BILL ANALYSIS Ó
AB 1520
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Date of Hearing: April 14, 2015
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
AB 1520
(Committee on Judiciary) - As Introduced March 10, 2015
SUBJECT: Civil rights
KEY ISSUE: SHOULD THE RALPH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT BE CLARIFIED TO
PREVENT FURTHER CONFUSION AMONG PARTIES AND THE COURTS?
SYNOPSIS
California's primary civil rights statutes include the Unruh
Civil Rights Act (prohibiting discrimination in business
establishments); the Ralph Civil Rights Act (prohibiting
violence or intimidation against another based on protected
characteristics; and the Bane Act (prohibiting the use of
threats, intimidation, or coercion to prevent another from
exercising a constitutional or statutory right). These laws deal
with related but distinct issues, and have overlapping but
unique application to various kinds of disputes. Because they
are codified next to each other - sections 51 and 51.7 of the
Civil Code - litigants and courts have frequently confused them,
most frequently believing mistakenly that the Ralph Act is part
of the Unruh Act. This confusion is natural because section 51
begins by declaring that it is the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By
contrast, there is no similar identification of the Ralph Act
that begins at section 51.7. Therefore, a reader may fail to
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note that one act has concluded and another has begun. This
bill would simply identify the Ralph Act by name in order to
prevent further confusion among litigants, courts, and the
public, consistent with the advice of a recent appeals court
decision. This non-controversial bill has no opposition. In
2011 an identical measure passed out of this Committee and off
the Assembly Floor unanimously but was never heard in the
Senate.
SUMMARY: Clarifies the Ralph Civil Rights Act. Specifically,
this bill finds and declares that section 51.7 of the Civil Code
was enacted as part of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, in
Chapter 1293 of the Statutes of 1976.
EXISTING LAW:
1)Provides pursuant to the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 that
all persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the
right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat
of violence, on account of their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition,
marital status, or sexual orientation. (Civil Code section
51.7.)
2)Provides pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act that all
persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and regardless of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, medical condition, marital
status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever. (Civil Code section 51.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed
non-fiscal.
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COMMENTS: In support of the bill the author notes that
California's primary civil rights statutes include the Unruh
Civil Rights Act and the Ralph Civil Rights Act. These laws
deal with related but distinct issues and have overlapping but
unique application to various kinds of disputes. Because they
are codified next to each other - sections 51 and 51.7 of the
Civil Code - litigants and courts have frequently confused them,
most frequently believing mistakenly that the Ralph Act is part
of the Unruh Act. This confusion is natural because section 51
begins by declaring that it is the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By
contrast, there is no similar identification at the beginning of
the Ralph Act (at section 51.7). Therefore, a reader may fail
to note that one act has concluded and another has begun. This
bill would simply identify the Ralph Act by name in order to
prevent further confusion of the courts, litigants, and the
public, consistent with the advice of a recent appeals court
decision.
This Bill Would Address Confusion That An Appeals Court Has
Noted Among Courts and Parties: In Stamps v. Superior Court
(2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 1441, the Second District Court of
Appeal has observed that misunderstandings of the Unruh and
Ralph Acts have been common among courts and parties. Because
the court so clearly stated the issue and provided examples, the
relevant portion of the opinion is reproduced below:
The parties vigorously debate whether the sections under
consideration are or are not part of the [Unruh] Act.
Before we reach our destination, we gently observe a point
that is beyond controversy: The courts generally have done
a poor job of describing the various components of the Act.
Not until 2002 did an appellate court tackle the issue
head on. In Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, the court
was confronted with determining the statute of limitations
for actions under sections 51 and 51.7. The case had
nothing to do with employment discrimination; rather, a
Hell's Angel was ejected from a county fair for not
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removing his motorcycle club vest. The court refused to
assume that the statutes of limitations for the two
sections were necessarily the same. Instead, it initially
reflected on the lack of precision in describing the
components of the Act.
By its own terms, the Unruh Civil Rights Act comprises only
section 51. Subdivision (a) of section 51 states: "This
section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act." The courts, however, have consistently
described as Unruh Civil Rights Act claims causes of action
based under seemingly related provisions set forth in
sections of the Civil Code that follow section 51. West
Shield is a good example. That case presented no claim of
denial of full and equal accommodations in violation of
section 51; however, the court treated causes of action
alleging interference with the exercise of constitutional
rights under section 52.1, and sexual harassment under
section 51.9 as Unruh Civil Rights Act claims. Similarly,
section 51.9 was treated as an 'Unruh Civil Rights Act
claim' in Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 774-775
as was section 54.1 in Independent Housing Services (1993)
840 F. Supp. 1328. Citing several state and federal
opinions, the court in Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist.
(N.D.Cal. 1993) 830 F. Supp. 1560 stated that '[i]t appears
that section 52.1 is at least a "component" of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act.' (Id. at p. 1581.) It is noteworthy,
however, that in construing section 52.1, our Supreme Court
explained that it was enacted by the Legislature 'to stem a
tide of hate crimes' (Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17
Cal.4th 329, 338) and never referred to it as part of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act which, at least originally, dealt
only with the issue of equal accommodations. Other courts
have referred to section 52.1 and related statutes,
including section 51.7, as part of the Bane Act. (See,
e.g., Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 141, 144; Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809.) In re Joshua H. (1993)
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13 Cal.App.4th 1734 also refers to section 52.1 as part of
the Bane Act but refers to section 51.7 as the 'Ralph Civil
Rights Act.' (Boccato, at p. 1748, fn. 9.)
Reference to a statute or statutory scheme by the name of
its author does not influence the meaning and effect of the
enactment, but an erroneous denotation that includes one
measure as part of another may obscure differences that are
legally very significant. This is what appears to have
happened to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which is
increasingly treated as an omnibus antidiscrimination
statute no longer limited to merely ensuring equal access
to accommodations. For purposes of determining the
applicable statute of limitations, this creates a problem,
for the provisions now seen as parts of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act do not all share the same common law
provenance." (Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 757-758.)
Although the Gatto court does not unequivocally hold that
sections 51.7 and 52.1 are not part of the Act, we are not
so reserved: We conclude neither section is part of a
properly denominated Act. This conclusion is based largely
on the legislative history that we have described ante and
is consistent with that reached by two commentators in the
civil rights litigation field. Their treatise devotes
entire sections to two subjects: "Ralph Act is not part of
the Unruh Act or FEHA," and "Bane Act is not part of the
Unruh Act, the Ralph Act or another statute." (Kahn &
Links, Cal. Civil Practice: Civil Rights Litigation (2005)
§ 314, p. 27, § 327, p. 50.)
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
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Support
None on file
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by:Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334