BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SB 1064
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Date of Hearing: June 9, 2014
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND COMMERCE
Steven Bradford, Chair
SB 1064 (Hill) - As Amended: April 8, 2014
SENATE VOTE : 36-0
SUBJECT : Public Utilities Commission: railroads: natural gas
pipelines: safety.
SUMMARY : This bill enacts provisions concerning National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations and
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) safety advisories relating
to California Public Utilities Commission (PUC)-regulated rail
facilities. Specifically, this bill :
1)Requires the PUC, upon receipt of NTSB rail safety
recommendations, to provide within 90 days a written response
to NTSB indicating the commission's intended actions for each
recommendation, including one of the following:
a) The intent to implement recommendations in full,
with a proposed timetable.
b) The intent to implement part of the recommendations,
with a proposed timetable, and detailed reasons for the
refusal to implement the remaining recommendations.
c) The refusal to implement recommendations, with
detailed reasons for the refusal.
2)Requires the PUC, if NTSB issues a safety recommendation
letter concerning a PUC-regulated rail facility to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, FTA, a PUC-regulated rail
operator, or the PUC itself, or if the FTA issues a safety
advisory concerning any PUC-regulated rail facility, to detail
in writing whether implementation of the recommendation or
advisory is appropriate and approve the decision by majority
vote.
3)Requires the PUC, upon deeming a NTSB recommendation
appropriate or an FTA action necessary, to issue orders or
adopt rules to implement the recommendation or action as soon
as practicable, and further requires the PUC to consider
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whether a more effective, or equally effective and less
costly, alternative exists to address the safety issue.
4)Requires the PUC annual work plan to report any action taken
regarding a rail safety recommendation or advisory, and
requires any correspondence from NTSB indicating that a gas or
rail safety recommendation has been closed following an action
that the NTSB finds unacceptable to be noted.
EXISTING LAW
a)Requires the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to regulate
railroads and prohibits states from adopting laws,
regulations, rules, or orders containing the same subject
matter as a regulation or order prescribed by the FRA. (49 USC
20103, 20105, and 20106)
b)Authorizes the FTA to regulate railroad facilities, including
rail fixed guideways operated by transit agencies. (49 USC
5330)
c)Requires the NTSB investigate significant pipeline, railroad,
and other accidents, and issue safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents. (49 USC 1131)
d)Authorizes the PUC to regulate the design, construction, and
operation of public transit guideways and to develop an
oversight program employing safety planning criteria,
guidelines, safety standards, and safety procedures. (Public
Utilities Code 99152)
e)Requires the PUC to respond within 90 days to gas pipeline
safety recommendations issued to the commission by NTSB, and
to indicate the PUC's intended actions, if any. (Public
Utilities Code 960(a))
f)Requires the PUC to detail in writing whether implementation
of NTSB safety recommendations for PUC-regulated gas pipeline
facilities is appropriate, and provides that a majority vote
of the commission is needed to approve the decision. (Public
Utilities Code 960(b))
g)Requires the PUC to issue orders or adopt rules relating to
implementation of safety recommendations as soon as
practicable, if a recommendation is deemed appropriate and/or
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action is deemed necessary. (Public Utilities Code 960(c))
h)Requires PUC action on any gas pipeline safety recommendation
to be reported to the Legislature in the PUC's annual workplan
report (Public Utilities Code 960 and 321.6).
FISCAL EFFECT : Unknown
COMMENTS :
1)Author's statement: "The Independent Review Panel into the San
Bruno explosion called for the profile of safety to be raised
throughout the California Public Utilities Commission's
organization. After finding that the CPUC had largely ignored
National Transportation Safety Board gas safety
recommendations and safety advisory bulletins from the federal
regulator, the Legislature decided to require the CPUC to be
more responsive to NTSB and to require a vote of the full
Commission in deciding whether to implement relevant
recommendations and advisory bulletins. After the dangerous
rescue of passengers of the September [2013] Angel's Flight
derailment-a rescue that wouldn't have been dangerous had the
CPUC not defied an NTSB recommendation (without even taking a
vote)-the Legislature should act again to raise the profile of
rail safety. By requiring the CPUC to report to the
Legislature of any actions the NTSB finds unacceptable-as NTSB
had found the CPUC's response to the fatal 2001 Angel's Flight
accident-gas and rail safety recommendations from the NTSB
will be given the consideration they deserve."
2)The National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB is an
independent Federal agency charged with investigating
significant transportation accidents in the U.S., including
those related to aviation, railroads, highways, marine, and
pipelines. NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents
and issues safety recommendations intended to prevent future
accidents. These recommendations are directed to the public or
private organization best able to correct the issue(s). Since
1967, the NTSB has issued over 13,000 safety recommendations
to more than 2,500 recipients.<1>
At NTSB, within the Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations, the Railroad Division has the
responsibility for railroad accident investigations involving
--------------------------
<1> http://www.ntsb.gov/about/history.html
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passenger railroads, freight railroads, commuter rail transit
systems and other transportation systems operating on a fixed
guideway. These accidents typically involve collisions or
derailments, and some of these accidents lead to the release
of hazardous materials.
Because the NTSB has no formal authority to regulate the
transportation industry, the Board's effectiveness depends on
thorough, accurate, and independent investigations and timely,
well-considered recommendations.
3)The Federal Transit Administration . FTA is an agency within
the United States Department of Transportation that provides
financial and technical assistance to local public transit
systems. Rail fixed guideway systems, and the Regional Transit
Agencies (RTAs) that operate them, are regulated by the FTA
and states. In the past, FTA has issued safety advisories in
response to NTSB recommendations. For example, after an
October 2013 incident in which two Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART) workers were struck and killed by a train while
inspecting track, the NTSB issued two urgent safety
recommendations to the FTA regarding the need for redundant
protection for workers on the rail transit right-of-way.<2> In
response to the NTSB recommendations, FTA Safety Advisory 14-1
requested State Safety Oversight agencies coordinate with the
rail transit agencies in their jurisdiction to complete
various actions.<3>
4)NTSB rail safety recommendations to the PUC. NTSB has issued
twelve safety recommendations - six concerning pipelines and
six concerning rail - to the PUC since 1982.<4> Regarding the
rail recommendations, four were for rail fixed guideways, one
was for a freight line, and the remaining was for Amtrak.
NTSB has marked all gas pipeline safety recommendations to the
PUC as having "Acceptable" actions or responses, but two rail
safety recommendations have been classified as "Unacceptable",
with one in particular - Angels Flight - being the impetus for
this bill.
The troubles for the downtown Los Angeles Angels Flight
funicular railway began on February 1, 2001, when the
--------------------------
<2> http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2013/R-13-039-040.pdf
<3> http://www.fta.dot.gov/newsroom/12910_15765.html
<4> http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/QueryPage.aspx
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collision of the two cars resulted in 7 injuries and 1
fatality. In August 2003, NTSB recommended the PUC verify
Angels Flight equipment met industry standards, including
having an emergency evacuation guideway, before reauthorizing
service. When Angels Flight reopened in 2010, it did so
without an emergency evacuation guideway, and the NTSB
reclassified the safety recommendation as
"Closed-Unacceptable" because the PUC did not require Angels
Flight to comply with all elements of the recommendation
before resuming service. Correspondence on this action
indicates the PUC unsuccessfully petitioned the NTSB to change
the safety recommendation status to "Closed-Acceptable".
Another Angels Flight accident occurred on September 5, 2013,
when the descending car derailed and required rescue of five
stranded passengers in the ascending car. A month later, NTSB
issued five urgent recommendations, and the PUC President
responded with actions the PUC is taking to address the
recommendations. NTSB's website currently classifies this item
as "Open-Initial Response Received", but a May 13, 2014 letter
from NTSB to the PUC updates the item as "Open-Acceptable
Response".
In regards to the aforementioned BART right-of-way incident,
the NTSB made safety recommendations to the FTA but did not
issue recommendations directly to the PUC. Purportedly, the
PUC's prompt revision of General Order 175<5>satisfied what
the NTSB would have otherwise recommended.
5)NTSB gas safety recommendations. The federal Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) sets safety
standards for gas and petroleum pipelines, and states are
allowed to adopt regulations exceeding those standards.
Occasionally NTSB will make a recommendation to PHMSA;
however, PHMSA does not always act on the recommendation.
Furthermore, there may be a safety gap if a state regulator
(like the PUC) is not vigilant about monitoring NTSB
recommendations for accidents that happen in other parts of
the country.
After the San Bruno incident, the Legislature examined NTSB
recommendations that may have prevented the disaster - had
--------------------------
<5>
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M081/K501/81
501283.PDF
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they been followed. These recommendations were implemented by
SB 216 (Yee, 2011) and AB 56 (Hill, 2011), which required
installation of remote controlled and automatic shutoff
valves. Moreover, after a series of explosions in the 1990s,
NTSB recommended to PHMSA that operators locate and either
replace or develop a plan to phase out a certain type of
polyethylene piping, but a 2011 condominium explosion in
Roseville demonstrated this piping was still in use. To ensure
NTSB gas safety recommendations were considered by the PUC, AB
578 (Hill, 2012) enacted provisions that required (1) the PUC
to be more responsive to NTSB recommendations; (2) a vote of
the commission when deciding whether to implement
recommendations and/or advisories; and (3) inclusion of PUC
actions on gas safety recommendations in the PUC's annual
report.
This bill seeks to provide consistency in the statute by
enacting similar provisions concerning the PUC's response to
NTSB rail safety recommendations.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
None on file.
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by : Brandon Gaytan / U. & C. / (916)
319-2083