SB 1052, as amended, Lara. Custodial interrogation: juveniles.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation
takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
begin delete The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction.end delete The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
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State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the
3(a) Developmental and neurological science concludes that the
4process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood,
5and that the human brain undergoes “dynamic changes throughout
6adolescence and well into young adulthood.” (See Richard J.
7Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental
8Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and
9Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
10children and youth “‘generally are less mature and responsible
11than adults,’” (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394,
122397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115);
13“they ‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
14recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’”
15(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443
16U.S. 622, 635); “they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to…
17outside pressures’ than adults” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting
18Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they “have limited
19understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
20institutional actors within it” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
2148, 78); and “children characteristically lack the capacity to
22exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability
23to understand the world around them” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
24(b) Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires
25that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a
P3 1knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before
2the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a
3lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning
4of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a
5large body of research has established that adolescent thinking
6tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications,
7and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions.
8(See, e.g., Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Future Orientation
9and Delay Discounting”; William Gardner and Janna Herman,
10“Adolescent’s AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective,”
11in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al.
12(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer,
13“Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent,” Kentucky Child Rights
14Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice
15Network, “Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A
16Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates,” September 2012, pp. 1-2;
17Catherine C. Lewis, “How Adolescents Approach Decisions:
18Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications,”
19Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing
20the specific context of police interrogation, the United States
21Supreme Court observed that events that “would leave a man cold
22and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early
23teens” (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)),
24and noted that “‘no matter how sophisticated,’ a juvenile subject
25of police interrogation ‘cannot be compared’ to an adult subject”
26(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962)
27370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely
28accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and
29 adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive
30interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient
31adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
32(c) For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult
33with legal counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the
34determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly,
35intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda
36v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account
37the special concerns that are present when a young person is
38 involved, including a child or youth’s limited experience, education
39and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707,
40725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a
P4 1child’s or youth’s age or experience indicates that his or her request
2for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation
3of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions
5Code, to read:
(a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
7waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall
8consult with legal counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
9(b) If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age
10occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel,
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11the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance
12with subdivision (a):
13(1) The court shall, in adjudicating the
14statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after
15a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply
16with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
17(2) Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure
18to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of
19claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his
20or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
21(3) If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was
22subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a),
23the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact,
24with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
25(c) In determining whether an admission, statement, or
26confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily,
27knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the
28circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not
29limited to, all of the following:
30(1) The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education
31level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
32(2) The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights,
33including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination
34under the United States and California Constitutions, the
35consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the
36youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether
37the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth
P5 1(3) The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her
2rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were
3minimized by law enforcement.
4(4) The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her
5understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
6(5) Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda
8(6) Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other
9adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
10(7) Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to
11consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or
12whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian
13from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
14(8) Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law
15enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda
17(9) Whether the youth requested to leave.
18(10) Whether law enforcement either by express or implied
19conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if
20any other promises of leniency were made.
21(11) The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including
22length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of
23individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement,
24the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether
25law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used,
26if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the
27failure to comply with Section 627.
28(12) Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to
30(13) Any other relevant evidence.
31(d) The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used
32 pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that
33statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of
34subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
32 35(e)end delete
36 This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements
37of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria
P6 1(1) The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed
2the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or
3property from a substantial threat.
4(2) The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that
5were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
P6 1 6(f)end delete
7 For purposes of this section, “Miranda rights” refers to the
8rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.