BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SB 1065
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Date of Hearing: June 28, 2016
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
SB
1065 (Monning) - As Amended March 28, 2016
As Proposed to be Amended
SENATE VOTE: 26-9
SUBJECT: PETITIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION: APPEALS
KEY ISSUE: IN ORDER TO ALLOW VICTIMS OF ELDER ABUSE TO
VINDICATE THEIR RIGHTS IN COURT, SHOULD AN APPEAL OF AN
INTERLOCTUTORY ORDER DENYING A PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION BE
EXPEDITED IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE CLAIMS OF ELDER ABUSE AND
WHERE THE ELDER HAS BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL PREFERENCE BECAUSE OF
FAILING HEALTH?
SYNOPSIS
According to the author, when there is an allegation of elder
abuse in a nursing home and the elder abuse victim is granted a
speedy trial preference, it is routine for a defendant nursing
home to file a motion to compel arbitration as a way to avoid
jury trial or to stall litigation proceedings. Because appeals
take anywhere from one to two years, the victim of elder abuse
may very likely die while awaiting for the court of appeal to
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render a decision, which in most cases, will be to uphold the
trial court's decision and send the case back to trial. When a
victim of elder abuse passes away, the defendant's damages are
reduced. The elder's surviving family members do not have the
right to collect damages under the Elder and Dependent Adult
Civil Protection Act (EADACPA). Nor, obviously, does the
victim. Under existing law, the ability to appeal an
interlocutory order relating to arbitration is only available
for orders denying a petition to compel, but not available for
orders granting appeal - which seems particularly unfair if the
appeal right is being used by a defendant as a litigation tactic
to reduce a defendant's damages.
As currently in print, this bill prohibits a party from
appealing an interlocutory court order that denies a petition to
compel arbitration if a party has filed a claim under the Elder
and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and the party has been
granted a trial preference because of poor or failing health.
The bill in print is sponsored by California Advocates for
Nursing Home Reform, California Alliance for Retired Americans,
Congress of California Seniors, Consumer Attorneys of
California, and is supported by SEIU California. The bill in
print is opposed by a coalition led by the California
Association of Health Facilities, and is opposed by doctors,
hospitals, and nursing homes.
As proposed to be amended by the author, the bill will provide
an expedited appeal process for an order dismissing or denying a
petition to compel arbitration in matters where the plaintiff
has filed a claim under the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act, and the plaintiff has been granted a trial
preference because of poor or failing health. Based on these
proposed amendments, the original opponents have removed their
opposition. Although the proposed amendments now raises
concerns among Judicial Council staff, the author has signaled
to this Committee that it will continue to work with the
Judicial Council to address their concerns.
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SUMMARY: Creates an expedited appeal process for a plaintiff
for an order denying a motion to compel arbitration in matters
where the plaintiff has made a claim of elder abuse and where
the plaintiff has been granted an expedited trial preference.
Specifically, this bill:
1)Provides that in a case where a plaintiff has filed a claim
pursuant to the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection
Act, and the plaintiff has been granted a trial preference, an
appeal dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration
shall be scheduled according to the following timeline:
a) The notice of appeal and designation of the record must
be filed within 15 days of the service of a notice of entry
of the order or judgment subject to appeal.
b) The clerk of the superior court shall prepare and file
the requested clerk's transcript within 10 days of the
filing of the notice of appeal and immediately give notice
to the parties of such filing by the most expedited means
available, including electronic mail. Consistent with
California Rule of Court 8.124, a party may elect to
provide the clerk's transcript by way of an appendix filed
with the briefs.
c) Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and designation
of the record, the clerk of the superior court shall
immediately give notice by the most expedited means
available (including electronic mail) to the designated
reporters, requiring preparation and filing of the
certified reporter's transcript with the appellate court
within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal upon
the filing of the transcript, the clerk shall immediately
give notice to the parties of such filing by the most
expedited means available, including electronic mail.
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d) In lieu of a reporter's transcript filed by the reporter
as set forth in the notice of designation of the record,
the appellant may elect to file certified copies of
previously-prepared transcripts with the Opening Brief;
such election must be indicated in the notice of the
designation of the record.
e) The opening brief of an appellant must be filed and
served by the most expedited means available, including
electronic mail within 20 days of the filing of the
complete and accurate record of the superior court
proceedings in the court of appeal or within 40 days of the
filing of the notice of appeal if the provisions as
specified are invoked. At the time of the filing of the
opening brief, an appellant must either expressly request
or waive oral argument.
f) The brief of a respondent must be filed and served by
the most expedited means available, including electronic
mail within 20 days of the filing of the opening brief. At
the time of the filing of the brief of a respondent, a
respondent must either expressly request or waive oral
argument.
g) The reply brief of an appellant, if any, must be filed
and served by the most expedited means available, including
electronic mail within 20 days of the filing of the brief
of an respondent.
h) If requested by either party, oral argument must be set
within 30 days of the date of the filing of the reply brief
or the date the reply brief is otherwise due.
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i) The decision of the appellate court must be issued no
later than 15 days after the submission of the case for
decision, i.e., at the end of oral argument or after the
filing of the reply brief or the date the reply brief is
otherwise due if no oral argument is requested.
2)Provides that the timelines established in the act, including
the time for filing a notice of appeal, may be extended by
stipulation of the parties filed with the appellate court or
may be waived, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff in
writing filed with the trial court, with respect to the timely
filing of the notice of appeal, or with the appellate court
with respect to all other matters.
3)Provides that any stipulated extension of time or written
waiver of the plaintiff to extend any of the time limitations
may not exceed the normal and usual maximum times otherwise
established for appeals under any statute or rule of court.
4)Provides that the timelines established in the act may be
extended if there is a showing of extraordinary good cause.
5)Establishes that the terms used in the act are defined as the
terms used in the appellate rules established in the Rules of
Court.
6)Makes various legislative declarations and findings.
EXISTING LAW:
1)Provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment except an
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interlocutory judgment unless provided otherwise. (Code of
Civil Procedure Section 904.1 (a)(1). Unless otherwise
stated, all further statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.)
2)Provides that when a court denies a petition to compel
arbitration, the aggrieved party has the right to immediately
appeal the order denying the petition. (Section 1294.)
3)Provides that when a court grants a petition to compel
arbitration, the aggrieved party does not have the right to
immediately appeal the order granting the petition. (Ibid.)
4)Provides that an aggrieved party may appeal from the
following:
a) An order dismissing or denying a petition to compel
arbitration.
b) An order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or
vacate an award.
c) An order vacating an award unless a rehearing in
arbitration is ordered.
d) A judgment entered pursuant to this title.
e) A special order after final judgment. (Ibid.)
5)Provides that a party seeking review of an order either
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denying or granting a petition to compel arbitration may file
a writ of mandate with the court of appeal. (Section 1085.)
6)Establishes the California Arbitration Act which provides that
agreements to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. (Section 1280 et seq.)
7)Similarly establishes the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) which
provides that agreements to arbitrate shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, except such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (9
U.S.C. Section 1 et seq.)
8)Provides on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement
alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a
controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such
controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that
an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it
determines that:
a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the
petitioner;
b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or
c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to
a pending court action or special proceeding with a third
party, arising out of the same transaction or series of
related transactions and there is a possibility of
conflicting rulings on common issue of law or fact.
(Section 1281.2.)
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9)Provides that specified civil parties may petition a court to
grant a trial preference, which upon granting, requires the
court to set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from
that date from the granting of the motion. (Section 36 et
seq.)
10)Provides that in a hearing and decision in the Court of
Appeal, a party seeking calendar preference must promptly
serve and file a motion for preference in the reviewing court.
"Calendar preference" means an expedited appeal schedule,
which may include expedited briefing and preference in setting
the date of oral argument. (Rule of Court 8.240.)
11)Establishes the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act (EADACPA), which provides civil protections and
remedies for victims of elder and dependent adult abuse and
neglect. (Welfare and Institutions Code Section 15600 et
seq.)
12)Provides that in any action for injury against a health care
provider based on professional negligence, the injured
plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
Provides that in no action shall the amount of damages for
noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
(Civil Code Section 3333.2.)
13)Provides that a party seeking calendar preference must
promptly serve and file a motion for preference in the
reviewing court. (California Rules of Court 8.240.)
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FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed
non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: Justice Brennan once said that, "courts are the
central dispute-setting institutions of our society. They are
bound to do equal justice under the law, to rich and poor
alike." It comes as no surprise then that the phrase, "Equal
Justice Under Law," is engraved above the entrance to our
nation's highest court. And so it seems, we put a great deal of
faith in our courts - but would we expect any less? We
anticipate our courts to apply the law in a fair, neutral, and
open manner. We hold judges to high standards, and ask that
they avoid even the appearance of impropriety. We count on our
judiciary to advance the law, issue orders, and render written
opinions. And yet, we acknowledge that our system isn't perfect
and that despite their best efforts, courts sometimes get it
wrong. Acknowledging the imperfection of our justice system is
undoubtedly one reason why it has safeguards. We remember that
decisions of courts are reviewed by appellate courts and indeed,
reviewed by our elected branches. In order to facilitate the
right to appeal, we provide a record of the proceedings, in
criminal matters at least. And so, when our families, friends,
and neighbors are injured, wronged, or have a dispute, we rely
upon that faith that our courts-the institution we trust upon to
promote fairness-will deliver equal justice under the law.
As this Committee is well-aware, arbitration is a form of
alternative dispute resolution held outside of courts where a
third-party (rather than a judge) makes a binding (and rarely
appealable) award. Because most arbitration is created by
entering into a contract (usually a contract that is adhesive or
take-it-or-leave-it), the arbitration agreement will lay-out the
procedures that will be followed during the arbitration hearing.
For example, the terms of the arbitration agreement may
stipulate that the award need not be written or justified
(unlike in court), and that the entire process be kept in secret
(rather than in public view). Arbitrators do not need to be
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lawyers, nor do they need to be trained in the law. Arbitrators
who issue favorable awards to a particular company can be
repeatedly-hired by that same company to serve as the
arbitration-neutral without ever notifying the public about that
award-history. It's easy to predict the calls if you can hire
the umpire.
Last year, the New York Times issued a three-part series titled,
"Beware the Fine Print" - a special report examining how
arbitration clauses buried in contracts deprives Americans of
their fundamental constitutional rights:
Over the last 10 years, thousands of businesses across the
country - from big corporations to storefront shops - have
used arbitration to create an alternate system of justice.
There, rules tend to favor businesses, and judges and juries
have been replaced by arbitrators who commonly consider the
companies their clients. The change has been swift and
virtually unnoticed, even though it has meant that tens of
millions of Americans have lost a fundamental right: their day
in court. (Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, In Arbitration, a
Privatization of the Justice System, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1,
2015).)
In fact, some legal scholars have stated that, arbitration
"amounts to the whole-scale privatization of the justice
system." (Ibid.) In an effort to protect consumers and
workers, this Legislature has worked on legislation aimed at
leveling the playing field, a turf that has been used by
corporate interests to evade public scrutiny, and even, avoid
the law. This is because arbitrators do not need to be trained
in the law, or even apply the law, or render a decision
consistent with the evidence presented to them. What evidence
is presented may, in fact, be incomplete because parties in
arbitration have no legal right to obtain evidence in support of
their claims or defenses, or the claims or defenses of the other
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party, contrary to the longstanding discovery practice in public
courts. Advocates continue to debate about the benefits and
harms of mandatory arbitration. Proponents of arbitration say
that arbitration produces quicker results and reduces litigation
costs. Opponents argue that arbitration harms consumers and
workers because arbitration proceedings render unfair awards.
A brief review of recent court decisions on arbitration. Given
the preemptive issues surrounding the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA,
the ability to legislate around the issue of arbitration is
difficult. In 2005, the California Supreme Court held that in
certain adhesive take-it-or-leave-it consumer contracts, a
contractual provision requiring the consumer to waive
class-action is unconscionable and void. This is known as the
Discovery Bank rule (herein the Rule). (36 Cal. 4th 148, 159.)
In the well-known Concepcion decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the Rule. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011)
563 U.S. 333, 344-47.) In that case, Vincent and Liza
Concepcion entered into a cellphone contract that required
claims to be brought in an "individual capacity, and not as a
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding." (Id. at 336.) Relying on Discovery
Bank, the Concepcions challenged the class-action waiver as an
unconscionable contract provision. (Id. at 338.) In abrogating
the Rule, the Court held that the Rule stood "as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" because it "interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration." (Id. at 344-47.) Although the
Supreme Court has not defined a "fundamental attribute of
arbitration," the Court did say that there were potential
advantages of arbitration: lower costs, greater efficiency and
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes. (Id. at 348.) Indeed, the Court
analogized to several examples on the kinds of rules or laws
that would amount to "interference" with the "fundamental
attribute of arbitration." For example, a rule to require
arbitration agreements and proceedings to provide
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judicially-monitored discovery, or to follow the Federal Rules
of Evidence would clearly violate the FAA. (Id. at 342.) In
those instances, those additional protections and
procedures-admirable as they are-would increase costs, reduce
efficiency and speed, and prevent an arbitrator from applying
the rules he or she wants to apply; accordingly, states and
courts are limited in crafting certain rules.
Despite what some may say, California may regulate issues that
affect arbitration. Relying on these principles in Concepcion,
some argue that anything that interferes with arbitration is
preempted by the FAA, as interpreted under Concepcion; however,
this argument is mistaken. Federal law does not preempt states
from enacting basic protections around the principles of
contract law. While federal preemption is broad, states are
permitted to set rules that are consistent with certain contract
law principles. Additionally, states may establish specific
arbitration rules in their states. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit?[Where] parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those
rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA." (Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479.) Accordingly, states can enact
legislation that affects arbitration without offending the FAA.
How do courts settle a dispute over whether there is a valid
arbitration clause? When there is a disagreement between
parties about whether the parties agreed to arbitration, a court
resolves the dispute by examining whether there was an agreement
by applying contract law principles. Because the resolution of
that question does not resolve the merits of the case-in-chief,
the court's decision is issued through an interlocutory order.
This is significant because there is generally no right to
appeal interlocutory orders, which are often issued throughout a
case. Generally, the right to appeal attaches upon a final
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judgment. According to one California court, there are sound
reasons for the final judgment rule:
Interlocutory appeals burden the courts and impede the
judicial process in a number of ways: (1) They tend to clog
the appellate courts with a multiplicity of appeals; (2) Early
resort to the appellate courts tends to produce uncertainty
and delay in the trial court; (3) Until a final judgment is
rendered the trial court may completely obviate an appeal by
altering the rulings from which an appeal would otherwise have
been taken; (4) Later actions by the trial court may provide
a more complete record which dispels the appearance of error
or establishes that it was harmless; (5) Having the benefit of
a complete adjudication will assist the reviewing court to
remedy error (if any) by giving specific directions rather
than remanding for another round of open-ended proceedings.
(Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 434, 442-444 [citations omitted].)
Current statute creates a one-sided interlocutory appellate
right. Despite the general rule requiring finality prior to
appeal, current law creates a one-sided interlocutory appeal in
the arbitration context. Currently, parties can appeal an
interlocutory order denying (a petition to compel) arbitration,
but parties may not appeal an interlocutory order compelling
arbitration. In other words, if a court orders the parties to
go to arbitration, the parties cannot appeal that decision; if a
court denies arbitration and orders the parties go to trial, the
injured parties can appeal. Indeed, in an attempt to equalize
the appellate rights for all parties contesting the validity of
an arbitration clause, this Committee previous considered AB
1062 (Dickinson, 2001), which would have eliminated the
interlocutory appeal for arbitration orders altogether.
Although this Committee passed AB 1062 (Dickinson) out of the
Committee, the bill was held on the Assembly Floor.
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Author's statement: In explaining the need for this bill, as
proposed to be amended, the author writes:
When there is an allegation of elder abuse in a nursing home
and the elder abuse victim is granted a speedy trial
preference, it is routine for the defendant nursing home to
file a motion to enforce arbitration as a way to avoid jury
trial or to stall litigation proceedings. This is because the
nursing facility drafts the arbitration provisions and coerces
the victim into signing the arbitration clause during
enrollment.
If the trial court finds that the agreement's terms are
unconscionable and unreasonably one-sided, it may deny the
defendant's motion to compel arbitration, allowing the elder
to proceed to a jury trial in regular court. Under current
law, a nursing care facility - who has lost in court - will
delay an elder's speedy trial by filing an unnecessary appeal.
This appeal causes a delay in the matter for another 1-3
years. The delay caused by the appeal is done in the hope
that the elder will not survive long enough for the appeal to
be decided, thereby reducing the defendant's liability if the
victim dies before trial.
SB 1065 helps seniors get a more timely trial in Elder Abuse
Act claims by maintaining current appellate rights, but
expediting the time frame that the appeal must be heard. This
bill will help victims of elder abuse who are old and dying
and who need a speedy resolution of the elder abuse case.
Victims should be able to proceed to the speedy hearing that
was originally ordered by the court, but under current law,
they cannot. SB 1065 fixes that injustice by establishing an
expedited appeal process for this narrow yet very deserving
class of elder abuse victims.
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Summary of the bill as proposed to be amended: The bill, as
proposed to be amended, will provide an expedited appeal process
for reviewing an order dismissing or denying a petition to
compel arbitration in matters where the plaintiff has filed a
claim under the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act,
and the plaintiff has been granted a trial preference because of
poor or failing health.
Examples of violations under the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act. The Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection
Act (EADACPA) was enacted to protect elder and dependent adults
from abuse and exploitation. EADACPA recognizes that elders and
dependent adults may have disabilities and cognitive
impairments, such as Alzheimer's disease and other dementia
disorders, which often leave elders incapable of seeking help
and protection from others. These elders and dependent adults
suffer from physical impairments and poor health, which places
them in a dependent and vulnerable position. In enacting
EADACPA, the Legislature found that criminal cases of elder and
dependent adult abuse are seldom prosecuted, and that civil
cases brought in connection with this abuse face problems of
proof, court delays, and the lack of incentives to litigate
these suits. EADACPA was enacted to expand and enhance the
remedies available to elders, their families, and their
advocates to encourage the civil prosecution of elder abuse
cases. For example, under EADACPA, a defendant who is found
liable for physical elder abuse may also be liable for damages
for pain, suffering, and disfigurement. If a defendant is found
liable for elder abuse and engaged in recklessness, oppression,
fraud, or malice in the commission of the abuse, EADACPA
mandates attorney's fees and costs. But if the elder passes
away before the claim is resolved, the elder obviously cannot
obtain any of these EADACPA damages. Nor can the deceased
elder's surviving family members.
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Certain parties may obtain a trial preference. In civil
litigation, shortly after the parties have filed their
pleadings, the court holds an initial case management conference
to schedule the timeline for the litigation, which includes
setting a trial date. Because the trial date largely controls
the pace of the litigation proceedings, some parties seek to
have expedited proceedings by obtaining a trial preference.
Generally, a court will grant a trial preference if the trial
preference serves the interests of justice. Existing law also
specifically authorizes a court to grant a trial preference in
certain instances and requires trial preference in other
instances. The purpose behind trial preference for elders is to
acknowledge that older litigants should have the right to go to
trial, and obtain a full measure of damages during the
litigant's lifetime. (Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 81.) For parties over seventy, the court must grant
a trial preference if the court finds that the health of the
party makes it necessary for the court to grant a trial
preference. Another instance of when the court may grant a
trial preference is when there is clear and convincing medical
documentation that one of the parties suffers from an illness or
condition that raises substantial medical doubt about the
survival of that party beyond six months. If a party obtains a
trial preference, the court must set that matter for trial
within six months, which may be postponed (or continued) for a
date no later than six months. Essentially, a party granted a
trial preference is expected to have their dispute resolved in
six months to one year.
It is not unprecedented to provide parties before the Courts of
Appeal with an expedited appeal. Under California Rules of
Court, a party seeking an expedited appeal schedule may serve
and file a motion for preference in a reviewing court. (Rules
of Court 8.240.) Generally, an expedited appeal includes
expedited briefing and preference in setting the date of oral
argument. Parties who are granted a trial preference - such as
parties over the age of seventy and who are in poor health - may
obtain an expedited appeal. Additionally, in 2011, the
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Legislature enacted AB 900 (Buchanan, Chap. 354, Stats. of
2011), which requires Courts of Appeal to issue a decision in
specified cases under the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) within 175 days of the filing of the petition.
According to the author, existing Rules of Court relating to
expedite appellate review are inadequate to ensure that victims
of elder abuse have their day in court. According to the author
and sponsors, an expedited appeal under current Rules of Court
can still take up to over a year. Given the concern that many
victims of elder abuse who have been granted a trial preference
because of poor health may not survive longer than 6 months, the
current Rules of Court does not provide adequate relief to those
victims. Thus, it would seem that legislation is necessary and
appropriate to shorten the timelines for resolving an appeal in
limited elder abuse cases.
Given that most cases are pending in a court of appeal for more
than 800 days - a little over two years--Judicial Council staff
has raised several legitimate concerns about a requirement to
resolve appeals in a fraction of that time. According to the
Judicial Council, the statewide average to process a civil
appeal is 498 days - nearly one year and a half - while the
statewide average to process a civil appeal of 90% of cases is
807 days - a little over two years. As proposed to be amended,
this bill would require an appellate case-reviewing an
interlocutory order denying a petition to compel arbitration in
EADACPA claims where the elder has been granted a trial
preference-to be completed in as few as 100 days, unless parties
stipulate to specified extensions. Given the short timeframe
under this bill, Judicial Council staff has raised significant
concerns about whether the requirements of this bill would be
workable - especially considering the court's existing
resources. Judicial Council staff point out that when the
Legislature has previously considered measures to expedite
judicial review, some of those bills included a 175 day timeline
(e.g., AB 900 (Buchanan, Chap. 354, Stats. of 2011)), which has
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been difficult for the court to implement. Additionally,
Judicial Council staff asserts that even if the timeline under
this bill were workable, statutory timelines are disfavored and
that a better approach would be to address this issue through a
Rule of Court.
In response to the arguments raised by the Judicial Council, the
author asserts the following:
This proposal is not intended to add extra burdens to the
appellate courts as very few people will qualify for the
expedited appeal. First, most elder abuse victims die and the
bill covers only live victims. Second, for those live
victims, in order to qualify for the expedited process, the
victim must prove to the court she qualifies for a trial court
preference, meaning she is over 70 and in ill health.
Although there are no state statistics on the number of elder
abuse plaintiffs, we believe a very small number (under 20)
would qualify and therefore the impact on the appellate courts
should be very small. Third, it is within the purview of the
legislature to set timeframes and deadlines for the court.
Fourth, it is important that when the Legislature has enacted
specific laws to assist a vulnerable population (in this case
elder abuse victims) that it also ensures that the laws are
adjudicated in a timely manner.
Although the Judicial Council raises legitimate concerns, this
bill would significantly help a very small number of very
vulnerable plaintiffs. The Committee staff acknowledges that
the role of our appellate courts is to render decisions
thoughtfully and methodically, and to serve as a backstop for
trial error. It would seem that forcing a Court of Appeal to
issue a decision quickly would potentially jeopardize these
principles by rushing judgment and potentially harming all
parties involved. However, given the limited number of
plaintiffs who would benefit from this procedure and the
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desperation of their circumstances, it seems that the burden on
the court and the risk of harm would be limited and justified.
Additionally, the Legislature has enacted a number of measures
aimed at ensuring that victims of elder abuse have their day in
court - a policy that is promoted by this bill. With that said,
the author is encouraged to continue working with the Judicial
Council to resolve the Council's concerns about this bill should
the bill move forward. Given that the ultimate goal is to allow
elder abuse victim plaintiffs to have their day in court by
reducing the appellate timeframe in limited cases without
disrupting the calendars of Courts of Appeal, the author may
wish to consider amendments that require the Judicial Council to
promulgate a Rule of Court consistent with the timeframe
provided under this bill, rather than specifying an exact timing
schedule.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support (of the bill in print)
California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (co-sponsor)
California Alliance for Retired Americans (co-sponsor)
Congress of California Seniors (co-sponsor)
Consumer Attorneys of California (co-sponsor)
SEIU California
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Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by:Eric Dang / JUD. / (916)
319-2334