BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular
Bill No: SB 178 Hearing Date: March 24, 2015
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|Author: |Leno |
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|Version: |March 16, 2015 |
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|Urgency: |No |Fiscal: |Yes |
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|Consultant:|MK |
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Subject: Privacy: Electronic Communications: Search Warrants
HISTORY
Source: American Civil Liberties Union and California
Newspaper Publishers Association
Prior Legislation:SB 467 (Leno) - Vetoed (2013)
SB 914 (Leno) - Vetoed (2012)
SB 1434 (Leno) - Vetoed (2012)
SB 662 (Figueroa) - Chapter 896, Stats. 1999
Support: Adobe; Apple Inc.; Asian Americans Advancing Justice;
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; The
California Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic
Relations; California Immigrant Policy Center;
California Library Association; California Public
Defenders Association; Consumer Action; Consumer
Federation of California; Electronic Frontier
Foundation; Engine; Facebook; Foursquare; Google; The
Internet Archive; Internet Association; LinkedIn;
Media Alliance; Mozilla; Namecheap, Inc.; National
Center for Lesbian Rights; Open Technology Institute;
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse; Restore the Fourth Bay
Area Chapter; Small Business California; Twitter;
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TechFreedom; TURN
Opposition:California District Attorneys Association; California
State Sheriffs' Association
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to require a search warrant or
wiretap order for access to all aspects of electronic
communications except where federal law allows voluntary
disclosure.
The US Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched an the persons or things to be seized." (4th Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.)
The California Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated;
and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons and things to be seized." (Article I,
Section 13 of the California Constitution.)
Existing law defines a "search warrant" as an order in writing
in the name of the People, signed by a magistrate, directed to a
peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or
persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and in the
case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same
before the magistrate. (Penal Code § 1523.)
Existing law provides that a search warrant may be issued upon
any of the following grounds:
a) When the property was stolen or embezzled;
b) When the property or things were used as the means of
committing a felony;
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c) When the property or things are in the possession of
any person with the intent to use them as a means of
committing a public offense, or in the possession of
another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the
purpose of concealing them or preventing them from being
discovered;
d) When the property or things to be seized consist of
any item or constitute any evidence that tends to show a
felony has been committed, or tends to show that a
particular person has committed a felony;
e) When the property or things to be seized consist of
evidence that tends to show that sexual exploitation of
a child, or possession of matter depicting sexual conduct
of a person under the age of 18 years, has occurred or is
occurring;
f) When there is a warrant to arrest a person;
g) When a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service
has records or evidence, showing that property was stolen
or embezzled constituting a misdemeanor, or that
property or things are in the possession of any person
with the intent to use them as a means of committing a
misdemeanor public offense, or in the possession of
another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the
purpose of concealing them or preventing their discovery;
h) When the property to be seized includes evidence of a
violation of specified Labor Code sections;
i) When the property to be seized includes a firearm or
deadly weapon or any other
deadly weapon at the scene of a domestic violence offense;
j) When the property to be seized includes a firearm or
deadly weapon owned by a person apprehended because of his
or her mental condition;
k) When the property to be seized is a firearm in
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possession of a person prohibited under the family code;
l) When the information to be received from the use of a
tracking device under shows a specified violation of the
Fish and Game Code or Public Resources Code;
m) When a sample of blood would show evidence of a DUI;
or,
n) Starting January 1, 2016, when the property to be
seized is a firearm owned by a person subject to a gun
violence restraining order. (Penal Code § 1524(a).)
Existing law sets forth procedures for a search warrant issued
for records of a foreign corporation that provides electronic
communication services or remote computing services to the
general public, where those records would reveal the identity of
the customers using services, data stored by, or on behalf of,
the customer, the customer's usage of those services, the
recipient or destination of communications sent to or from those
customers, or the content of those communications. (Penal Code §
154.2)
Existing law provides that a provider of electronic
communication or remote computing service shall disclose to a
governmental prosecuting or investigating agency the name,
address, local and long distance toll billing records, telephone
number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of
service of a subscriber to a customer of that service and types
of services the subscriber or customer utilized when the
governmental entity is granted a search warrant. (Penal Code §
1524.3(a))
Existing law provides that a provider of wire or electronic
communication services or a remote computing service, upon the
request of a peace officer, shall take all necessary steps to
preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending
the issuance of a search warrant or a request in writing and an
affidavit declaring an intent to file a warrant to the provider.
Records shall be retained for a period of 90 days which shall
be extended for an additional 90-day upon a renewed request by
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the peace officer. (Penal Code § 1524.3(d))
Exiting law provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or
describing the person to be searched or searched for, and
particularly describing the property, thing or things and the
place to be searched. (Penal Code § 1525.)
Existing law authorizes the Attorney General, chief deputy
attorney general, chief assistant attorney general, district
attorney or the district attorney's designee to apply to the
presiding judge of the superior court for an order authorizing
the interception of wire or electronic communications under
specified circumstances. (Penal Code §§ 629.50 et. seq.)
This bill creates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
This bill provides that except as otherwise provided a
government entity shall not do any of the following:
Compel the production of or access to electronic device
information from any person or entity except the authorized
processor of the device;
Compel the production of or access to electronic device
information from any person or entity except the authorized
processor of the device; or,
Access electronic device information by means of
physical interaction or electronic communication with the
device, except with the specific consent of the authorized
processor of the device.
This bill provides that a government entity may compel the
production of or access to electronic communication information
or electronic communication with the device information by means
of physical interaction with the device only pursuant to a
wiretap order or pursuant to a search warrant provided that the
warrant shall not compel the production of or authorize access
to the contents of any electronic communication initiated after
the issuance of the warrant.
This bill provides that a government entity may access
electronic device information by means of the physical
interaction or electronic communication with the device only as
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follows:
In accordance with a wiretap order or search warrant
issued pursuant to the appropriate Penal Code provision,
provided that a warrant shall not authorize accessing the
contents of any electronic communication initiated after
the issuance of the warrant;
With the specific consent of the owner or authorized
possessor of the device, when a government entity is the
intended recipient of an electronic communication initiated
by the owner or authorized possessor of the device;
With the specific consent of the owner of the device
when the device has been reported lost or stolen;
If the government entity, in good faith, believes that
an emergency involving imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person requires access to the
electronic device information; and,
If the government entity, in good faith, believes the
device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the
entity shall only access electronic device information in
order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner
or authorized possessor of the device.
This bill provides that the warrant or order shall be limited to
only that information necessary to achieve the objective of the
warrant or wiretap order, including specifying the target
individuals or accounts, the applications or services, the types
of information, and the time periods covered.
This bill provides the warrant or order shall identify the
effective date upon which the warrant is to be executed, not to
exceed 10 days from the date the warrant is signed, or
explicitly state whether the warrant or wiretap order
encompasses any information created after its issuance.
This bill provides that the warrant or order shall comply with
all other provisions of California and federal law, including
any provision prohibiting, limiting or imposing additional
requirements on the use of search warrants or wiretap orders.
This bill provides that when issuing any warrant or wiretap
order the court may do any of the following:
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Appoint a special master to ensure only information
necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order
is produced or accessed; or,
Require any information obtained through the execution
of the warrant or order that is unrelated be destroyed.
This bill provides that a service provider may disclose, but is
not required to disclose, electronic communication information
or subscriber information when disclosure is not otherwise
prohibited by law.
This bill provides that if a government entity receives
electronic communication without a warrant or order, it shall
delete the information within 90 days unless the entity has or
obtains the specific consent or the sender of the sender or
recipient about which the information was disclosed or obtains a
court order authorizing the retention of the information, and
specifies when the court shall order a retention order.
This bill provides that if a government entity requests that a
service provider disclose information or if the government
entity obtains information involving the danger of death or
serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the
electronic information without delay, the entity shall within
three days after seeking the disclosure, file with the court a
motion seeking approval of the requested emergency disclosures
and shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency. If
the court finds the facts did not give rise to the emergency the
court shall order the information destroyed.
This bill provides that it does not limit the authority of a
government to use administrative, grand jury, trial or civil
discovery subpoena to do either of the following:
Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient
of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic
communication information associated with that
communication; or,
Require an entity that provides electronic
communications services to its officers, directors,
employees, or agents to disclose electronic communication
information associated with an electronic communication to
or from an officer, director, employee or agent of the
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entity.
This bill provides that except as otherwise provided the
government entity that executes a warrant or wiretap order or
issues and emergency request shall contemporaneously notice the
identified targets that the information about the recipient has
been compelled or requested and states with reasonable
specificity the nature of the government investigation under
which the information is sought.
This bill provides that if there is no identified target of the
warrant or order or emergency request, the government shall take
reasonable steps to provide notice within three days to all
individuals about whom information was obtained.
This bill provides that when a wire tap order or search warrant
is sought the government entity may submit a request supported
by an affidavit for an order delaying notification and
prohibiting any party from providing information or notifying
any party it is being sought. If the court determines
notification may have an adverse impact the court may delay
notification for up to 90 days with subsequent extensions for 90
days.
This bill provides that except as proof of a violation of this
chapter, no evidence obtained or retained in violation of this
chapter shall be admissible in a criminal, civil or
administrative proceeding or used in an affidavit in an effort
to obtain a search warrant or court order.
This bill provides that the Attorney General may commence a
civil action to compel any government entity to comply with the
provisions of this bill.
This bill provides that if a warrant or wiretap order does not
comply with this chapter, a service provider, or any other
recipient of the warrant or wiretap order, or any individual
whose information is target by the warrant or wiretap order, may
petition the court to void or modify the warrant or order the
destruction of any information obtained in violation of the
chapter.
This bill requires a government entity that obtains electronic
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communication information to report annually to the Attorney
General specified information regarding any requests that the
entity made and requires the Attorney General to publish on
their website the information in a report.
This bill defines electronic communication as the transfer of
signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or intelligence
of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.
This bill defines electronic communication information as any
information about an electronic communication or the use of an
electronic communication service, including, but not limited to
the contents, sender, recipients, format, or location of the
sender or recipients at any point during the communication, the
time or date the communication was created, sent or received, or
any information pertaining to any individual or device
participating in the communication including, but not limited to
an IP address but does not include subscriber information.
This bill defines electronic communication service as a service
that provides its subscribers or users the ability to send or
receive electronic communications, including any service that
acts as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic
communications or stores electronic communication information.
This bill defines electronic device as a device that stores,
generates, or transmits information in electronic form.
This bill defines other appropriate terms.
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the past eight years, this Committee has scrutinized
legislation referred to its jurisdiction for any potential
impact on prison overcrowding. Mindful of the United States
Supreme Court ruling and federal court orders relating to the
state's ability to provide a constitutional level of health care
to its inmate population and the related issue of prison
overcrowding, this Committee has applied its "ROCA" policy as a
content-neutral, provisional measure necessary to ensure that
the Legislature does not erode progress in reducing prison
overcrowding.
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On February 10, 2014, the federal court ordered California to
reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5% of
design capacity by February 28, 2016, as follows:
143% of design bed capacity by June 30, 2014;
141.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2015; and,
137.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2016.
In its most recent status report to the court (February 2015),
the administration reported that as "of February 11, 2015,
112,993 inmates were housed in the State's 34 adult
institutions, which
amounts to 136.6% of design bed capacity, and 8,828 inmates were
housed in out-of-state
facilities. This current population is now below the
court-ordered reduction to 137.5% of design
bed capacity."( Defendants' February 2015 Status Report In
Response To February 10, 2014 Order, 2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD PC,
3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown , Plata v. Brown (fn. omitted).
While significant gains have been made in reducing the prison
population, the state now must stabilize these advances and
demonstrate to the federal court that California has in place
the "durable solution" to prison overcrowding "consistently
demanded" by the court. (Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants' Request For Extension of December
31, 2013 Deadline, NO. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 3-Judge Court,
Coleman v. Brown , Plata v. Brown (2-10-14). The Committee's
consideration of bills that may impact the prison population
therefore will be informed by the following questions:
Whether a proposal erodes a measure which has contributed
to reducing the prison population;
Whether a proposal addresses a major area of public safety
or criminal activity for which there is no other
reasonable, appropriate remedy;
Whether a proposal addresses a crime which is directly
dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there
is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
Whether a proposal corrects a constitutional problem or
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legislative drafting error; and
Whether a proposal proposes penalties which are
proportionate, and cannot be achieved through any other
reasonably appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
SB 178 updates California law to properly safeguard
the robust constitutional privacy and free speech
rights of Californians, spur innovation, and support
public safety by instituting clear warrant standards
for government access to electronic information.
Californians must use technology every day to connect,
work, and learn. The state's leading technology
companies rely on consumer confidence in their
services to help power California's economy.
California law enforcement increasingly utilizes
electronic information to protect public safety. The
California legislature has long been a leader in
enacting laws to properly balance the rights of
Californians as technology advances. But California's
statutory protections for electronic information is
now very outdated.
SB 178 updates existing federal and California
statutory law for the digital age and codifies federal
and state constitutional rights to privacy and free
speech by instituting a clear, uniform warrant rule
for California law enforcement access to electronic
information, including data from personal electronic
devices, emails, digital documents, text messages,
metadata, and location information. Each of these
categories can reveal sensitive information about a
Californian's personal life: her friends and
associates, her physical and mental health, her
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religious and political beliefs, and more.<1> The
California Supreme Court has long held that this type
of information constitutes a "virtual current
biography" that merits constitutional protection. SB
178 would codify that protection into statute. SB 178
also ensures that proper notice, reporting, and
enforcement provisions are also updated and in place
for government access to electronic information and to
ensure that the law is followed.
2. Search and Seizure Generally
The 4th Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I, Section
13 of the California Constitution protect people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, the lawfulness
of a search of the items in the arrestee's immediate control is
based upon the need to protect the officer and to discover
evidence in the case. This has been found to include search of
items when a person is booked into jail on the theories that the
time lag is inconsequential; it is less of an invasion than a
public search at the place of arrest; is necessary for inventory
purposes; and, can protect from contraband being brought into
the jail. However, if the search is remote in time and the
property has been removed from the defendant's possession and is
in the control of the police, then a warrantless search has been
found not to be reasonable. Numerous cases have looked at this
issue of when a search incident to arrest is valid. (See for
example: U.S v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218; U.S. V. Edwards
(1974) 415 U.S. 800; U.S. v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1; N.Y. v.
Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454; People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 C. 3d
123) ) After Proposition 8 (June 1982), in California, the scope
of a search incident to arrest is based on federal law; thus,
California courts will look to the federal courts for precedent
when deciding a case.
3. Wiretap Generally
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United States
(1967) 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.CT. 507, 19 L.ED.2D 576, that
telephone conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Intercepting a conversation
is a search and seizure similar to the search of a citizen's
---------------------------
<1>
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home. Thus, law enforcement is constitutionally required to
obtain a warrant based on probable cause and to give notice and
inventory of the search.
In 1968, Congress authorized wiretapping by enacting Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. (See 18 USC
Section 2510 et seq.) Out of concern that telephonic
interceptions do not limit the search and seizure to only the
party named in the warrant, federal law prohibits electronic
surveillance except under carefully defined circumstances. The
procedural steps provided in the Act require "strict adherence."
(United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir.
1976)), and "utmost scrutiny must be exercised to determine
whether wiretap orders conform to Title III.")
Both Federal and California law requires that each wiretap
application include "a full and complete statement as to whether
or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed
or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
or to be too dangerous." (18 USC Section 2518 (1)(c); Penal
Code Section 629.50(d).) Often referred to as the "necessity
requirement," it exists in order to limit the use of wiretaps,
which are highly intrusive. (United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d
1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000).) The original intent of Congress in
enacting such a provision was to ensure that wiretapping was not
resorted to in situations where traditional investigative
techniques would suffice to expose the crime.
4. Recent Supreme Court Cases
The fact that Fourth Amendment protections extends to electronic
information has been recently affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court.
In United States v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) involved two
cases. In the first case, the defendant (Riley) was stopped for
a traffic violation which lead to his arrest on a misdemeanor
firearms charge. In the search incident to his arrest the
officer searched his phone and noticed terminology related to
gangs. The phone was further searched at the police station and
photos and videos on the phone lead to Riley being charged in
connection with a shooting and the phone evidence being used to
claim a gang enhancement. In the second case, as a result of
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his cell phone being searched the defendant's apartment was
searched and guns and drugs were found after he was arrested
during a drug sale. "These cases require us to decide how the
search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell
phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude
they were an important feature of human anatomy. A smart phone
of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of ten years ago; a
significant majority of American adults now own such phones."
(Id. at 2484. ) The Supreme Court refused to apply to cell
phone searches the precedents established for the searches of
purses and wallets because "that would be like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon." (Id. at 2488.) Recognizing that modern cell phones'
storage capacity and multi-functionality allow them to contain
"the privacies of life," the Court required law enforcement to
"get a warrant" for cell phone searches. (Id. at 2495.)
In the case of U.S. v. Jones (132 S.Ct. 945(2012)), the court
found that the government's attachment of a GPS device to a
vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements constituted a search warrant under the 4th Amendment.
In Jones, all members of the Court found that the law
enforcement's attachment and subsequent monitoring of a GPS on a
vehicle violated the 4th Amendment, although with two concurring
opinions, various judges reached that conclusion using different
legal reasoning.
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that attaching a
global positioning system (GPS) device to a person's vehicle to
track his or her movements constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Authorities obtained a search
warrant to install a GPS device on defendant's car as part of a
drug trafficking investigation. But, the authorities did not
install the device until after the warrant expired. The device
was used to track the defendant's movements for almost one
month. When charges were filed against defendant, he moved to
suppress the GPS evidence as the product of an illegal search.
The prosecution argued at trial and on appeal that a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment had not occurred
because Jones did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
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in the location of his vehicle on public streets, which was
visible to all.
The Supreme Court found the government's use of a GPS monitoring
device was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
and therefore must be reasonable. The majority decision was not
based on the reasonable expectation of privacy test for
challenges to law enforcement surveillance, which is generally
employed. (Katz v. U.S. (1967) 389 U.S. 347.) Instead, the
majority based its decision on common law trespass principals,
holding that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle (an "effect")
for purposes of data collection constitutes a search because the
government physically occupied private property for the purpose
of information gathering. But five of the justices (the four
members of the Alito concurrence, plus Justice Sotomayor) were
critical of the trespass theory, stating the majority should
have used the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
5. Warrant or Wiretap for Access to Electronic
Communication or Device Information
Unless a search warrant or wiretap order is obtained, this
bill would prohibit a government entity from: compelling the
production of or access to electronic communications from
an information service provider; compelling the production
of or access to electronic device information from any
person or entity except the authorized possessor of the
device; or, accessing electronic device information by means
of physical interaction or electronic communication with the
device except with the specific consent of the authorized
user.
Exceptions exist to the warrant requirement including
consent of the owner of a device and when the government in
good faith believes that an emergency involving imminent
danger of death or serious physical injury requires access
to the electronic device information or the entity
reasonably believes the device is stolen.
If the government agency obtains information without a
warrant or order because of an emergency the entity must
within three days file a court motion seeking court approval
of the requested emergency disclosures.
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6. Notice to Consumer
The bill requires notice to the targets of warrant or
wiretap contemporaneously with the execution of the warrant
unless a court ordered delay of notice is granted for a
renewable period up to 90 days.
7. Destruction of Information Obtained Voluntarily
If the government entity obtains electronic information
voluntarily, this bill requires that the information be
deleted in 90 days, unless the obtainer receives specific
consent or obtains a court order to retain the information.
The 90 day destruction requirement does not apply to
information obtained by a warrant or wiretap.
8. Does not Apply to Internal Communications of a Provider
This bill provides that administrative subpoenas can still
be used in an administrative, grand jury or civil discovery
situation when it involves internal emails within a company.
Thus, for example, in a civil action against an employer
who also happens to be a service provider under this bill,
emails between the plaintiff and the defendant or other
information would be subject to a civil subpoena.
9. DOJ Report
This bill requires government entities that seek information
under this bill to report specified information yearly to the
Attorney General and requires the Attorney General to publish a
report on that information on their website. This is similar to
information that must be reported when a jurisdiction uses a
wiretap.
10. Support
California Newspaper Publishers Association, a co-sponsor of
this bill, states:
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The threat of law enforcement obtaining protected,
personal information from third parties without a
warrant presents serious problems for newspaper
publishers, editors and working journalists.
California has unique protections that allow
publishers, editors, and working journalists to
maintain sensitive source information and unpublished
notes without being subject to routine access by law
enforcement and litigants.
Twitter supports this bill, stating:
Current federal law that extends fourth amendment
right to electronic communications is nearly 30 years
out of date. As technology and the nature of data
transmission and storage has changed, the protections
afforded by the Federal ECPA law has largely lapsed.
Although there is broad support to ECPA reform in
Washington, it is unclear if Congress will act in
timely fashion to clarify Federal law. This leaves the
responsibility of protecting consumer's rights in the
hands of private communication service providers.
SB 178 will modernize electronic communications
protections and ensure that, in California, an
individual's digital property cannot be seized without
a warrant. By acting in a timely fashion, SB 178 will
set a standard for protecting the rights of users
everywhere that can and should be replicated across
the country.
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse states in support of this bill:
SB 178 follows the spirit of Riley and extends the
warrant requirements to digital information that
reveals personal and sensitive details about who we
are, whom we communicate and associate with, and where
we've been. While law enforcement will still be able
to obtain this information and utilize it to solve
crimes, SB 178 provides needed oversight by requiring
law enforcement obtain a search warrant in order to
access this wealth of information. The bill contains
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reasonable exceptions that allow law enforcement to
obtain digital information without a warrant in an
emergency.
11. Opposition
The California District Attorneys Association opposes this bill,
stating:
This bill, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
would establish a number of new procedures and
reporting requirements for law enforcement agencies to
comply with when seeking a search warrant for
electronic communications. Unfortunately, in doing
so, it undermines critical efforts to stop child
exploitation, mandates the destruction of evidence by
law enforcement, and violates the California
Constitution.
The California State Sheriffs' Association opposes this bill,
stating:
This measure has a myriad of problems: it conflates
existing procedures for obtaining certain electronic
information under state and federal law, contains
burdensome and unnecessary reporting requirements, and
will undermine investigations that are fully compliant
with the Fourth Amendment.
-- END -