SB 1052, as amended, Lara. Custodial interrogation: juveniles.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived.
begin delete If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, theend delete bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified begin delete requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.end delete The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the
3(a) Developmental and neurological science concludes that the
4process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood,
5and that the human brain undergoes “dynamic changes throughout
6adolescence and well into young adulthood.” (See Richard J.
7Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental
8Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and
9Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
10children and youth “‘generally are less mature and responsible
11than adults,’” (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394,
122397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115);
13“they ‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
14recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’”
15(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443
16U.S. 622, 635); “they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to…
17outside pressures’ than adults” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting
18Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they “have limited
19understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
20institutional actors within it” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
2148, 78); and “children characteristically lack the capacity to
22exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability
23to understand the world around them” (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
P3 1(b) Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires
2that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a
3knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before
4the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a
5lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning
6of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a
7large body of research has established that adolescent thinking
8tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications,
9and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions.
10(See, e.g., Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Future Orientation
11and Delay Discounting”; William Gardner and Janna Herman,
12“Adolescent’s AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective,”
13in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al.
14(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer,
15“Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent,” Kentucky Child Rights
16Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice
17Network, “Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A
18Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates,” September 2012, pp. 1-2;
19Catherine C. Lewis, “How Adolescents Approach Decisions:
20 Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications,”
21Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing
22the specific context of police interrogation, the United States
23Supreme Court observed that events that “would leave a man cold
24and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early
25teens” (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)),
26and noted that “‘no matter how sophisticated,’ a juvenile subject
27of police interrogation ‘cannot be compared’ to an adult subject”
28(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962)
29370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely
30accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and
31 adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive
32interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient
33adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
34(c) For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult
begin delete counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the
38determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly,
39intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda
40v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account
P4 1the special concerns that are present when a young person is
2 involved, including a child or youth’s limited experience, education
3and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707,
4725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a
5child’s or youth’s age or experience indicates that his or her request
6for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation
7of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).end delete
Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions
11Code, to read:
(a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
13waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall
14consult with legal
begin delete counsel.end delete The consultation may not be waived.
16(b) If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age
17occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, both of the
18following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance
19with subdivision (a):
13 20(1)end delete
21 The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of
22statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after
23a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply
begin delete (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).end delete
26(2) Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure
27to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of
28claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his
29or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
30(c) In determining whether an admission, statement, or
31confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily,
32knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the
33circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not
34limited to, all of the following:
35(1) The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education
36level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
37(2) The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights,
38including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination
39under the United States and California Constitutions, the
40consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the
P5 1youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether
2the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth
4(3) The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her
5rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were
6minimized by law enforcement.
7(4) The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her
8understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
9(5) Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda
11(6) Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other
12adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
13(7) Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to
14consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or
15whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian
16from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
17(8) Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law
18enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda
20(9) Whether the youth requested to leave.
21(10) Whether law enforcement either by express or implied
22conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if
23any other promises of leniency were made.
24(11) The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including
25length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of
26individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement,
27the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether
28law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used,
29if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the
30failure to comply with Section 627.
31(12) Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to
33(13) Any other relevant evidence.end delete
36 34(d)end delete
35 This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements
36of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria
38(1) The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed
39the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or
40property from a substantial threat.
P6 1(2) The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that
2were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
3(e) For purposes of this section, “Miranda rights” refers to the
4rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.