BILL ANALYSIS Ó
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | SB 247|
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THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 247
Author: Lara (D)
Amended: 1/26/16
Vote: 21
PRIOR VOTES NOT RELEVANT
SENATE TRANS. & HOUSING COMMITTEE: 8-0, 1/12/16
AYES: Beall, Cannella, Allen, Galgiani, McGuire, Mendoza,
Roth, Wieckowski
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bates, Gaines, Leyva
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 8-0, 1/13/16
AYES: Hueso, Cannella, Hertzberg, Hill, Lara, McGuire, Pavley,
Wolk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Fuller, Leyva, Morrell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 1/21/16
AYES: Lara, Bates, Beall, Hill, Leyva, Mendoza, Nielsen
SUBJECT: Charter bus transportation: safety improvements
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST: This bill places new safety requirements on charter
buses.
ANALYSIS: Existing law requires charter-party carriers of
passengers to be permitted by the California Public Utilities
Commission.
This bill:
1)Requires charter bus drivers to instruct passengers on exit
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location and operation, encourage seatbelt use at the outset
of every trip, and provide the same content in writing.
2)Requires all charter buses to be equipped with:
a) Burn-resistant materials in their passenger compartments
b) emergency lighting systems that run on an independent
power source
c) reflective emergency signage
d) windows that can be easily opened and remain open during
an emergency
e) event data recording systems triggered by sudden
deceleration or braking
3)Requires the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to adopt
standards for these new features by July 1, 2017.
4)Requires all buses manufactured after July 1, 2017, and used
for charter transportation in California, to be equipped with
a secondary door.
Comments
1)Purpose of bill: Orland accident. In April 2014, a FedEx
tractor-trailer traveling on I-5 near Orland, California,
drifted across the grassy median separating the north and
southbound lanes and collided with a charter bus carrying a
group of Los Angeles-area high school students travelling to
Humboldt State University for a campus tour. Diesel from one
of the truck's fuel tanks sprayed into the front of the bus on
impact, and friction from the crash ignited it, causing a fire
in the passenger compartment. The drivers of both vehicles
were killed, along with eight passengers - seven of whom died
from asphyxiation or burns rather than their impact-related
injuries.
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Though the accident was caused by the truck, investigators
from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also
examined factors related to the features and operation of the
bus that may have contributed to the fatalities. NTSB then
made several recommendations to the National Highway and
Transportation System Administration and the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, which have so far declined to
impose additional regulations on charter buses. This bill
proposes to adopt these recommendations - discussed below - as
state law.
2)What's covered; what's not. This bill deals with carriers
engaged in charter bus transportation. Charter bus
transportation is defined as the use of a vehicle designed to
carry more than 10 persons travelling together under a single
contract for a fixed fee. This definition excludes school
buses and public transit buses.
3)State jurisdiction. Federal law imposes some restrictions on
California's jurisdiction over vehicles. The California Bus
Association (CBA) notes that states are preempted from
regulating vehicle design. However, Legislative Counsel has
found that states may exercise "safety regulatory authority"
over motor vehicles (49 U.S. Code Section 14501), and believes
the provisions of this bill are within California's
jurisdiction.
4)Concerns. The bus industry has raised concerns about the
bill, noting that the bus and its passengers were the victims
of a collision with a truck that crossed the median. CBA
quotes the NTSB report as identifying a "sudden and
catastrophic rupture" of the truck fuel tank, which sprayed
diesel fuel onto and into the bus. They believe that public
safety would be better enhanced by requiring truck fuel tank
safety cages and pursuing bus equipment requirements through
changes in federal law rather than California law.
5)Passenger safety briefings. Unlike commercial airlines,
charter bus companies are not required to provide safety
information to passengers at the outset of each trip. The
charter bus company involved in the Orland accident had
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prepared a safety video for passengers; however, the driver
did not show it at the outset of this particular trip. This
may have affected crash survivability: Although the bus was
equipped with seatbelts, many passengers were not wearing them
at the time of the accident, and several sustained serious or
fatal injuries after being thrown from their seats. Bus
passengers also reported having difficulty operating the
emergency window exits. Both the availability of seatbelts
and window exit operation would have been covered in the
safety briefing, had it been shown. The NTSB report
recommends that charter bus operators be required to provide
pre-trip safety briefings, written safety materials, and
information on seatbelts.
6)Fire frequency. The CBA knows of no other instances of fires
in buses in the past year. They point to what they believe is
an exemplary safety record of buses, particularly when
considered in the context of passenger miles travelled. The
California Highway Patrol (CHP) has searched media articles
for other instances of deaths from an inability to exit a
burning bus, and they could find none. Though not specific to
fires, the CHP has found that there have been between two and
seven fatal tour bus collisions (not necessarily fire-related)
annually in California since 2010. Except for 2014, the year
of the Orland fire, the number of tour bus fatalities has been
less than four annually during that same period.
7)Equipment costs and effectiveness. The cost of installing the
various safety equipment is unknown, though the CBA believes
it will be expensive both in terms of direct costs and the
opportunity cost of taking a bus out of service for
retrofitting. The different specific requirements of the bill
appear to have widely varying costs. While signage and
emergency lighting may not be too expensive, retrofitting an
event data recorder and windows that remain open could well
be. The CBA notes that materials used in buses must already
comply with federal flammability standards, and that most
modern buses use materials which comply with the standards for
airplanes, which have the strictest standards for
inflammability. Therefore, the requirement for burn-resistant
material may be unnecessary. The effectiveness of the various
safety equipment requirements is hard to assess, though it
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seems clear that open, latchable windows; additional lighting;
and visible signage would have saved lives.
8)Emergency exit improvements. In the Orland accident, the
truck collided with the front of the bus and disabled its only
door. Emergency exits through the windows and roof were
unfamiliar to passengers and difficult to locate and use,
especially as dark smoke obscured operating instructions.
These exits were 7 and 12 feet from the ground, respectively -
higher than the 6 feet above which aircraft must be equipped
with slides for passenger evacuation - and passengers had to
hold the very heavy windows open in order to keep them from
shutting as they escaped. This bill requires that buses
manufactured after July 1, 2017, be equipped with a secondary
door, as recommended by the NTSB; retrofit of existing buses
is not required. Secondary doors are currently in use in some
buses. Both second doors and propping mechanisms for window
exits are currently required on all European buses.
9)Limousine precedent. There is precedent for state law to
require improvements in the ability of passengers to exit
vehicles. In an unfortunately analogous circumstance, in 2013
a limousine caught fire on the San Mateo Bridge in the San
Francisco Bay Area, killing several passengers who were
trapped inside. The Legislature responded by requiring that
limousines have additional exits.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal
Com.:YesLocal: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, CHP would
incur costs of approximately $20,000 to develop standards and
criteria for the proposed safety equipment requirements. (Motor
Vehicle Account)
SUPPORT: (Verified1/25/16)
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
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OPPOSITION: (Verified1/25/16)
None received
Prepared by:Randy Chinn / T. & H. / (916) 651-4121
1/26/16 16:39:33
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