BILL ANALYSIS Ó
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Ricardo Lara, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular Session
SB 1295 (Nielsen) - Mentally ill prisoners
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|Version: April 26, 2016 |Policy Vote: PUB. S. 7 - 0 |
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|Urgency: No |Mandate: No |
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|Hearing Date: May 9, 2016 |Consultant: Jolie Onodera |
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This bill meets the criteria for referral to the Suspense File.
Bill
Summary: SB 1295 would authorize the use of certain documentary
evidence for purposes of meeting the criteria used to evaluate
whether a prisoner released on parole is required to be treated
by the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) as a mentally
disordered offender (MDO).
Fiscal
Impact:
MDO population : Likely minor impact on the number of MDOs
determined to require treatment as a result of the
admissibility of documentary evidence to prove the facts of an
inmate's allegedly violent commitment offense. However, the
impact of even one additional parolee determined to require
DSH treatment is estimated to cost over $200,000 (General
Fund) annually.
MDO hearings : Potential future trial court cost savings
(General Fund*) to the extent the admissibility of documentary
evidence reduces the amount of time spent in trial, including
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the number and complexity of appeals to decide evidentiary
issues.
Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) : Minor, if any, impact
(General Fund) to the BPH and its existing MDO process.
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background: Existing law requires as a condition of parole, a prisoner who
meets the following criteria to be treated by the DSH with the
necessary treatment:
(1) The prisoner has a severe mental disorder, as defined,
that is not in remission, as defined, or cannot be kept in
remission without treatment;
(2) The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or
was an aggravating factor in the commission of a crime, as
specified, for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison;
(3) The prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental
disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the
prisoner's parole or release;
(4) Prior to release on parole, the person in charge of
treating the prisoner and a practicing psychiatrist or
psychologist from the DSH or a chief psychiatrist of CDCR
have evaluated the prisoner at a CDCR facility or state
hospital and a chief psychiatrist of CDCR has certified to
BPH that the prisoner meets the above criteria and that by
reason of his or her severe mental disorder the prisoner
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others;
and,
(5) The prisoner received a determinate sentence for the
offense, and the offense must be one of a specified list of
enumerated crimes. If not an enumerated offense, a crime in
which the prisoner used force or violence, or caused
serious bodily injury, as defined, or a crime in which the
perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened another with
the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial
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physical harm, as specified. (Penal Code § 2962.)
Existing law allows a prisoner to challenge the MDO
determination both administratively (via BPH) and judicially
(via a superior court trial). Additionally, the district
attorney is authorized to file a petition in superior court
seeking a one-year extension of the MDO commitment, as
specified.
The California Supreme Court resolved the issue of the
admissibility of hearsay evidence to prove the facts of an
inmate's allegedly violent commitment offense, which had
resulted in conflicting opinions issued at the appellate level.
In People v. Stevens (2015) 64 Cal.4th 325, the Supreme Court
found that hearsay (a statement made out of court to prove a
fact in a trial or hearing) is not admissible to prove the facts
of a conviction.
The Court agreed that an expert psychiatrist or psychologist may
use hearsay in forming and stating an opinion as to whether a
defendant's mental disorder was one of the causes or an
aggravating factor in the commission of the underlying offense.
However, the Court stated that proof of a qualifying conviction
under the MDO Act is based on facts rather than on a defendant's
psychological condition, and thus does not call for a mental
health expert's opinion testimony. The Court ruled as follows:
We conclude that in a commitment hearing under the
MDO Act, the People may not prove the facts
underlying the commitment offense (that are
necessary to establish the qualifying offense)
through a mental health expert's opinion
testimony. We note that the Legislature is free to
create exceptions to the rules of evidence as it
has done in the SVP context. We therefore reverse
the Court of Appeal judgment, and remand the
matter for proceedings consistent with our
conclusion. (Stevens, at p. 338.)
This bill seeks to create the hearsay exception to which the
Stevens court referred. Accordingly, the provisions of this
measure are drawn from the existing relevant provisions of SVP
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law so referenced.
Proposed Law:
This bill would allow evidence of the qualifying violent nature
of an alleged MDO's crime of commitment to prison to include
"documentary evidence."
This bill provides that documentary evidence to establish the
qualifying violent nature of the inmate's offense or offenses
includes, but is not limited to, preliminary hearing and trial
transcripts, probation and sentencing reports, and DSH
evaluations.
This bill provides that the introduction into evidence of a
certified copy of the chief psychiatrist's certification
prepared for the BPH creates a rebuttable presumption that the
requirement that the prisoner has been in treatment for the
severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior
to the prisoner's parole or release has been provided.
Prior
Legislation: SB 279 (Dunn) Chapter 16/1999 responded to the
California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Anzalone,
(1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1074, which limited the definition of MDO by
excluding crimes involving "implied force." The Supreme Court
concluded that a bank robbery involving no actual force or
violence did not qualify as a crime of "force or violence"
within the meaning of PC § 2962(e)(2)(P). This bill expanded the
definition of MDO compelled to remain in custody for treatment
to include crimes that involved the implied use of force likely
to produce substantial physical harm.
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