BILL ANALYSIS Ó
AB 1520
Page 1
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
AB
1520 (Committee on Judiciary)
As Introduced March 10, 2015
Majority vote
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|Committee |Votes|Ayes |Noes |
| | | | |
|---------------+-----+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Judiciary |7-2 |Mark Stone, Alejo, |Wagner, Gallagher |
| | |Chau, Chiu, Cristina | |
| | |Garcia, Holden, | |
| | |O'Donnell | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
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SUMMARY: Clarifies the Ralph Civil Rights Act. Specifically,
this bill finds and declares that Civil Code Section 51.7 was
enacted as part of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, in Chapter
1293 of the Statutes of 1976 (Ralph Act).
EXISTING LAW:
1)Provides pursuant to the Ralph Act that all persons within the
jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, on account of
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
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disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual
orientation.
2)Provides pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) that
all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and regardless of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status,
or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
FISCAL EFFECT: None
COMMENTS: In support of the bill the author notes that
California's primary civil rights statutes include the Unruh Act
and the Ralph Act. These laws deal with related but distinct
issues and have overlapping but unique application to various
kinds of disputes. Because they are codified next to each other -
Sections 51 and 51.7 of the Civil Code - litigants and courts have
frequently confused them, most frequently believing mistakenly
that the Ralph Act is part of the Unruh Act. This confusion is
natural because Civil Code Section 51 begins by declaring that it
is the Unruh Act. By contrast, there is no similar identification
at the beginning of the Ralph Act (at Section 51.7). Therefore, a
reader may fail to note that one act has concluded and another has
begun. This bill would simply identify the Ralph Act by name in
order to prevent further confusion of the courts, litigants, and
the public, consistent with the advice of a recent appeals court
decision.
This Bill Would Address Confusion that an Appeals Court has Noted
Among Courts and Parties. In Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136
Cal. App. 4th 1441, the Second District Court of Appeal has
observed that misunderstandings of the Unruh and Ralph Acts have
been common among courts and parties. Because the court so
clearly stated the issue and provided examples, the relevant
portion of the opinion is reproduced below:
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The parties vigorously debate whether the sections under
consideration are or are not part of the [Unruh] Act.
Before we reach our destination, we gently observe a
point that is beyond controversy: The courts generally
have done a poor job of describing the various
components of the Act. Not until 2002 did an appellate
court tackle the issue head on. In Gatto, supra, 98
Cal.App.4th 744, the court was confronted with
determining the statute of limitations for actions under
sections 51 and 51.7. The case had nothing to do with
employment discrimination; rather, a Hell's Angel was
ejected from a county fair for not removing his
motorcycle club vest. The court refused to assume that
the statutes of limitations for the two sections were
necessarily the same. Instead, it initially reflected on
the lack of precision in describing the components of
the Act.
By its own terms, the Unruh Civil Rights Act comprises
only section 51. Subdivision (a) of section 51 states:
"This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the
Unruh Civil Rights Act." The courts, however, have
consistently described as Unruh Civil Rights Act claims
causes of action based under seemingly related
provisions set forth in sections of the Civil Code that
follow section 51. West Shield is a good example. That
case presented no claim of denial of full and equal
accommodations in violation of section 51; however, the
court treated causes of action alleging interference
with the exercise of constitutional rights under section
52.1, and sexual harassment under section 51.9 as Unruh
Civil Rights Act claims. Similarly, section 51.9 was
treated as an 'Unruh Civil Rights Act claim' in Brown v.
Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 774-775 as was section
54.1 in Independent Housing Services (1993) 840 F. Supp.
1328. Citing several state and federal opinions, the
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court in Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist. (N.D.Cal.
1993) 830 F. Supp. 1560 stated that '[i]t appears that
section 52.1 is at least a "component" of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act.' (Id. at p. 1581.) It is noteworthy,
however, that in construing section 52.1, our Supreme
Court explained that it was enacted by the Legislature
'to stem a tide of hate crimes' (Jones v. Kmart Corp.
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and never referred to it as
part of the Unruh Civil Rights Act which, at least
originally, dealt only with the issue of equal
accommodations. Other courts have referred to section
52.1 and related statutes, including section 51.7, as
part of the Bane Act. (See, e.g., Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
141, 144; Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809.) In re Joshua H. (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 1734 also refers to section 52.1 as part of
the Bane Act but refers to section 51.7 as the 'Ralph
Civil Rights Act.' (Boccato, at p. 1748, fn. 9.)
Reference to a statute or statutory scheme by the name
of its author does not influence the meaning and effect
of the enactment, but an erroneous denotation that
includes one measure as part of another may obscure
differences that are legally very significant. This is
what appears to have happened to the Unruh Civil Rights
Act, which is increasingly treated as an omnibus
antidiscrimination statute no longer limited to merely
ensuring equal access to accommodations. For purposes
of determining the applicable statute of limitations,
this creates a problem, for the provisions now seen as
parts of the Unruh Civil Rights Act do not all share the
same common law provenance. (Gatto, supra, 98
Cal.App.4th 744, 757-758.)
Although the Gatto court does not unequivocally hold
that sections 51.7 and 52.1 are not part of the Act, we
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are not so reserved: We conclude neither section is part
of a properly denominated Act. This conclusion is based
largely on the legislative history that we have
described ante and is consistent with that reached by
two commentators in the civil rights litigation field.
Their treatise devotes entire sections to two subjects:
"Ralph Act is not part of the Unruh Act or FEHA," and
"Bane Act is not part of the Unruh Act, the Ralph Act or
another statute." (Kahn & Links, Cal. Civil Practice:
Civil Rights Litigation (2005) Section 314, p. 27,
[Section] 327, p. 50.)
Analysis Prepared by:
Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000128