Amended in Senate March 28, 2016

Senate BillNo. 1052


Introduced by Senators Lara and Mitchell

February 16, 2016


An actbegin insert to add Section 625.6 to the Welfare and Institutions Code,end insert relating to juveniles.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST

SB 1052, as amended, Lara. begin deleteJuveniles. end deletebegin insertCustodial interrogation: juveniles.end insert

Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.

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This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to juveniles.

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This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction.

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Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: begin deleteno end deletebegin insertyesend insert. State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

P2    1begin insert

begin insertSECTION 1.end insert  

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The Legislature finds and declares all of the
2following:

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3
(a) Developmental and neurological science concludes that the
4process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood,
5and that the human brain undergoes “dynamic changes throughout
6adolescence and well into young adulthood.” (See Richard J.
7Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental
8Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and
9Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
10children and youth “‘generally are less mature and responsible
11than adults,’” (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394,
122397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115);
13“they ‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
14recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’”
15(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443
16U.S. 622, 635); “they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to…
17outside pressures’ than adults” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting
18Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they “have limited
19understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
20institutional actors within it” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
2148, 78); and “children characteristically lack the capacity to
22exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability
23to understand the world around them” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).

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24
(b) Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires
25that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a
26knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before
27the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a
28lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning
29of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a
P3    1large body of research has established that adolescent thinking
2tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications,
3and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions.
4(See, e.g., Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Future Orientation
5and Delay Discounting”; William Gardner and Janna Herman,
6“Adolescent’s AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective,”
7in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al.
8(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer,
9“Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent,” Kentucky Child Rights
10Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile
11Justice Network, “Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform
12Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates,” September 2012,
13pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, “How Adolescents Approach
14Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy
15Implications,” Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538,
16541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation,
17the United States Supreme Court observed that events that “would
18leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm
19a lad in his early teens” (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596
20(plurality opinion)), and noted that “‘no matter how sophisticated,’
21a juvenile subject of police interrogation ‘cannot be compared’
22to an adult subject,” J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos
23v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement
24community now widely accepts what science and the courts have
25recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable
26to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings
27with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal
28justice system.

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29
(c) For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should
30consult with counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the
31determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly,
32intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under
33Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into
34account the special concerns that are present when a young person
35is involved, including a child or youth’s limited experience,
36education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442
37U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration
38whether a child’s or youth’s age or experience indicates that his
39or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in
P4    1fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442
2U.S. at 725).

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begin insertSEC. 2.end insert  

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begin insertSection 625.6 is added to the end insertbegin insertWelfare and Institutions
4Code
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begin insert, to read:end insert

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5

begin insert625.6.end insert  

(a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
6waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall
7consult with counsel. The consultation may not be waived.

8
(b) If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of
9age occurs prior to the youth consulting with counsel, all of the
10following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance
11with subdivision (a):

12
(1) The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of
13statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after
14a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply
15with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).

16
(2) Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure
17to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of
18claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his
19or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.

20
(3) If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was
21subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a),
22the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact,
23with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).

24
(c) In determining whether an admission, statement, or
25confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily,
26knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the
27circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not
28limited to, all of the following:

29
(1) The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education
30level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.

31
(2) The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights,
32including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination
33under the United States and California Constitutions, the
34consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the
35youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether
36the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during
37interrogation.

38
(3) The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her
39rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were
40minimized by law enforcement.

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(4) The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or
2her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.

3
(5) Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda
4rights.

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(6) Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other
6adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.

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(7) Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to
8consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or
9whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian
10from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.

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(8) Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law
12enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda
13rights previously.

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(9) Whether the youth requested to leave.

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(10) Whether law enforcement either by express or implied
16conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if
17any other promises of leniency were made.

18
(11) The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including
19length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of
20individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement,
21the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether
22law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if
23express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure
24to comply with Section 627.

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(12) Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver.

26
(13) Any other relevant evidence.

27
(d) The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used
28 pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that
29statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of
30subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.

31
(e) For purposes of this section, “Miranda rights” refers to the
32rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.

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33

SECTION 1.  

It is the intent of the Legislature to enact
34legislation relating to juveniles.

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