BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    Ó



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          Date of Hearing:  January 13, 2016 


                  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND REDISTRICTING


                           Sebastian Ridley-Thomas, Chair


          AB 887  
          (Ting) - As Amended January 4, 2016


          SUBJECT:  Military and overseas voters: ballot submission by  
          electronic mail: Internet voting.


          SUMMARY:  Permits a military or overseas voter to return his or  
          her vote by mail (VBM) ballot by electronic mail (email), as  
          specified, and allows a military or overseas voter to cast his  
          or her vote on the Internet, as specified.  Specifically, this  
          bill:  


          1)Permits a military or overseas voter to return his or her VBM  
            ballot by email, as specified.


          2)Provides that, to be counted, the ballot returned by email  
            must be received by the voter's elections official no later  
            than the closing of the polls on election day and must be  
            accompanied by a copy of an identification envelope and an  
            oath of voter declaration, as specified.


          3)Provides that in order for a ballot to be submitted by email,  
            the ballot, identification envelope, and oath of voter  
            declaration, must be scanned to create electronic copies of  
            the documents.  Requires the electronic copies of the  








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            documents to be included in the email sent to the elections  
            official as attachments.  


          4)Requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to adopt uniform  
            regulations for the use of email in returning ballots.


          5)Requires each elections official to adopt appropriate  
            procedures to protect the secrecy of the ballots returned by  
            email.


          6)Requires the elections official, upon receipt of a ballot  
            returned by email, to determine the voter's eligibility to  
            vote by comparing the signature on the scanned copy of the  
            identification envelope with the signature on the voter's  
            affidavit of registration


          7)Allows a military or overseas voter to cast his or her vote on  
            the Internet by electronically marking his or her ballot and  
            securely transmitting the voted ballot to the appropriate  
            election official using the Internet.  Provides that, in order  
            to be counted, the voted ballot must be received by the  
            voter's elections official no later than the closing of the  
            polls on election day.


          8)Requires the SOS to adopt uniform regulations for military and  
            overseas voters to cast votes using the Internet.  


          9)Provides that the Internet voting provisions of this bill  
            shall become operative only if the SOS certifies that he or  
            she has identified and addressed all issues regarding the  
            security of casting a vote using the Internet.










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          10)Makes conforming changes.


          




          EXISTING LAW:  
          1)Defines a "military or overseas voter" as an elector absent  
            from the county in which he or she is otherwise eligible to  
            vote who is any of the following:

             a)   A member of the active or reserve components of the  
               United States (U.S.) Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,  
               or Coast Guard; a Merchant Marine; a member of the U.S.  
               Public Health Service Commissioned Corps; a member of the  
               National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
               Commissioned Corps of the U.S.; a member on activated  
               status of the National Guard or state militia;  

             b)   A citizen of the U.S. living outside of the territorial  
               limits of the U.S. or the District of Columbia; or,

             c)   A spouse or dependent of a person described above.

          2)Provides that when a military or overseas voter applies for a  
            VBM ballot, the application shall be deemed to be an affidavit  
            of registration and an application for permanent VBM status. 

          3)Requires each elections official to have a system available  
            which allows a military or overseas voter to electronically  
            request and receive a VBM application, an unvoted ballot, and  
            other information.

          4)Requires elections officials to request an email address from  
            each military or overseas voter who registers, as specified.  

          5)Requires elections officials to send VBM ballots by means of  








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            transmission (mail, facsimile, or electronic transmission)  
            requested by a qualified military or overseas voter.

          6)Requires the elections official to send a VBM ballot to a  
            military or overseas voter not earlier than 60 days, but not  
            later than 45 days, before the election.

          7)Allows a military or overseas voter who is temporarily living  
            outside of the U.S. to return his or her ballot by facsimile  
            transmission.  Requires a ballot returned by facsimile  
            transmission to be accompanied by an identification envelope  
            and an oath of voter declaration in which the voter  
            acknowledges that the electronic transmission of a completed  
            ballot may compromise the secrecy of the ballot.

          8)Requires the county elections official to determine the  
            voter's eligibility to vote by comparing the voter's signature  
            from the materials returned by facsimile transmission to the  
            signature on the voter's affidavit of registration.

          9)Allows a military or overseas voter who is unable to appear at  
            his or her polling place because of being recalled to service  
            after the final day for applying for a VBM ballot to appear  
            before the elections official in the county in which the voter  
            is registered to apply for a VBM ballot.

          10)Permits a military or overseas voter to use a federal  
            write-in absentee ballot in any election in which he or she is  
            qualified to vote.

          FISCAL EFFECT:  Unknown.  State-mandated local program; contains  
          a crimes and infractions disclaimer and reimbursement direction.  
           


          COMMENTS:  


          1)Purpose of the Bill:  According to the author:








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               The nonpartisan Overseas Vote Foundation (OVF) claims 2012  
               was a tipping point in the use of electoral technology by  
               Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting [Act]  
               voters (UOCAVA voters).  That year, UOCAVA voters nearly  
               doubled the rate at which they returned their ballots via  
               email and more UOCAVA voters than ever cast their votes  
               online.  This technological transition eliminated the  
               biggest roadblocks preventing these voters from  
               participating in the democratic process.  





               Research shows paper ballots often arrive too late for  
               voters overseas to meet the required deadline to return  
               their ballots, that ballots are lost in the mail, and that  
               many ballots are undeliverable.  





               Over thirty states already offer their UOCAVA voters the  
               option of submitting their ballots through email and two  
               states offer UOCAVA voters the option of casting their  
               votes online.  Unfortunately, California does not offer  
               either of these options.  We mandate a paper process.   
               Assembly Bill 887 enables California to catch up with the  
               times.  By giving California's UOCAVA voters the option to  
               cast vote online and to submit their ballots through email,  
               California can start to administer elections in electronic  
               formats, which have permeated how our citizens live and  
               work.  Through these means, we will reduce the largest  
               voting barriers facing California's overseas voters.










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          2)New Ballot Return Election Policies: This bill breaks new  
            ground and permits new methods by which a voted ballot may be  
            returned and how a ballot may be cast that have never been  
            used in California.  This bill allows a military or overseas  
            voter to return his or her VBM ballot by email.   For the  
            ballot to count, the voter must send electronic copies of the  
            voted ballot, a copy of the identification envelope and an  
            oath of voter declaration to the voter's elections official no  
            later than the closing of the polls on election day.   
            Returning a voted ballot by email is not currently allowed  
            under existing law.  As mentioned above, military or overseas  
            voters currently are only allowed to return a voted ballot by  
            mail, fax, or in-person return.

          In addition, this bill allows a military or overseas voter to  
            cast his or her vote on the Internet by electronically marking  
            his or her ballot and securely transmitting the voted ballot  
            to the appropriate elections official using the Internet.  In  
            order for the ballot to be counted, the voted ballot must be  
            received by the voter's elections official no later than the  
            closing of the polls on election day.  Again, this change  
            proposes a major departure from how a military or overseas  
            voter may currently cast his or her ballot.  

          3)How Would a Voter Cast a Ballot on the Internet?  While this  
            bill authorizes a military or overseas voter to cast his or  
            her ballot on the Internet by electronically marking his or  
            her ballot and securely transmitting the voted ballot to the  
            appropriate elections official using the Internet, it does  
            not, however, indicate how or by which method this new  
            procedure to vote on the Internet will occur.  Will a military  
            or overseas voter vote on the Internet via a kiosk, a  
            web-based application, or his or her own personal computer?   
            This bill does not provide any detail as to how this new  
            process or system would work.  Theoretically, some sort of new  
            voting system would need to be reviewed, certified, and  
            approved for use in order for a military or overseas voter to  
            utilize this option to cast his or her ballot.  Under current  
            law, no voting system or part of a voting system may be  








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            connected to the Internet at any time.  Consequently, new  
            testing and certification protocols and procedures will need  
            to be developed to ensure the system is appropriately tested  
            and examined.  Because this bill requires the SOS to adopt  
            uniform regulations for military and overseas voters to cast  
            votes using the Internet, an argument can be made that the SOS  
            will include those details in the regulations.  The committee,  
            however, may wish to consider requiring the SOS to develop new  
            testing and certification protocols and procedures for a  
            voting system that allows for Internet voting.  Currently,  
            there are no state laws or regulations governing the use of  
            Internet voting systems and the committee staff is unaware of  
            any official federal standards.  



          Moreover, this bill provides that the Internet provisions of  
            this bill will not become operative until the SOS certifies  
            that he or she has identified and addressed all issues  
            regarding the security of casting a vote using the Internet.   
            This language, however, is vague and ambiguous.  This bill  
            does not include specific safeguards or safety measures to  
            protect a voter's private information and voting selections,  
            nor does it include any requirements for encryption or other  
            safeguards to protect against information being intercepted  
            during transmission.  Again, while an argument can be made  
            that those provisions will not be operative until the SOS  
            certifies that all security issues have been addressed, more  
            detail and specificity is needed to understand what it means  
            for an Internet voting system to be secure.  As noted later in  
            this analysis, various documented studies and reports  
            generally conclude that the current architecture of the  
            Internet and the variety of ways in which its security can be  
            compromised pose a significant threat and risk to Internet  
            voting systems.  Many specifically state that Internet voting  
            systems can be vulnerable to a variety of different attacks,  
            the most common attacks include, but are not limited to,  
            denial of service, Trojan horse viruses, malware, website  
            spoofing, and phishing.  Depending on the attack, a variety of  








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            outcomes can result, all of which could compromise the  
            integrity of the election.  

          In addition to the security issues mentioned, there are other  
            important concerns that are not currently addressed or  
            contemplated in this bill, such as usability, transparency,  
            auditability and verifiability.  If it is the will of the  
            committee to approve this bill, it may be appropriate to  
            include more detail to address these important issues.  
          4)What is an Internet Voting System?  According to the U.S.  
            Election Assistance Commission's (EAC) September 2011 report  
            entitled, "A Survey on Internet Voting," the term "Internet  
            voting" is used to refer to many different methods, or  
            channels, of voting.  What the channels have in common is the  
            use of the communications connectivity and protocols by the  
            Internet.  The report classifies Internet voting as a subset  
            of electronic voting.  For the purposes of their study, an  
            Internet voting system was defined as any system where the  
            voter's ballot selections are transmitted over the Internet  
            from a location other than a polling place to the entity  
            conducting the election.  Consequently, the term "remote  
            electronic voting" is often used as a synonym.  

            The report states that the remote voting location can be  
            either a controlled or an uncontrolled voting environment.  It  
            defines a controlled environment to mean a situation where the  
            voting platform, such as the computer used for voting, was  
            supplied by and under the control of the entity conducting the  
            election.  The report describes an uncontrolled environment to  
            mean a situation where the voter supplies the computer used  
            for voting, which may be the voter's personal computer,  
            workplace computer, or any other public computer.  

            According to the survey, there are two forms in which a  
            voter's ballot selections can be returned - electronic ballot  
            return, where the entire ballot document, including the  
            voter's selections, are transmitted, or vote data return,  
            where only the voter's selections are transmitted.   
            Furthermore, the survey describes that there are three  








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            channels, or methods, for electronic ballot return: a  
            web-based communications application which uploads a digital  
            representation of a voted ballot (e.g., pdf or jpeg) file to a  
            website; a digital facsimile, where a voter's ballot is  
            scanned and transmitted as a graphics file; and, email, where  
            a digital representation (e.g., pdf or jpeg) of a voter's  
            ballot is transmitted via email.  

            In addition, their survey outlines three methods for  
            presentation of the ballot and vote data return.  They include  
            a web browser or computer application which the voter executes  
            to display the ballot, record selections, and transmit  
            selections; a direct recording electronic (DRE) device or  
            kiosk connected to the Internet to transmit vote data; and a  
            Voting Over Internet Protocol approach for the voter to access  
            the ballot, record selections, and transmit selections. 

          5)California Internet Voting Task Force:  In 1999, Secretary of  
            State Bill Jones convened the California Internet Voting Task  
            Force (Task Force) to study the feasibility of using the  
            Internet to conduct elections in California.  The goal of the  
            Task Force, which was comprised of more than two dozen experts  
            in the field of data security and elections and voter  
            participation, was to examine the feasibility of Internet  
            voting and develop a report that included recommendations,  
            analysis, and suggested technical requirements.  The Task  
            Force issued a final report in 2000.  According to the report,  
            the implementation of Internet voting would allow increased  
            access to the voting process for millions of potential voters  
            who do not regularly participate in our elections.   However,  
            the Task Force concluded that technological threats to  
            security, integrity, and secrecy of Internet ballots are  
            significant and very real.  Among the recommendations provided  
            by the Task Force was that the election process would be best  
            served by a strategy of evolutionary rather than revolutionary  
            change.  The report states that the implementation of Internet  
            voting will be a complex undertaking with no room for error.   
            Consequently, the Task Force recommended a phased-in approach  
            that will allow for the gradual testing of various components  








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            of technology to authenticate voters and provide secure and  
            secret ballots.  Other recommendations included ensuring  
            Internet voting would serve as a supplement to, not a  
            replacement of, traditional paper-based voting, be accessible  
            to all voters, and ensure there is large public support  
            otherwise large levels of skepticism may compromise the  
            fundamental trust in the democratic process.

          6)Security Concerns:  Many computer scientists and cyber  
            security experts and documented studies and reports, generally  
            conclude that the current architecture of the Internet and the  
            variety of ways in which its security can be compromised, pose  
            a significant threat and risk to Internet voting systems and  
            electronic ballot delivery.  Both private and public entities  
            are susceptible to attacks via the Internet.  Experts say they  
            can happen by anyone, anywhere in the world who has a computer  
            and an Internet connection.  According to various studies and  
            reports, Internet voting systems and electronic ballot  
            transmission can be vulnerable to a variety of different  
            attacks.  



          Scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology  
            (NIST), the technical advisors to the U.S. EAC, have been  
            conducting research into the use of electronic technologies to  
            support military and overseas voting, including casting a  
            ballot over the Internet.  In a 2008 report entitled, "A  
            Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems," NIST analyzed the  
            use of several electronic technologies for different aspects  
            of the absentee voting process.  Their research concluded that  
            widely-deployed security technologies and procedures could  
            help mitigate risks associated with electronic ballot  
            delivery, however the risks associated with casting ballots  
            over the Internet were more serious and challenging to  
            overcome. 

          Specifically, the report concluded that the use of email to  
            return ballots presents several significant security  








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            challenges.  Several different computer systems are involved  
            in sending an email from a voter to an election official.   
            Many of these systems, such as the voters' computers and email  
            servers, are outside the control of election officials.   
            Attacks on these systems could violate the privacy of voters,  
            modify ballots, or disrupt communication with election  
            officials.  Because other individuals or organizations operate  
            these systems, there is little election officials can do to  
            prevent attacks on these systems.  The security challenges  
            associated with email return of voted ballots are difficult to  
            overcome using technology widely deployed today. 

          Additionally the report stated that casting ballots via the web  
            (the Internet) also pose a large number of security challenges  
            that are difficult to overcome.  Using this transmission  
            method, voters would log into a web site and submit their  
            selections on a web page. A great deal of trust must be placed  
            in the software on the election server to accurately record  
            votes, as there would be no opportunity for voters to directly  
            verify that their ballots have been recorded correctly.  
            Furthermore, the reports states that similar to email voting  
            systems, a web-based system for casting ballots would rely on  
            computer systems outside the control of election officials.   
            Attacks on these systems, such as voters' computers, could  
            significantly threaten the integrity of elections or the  
            ability of voters to cast ballots.  Moreover, less  
            sophisticated attacks, such as phishing and spoofing, could  
            trick voters into giving up their voting credentials to an  
            attacker.  Such attacks are common in the banking industry,  
            and are difficult to defend against. 

          Moreover, in 2011 NIST released a report entitled, "Security  
            Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting," which  
            studied Internet voting in more detail.  The report identified  
            and analyzed current and emerging technologies that may  
            mitigate risks to Internet voting, however it also identified  
            several areas that require additional research and  
            technological improvements.  Ultimately, the study concluded  
            that Internet voting systems cannot currently be audited with  








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            a comparable level of confidence in the audit results as those  
            for polling place systems.  The report also concluded that  
            malware on voters' personal computers poses a serious threat  
            that could compromise the secrecy or integrity of voters'  
            ballots.  Finally, the report stated that the U.S. currently  
            lacks a public infrastructure for secure electronic voter  
            authentication and recommended that additional research and  
            development is needed to overcome these challenges before  
            secure Internet voting will be feasible.  
             7)Electronic Transmission of Ballots in Other States: According  
            to a 2015 report by the National Conference of State  
            Legislatures, two states permit some voters to return ballots  
            via the Internet.  In addition, the District of Columbia and  
            22 states (Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,  
            Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,  
            Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,  
            North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and  
            West Virginia) permit UOCAVA voters to return their voted  
            ballots by email or fax.  Five of the 22 states, however, only  
            permit a UOCAVA voter to return his or her voted ballot via  
            email or fax under certain circumstances, such as when a more  
            secure method is not available, only in certain emergency  
            situations, if the voter is in an area eligible for imminent  
            danger, serving in a hostile fire area, or must also send a  
            hard copy of the ballot via postal mail.  The report also  
            states that 19 states do not allow electronic transmission and  
            voters must return voted ballots via postal mail. 



          As mentioned above, California permits a military or overseas  
            voter to return a voted ballot via mail or fax.  
          8)Existing Laws to Facilitate Voting by Overseas and Military  
            Voters: On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed into law  
            the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act to  
            expand the 1986 UOCAVA, which was established to protect the  
            rights of service members to vote in federal elections  
            regardless of where they are stationed.  The MOVE Act builds  
            on UOCAVA to provide greater protections for service members,  








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            their families, and other overseas citizens.

          The provisions of the MOVE Act have been in effect since the  
            November 2010 election.  However, given that California law  
            already included provisions to facilitate voting by military  
            members and other California residents who are outside of the  
            U.S., the SOS's office and local elections officials only had  
            to make minimal adjustments to their practices in order to be  
            in compliance.  For example, the MOVE Act requires states to  
            establish procedures to allow overseas voters to request voter  
            registration applications and absentee ballot applications by  
            mail or electronically, and requires at least one means of  
            electronic communication for voters to request, and for all  
            states to send, voter registration applications, absentee  
            ballot applications, and voting information.  Current law  
            allows a military or overseas voter to register to vote and  
            apply for VBM ballot by facsimile transmission and allows  
            elections official to send a VBM ballot by mail, facsimile, or  
            electronic transmission.  Exceeding the requirement of the  
            MOVE Act, current law allows a military or overseas voter who  
            is temporarily living outside of the US to return his or her  
            ballot by facsimile transmission.

          In addition, the MOVE Act requires states to transmit a  
            requested absentee ballot to overseas voters not later than 45  
            days before an election for federal offices.  Again,  
            California law exceeds this requirement by specifically  
            requiring the county elections official to send ballots to  
            overseas voters with a list of all candidates who have  
            qualified for the ballot beginning on the 60th day before the  
            election, along with a list of all measures on which the voter  
            is qualified to vote.

          9)One Step Further:  In addition to being compliant with all  
            provisions in the MOVE Act, California law also makes other  
            accommodations to facilitate voting by military voters and  
            other California residents who are outside of the U.S.   
            Specifically, current law provides that an application for a  
            VBM ballot by an overseas voter is deemed to be a request for  








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            voter registration (if the voter was not already registered to  
            vote) and an application for permanent VBM voter status.  In  
            addition, California makes all overseas voters permanent VBM  
            voters, thereby eliminating the need for overseas military  
            voters and other overseas voters to request a VBM ballot for  
            each election.

          More recently, in 2012 the Legislature passed and the Governor  
            signed AB 1805 (Huffman), Chapter 744, Statutes of 2012, which  
            established new voting procedures for military and overseas  
            voters, as defined, to comply with the UOCAVA and implement  
            the policies of that act and the Uniform Military & Overseas  
            Voter Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners  
            on Uniform State Laws.  Among other provisions, AB 1805  
            expands the universe of people who can be considered military  
            or overseas voters; expands the use of the Federal Write-In  
            Absentee Ballot by allowing it to be used by military or  
            overseas voters in non-federal elections; and makes other  
            conforming changes, where appropriate in California, to ensure  
            continuity and uniformity across state lines for military and  
            overseas voters.
            
            AB 1929 (Gorell), Chapter 694, Statues of 2012, established  
            processes and procedures for the review and approval of ballot  
            marking systems, as defined, for use in California elections.   
            A ballot marking system speeds up the amount of time it takes  
            for military or overseas voter to cast a ballot by allowing a  
            military or overseas voter to electronically obtain a ballot  
            specific to the precinct in which they reside and  
            electronically mark his or her ballot.  The information marked  
            on the voter's ballot is formatted onto a document that the  
            voter may print out and mail or fax to their county elections  
            official.  

            SB 29 (Correa), Chapter 618, Statues of 2014, allows a VBM  
            ballot to be counted if it is cast by election day and  
            received by the elections official by mail no later than three  
            days after the election, as specified.  









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          10)Efforts on the Federal Level:  The Federal Voting Assistance  
            Program (FVAP) works to ensure service members, their eligible  
            family members, and overseas citizens are aware of their right  
            to vote and have the tools and resources to successfully do so  
            - from anywhere in the world.  The Director of FVAP  
            administers UOCAVA on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.  In  
            general, the FVAP exists to: 1) assist uniformed services and  
            overseas voters in exercising their right to vote so that they  
            have an equal opportunity with the general population to have  
            their vote counted; 2) assist states in complying with  
            relevant federal laws by providing current information; and 3)  
            advocate on behalf of the uniformed services and overseas  
            voters, identifying impediments to their ability to exercise  
            their right to vote, and proposing methods to overcome those  
            impediments.

          According to a 2015 Congressional Research Service report,  
            entitled "The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting  
            Act: Overview and Issues," the FVAP has had a long history of  
            conducting research on barriers to absentee voting and working  
            with states to determine how these hurdles can be reduced or  
            eliminated.  In 2000, FVAP conducted a Voting Over the  
            Internet (VOI) pilot project that was intended to address the  
            specific needs of the military when attempting to vote  
            absentee remotely.  The VOI pilot was limited in scope and  
            participation (only 4 states and a total of 350 potential  
            voters were eligible to participate).  The project was  
            designed to explore the viability of using the Internet to  
            assist UOCAVA voters, most of whom face unique challenges when  
            registering and voting.  According to the report, under the  
            VOI, to request a ballot, a voter would fill out an electronic  
            version of the request form and sign it with a digital  
            certificate.  A local elections official would then post an  
            electronic version of the ballot on a secure server, where it  
            would be retrieved by the voter.  Once the ballot was  
            completed by the voter, it was digitally signed and encrypted  
            and placed on a FVAP server.  The completed ballot could only  
            be decrypted by the appropriate election office, who printed  
            the ballot and counted it with mail-in absentee ballots.  In  








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            2001, FVAP issued a report evaluating the program and noted,  
            among other conclusions, that "further development is needed  
            before Internet remote registration and voting can be provided  
            effectively, reliably, and securely on a large scale."  

          According to a December 2015 FVAP research report, entitled  
            "Review of FVAP's Work Related to Remote Electronic Voting for  
            the UOCAVA Population," although the VOI was limited in scope  
            and participation, Congress recognized the initial success of  
            the VOI pilot and mandated the conduct of an electronic voting  
            demonstration project (e.g. remote Internet voting) through  
            the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002  
            (FY 2002) for a statistically relevant population of absent  
            uniformed service personnel.  

          As a result, according to the Congressional Research Service  
            report, an expanded version of the VOI project was to be used  
            in the 2002 elections and called on the Secretary of Defense  
            to "carry out a demonstration project under which absent  
            uniformed services voters [were] permitted to cast ballots in  
            the regularly scheduled general election for federal office in  
            November 2002 through an electronic voting system" called the  
            Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE).   
            The report states that SERVE was to provide the capability to  
            authenticate voters and local election officials using unique  
            digital signatures.  In order to do so the voters and  
            officials had to register with SERVE in order to be assigned  
            the digital identity, which would allow them to access servers  
            hosted by FVAP in order to register and vote.  The SERVE  
            program was expanded from four to seven states, with a target  
            of 100,000 participants.  

          The Congressional Research Service reported that FVAP assembled  
            a Security Peer Review Group to review the SERVE program's  
            security design, and that several members of the group  
            unofficially asserted that the program had fundamental  
            security problems that made it vulnerable to a variety of  
            well-known cyber attacks.  The report also stated that as a  
            result, in 2004, the FVAP's attempt to execute the SERVE  








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            project was suspended and the defense authorization act for FY  
            2005 instructed it to wait until the EAC issued guidelines for  
            electronic absentee voting before pursuing another Internet  
            voting project.  

          According to the December 2015 FVAP research report, in the  
            National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015, Congress  
            eliminated the requirement for FVAP to conduct the electronic  
            voting demonstration project and with the repeal of that  
            requirement, the Department of Defense is no longer exploring  
            program implementation in this area.    
          11)Arguments in Support:  In support, the Inyo County  
            Clerk/Recorder writes:





          Currently twenty-four states allow some voters to return ballots  
          via electronic delivery, but California is not one of them.   
          Military and Overseas voters from California must use either the  
          Postal Service or a fax machine to return their voted ballot. 



          The last 30 to 40 years have seen a steep decline in the  
          availability of fax machines as demands to move from paper to  
          electronic have increased.  If a Military or Overseas voter does  
          not have access to a fax machine, they may not have time to  
          return their ballot and have it counted in California.  However,  
          if that same voter lived in Colorado or the District of Columbia  
          - they would be afforded the ability to use secure electronic  
          methods to return their voted ballot.  

          12)Arguments in Opposition: In opposition, VerifiedVoting.org  
            writes:











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          We oppose the electronic transmission of voted ballots because  
          ballots cast over the Internet are highly vulnerable to online  
          failures through attacks and malfunctions of various kinds. We  
          need to safeguard with special care the ballots of our military  
          to ensure they are cast and counted as intended so that our  
          service members are not disenfranchised. Online ballot  
          transmission needlessly risks the security and secrecy of the  
          troops' ballots.



          The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) of the Department  
          of Defense does not support online return of voted ballots,  
          pointing out that given unsolved security issues, postal mail is  
          the "most responsible" method of ballot return. Researchers for  
          the federal government have studied the electronic return of  
          voted ballots for years and have concluded that it is currently  
          not possible to ensure the security, privacy, auditability and  
          integrity of ballots cast over the Internet. For this reason,  
          the U.S. Election Assistance Commission has not set security  
          standards or guidelines for Internet voting systems. There are  
          no federal security guidelines because the federal government  
          concluded online voting cannot be done securely.  Return of  
          voted ballots by email, as proposed in AB 887, is considered the  
          "least secure" method of ballot return by election technology  
          experts. Moreover, because federal researchers determined that  
          secure online voting is not currently feasible, last year the  
          federal government ended its effort to try to develop a
          secure online voting system for the military.  The question of  
          offering secure online voting for the troops has been asked and  
          answered. It's not presently possible.



          It should be noted that California has a proud standard of  
          requiring voter-verifiable paper
          records, which are used in post-election manual tallies to check  
          the proper functioning of our systems. Ballots returned by email  
          - even when printed on the receiving end - cannot be construed  








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          as voter-verified, because they are digital ballots subject to  
          alteration in transit?



          13)Upcoming Deadlines and Amendments:  Due to impending  
            committee deadlines, if this bill is approved in this  
            committee today, it would need to be heard in the Assembly  
            Appropriations Committee next week, absent a waiver of the  
            Joint Rules.  However, if this bill is amended in committee  
            today, that may prevent this bill from being heard in the  
            Assembly Appropriations Committee before next week's deadline  
            for committees to hear and report two-year bills.  In light of  
            this fact, if it is the committee's desire to approve this  
            bill with amendments, committee staff recommends that this  
            bill be passed out of committee with the author's commitment  
            to take those amendments subsequent to passage by this  
            committee.  
          







          REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:


          Support


          American Legion-Department of California


          AMVETS-Department of California


          California Association of County Veterans Service Officers








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                                                                    Page  20







          California State Commanders Veterans Council


          Inyo County Clerk/Recorder


          Military Officers Association of America, California Council of  
          Chapters


          VFW-Department of California


          Vietnam Veterans of America-California State Council




          Opposition


          Secretary of State Alex Padilla (Unless Amended)


          VerifiedVoting.org


          Five Individuals




          Analysis Prepared by:Nichole Becker / E. & R. / (916) 319-2094












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