SB 1052, as amended, Lara. Custodial interrogation: juveniles.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the
begin delete above specifiedend delete rights. The bill would provide that consultation with counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to
develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the
3(a) Developmental and neurological science concludes that the
4process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood,
5and that the human brain undergoes “dynamic changes throughout
6adolescence and well into young adulthood.” (See Richard J.
7Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental
8Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and
9Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
10children and youth “‘generally are less mature and responsible
11than adults,’” (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394,
122397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115);
13“they ‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
14recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’”
15(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443
16U.S. 622, 635); “they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to…
17outside pressures’ than adults” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting
18Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they “have limited
19understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
20institutional actors within it” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
2148, 78); and “children characteristically lack the capacity to
22exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability
23to understand the world around them” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
24(b) Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires
25that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a
26knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before
27the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a
28lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning
29of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a
30large body of research has established that adolescent thinking
31tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications,
P3 1and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions.
2(See, e.g., Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Future Orientation
3and Delay Discounting”; William Gardner and Janna Herman,
4“Adolescent’s AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective,”
5in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al.
6(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer,
7“Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent,” Kentucky Child Rights
8Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice
9Network, “Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A
10Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates,” September 2012, pp. 1-2;
11Catherine C. Lewis, “How Adolescents Approach Decisions:
12Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications,”
13Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing
14the specific context of police interrogation, the United States
15Supreme Court observed that events that “would leave a man cold
16and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early
17teens” (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)),
18and noted that “‘no matter how sophisticated,’ a juvenile subject
19of police interrogation ‘cannot be compared’ to an adult
begin delete subject,”
131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v.
21Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement
22community now widely accepts what science and the courts have
23recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable
24to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings
25with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal
27(c) For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult
28with counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the
29determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly,
30intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda
31v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account
32the special concerns that are present when a young person is
33 involved, including a child or youth’s limited experience, education
34and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707,
35725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a
36child’s or youth’s age or experience indicates that his or her request
37for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation
38of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions
40Code, to read:
(a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
2waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall
3consult with counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
4(b) If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age
5occurs prior to the youth consulting with counsel, all of the
6following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance
7with subdivision (a):
8(1) The court shall,
in adjudicating the admissibility of
9statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after
10a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply
11with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
12(2) Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure
13to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of
14claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his
15or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
16(3) If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was
17subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a),
18the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact,
19with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
20(c) In determining whether an admission, statement, or
21confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily,
22knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the
23circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not
24limited to, all of the following:
25(1) The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education
26level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
27(2) The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights,
28including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination
29under the United States and California Constitutions, the
30consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the
31youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether
32the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth
34(3) The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her
35rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were
36minimized by law enforcement.
37(4) The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her
38understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
39(5) Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda
P5 1(6) Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other
2adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
3(7) Whether law enforcement offered to allow
the youth to
4consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or
5whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian
6from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
7(8) Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law
8enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda
10(9) Whether the youth requested to leave.
11(10) Whether law enforcement either by express or implied
12conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if
13any other promises of leniency were made.
14(11) The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including
15length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of
16individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement,
17the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether
18law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used,
19if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the
20failure to comply with Section 627.
21(12) Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to
23(13) Any other relevant evidence.
24(d) The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used
25 pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that
26statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of
27subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
28(e) For purposes of this section, “Miranda rights” refers to the
29rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.