BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SB 178
Page 1
Date of Hearing: June 23, 2015
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Mike Gatto, Chair
SB
178 (Leno) - As Amended June 2, 2015
SENATE VOTE: 39-0
SUBJECT: Privacy: electronic communications: search warrant.
SUMMARY: Creates the California Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (CalECPA), which generally requires law enforcement
entities to obtain a search warrant before accessing data on an
electronic device or from an online service provider.
Specifically, this bill:
1)Prohibits a government entity from:
a) Compelling the production of or access to electronic
communication information from a service provider.
b) Compelling the production of or access to electronic
device information from any person or entity except the
authorized possessor of the device.
c) Accessing electronic device information by means of
physical interaction or electronic communication with the
device.
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2)Permits a government entity to compel the production of or
access to electronic information subject to a warrant or
wiretap order, as specified, provided that the warrant shall
not compel the production of or authorize access to the
contents of any electronic communication initiated after the
issuance of the warrant.
3)Permits a government entity to access electronic device
information by means of physical interaction or electronic
communication with the device only as follows:
a) In accordance with a wiretap order or in accordance
with a search warrant, as specified, provided that a
warrant shall not authorize accessing the contents of any
electronic communication initiated after the issuance of
the warrant.
b) With the specific consent of the authorized
possessor of the device, including when a government
entity is the intended recipient of an electronic
communication initiated by the authorized possessor of
the device.
c) With the specific consent of the owner of the
device, only when the device has been reported as lost or
stolen.
d) If the government entity, in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person requires access to the
electronic device information.
e) If the government entity, in good faith, believes
the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided
that the entity shall only access electronic device
information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or
contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
4)Requires any warrant or wiretap order for electronic
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information to comply with the following:
a) The warrant or order shall be limited to only that
information necessary to achieve the objective of the
warrant or wiretap order, including by specifying the
target individuals or accounts, the applications or
services, the types of information, and the time periods
covered, as appropriate.
b) The warrant or order shall identify the effective
date upon which the warrant or order is to be executed,
not to exceed 10 days from the date the warrant is
signed, or explicitly state whether the warrant or
wiretap order encompasses any information created after
its issuance.
c) The warrant or order shall comply with all other
provisions of California and federal law, including any
provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional
requirements on the use of search warrants or wiretap
orders.
5)When issuing any warrant or wiretap order for electronic
information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient
of the warrant or wiretap order, a court may, at its
discretion, do any or all of the following:
a) Appoint a special master, who is charged with
ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the
objective of the warrant or order is produced or
accessed.
b) Require that any information obtained through the
execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to
the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as
feasible after that determination is made.
6)Authorizes, but does not require, a service provider to
disclose electronic communication information or subscriber
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information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited
by state or federal law.
7)Requires a government entity that receives electronic
communication information voluntarily provided by a service
provider to delete that information within 90 days unless the
entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or
recipient or obtains a court order, as specified.
8)Requires a government entity that obtains electronic
information pursuant to an emergency to seek approval, within
three days after obtaining the electronic information, from
the appropriate court, as specified.
9)Declares that certain of these provisions (#1 through #8) do
not limit the authority of a government entity to use an
administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena
to do either of the following:
a) Require an originator, addressee, or intended
recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any
electronic communication information associated with that
communication; or,
b) Require an entity that provides electronic
communications services to its officers, directors,
employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out
their duties, to disclose electronic communication
information associated with an electronic communication
to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of
the entity.
10)Requires a government entity that executes a warrant or
wiretap in an emergency pursuant to these provisions to
contemporaneously serve or deliver a notice to the identified
targets that informs the recipient that information about the
recipient has been compelled or requested, and states with
reasonable specificity the nature of the government
investigation under which the information is sought, including
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a copy of the warrant or order, or a written statement setting
forth facts giving rise to the emergency.
11)Requires, if there is no identified target of a warrant,
wiretap order, or emergency request or access at the time of
its issuance, the government entity to submit to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) within 72 hours a report that
states the nature of the government investigation and a copy
of the warrant, or order, or a written statement. Further
requires the DOJ to publish each report on its website within
90 days of receipt.
12)Authorizes the government entity, when a wiretap order or
search warrant is sought, to submit a request supported by a
sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification and
prohibiting any party providing information from notifying any
other party that information has been sought. Further
requires the court to issue the order if the court determines
that there is reason to believe that notification may have an
adverse result, not to exceed 90 days, and the court may grant
extensions of the delay of up to 90 days each, as specified.
13)Requires, upon expiration of the period of delay of the
notification, the government entity to serve or deliver to
each individual whose electronic information was acquired, a
document that includes the information required in #10 above,
as well as a copy of all electronic information obtained or a
summary of that information, and a statement of the grounds
for the court's determination to grant a delay in notifying
the individual, as specified.
14)Declares that nothing in these provisions shall prohibit or
limit a service provider or any other party from disclosing
information about any request or demand for electronic
information, except as provided.
15)Declares that no evidence obtained or retained in violation
of these provisions shall be admissible in a criminal, civil,
or administrative proceeding, or used in an affidavit in an
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effort to obtain a search warrant or court order, except as
proof of a violation of these provisions.
16)Authorizes the Attorney General to commence a civil action to
compel any government entity to comply with these provisions.
17)Authorizes an individual whose information is targeted by a
warrant, wiretap order, or other legal process that is
inconsistent with these provisions, or the California
Constitution or the United States Constitution, or a service
provider or any other recipient of the warrant, wiretap order,
or other legal process, to petition the issuing court to void
or modify the warrant, wiretap order, or process, or to order
the destruction of any information obtained in violation of
this chapter, the California Constitution, or the United
States Constitution.
18)Declares that a California or foreign corporation, and its
officers, employees, and agents, are not subject to any cause
of action for providing records, information, facilities, or
assistance in accordance with the terms of a warrant, court
order, statutory authorization, emergency certification, or
wiretap order issued pursuant to these provisions.
19)Defines the terms "adverse result," "authorized possessor,"
"electronic communication," "electronic communication
information," "electronic communication service," "electronic
device," "electronic device information," "electronic
information," "government entity," "service provider,"
"specific consent," and "subscriber information."
EXISTING LAW:
1)Provides, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, that "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched an the
persons or things to be seized." (U.S. Const. amend. IV)
2)Defines a "search warrant" as an order in writing in the name
of the People, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace
officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or
persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and in the
case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same
before the magistrate. (Penal Code (PC) Section 1523)
3)Sets forth procedures for a search warrant issued for records
of a foreign corporation that provides electronic
communication services or remote computing services to the
general public, where those records would reveal the identity
of the customers using services, data stored by, or on behalf
of, the customer, the customer's usage of those services, the
recipient or destination of communications sent to or from
those customers, or the content of those communications. (PC
1524.2)
4)Provides that a provider of electronic communication or remote
computing service shall disclose to a governmental prosecuting
or investigating agency the name, address, local and long
distance toll billing records, telephone number or other
subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a
subscriber to a customer of that service and types of services
the subscriber or customer utilized when the governmental
entity is granted a search warrant. (PC 1524.3(a))
5)Provides that a provider of wire or electronic communication
services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a
peace officer, shall take all necessary steps to preserve
records and other evidence in its possession pending the
issuance of a search warrant or a request in writing and an
affidavit declaring an intent to file a warrant to the
provider. Records shall be retained for a period of 90 days
which shall be extended for an additional 90-day upon a
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renewed request by the peace officer. (PC 1524.3(d))
6)Provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but upon
probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing
the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly
describing the property, thing or things and the place to be
searched. (PC 1525)
7)Authorizes the Attorney General, chief deputy attorney
general, chief assistant attorney general, district attorney
or the district attorney's designee to apply to the presiding
judge of the superior court for an order authorizing the
interception of wire or electronic communications under
specified circumstances. (PC 629.50, et seq.)
8)Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution and
attendant case law, that Californians do not forfeit their
reasonable expectation of privacy when they share their
information with a third party. (Burrows v. Superior Court, 13
Cal.3d 238 (1974) (recognizing expectation of privacy in bank
records under California Constitution even though United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) found none under Fourth
Amendment).
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Senate Appropriations
Committee:
Noticing requirements : Ongoing potentially significant costs
to state and local law enforcement agencies for those noticing
provisions in the bill that exceed requirements under federal
law. To the extent local agency expenditures qualify as a
reimbursable state mandate, agencies could claim reimbursement
of those costs (General Fund). Costs would be dependent on
various factors including but not limited to the number of
persons requiring notice, both contemporaneously and under the
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delayed noticing provisions, time/workload required per
notice, and the method of noticing used.
Information deletion : Unknown, but potentially significant
costs to government entities for the required deletion of
information within the specified time period. To the extent
local agency expenditures qualify as a reimbursable state
mandate, agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs
(General Fund).
DOJ impact : Significant ongoing costs potentially in excess
of $300,000 (General Fund) for resources to meet the noticing
requirements of the bill. Minor, absorbable impact to
aggregate and post annual reports received to its website.
COMMENTS:
1)Purpose of this bill . This bill is intended to both codify
and expand on existing case law to generally require law
enforcement entities to obtain a search warrant before
accessing data on an electronic device or from an online
service provider. SB 178 is co-sponsored by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and the California Newspaper Publishers
Association.
2)Author's statement . According to the author's office, "SB 178
updates existing federal and California statutory law for the
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digital age and codifies federal and state constitutional
rights to privacy and free speech by instituting a clear,
uniform warrant rule for California law enforcement access to
electronic information, including data from personal
electronic devices, emails, digital documents, text messages,
metadata, and location information."
"Each of these categories can reveal sensitive information about
a Californian's personal life: her friends and associates, her
physical and mental health, her religious and political
beliefs, and more. The California Supreme Court has long held
that this type of information constitutes a 'virtual current
biography' that merits constitutional protection. SB 178
would codify that protection into statute. SB 178 also
ensures that proper notice, reporting, and enforcement
provisions are also updated and in place for government access
to electronic information and to ensure that the law is
followed."
3)What legal requirements and restrictions apply to government
searches ? As a starting point, the Fourth Amendment to the
United State Constitution (and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the
California Constitution) generally provide a right in their
property and privacy against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and a requirement that search warrants be specific
and based on probable cause (with some exceptions). A search
occurs when the government impinges on an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy." The rule is enforced in
part by excluding evidence from trial that was obtained in
violation of these requirements.
As communications technology evolved, Congress passed in 1986
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to regulate
interception of electronic data and access of stored
electronic communications. Unfortunately, technology
continued to advance rapidly since the Act's inception nearly
30 years ago and amendments to the Act have not always kept
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pace.
The author contends that the federal statute "has not been
meaningfully updated to account for modern technology," and
quotes the U.S. DOJ as writing that there is "no principled
basis" for maintaining the outdated distinctions that allow
for warrantless access to older content and that the law draws
lines that "may have made sense in the past have failed to
keep up with the development of technology."
The author also cites a variety of situations where California
law already explicitly requires a warrant for many kinds of
information, including "any information sought by California
law enforcement held by a company outside of California; any
information sought by out of state law enforcement held by a
company inside of California; any personal information sought
from a provider of book services; non-content information
sought by California law enforcement in connection with a
misdemeanor property crime held by a California service
provider; and contents of communications or the information
obtained by a pen register sought from a utility in connection
with embezzlement and fraud investigations. Both the federal
and California Wiretap Acts also require a 'super-warrant'
with additional protections to capture live communications."
As a result, the author and supporters believe that existing
law is insufficient to protect all forms of electronic
communications and their meta-data, such personal emails
stored on a company's servers or mobile phone location data
held by carriers - information that is in great demand from
law enforcement.
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4)The growth in government requests for electronic data . As
evidence of the confusion around how certain kinds of
communications or data are protected by the Fourth Amendment,
the author and supporters contend that warrantless demands by
government agencies for personal information have increased
substantially in recent years.
According to data provided by the author, "Google received over
12,500 requests from U.S. law enforcement in the first 6
months of 2014 alone, a 250 percent increase in just the past
five years. Only around 25 percent of those requests were
warrants. AT&T received over 64,000 demands for location
information in 2014, nearly 70% increase in a single year.
Verizon received over 15,000 demands for location data in the
first half of 2014, only 1/3 with a warrant. Twitter and
Tumblr both received more demands from California law
enforcement than any other state."
The large number of requests has likely not gone unnoticed by
consumers, as the author cites a Pew Research Center poll from
November 2014 which found that "70% of social networking site
users are concerned about government access and another recent
poll showed that only 7% trust email for secure
communications." Consumer discontent related to the low level
of trust in privacy has also garnered the attention of the
tech industry, which the author says is "increasingly
concerned about loss of consumer trust and its business
impact, including potential losses in the billions of dollars
for California technology companies."
5)Recent Supreme Court decisions on electronic communications .
With this explosion in requests for electronic data by law
enforcement, long-standing questions about the level of
authorization required to conduct a search or intercept
communications are back in the spotlight. Two major, recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions are relevant to that discussion.
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In the case of U.S. v. Jones (132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)), the Court
ruled that the physical attachment of a global positioning
system (GPS) device to a car and monitoring its movements over
the course of a month as part of a drug trafficking
investigation required a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment, although the reasoning differed between the
Justices. This left open the question of whether government's
collection of geolocation data requires a warrant when there
is no physical invasion, such as getting GPS information from
a mobile phone company. The Court even highlighted this
uncertainty, writing, "[i]t may be that achieving the same
result through electronic means, without an accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question."
Instead, Justice Alito appears to invite action by Congress
and the states, saying "a legislative body is well suited to
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and
to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way."
A more recent case, Riley v. United States (134 S.Ct. 2473
(2014)), held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant
prior to searching digital information on a cellphone seized
during an arrest. The Court found that searching an
individual's purse for evidence or a weapon during an arrest
is qualitatively different than searching someone's cellphone
in part because there is less danger of potential harm to an
officer or of evidence being destroyed, but there is also a
far greater danger to an individual's privacy because of the
vast quantities and distinct types of personal information
that can be stored on a phone. In one widely quoted passage,
the Court wrote that treating the search of a purse like the
search of a cellphone "would be like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon."
According to the author, SB 178 "codifies Riley and ensures
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that its protections extend to all electronic devices while
enumerating the exceptional circumstances where a warrant is
not required." Similarly, it enshrines protection for
location data consistent with the decision in Jones. The aim
is to create a "clear, uniform warrant rule for California law
enforcement access to electronic information."
Finally, as evidence of widespread legislative interest and
action on the topic, the author points to recent Congressional
hearings and pending bipartisan legislation to create a
uniform warrant requirement for stored communications access
by law enforcement. The author also states that sixteen state
legislatures have enacted new electronic privacy legislation,
with ten states acting to protect geophysical location data
and six states protecting electronic communications content.
6)This bill's impacts on privacy in practice . This bill aims to
codify and strengthen privacy protections under the California
Constitution in a number of ways. First, it requires a
demonstration of probable cause to obtain electronic
communications information from a third party service
provider, responding to a high percentage of legally
inadequate requests from law enforcement. It also applies the
probable cause requirement to past electronic communications,
regardless of their age, which is an improvement over federal
law. SB 178 also guarantees that geolocation information is
protected by the same standard, which codifies protections
established in case law, and also protects some forms of
'metadata.'
Generally, this bill's requirement for a search warrant or
probable cause order for electronic communications information
is protective of personal privacy and in keeping with the
California Constitution's explicit protection of an
individual's right of privacy, but does provide for the
traditional exceptions in limited circumstances (i.e.,
volunteered information, lost devices, emergency situations,
etc.). Moreover, these requirements explicitly limit the
searches to necessary information, judicial oversight of
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information obtained without a warrant or order, and deletion
of unneeded information. SB 178 also requires reasonable
notification to the target of the request, prohibits the use
in court of information obtained in violation of these
requirements, and provides authorization to affected entities
and the Attorney General to take action to uphold these
requirements.
7)Arguments in support . The Electronic Frontier Foundation,
co-sponsor of this bill, writes, "While the premise of SB 178
is the strong privacy protections enshrined in the California
constitution, even the U.S. Supreme Court is recognizing the
need to protect digital data. This past summer, its decision
in Riley v. California confirmed that electronic devices like
cell phones, and specifically the digital data stored on the
phone, differ in both 'a quantitative and a qualitative sense'
from other physical objects accessible to law enforcement.
These devices, and the digital data contained within, is 'not
just another technological convenience' but, given 'all they
contain and all they may reveal?hold for many Americans
'privacies of life.'" Thus the Supreme Court, required police
'get a warrant' before searching the data on a cell phone
incident to arrest."
"SB 178 follows the spirit of Riley and extends the warrant
requirement to a wealth of digital information that reveals
personal and sensitive details about who we are, whom we
communicate and associate with, and where we've been. While
law enforcement will still be able to obtain this information
and utilize it to solve crimes, SB 178 provides needed
oversight by requiring law enforcement to obtain a search
warrant in order to access this wealth of information. The
bill contains reasonable exceptions that allow law enforcement
to obtain digital information without a warrant during an
emergency."
A retired Federal Magistrate Judge (S.D. Cal.), the Hon. James
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F. Stiven, writes: "[d]espite strong support for SB 178 in
existing law, its passage will bring needed clarity for all
those affected, including law enforcement. For example, legal
uncertainty persists about the treatment of location data
obtained from cell phone providers, despite the Jones
decision. Congress has not updated the federal electronic
surveillance laws that are nearing their 30th birthday. Those
laws have been justifiably criticized for being more complex
and convoluted than the tax laws and for being particularly a
mess regarding location data. At the same time, government
lawyers argue that under Fourth Amendment precedents from the
1970s, people forfeit privacy in information, such as location
data, stored with third parties. While the Supreme Court has
not extended those precedents to modern communications
technologies and its recent decisions suggest it may not, the
Court has not yet joined the California Supreme Court in
rejecting the third party rule's application to electronic
communications and metadata."
"Because of the persisting legal uncertainty, Californians
have good reason to worry that the information SB 178 covers
is inadequately protected.?SB 178 incorporates into California
statutory law legally sound provisions that are essential to
ensuring that Californians may take advantage of innovations
in communications technologies without sacrificing their
constitutionally protected rights to privacy, free expression
and free association."
Google adds, "SB 178 would update California law to ensure
that online communications are afforded comparable privacy
protections to those that exist for offline communications.
We believe our users deserve stronger protections than they
have today. Updating the state's electronic surveillance laws
is one of the easiest and most effective ways to protect
Californians' privacy. Law enforcement agencies must be able
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to pursue illegal activity and keep the public safe. But it's
also important that laws afford the highest privacy
protections for our users' communications and related
information. In that context, if enacted, SB 178 will better
align California's laws with how people use the Internet today
and provide them with important protections they should
reasonably expect."
8)Arguments in opposition . According to the California State
Sheriffs' Association, SB 178 "has a myriad of problems: it
conflates existing procedures for obtaining certain electronic
information under state and federal law, contains burdensome
and unnecessary reporting requirements, and will undermine
investigations that are fully compliant with the Fourth
Amendment. Much of the national debate around electronic
privacy goes to whether the federal statutes governing third
party records provide for sufficient protections. While there
is a process for some law enforcement to obtain some records
via subpoena rather than a search warrant, under existing
California law, California prosecutors cannot obtain any
electronic information without judicial review. This measure
goes beyond the question of judicial review and search
warrants, however, and creates barriers that will hinder law
enforcement investigations."
The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) argues
that SB 178 "creates conflicts with existing laws regarding
the execution of search warrants and the lawful use of
wiretaps, and mandates the destruction of evidence by law
enforcement." They point out that many provisions of the bill
are covered by existing judicial decisions or federal law,
such as restrictions on searching electronic devices incident
to arrest, and limits on accessing content of electronic
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communications held by a service provider.
CDAA also argues that "[m]uch of the current national debate
around digital privacy and existing federal protections boil
down to the ability of some law enforcement to access some
information by subpoena - and without judicial review. This
is not the case in California... Under current law, California
prosecutors cannot get any electronic evidence - neither
content, nor information about the subscriber - without
judicial review."
Additionally, CDAA criticizes the bill for "eliminate[ing] the
standard 'ten-day rule' for electronic evidence", which they
say will result in "the addition of unnecessary boilerplate to
warrants, or a burdensome two-step process when searching for
electronic evidence - neither of which add to the privacy of a
suspect's data." CDAA also claims that "SB 178 combines
wiretaps and stored communications in the same statute. In
doing so, it creates conflicts with the existing California
wiretap statutes?" Finally, they say that the bill's
requirement to destroy "evidence" before the investigation is
finished or the case adjudicated may lead to "an accused
individual [being] denied evidence of his or her
innocence...[M]andating evidence destruction before a case is
over will never be a good idea."
Finally, the California Police Chiefs Association states that
"we are incredibly concerned" about the impact of the
prohibition on access to device information by means of
electronic communication. They state,"[o]ne of the most
effective techniques to identify and arrest child predators or
to combat the trade of child pornography is through undercover
investigations where police officers create online profile
posing as either potential victims or trading partners?The
emails that offenders voluntarily send to police officers
contain information ('metadata') that is invaluable in
locating and identifying these dangerous criminals. Similar
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techniques are commonly used to track stalkers, cyber bullies,
and internet fraudsters. The proposed prohibition on
electronic communication that reveals device information
(along with the restrictive definition of 'specific consent')
would effectively end online undercover investigations in
California."
9)Technical amendments . In order to address the concerns of
opponents that this bill might interfere with undercover
efforts to identify child predators and other criminals
online, the author has agreed to explicitly define the term
"specific consent" to better clarify the bill's existing
language which states that emails or other communications sent
or addressed to a government entity meet the requirements for
specific consent.
On page 4, strike lines 21-22 and add:
(k)"Specific consent" means consent provided directly to
the government entity seeking information, including when
the government entity is the addressee or intended
recipient of an electronic communication.
On page 5, lines 16-18, strike the words:
including when a government entity is the intended
recipient of an electronic communication initiated by the
authorized possessor of the device
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10)Two-thirds vote requirement . The California Constitution
provides for a "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" as a result of the
passage of the Victim's Bill of Rights Act (California
Proposition 8, 1982). That measure was intended to ensure
that a state court did not unnecessarily exclude evidence
relevant to a criminal prosecution, even if gathered in a
manner that violates the rights of the defendant, although the
U.S. Constitution may still require exclusion in some cases.
Any exception to this right requires a two-thirds vote by both
the Assembly and the Senate.
Because this bill would exclude evidence obtained or retained in
violation of this bill's provisions, it will require a
two-thirds vote for passage on the Assembly Floor.
11)Previous legislation . SB 467 (Leno) of 2013 would have
required a search warrant when a governmental agency is
seeking the contents of a wire or electronic communication
that is stored, held or maintained by a provider. SB 467 was
vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: "The bill, however,
imposes new notice requirements that go beyond those required
by federal law and could impede ongoing criminal
investigations. I do not think that is wise."
SB 1434 (Leno) of 2012 would have required a government entity
to get a search warrant in order to obtain the location
information of an electronic device. SB 1434 was vetoed by
Governor Brown, who wrote: "It may be that legislative action
is needed to keep the law current in our rapidly evolving
electronic age. But I am not convinced that this bill strikes
the right balance between the operational needs of law
enforcement and individual expectations of privacy."
SB 914 (Leno) of 2011 would have required a search warrant to
search the contents of a portable electronic device that is
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found during a search incident to an arrest. SB 914 was vetoed
by Governor Brown, who wrote: "This measure would overturn a
California Supreme Court decision that held that police
officers can lawfully search the cell phones of people who
they arrest. The courts are better suited to resolve the
complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional
search-and-seizures protections."
12)Double-referral . This bill is double-referred with the
Assembly Public Safety Committee, where this bill will be
heard if passed by this Committee.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Newspaper Publishers Association (co-sponsor)
Electronic Frontier Foundation (co-sponsor)
Adobe
Airbnb
American Civil Liberties Union of California
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Apple, Inc.
Asian Law Caucus
Bay Area Civil Liberties Coalition
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Library Association
California Public Defenders Association
Center for Democracy & Technology
Center for Media Justice
Citizens for Criminal Justice Reform - California
Civil Justice Association of California
ColorOfChange.org
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Consumer Action
Consumer Federation of California
Council on American-Islamic Relations, California Chapter
Dropbox
Drug Policy Alliance
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Engine
Facebook
Foursquare Labs, Inc.
Google, Inc
Internet Archive
Internet Association
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
SB 178
Page 24
LinkedIn
Media Alliance
Mozilla
Namecheap, Inc.
National Center for Lesbian Rights
New America's Open Technology Institute
Oakland Privacy Working Group
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Restore the Fourth (San Francisco Bay Area Chapter)
Small Business California
TechFreedom
TechNet
TURN-The Utility Reform Network
SB 178
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Twitter
17 individual legal scholars
1 individual
Opposition
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Analysis Prepared by:Hank Dempsey / P. & C.P. / (916)
319-2200
SB 178
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