BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING
Senator Jim Beall, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular
Bill No: SB 247 Hearing Date: 1/12/2016
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|Author: |Lara |
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|Version: |1/4/2016 |
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|Urgency: |No |Fiscal: |Yes |
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|Consultant|Randy Chinn |
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SUBJECT: Charter bus transportation: safety improvements
DIGEST: This bill requires charter bus drivers to instruct
passengers on exit location and operation, requires all charter
buses to be equipped with specified emergency equipment by July
1, 2017, and requires all buses manufactured after July 1, 2017,
and used for charter transportation in California to be equipped
with a secondary door.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law requires charter-party carriers of passengers to be
permitted by the California Public Utilities Commission.
This bill:
1) Requires charter bus drivers to instruct passengers on
exit location and operation and encourage seatbelt use at
the outset of every trip, and provide the same content in
writing.
2) Requires all charter buses to be equipped with:
a) burn resistant materials in their passenger compartments
b) emergency lighting systems that run on an independent
power source
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c) reflective emergency signage
d) windows that "can be easily opened and remain open
during an emergency"
e) event data recording systems triggered by sudden
deceleration or braking
3) Requires the CHP to adopt standards for these new features
by July 1, 2017.
4) Requires all buses manufactured after July 1, 2017, and
used for charter transportation in California to be equipped
with a secondary door.
COMMENTS:
1) Background - Orland accident. In April 2014, a FedEx
tractor-trailer traveling on I-5 near Orland, California
drifted across the grassy median separating the north and
southbound lanes and collided with a charter bus carrying a
group of Los Angeles-area high school students travelling to
Humboldt State University for a campus tour. Diesel from
one of the truck's fuel tanks sprayed into the front of the
bus on impact, and friction from the crash ignited it,
causing a fire in the passenger compartment. The drivers of
both vehicles were killed, along with eight passengers -
seven of whom died from asphyxiation or burns rather than
their impact-related injuries.
Though the accident was caused by the truck, investigators
from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also
examined factors related to the features and operation of
the bus that may have contributed to the death toll. NTSB
then made several recommendations to federal agencies
charged with regulating highway vehicle design and charter
bus transportation, which those agencies can choose to adopt
or not. The recommendations referenced in its report on the
Orland crash were directed to the National Highway and
Transportation System Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), which as of
this writing have declined to impose additional regulations
on charter buses. This bill proposes to adopt these
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recommendations - discussed below - as state law.
2) What's covered; what's not. This bill deals with carriers
engaged in charter bus transportation. Charter bus
transportation is defined as the use of a vehicle designed
to carry more than 10 persons travelling together under a
single contract for a fixed fee. This definition excludes
school buses and public transit buses.
3) State jurisdiction. Federal law imposes some restrictions
on California's jurisdiction over vehicles. The California
Bus Association (CBA) notes that states are preempted from
regulating vehicle design. However, Legislative Counsel has
found that states may exercise "safety regulatory authority"
over motor vehicles<1>, and believes the provisions of this
bill are within California's jurisdiction.
4) Concerns. The bus industry has raised concerns about the
bill, noting that the bus and its passengers were the
victims of a collision with a truck that crossed the median.
CBA quotes the NTSB report as identifying a "sudden and
catastrophic rupture" of the truck fuel tank, which sprayed
diesel fuel onto and into the bus. They believe that public
safety would be better enhanced by requiring truck fuel tank
safety cages and pursuing bus equipment requirements through
changes in federal law rather than California law.
Ideally, the merit of imposing safety equipment requirements
would be assessed by comparing the risk to the public of
fires in buses against the cost and effectiveness of the
proposed safety equipment. Unfortunately, such information
is difficult to obtain, though some data is available.
5) Passenger safety briefings. Unlike commercial airlines,
charter bus companies are not required to provide safety
information to passengers at the outset of each trip. The
charter bus company involved in the Orland accident had
prepared a safety video for passengers; however, the driver
did not show it at the outset of this particular trip. This
may have affected crash survivability: Although the bus was
equipped with seatbelts, many passengers were not wearing
them at the time of the accident, and several sustained
serious or fatal injuries after being thrown from their
seats. Bus passengers also reported having difficulty
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<1> 49 U.S. Code Section 14501
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operating the emergency window exits. Both the availability
of seatbelts and window exit operation would have been
covered in the safety briefing had it been shown. The NTSB
report recommends that charter bus operators be required to
provide pre-trip safety briefings, written safety materials,
and information on seatbelts particularly.
6) Fire frequency. The CBA knows of no other instances of
fires in buses in the past year. They point to what they
believe is an exemplary safety record of buses, particularly
when considered in the context of passenger miles travelled.
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) has searched media
articles for other instances of deaths from an inability to
exit a burning bus, and they could find none. Though not
specific to fires, the CHP has found that there have been
between two and seven fatal tour bus collisions (not
necessarily fire-related) annually in California since 2010.
Except for 2014, the year of the Orland fire, the number of
tour bus fatalities has been less than four annually during
that same period.
7) Equipment costs and effectiveness. The cost of installing
the various safety equipment is unknown, though the CBA
believes it will be expensive both in terms of direct costs
and the opportunity cost of taking a bus out of service for
retrofitting. The different specific requirements of the
bill appear to have widely varying costs. While signage and
emergency lighting may not be too expensive, retrofitting an
event data recorder and windows that remain open could well
be. The CBA notes that materials used in buses must already
comply with federal flammability standards, and that most
modern buses use materials which comply with the standards
for airplanes, which have the strictest standards for
inflammability. Therefore, the requirement for
burn-resistant material may be unnecessary. (The committee
has requested cost information from the CBA, which is
pending.) The effectiveness of the various safety equipment
requirements is hard to assess, though it seems clear that
open, latchable windows, additional lighting, and visible
signage would have saved lives.
8) Emergency exit improvements. In the Orland accident, the
truck collided with the front of the bus and disabled its
only door. Emergency exits through the windows and roof
were unfamiliar to passengers and difficult to locate and
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use, especially as dark smoke obscured operating
instructions. These exits were 7 and 12 feet from the
ground, respectively - higher than the 6 feet above which
aircraft must be equipped with slides for passenger
evacuation - and passengers had to hold the very heavy
windows open in order to keep them from shutting as they
escaped. This bill requires that buses manufactured after
July 1, 2017, be equipped with a secondary door, as
recommended by the NTSB; retrofit of existing buses is not
required. Secondary doors are currently in use in some
buses. (The committee has requested cost information from
the CBA, which is pending.) Both second doors and propping
mechanisms for window exits are currently required on all
European buses.
There is precedent for state law to require improvements in
the ability of passengers to exit vehicles. In an
unfortunately analogous circumstance, in 2013 a limousine
caught fire on the San Mateo bridge in the San Francisco Bay
Area, killing several passengers who were trapped inside.
The Legislature responded by requiring that limousines have
additional exits.
Related Legislation:
SB 109 (Corbett, Chapter 752, Statutes of 2013) - requires all
modified, or "stretch," limousines to have at least two rear
doors and two push-out exit windows.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes
Local: Yes
POSITIONS: (Communicated to the committee before noon on
Wednesday,
January 6, 2016.)
SUPPORT:
None received
OPPOSITION:
None received
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