BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    Ó



                                                                  SB 1058
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          Date of Hearing:  June 10, 2014
          Counsel:       Stella Choe


                         ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
                                 Tom Ammiano, Chair

                      SB 1058 (Leno) - As Amended:  June 4, 2014


           SUMMARY  :   Includes within the definition of "false evidence,"  
          for purposes of prosecuting a writ of habeas corpus, opinions of  
          experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who  
          originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that  
          have been undermined by later scientific research or  
          technological advances.  This bill also clarifies that these  
          provisions shall not be construed to create additional  
          liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for experts who  
          repudiate his or her own original opinion or whose basis has  
          been repudiated by later scientific or technological  
          advancements.

           EXISTING LAW  :

          1)States that every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or  
            restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, to  
            prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause  
            of such imprisonment or restraint.  (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd.  
            (a).)

          2)Provides that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for,  
            but not limited to, the following reasons (Pen. Code, § 1473,  
            subd. (b)):

             a)   False evidence that is substantially material or  
               probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was  
               introduced against a person at any hearing or trial  
               relating to his incarceration; or,

             b)   False physical evidence, believed by a person to be  
               factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt,  
               which was known by the person at the time of entering a  
               plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly  
               related to the plea of guilty by the person.









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          3)States that nothing in the provisions authorizing a writ of  
            habeas corpus shall be construed as limiting the grounds for  
            which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as  
            precluding the use of any other remedies.  (Pen. Code, § 1473,  
            subd. (d).)

          4)Provides that the application for the writ is made by  
            petition, signed either by the party for whose relief it is  
            intended, or by some person in his behalf, and must specify  
            (Pen. Code, § 1474):

             a)   That the person in whose behalf the writ is applied for  
               is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, the officer or  
               person by whom he is so confined or restrained, and the  
               place where, naming all the parties, if they are known, or  
               describing them, if they are not known; 

             b)   If the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the  
               petition must also state in what the alleged illegality  
               consists; and,

             c)   The petition must be verified by the oath or affirmation  
               of the party making the application.

          5)States that the writ must be directed to the person having  
            custody of or restraining the person on whose behalf the  
            application is made, and must command him to have the body of  
            such person before the Court or Judge before whom the writ is  
            returnable, at a time and place therein specified.  (Pen.  
            Code, § 1477.)

          6)Requires the person upon whom the writ is served must state in  
            his return, plainly and unequivocally (Pen. Code, § 1480):

             a)   Whether he has or has not the party in his custody, or  
               under his power or restraint;

             b)   If he has the party in his custody or power, or under  
               his restraint, he must state the authority and cause of  
               such imprisonment or restraint;

             c)   If the party is detained by virtue of any writ, warrant,  
               or other written authority, a copy thereof must be annexed  
               to the return, and the original produced and exhibited to  
               the Court or Judge on the hearing of such return; and,








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             d)   If the person upon whom the writ is served had the party  
               in his power or custody, or under his restraint, at any  
               time prior or subsequent to the date of the writ of habeas  
               corpus, but has transferred such custody or restraint to  
               another, the return must state particularly to whom, at  
               what time and place, for what cause, and by what authority  
               such transfer took place;

             e)   The return must be signed by the person making the same,  
               and, except when such person is a sworn public officer, and  
               makes such return in his official capacity, it must be  
               verified by his oath.

          7)Requires the Court or Judge before whom the writ is returned,  
            immediately after the return, to proceed to hear and examine  
            the return, and such other matters as may be properly  
            submitted to their hearing and consideration.  (Pen. Code, §  
            1483.)

          8)States that the party brought before the Court or Judge, on  
            the return of the writ, may deny or controvert any of the  
            material facts or matters set forth in the return, or except  
            to the sufficiency thereof, or allege any fact to show either  
            that his imprisonment or detention is unlawful, or that he is  
            entitled to his discharge. The Court or Judge must thereupon  
            proceed in a summary way to hear such proof as may be produced  
            against such imprisonment or detention, or in favor of the  
            same, and to dispose of such party as the justice of the case  
            may require, and have full power and authority to require and  
            compel the attendance of witnesses, by process of subpoena and  
            attachment, and to do and perform all other acts and things  
            necessary to a full and fair hearing and determination of the  
            case.  (Pen. Code, § 1484.)

          9)States if no legal cause is shown for such imprisonment or  
            restraint, or for the continuation thereof, such Court or  
            Judge must discharge such party from the custody or restraint  
            under which he is held.  (Pen. Code, § 1485.)

           FISCAL EFFECT  :   Unknown

           COMMENTS  :   

           1)Author's Statement  :  According to the author, "SB 1058 would  








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            clarify that 'false evidence' includes repudiated and recanted  
            expert testimony that served as the primary basis for an  
            incarcerated individual's conviction. 

            "California's false testimony statutes are intended to protect  
            an individual from wrongful incarceration due to the false  
            testimony of a witness. Unfortunately, a recent court decision  
            created an unjust distinction between the false testimony of  
            laypersons-which a court may consider in overturning a  
            wrongful conviction-and that of "expert witnesses", which must  
            now meet a higher bar before being considered in overturning a  
            wrongful conviction.  This contradictory interpretation is  
            unreasonable and exacerbates the problem of wrongful  
            convictions.

            "This bill will allow a judge to determine when wrongful  
            incarceration has taken place due to a conviction that was  
            based on evidence that has been disproven by scientific and  
            technological advances.  

            "Quite simply, this bill will keep innocent people out of  
            prison."  

           2)Writ of Habeas Corpus Generally  :  Habeas corpus, also known as  
            "the Great Writ", is a process guaranteed by both the federal  
            and state constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from  
            illegal restraint.  The functions of the writ is set forth in  
            Penal Code Section 1473(a):  "Every person unlawfully  
            imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any  
            pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to  
            inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint."   
            Penal Code Section 1473(d) specifies that "nothing in this  
            section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a  
            writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted."  A writ of habeas  
            corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the  
            following reasons:

             a)   False evidence that is substantially material or  
               probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was  
               introduced against a person at any hearing or trial  
               relating to his incarceration;

             b)   False physical evidence believed by a person to be  
               factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which  
               was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of  








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               guilty and which was a material factor directly related to  
               the plea of guilty by the person; and,

             c)   Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have  
               known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to  
               the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus.  (Pen. Code, §  
               1473, subd. (b).)     

            A habeas corpus claim of false testimony requires proof that  
            false evidence was introduced against petitioner at his or her  
            trial and that such evidence was material or probative on the  
            issue of his or her guilt.  (In re Bell (2007) 42 Cal.4th  
            630.) False evidence introduced at trial against a defendant  
            is substantially material or probative if there is a  
            reasonable probability that, had the false evidence not been  
            introduced, the result would have been different. (In re  
            Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726.)  A reasonable probability that  
            the result would have been different if false evidence had not  
            been introduced against defendant is a chance great enough,  
            under the totality of circumstances, to undermine the court's  
            confidence in the outcome. (Ibid.) A habeas claim of false  
            testimony does not require a showing of perjury or other  
            knowledge of impropriety. (In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 308.)

            A writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted based on newly  
            discovered evidence, and shall be granted only if the new  
            evidence undermines the entire prosecution case and point  
            unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.  (In re Clark  
            (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.)

           3)Impetus for this Bill  :  The issue this bill seeks to address  
            was raised by the recent California Supreme Court ruling in In  
            re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948.  The 4-3 majority in  
            Richards held that expert opinion stated at trial is "false  
            evidence" supporting a habeas relief if the expert's  
            conclusion is proved to be objectively untrue.  (Richards,  
            supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg. 963.) Thus, a petitioner "does not  
            establish false evidence by presenting evidence that an expert  
            witness has recanted the opinion testimony given at trial."  
            (Ibid.)

          In Richards, the petitioner was charged with murdering his wife.  
            His first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable  
            to reach a verdict.  His second trial was cancelled before a  
            jury was selected, when the trial court recused itself.  His  








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            third trial also ended in a mistrial after the jury could not  
            reach a verdict.  At his fourth trial, the prosecution  
            produced expert testimony regarding what appeared to be a bite  
            mark on the victim's hand. The prosecution's forensic dentist,  
            Dr. Sperber, testified that "it might be one or two less" out  
            of a hundred people who would have the petitioner's dental  
            irregularity.  (Richards, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg. 955.) After  
            visually comparing a photograph of the lesion on the victim's  
            hand to a model of petitioner's lower teeth, Dr. Sperber  
            stated his opinion that the lesion was a human bite mark, and  
            that petitioner's unusual dentition was consistent with the  
            bite mark. (Ibid.)

          The defense also presented expert testimony of a forensic  
            dentist, Dr. Golden, who testified that in a brief review of  
            15 "study models" of teeth in his office, he found five models  
            that were consistent with the mark.  In Dr. Golden's opinion,  
            the bite-mark evidence was inconclusive and should be  
            disregarded, in part because of the angular distortion in the  
            photograph of the mark.  (Richards, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg.  
            956.) 

          Petitioner was convicted of murder, and he subsequently filed a  
            writ of habeas corpus. At petitioner's evidentiary hearing on  
            the habeas corpus petition, Dr. Sperber, the forensic dentist  
            who had testified for the prosecution at trial stated that,  
            after reviewing all of the photographs of the victim's hand,  
            he was no longer certain that the mark was a human bite mark.  
            (Richards, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg. 957.)  Dr. Sperber added  
            that "[his] opinion today is that [petitioner's] teeth ? are  
            not consistent with the lesion on the hand." (Ibid.)  Dr.  
            Golden, the forensic dentist who testified for the defense at  
            trial, described the availability of new computer technology  
            allowing him to remove angular distortion from photographs.   
            Dr. Golden concluded that the lesion on the victim's hand  
            might have been from a dogbite or some other source; in any  
            case, he "would tend to rule out Mr. Richards ? as the  
            suspected biter."  Other experts testified that new technology  
            for removing angular distortion from photographs had made it  
            doubtful that the mark on the victim's hand was a human bite  
            mark. (Ibid.)

          The superior court granted habeas relief.  The Court of Appeal  
            disagreed, and the California Supreme Court granted request  
            for review.








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          The majority stated that "the opinion of Dr. Sperber offered at  
            trial could qualify as 'false evidence' if, for example, a  
            generally recognized and relevant advance in science or  
            technology proved under the preponderance of the evidence  
            standard that the trial opinion was objectively untrue."  
            (Richards, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg. 965.)  The petitioner's  
            habeas evidence at most, calls into question Dr. Sperber's  
            opinion at trial that petitioner's teeth could have been the  
            source of the mark, but he did not prove that the opinion was  
            objectively untrue.  Thus, Dr. Sperber's testimony was not  
            false evidence for purposes of Penal Code section 1473 and  
            petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief. (Id. at pg.  
            966.)  

          Next the court analyzed the habeas petition under the newly  
            discovered evidence standard, and after analyzing the  
            cumulative effect of all of the evidence, the court found that  
            the petitioner had failed to show that the newly discovered  
            evidence (advance in technology allowing an undistorted view  
            of victim's hand in photographs) pointed unerringly to his  
            innocence or reduced culpability, therefore habeas relief  
            could not be granted.

          In his dissenting opinion, Justice Goodwin Liu challenged the  
            majority opinion stating that "[a]lthough the false evidence  
            statute makes no distinction between lay and expert testimony,  
            today's decision imposes novel burdens on a petitioner who  
            seeks relief under section 1473(b) where false evidence was  
            introduced through expert testimony." (Richards, supra, 55  
            Cal.4th at pg. 971.) According to Justice Liu, this is  
            inconsistent with the California Supreme Court's holdings in  
            previous cases, that "false evidence" within the meaning of  
            section 1473(b) is established when a petitioner shows by a  
            preponderance of the evidence either the falsity of an  
            expert's testimony or the falsity of an underlying fact  
            essential to an expert's testimony. (Ibid.)

          In the context of lay witnesses, "[w]hen a lay witness in good  
            faith gives testimony that the witness later concedes he or  
            she had no perceptual basis to give, that witness has given  
            false evidence within the meaning of section 1473(b). . . .  
            Just as the truth or falsity of eyewitness testimony under  
            section 1473(b) depends on the truth or falsity of underlying  
            facts concerning the witness's perceptual abilities, the truth  








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            or falsity of expert testimony depends on the truth or falsity  
            of underlying facts essential to the expert's inferential  
            method and ultimate opinion." (Richards, supra, 55 Cal.4th at  
            pg. 973.) At trial, Dr. Sperber based his opinion on the  
            single uncorrected photograph of the mark on the victim's hand  
            to conclude that the petitioner's teeth were a match.  "[T]he  
            expert testimony here was false because it depended crucially  
            on Dr. Sperber having seen something-a true photographic  
            representation of the lesion on the victim's hand-that it  
            turns out he did not actually see. (Id. at pp. 975-976.) 

          Another issue raised by the dissent is that the majority's  
            holding raises the standard of proof for false evidence from  
            preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) to a  
            virtual certainty.  (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 935.) The  
            majority stated that the petitioner's evidence could not  
            definitively rule out his teeth as a possible source of the  
            mark.  However, under the established standard of proof for  
            "false evidence" petitioner only needed to show that the mark  
            was inconsistent with his teeth by a preponderance of the  
            evidence, meaning that he needed to show that it was more  
            likely than not that his teeth did not cause the mark.

          Justice Liu's dissenting opinion concludes that petitioner has  
            shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the mark on the  
            victim's hand was not caused by his teeth, thus Dr. Sperber's  
            trial testimony was based on false evidence.  (Richards,  
            supra, 55 Cal.4th at pg. 979.) He also concludes that it is  
            reasonably probable that the verdict at the final trial would  
            have been different without Dr. Sperber's testimony which is  
            evidenced by the fact that at petitioner's two previous trials  
            the juries could not reach a verdict, and it was only at his  
            fourth trial, where the expert testimony regarding bite mark  
            evidence was introduced, that the jury found the petitioner  
            guilty.  Therefore, petitioner's grant for habeas corpus  
            should have been granted. (Id. at pp. 981-982.)

          This bill specifies that "false evidence" for purposes of  
            prosecuting a writ of habeas corpus, includes opinions of  
            experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who  
            originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that  
            have been undermined by later scientific research or  
            technological advances.  This bill removes the distinction  
            between testimony by lay witnesses and testimony of experts  
            created by the Richards decision but still requires that the  








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            court make a finding that it is reasonably probable that the  
            verdict at trial would have been different without the  
            expert's testimony before granting habeas relief. 

           4)California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice's  
            Report on Forensic Evidence  :  The California Commission on the  
            Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) was established in 2004  
            by Senate Resolution No. 44 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) and charged  
            with the following duties:  (1) to study and review the  
            administration of criminal justice in California to determine  
            the extent to which that process has failed in the past,  
            resulting in wrongful executions or the wrongful conviction of  
            innocent persons; (2) to examine ways of providing safeguards  
            and making improvements in the way the criminal justice system  
            functions; and, (3) to make any recommendations and proposals  
            designed to further ensure that the application and  
            administration of criminal justice in California is just,  
            fair, and accurate. 

          CCFAJ's report on Forensic Science Evidence identified erroneous  
            forensic identifications of hair, bullets, handwriting,  
            footprints, bite marks, and venerated fingerprints as the  
            second most common factor contributing to wrongful  
            convictions. The report highlighted the following incidents  
            where the bases for the experts' testimony were later proven  
            to be erroneous:

          "Herman Atkins was convicted of rape in Riverside County in1988,  
            and sentenced to forty-five years in prison. After serving  
            eleven years in prison for a crime he did not commit, he was  
            exonerated by DNA testing conducted in 1999, which showed he  
            was not the source of semen found on the victim's sweater. His  
            defense at trial was based on mistaken eyewitness  
            identification.  In testifying at his trial, a criminalist  
            from the California State Laboratory at Riverside improperly  
            testified that Atkins was included in a population of only  
            4.4% of the population that could have contributed the semen.   
            In truth, because nothing foreign to the victim was seen, no  
            male in the world could ever be excluded as a potential semen  
            donor. Hence, 100% of the male population could be  
            contributors. The serology data, in fact, was
            not probative of guilt or innocence but the jury was  
            nonetheless misled by the state's expert.
            [Citation omitted.]"









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            "Jeffrey Rodriguez, 28, was freed in San Jose on Monday,  
            February 5, 2007.  He had served 5 years of a 25 years to life  
            sentence for a robbery under California's "three strikes" law.  
             In his case, a shaky eyewitness identification was  
            corroborated by the testimony of a criminalist who claimed his  
            pants contained a stain with a combination of motor oil and  
            cooking oil. Such a combination would have connected him to  
            the crime scene.  Subsequent tests by a state crime lab  
            concluded that the stain was not as described.  Although at  
            his first trial, jurors voted 11-1 to acquit, by the time of  
            his retrial his family ran out of money, and his lawyer failed  
            even to call the defense witnesses who had testified at the  
            first trial.  After his conviction was set aside on appeal  
            because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecution  
            elected to drop the charges. [Citation omitted.]" (CCFAJ,  
                                  Report and Recommendations Regarding Forensic Scientific  
            Evidence (May 2007), p. 4.)

           5)Argument in Support  : The  American Civil Liberties Union   
            writes, "[T]he [Richards] court determined that the opinions  
            of expert witnesses have no bearing on the validity of the  
            evidence that their opinion provides.  Under this  
            interpretation, a case involving an expert witness whose  
            testimony serves as the primary basis for a conviction - and  
            who later realizes the analysis was wrong - cannot be reversed  
            under any circumstances, no matter how egregious the false  
            testimony.

          "As Justice Goodwin Liu stated in his dissenting opinion, 'There  
            is no reason to treat expert testimony differently.  Just as  
            the truth or falsity of eye witness testimony under section  
            1473(b) depends on the truth or falsity of underlying facts  
            concerning the witness's perceptual abilities, the truth or  
            falsity of expert testimony depends on the truth or falsity of  
            underlying facts essential to the expert's inferential method  
            and ultimate opinion.

          "In fact, prior to the 2012 decision in Richards, innocent  
            individuals could and often did successfully challenge their  
            convictions when the evidence underlying their original  
            conviction has been substantially undermined by scientific and  
            technological advances.  One such instance was the case with  
            Kenneth Marsh.

          "Marsh was convicted in November 1983 for the death of  








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            33-month-old Phillip Buell, who died 10 months earlier from a  
            head injury sustained when he fell off a couch and hit his  
            head on a brick hearth. Although the incident was originally  
            treated as an accidental fall by the San Diego Police  
            Department, San Diego prosecutors later charged Marsh with the  
            murder of young Phillip.  At trial, the prosecution's medical  
            experts claimed that the only way Phillip could have sustained  
            the injuries was through abuse.

          "Marsh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in October  
            2002 seeking a new trial after evidence was uncovered that  
            proved Marsh's innocence.  Based on the false evidence  
            provided in Marsh's original trial, his habeas petition was  
            granted and new charges were dismissed - he is now a free man.  
             Had Marsh's case been decided today, it is possible that he  
            would remain in prison for the tragic accidental death of  
            Buell."

           6)Argument in Opposition  : The  California District Attorneys  
            Association  writes, "False evidence, the preparation and  
            offering of which is a felony under Penal Code Sections 132  
            and 134, is evidence that is presented as a genuine and true  
            depiction of something other than what it actually represents.  
             People v. Bamberg (2009) 175 Cal.App. 618, 628. The expert  
            opinions that SB 1058 seeks to address, on the other hand are  
            exactly what they claim to be - the opinion of experts.

          "Certainly, experts who provide testimony that they know to be  
            untrue should be prosecuted under the myriad of laws that  
            already cover perjury, false evidence, and obstruction of  
            justice.  However, an expert opinion that is later invalidated  
            by scientific or technological advances is not false evidence.  
             To categorize it as such is to suggest some nefarious intent  
            on the part of the expert that likely does not exist.

          "More generally, we believe that this clarification is  
            unnecessary, given the permissive nature of Penal Code Section  
            1473.  It is already clear from the language of subdivision  
            (b) and (d) that a writ of habeas corpus may be filed for any  
            reason, including the scenario envisioned by SB 1058."

           7)Prior Legislation  : 

             a)   AB 1593 (Ma), Chapter 809, Statutes of 2012, allows a  
               writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted if expert testimony  








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               relating to intimate partner battering and its effects was  
               received into evidence but was limited at the trial court  
               proceedings relating to a prisoner's incarceration for the  
               commission of a violent felony committed prior to August  
               29, 1996, and there is a reasonable probability, sufficient  
               to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction, that  
               if the testimony had not been limited, the result of the  
               proceedings would have been different.

             b)   SB 1471 (Runner), of the 2007-08 Legislative Session,  
               would have required habeas petitions in death penalty cases  
               to be filed within one year and change the standards for  
               competent counsel.  SB 1471 failed passage in Senate Public  
               Safety.


           REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION  :

           Support 
           
          California Innocence Project (Co-Sponsor)
          Northern California Innocence Project (Co-Sponsor)
          American Civil Liberties Union 
          California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
          California Catholic Conference of Bishops
            California Public Defenders Association
          Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
          Equal Justice Society
          Friends Committee on Legislation of California
          Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
          National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter
          Taxpayers for Improving Public Safety

           Opposition 
           
          California District Attorneys Association


           Analysis Prepared by  :    Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744