.
Ultimately, the Quarry case and about 20 others were taken up by
the California Supreme Court. (Quarry v. Doe (2009) 53 Cal.4th
945.) The Court held that the Legislature failed to make its
intent for SB 1779 to be retroactive clear, and the rules of
statutory construction required that when the Legislature amends
a statute of limitations, that amendment is presumed to be
prospective, and is retroactive only if the Legislature
expressly provides that it is intended to be retroactive and
revive previously time-barred claims. The majority found the
language of SB 1779 did not satisfy that rule of construction,
and must be interpreted prospectively, or limited to the one
year window. The dissent disagreed, and invited the Legislature
to fix the problem.
That invitation was answered by SB 131 (Beall, 2013), which
would have allowed the statute of limitations to be applied
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retroactively to any claim that had not been adjudicated as of
January 1, 2014. That bill also would have revived, for a
period of one year, a cause of action that would have otherwise
been barred by the statute of limitations as of January 1, 2014,
provided that the plaintiff's 26th birthday was before January
1, 2003, and the plaintiff discovered the cause of his/her
injury on or after January 1, 2004.
SB 131 was vetoed by Governor Brown who noted the reliance of
third parties on the certainty of the statute of limitations
created by SB 1779, and the unintentional inequities when that
bill only benefited victims who sought to sue a private entity.
Regarding SB 131, the Governor wrote, "This bill does not
change a victim's ability to sue a perpetrator. This bill also
does not change the significant inequity that exists between
private and public entities. What this bill does is go back to
the only group, i.e. private institutions, that have already
been subjected to the unusual 'one year revival period' and
makes them, and them alone, subject to suit indefinitely. This
extraordinary extension of the statute of limitations, which
legislators chose not to apply to public institutions, is simply
too open-ended and unfair."
Prior Legislation
SB 131 (Beall, 2013) See Background.
AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have extended the statute of
limitations in civil cases involving child sex abuse to 35 years
of age, prohibited confidential settlements, and imposed new
duties on private entities. The bill died in the Senate
Appropriations Committee.
SB 1779 (Burton and Escutia, Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002) See
Background.
AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chapter 1021, Statutes of 1998) See Background.
SB 108 (Lockyer, Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990) See Background.
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local:
No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, unknown,
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potentially significant future state court costs (General Fund)
to the extent extending the statute of limitations results in
additional court filings. For every 10 to 25 additional claims
filed, assuming one week of court time, annual costs would be
about $200,000 to $500,000 (General Fund).
SUPPORT : (Verified 8/26/14)
American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy
California Association of Nonprofits
California Coalition Against Sexual Assault
California Police Chiefs Association
California Protective Parents Association
Child Abuse Listening Mediation
Child Abuse Prevention Center
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United California
Incest Survivors' Speakers Bureau of California
National Child Safe Coalition
Restorative Justice International
OPPOSITION : (Verified 8/26/14)
California Association of Joint Power Authorities
California Association of School Business Officials
California Catholic Conference
California Council of Non-Profits
California School Boards Association
CSAC Excess Insurance Authority
Schools Excess Liability Fund
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : According to the author, "Over the last
27 years the California Legislature has come to have a better
understanding of the insidious and latent nature of the injuries
suffered by a child who has been sexually abused and the reasons
why victims of childhood sexual abuse ("CSA") often wait years
before reporting the abuse to law enforcement or otherwise.
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 340.1, a remedial
statute intended to provide redress to CSA victims, has been
amended no less than five times since its original enactment in
1986, consistent with this evolving knowledge of the latent
effects of the original abuse."
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION : The California Catholic Conference,
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Inc. (CCC) and the California Council of Nonprofit Organizations
(CCNO) both argue that this bill should address injustices to
victims of abuse inflicted by employees of the State of
California. CCC writes, "While SB 924 pays lip service to the
interests of victims of abuse, it fails to correct the enormous
injustice in the law that denies any extended limitations period
to victims of abuse by individuals employed by the State of
California. This is because the six month filing requirement in
the Government Tort Claim Act overrides and drastically shortens
the time period by which a victim of abuse by a state government
employee can pursue claims-even in a case where the agency knew
of the propensities of the perpetrator but failed to act to
prevent harm to other victims."
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 55-19, 8/25/14
AYES: Achadjian, Alejo, Allen, Ammiano, Bloom, Bocanegra,
Bonilla, Bonta, Bradford, Brown, Buchanan, Ian Calderon,
Campos, Chau, Chesbro, Cooley, Dababneh, Daly, Dickinson,
Eggman, Fong, Fox, Frazier, Garcia, Gatto, Gomez, Gordon,
Hall, Roger Hernández, Holden, Jones-Sawyer, Levine, Linder,
Lowenthal, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Pan, John A.
Pérez, V. Manuel Pérez, Quirk, Rendon, Ridley-Thomas,
Rodriguez, Skinner, Stone, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wieckowski,
Wilk, Williams, Yamada, Atkins
NOES: Bigelow, Chávez, Conway, Dahle, Donnelly, Beth Gaines,
Grove, Hagman, Harkey, Jones, Logue, Mansoor, Melendez,
Nestande, Patterson, Perea, Quirk-Silva, Salas, Wagner
NO VOTE RECORDED: Gonzalez, Gorell, Gray, Maienschein, Olsen,
Vacancy
AL:k 8/26/14 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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