BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                    John L. Burton, Chairman 
                    1997-98 Regular Session

SB 911                                                 S
Senator Knight                                    B
As Introduced
Hearing Date:  April 22, 1997                          9
Family Code                                            1
JMR:cjt                                           1

                     Same-sex marriages


This bill would declare the strong public policy of this  
state that only a marriage contracted between one man and  
one woman outside this state which is valid in that  
jurisdiction, is invalid in this state, and that any other  
union or relationship treated as a marriage by another  
jurisdiction, involving members of the same sex, is  
contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be  
void ab initio.


In May 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that making a  
person's ability to marry depend on the sex of the proposed  
spouse is sex discrimination under the Hawaii Constitution.  
 The Supreme Court remanded the case for a trial on the  
issue of whether the State has a compelling reason to  
continue discrimination.

Last December, the trial court ruled that the Hawaii law  
which bans same-sex marriages violated the equal protection  
clause of the Hawaii constitution, finding that the state  
had failed to prove a "compelling state interest"  
sufficient to allow the state to continue to issue marriage  
licenses only to opposite-sex couples.  The state has  
appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court, so there is likely to  
be a final decision later this year or early next year.  


                   CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
Existing law provides that a marriage contracted outside  
this state that would be valid by the laws of the  
jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted, is valid  
in this state.
This bill would provide that any marriage contracted  
outside this state between individuals of the same sex is  
not valid in this state. 
1.   Author's purpose  :  The author has stated that the  
purpose of this bill is "to defend California's definition  
of civil marriage from being undermined when Hawaii  
legalizes same-sex marriages and same-sex couples return to  
demand recognition in California of their Hawaii marriage."

2.   Does this bill violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause  
of the United States Constitution  ? 
Section 1, of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides,  
in part: 
     "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to  
     the public acts, records, and judicial  proceedings of  
     every other state.  And the Congress may by general  
     laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records  
     and proceedings shall  be proved and the effect  
In addition, Congress enacted Section 1738 of Title 28 of  
the U.S. Code, which provides, in part, as follows: 
     "Such acts, records, and judicial proceedings ...   
     shall have the same full faith and credit in every  
     court within the United States ... as they have by law  
     or usage in the courts of such state ... from which  
     they were taken." 
There is an exception to full faith and credit where the  
judicial proceedings of a sister state involve a lack of  
jurisdiction (  Adam v. Saenger   (1938) 82 L.Ed. 649, reh.  
den.; cert. den. 83 L. Ed. 1511), are not final (  Hendrix v.  
Hendrix  (Conn. 1970) 273 A.2d 890), involve the enforcement  
of  a sister state's penal law (  Huntington v. Attrill   


(1892) 146 U.S. 657), or where the enforcement of the  
judicial proceedings would deny to a party or parties due  
process of law ( Hanson v. Deckla  (1958) 2 L.Ed.2d 1283,  
reh. den., 3 L.Ed.2d 92). 
The courts are generally in accord that the "full faith and  
credit" clause of the United States Constitution and the  
implementing federal statute require that each state give  
to the judicial proceedings the same force and effect as  
such proceedings would have in the rendering state.   
(  Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt (1943) 88 L.Ed. 149,  
154-155, reh. den. 88 L.Ed. 1088;  Nowell v. Nowell  (Conn.  
1969) 254 A.2d 889, 893 cert. den. 24 L.Ed.2d 94.) 

The Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether  
marriages must be accorded Article IV, Section 1 respect,  
but state courts and lower federal courts often have, even  
in instances where the marriages would not be recognized  
under the laws of the forum state.  (See  Parish v.  
Minvielle  (LA 1969) 217 So.2d 684, 688, Louisiana does not  
recognize or permit common-law marriages but must give  
effect to them when validly contracted in Texas;  Guidry v.  
Mezeal  (LA 1986) 487 So.2d 780, 781;  Commonwealth ex rel.  
Alexander v. Alexander  (PA 1971) 289 A.2d 83, 86;  Orsburn  
v. Graves  (AK 1948) 210 S.W.2d 496.)

a.   Federal "Defense of Marriage Act"  

On September 21, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed HR  
3396 into law.  (Public Law 104-199; 110 Statute 2419.)   
The effect of the "Defense of Marriage Act" was two-fold:

to prohibit the legal recognition of same-sex marriages for  
  any purpose under federal law, and
to allow each state to pass laws declining to give "effect"  
  to any same-sex relationship treated as a marriage under  
  the laws of another jurisdiction.

The federal legislation has been widely debated as to its  
constitutionality.  Some scholars believe the legislation  
exceeds the federal government's authority and intervenes  
into matters legitimately within the power of the states,  
such as divorce and probate.  Other legal commentators  
argue that the legislation runs afoul of the constitution  
by allowing states to be relieved of their general  
obligation to recognize other states' laws under the Full  


Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.   
Interestingly, even the U.S. House Report from the  
Judiciary Committee, which asserted that it believes that  
states currently possess the ability to avoid recognizing a  
same-sex marriage license from another state, recognized  
"that that conclusion is far from certain."   (House Report  
No. 104-664, July 9, 1996, p. 9.)  Still, others believe  
that the constitutional history and case precedent  
overwhelmingly confirm that a state can refuse to recognize  
a same-sex marriage when the state has a strong public  
policy against same-sex marriage.  One thing seems certain,  
the passage of HR 3396 has not resolved the  
constitutionality of a state's refusal to recognize a  
same-sex marriage of another state.
b.   "Conflicts of law" as a competing analysis  

While it has been held that considerations of local law and  
policy do not diminish the requirement of enforcing sister  
state judgments (  Fauntleroy v. Lum  (1908) 52 L.Ed. 1039;  
  Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World  (1920) 64 L.Ed. 638),  
the courts have appeared to follow a less stringent  
approach regarding the enforcement of sister state statutes  
and laws, recognizing that the laws of one state need not,  
in all cases, be subordinated to the laws of a sister  
state.  (See  Hughes v. Fetter  (1951) 95 L.Ed. 1212, 1216  ;  
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express Inc  . (1941) 86 L.Ed. 152,  
158, reh. den., 86 L.Ed. 570  ; Alaska Packers Assoc. v.  
Industrial Acci. Com  . (1935) 79 L.Ed. 1044, 1052.)
This dichotomy appears to have resulted not from any  
inherent superiority of judgments over statutes and other  
laws, but rather because of a tendency of cases to combine  
the requirement of "full faith and credit" with the  
doctrine of comity; the former requiring enforcement, the  
latter permitting enforcement.  (See  Rich v. Con-Stan  
Industries  (Tex. 1969) 449 S.W.2d 323, 327.) 
The United States Supreme Court in  Pink v. A.A.A. Highway  
Express Inc  . (1941) 86 L.Ed. 152, 158, stated: 
     "Every State has authority under the Constitution to  
     establish laws through both its judicial and its  
     legislative arms, which are controlling upon its  
     inhabitants and domestic affairs.  When it is demanded  
     in the domestic forum that the operation of those laws  


     be supplanted by the statute of  another state, that  
     forum is not bound, apart  from the full faith and  
     credit clause, to yield to the demand, and the law of  
     neither can, by its own force, determine  the choice of  
     law  for the other... 
     "...But the full faith and credit clause is not an  
     inexorable and unqualified command.  It leaves some  
     scope for state control within its borders of affairs  
     which are peculiarly its own.  This court has often  
     recognized that, consistent with the appropriate  
     application of the full faith and credit clause, there  
     are limits to the extent to which the laws and policy  
     of one state may be subordinated to those of  
     "It was the purpose of that provision to preserve  
     rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and  
     judicial proceedings of one state by recognition of  
     their validity in others.  But the very nature of the  
     federal union of states, to each of which is reserved  
     the sovereign right to make its own laws, precludes  
     resort to the Constitution as the means for compelling  
     one state wholly to subordinate its own laws and  
     policy concerning its particularly domestic affairs to  
     the laws and policy of others.  When  such conflict of  
     interest arises it is for this Court to resolve it by  
     determining how far the full faith and credit clause  
     demands the qualification or denial of rights asserted  
     under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the  
     public acts and judicial proceedings of another..."   
     (Citations omitted, emphasis added.) 
Thus, while it is clear from the above, that there may be  
exceptions to the application of the full faith and credit  
clause, it is not clear precisely what the parameters of  
such exceptions may be, and the U.S. Supreme Court seems  
content to provide for the exceptions on a case-by-case  

Proponents resisting recognition of same-sex marriages rely  
on this equivocal area of exceptions to argue that the Full  
Faith and Credit Clause does not  require  the state to treat  
such marriages as an act, proceeding, or record to which  
they must give effect, but rather  allows  the state to  
invoke its own marriage laws as applicable.


Opponents argue that the argument is misplaced, and assert  
that what is at issue is not whose  law  should govern, but  
rather what respect must be accorded a  res  , a marital  
status, that the couples would possess and embody.   
Opponents argue that the proper conflicts of law analysis  
is that when state acts, records, or judicial proceedings  
have been applied to the facts of a particular case to  
determine the rights, obligations, or status of specific  
parties, the other states must give those acts, records, or  
proceedings the same effect they would have at home.  The  
status has been created, the judgment rendered, the record  
recorded, and rights established - no question of what  
legal regime may be invoked is appropriate.  However, when  
asked to recognize an unfulfilled or general right based on  
another state's statute or case law, states may weigh the  
competing interest before deciding which rule of law to  

This distinction seems consistent with California  
decisions.   In Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri  ,15  
Cal.App.4th 1821, the defendant had exchanged checks and  
memoranda of indebtedness for gambling chips at a Nevada  
casino and thereafter lost the chips playing baccarat.  The  
defendant stopped payment of the checks and memoranda, and  
the assignee of the casino brought an action in California  
to collect on the credit instruments.  The appellate court  
affirmed the trial court's judgment for the defendant,  
ruling that the enforcement of gambling debts is against  
public policy in California.  The court explained the  
principles of the full faith and credit clause as applied  
to foreign judgments and cause of action, as follows:

     "A forum state must give full faith and credit to a  
     sister state judgment, regardless of the forum state's  
     public policy on the underlying claim....  However,  
     the forum state may refuse to entertain a lawsuit on a  
     sister state cause of action if its enforcement is  
     contrary to the strong public policy of the forum  

c.   Common law and California statute
The California cases involving the recognition of marriages  
contracted in other states have not relied on the full  
faith and credit clause.  In  Colbert v. Colbert  (1946) 28  


Cal.2d 276, 280, the court relied on the proposition that  
ordinarily the law of the place of marriage controls the  
question of its validity, as well as relying on Civil Code  
Section 63 (now Family Code Section 308), in ruling that  
California recognizes common law marriages validly  
contracted in a sister state. 

The Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second) elaborates on  
the practice of recognizing marriages performed in other  
states.  The Restatement states a presumptive rule that the  
lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place of marriage)  
governs, unless upholding the marriage would violate the  
"strong public policy" of another state that had the most  
significant relationship to the couple.  (Restatement  
(Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 283 (1971); see also   
McDonald v. McDonald  (1936) 6 Cal.2d 457, 459-460;  Pearson  
v. Pearson  (1873)  51 Cal. 120, 125;  Estate of Bir  (1948)  
83 Cal.App.2d 256, 261;  Barrons v. United States  (9th Cir.  
1951) 191 F.2d 92, 95.)

The California Supreme Court, in  Norman v. Thomson  (1898)   
121 Cal. 620, at 624, cited with approval the following  
rule set forth in  Commonwealth v. Lane  113 Mass. 458, as  
     "'A marriage which is prohibited here by statute,  
     because contrary to the policy of our laws, is yet  
     valid if celebrated elsewhere according to the law of  
     the place, even if the parties are citizens and  
     residents of this commonwealth, and have gone abroad  
     for the purpose of evading our laws, unless the  
     legislature has clearly enacted that such marriages  
     out of the state shall have no validity  here.'" 
  Norman  notwithstanding, California courts have upheld  
certain marriages which were contrary to the public policy  
of the laws of California, when validly contracted in other  
jurisdictions.  For example, interracial marriages at a  
time interracial marriages were invalid in California  
(  People v. Godines  (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 721,723); a  
marriage which would be deemed bigamous under California  
law because of a law prohibiting marriage within a year  
after a divorce, where the marriage was validly contracted  
in Nevada (  Estate of Wood  137 Cal. 129.); a valid Nevada  
marriage of underage persons who went to that state for the  
purpose of evading the laws of California requiring the  


consent of a parent or guardian (  McDonald v. McDonald   
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 457, 459-460); and where a proxy marriage  
validly contracted in Nevada that would not otherwise be  
valid in California was upheld as valid (  Barrons v. United  
States  (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F.2d 92, 95-96). 

Thus, the issue is whether the public policy of the state  
which would be offended by the statute is sufficiently  
strong to be deemed an exception to the general rule of  
recognizing marriages performed in other states.  As  
discussed above, California has followed a long-standing  
policy of validating marriages valid in other forums, even  
where they would be invalid under California law.  Last  
year, during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on this  
same subject, Professor Sullivan of Standard University Law  
School facility, surmised that the state's refusal to  
recognize same-sex marriages when it has recognized all  
other out-of-state marriages, including those which may be  
contrary to California policy, would be constitutionally  

2.   SB 911, on its face and as applied, would discriminate  
based on sexual orientation and gender in the exercise of  
marriage, thereby implicating the equal protection clause  

a.   Classification based on sexual orientation  
Last year the United States Supreme Court decided  Romer v.  
Evans  (1996) U.S. Lexis 3245.  The basic facts of Romer,  
taken from the Supreme Court decision, are as follows: 
     After various Colorado municipalities passed  
     ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual  
     orientation in housing, employment, education, public  
     commendations, health and welfare services, and other  
     transactions and activities, Colorado voters adopted a  
     statewide referendum "Amendment 2" to the State  
     Constitution, which precluded all  legislative,  
     executive, or judicial action at any level of state or  
     local government designed to protect the status of  
     persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or  
     bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or  
     Respondents, who included aggrieved homosexuals and  
     municipalities, commenced suit in state court against  


     the state (Roy Romer is sued in his capacity as the  
     Governor of Colorado) to declare Amendment 2 invalid. 
     The trial court granted a preliminary injunction which  
     was sustained by the Colorado Supreme Court, which  
     held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny  
     under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth  
     Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right  
     of gays and lesbians to participate in the political  
     On remand, the trial court found that the Amendment  
     failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and so, enjoined its  
     enforcement.  The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that  
     decision, in its second opinion on the case. 
In  Romer  , the Court concluded that:

     "..Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a  
     proper legislative end but to make them unequal to  
     everyone else.  This Colorado cannot do.  A State  
     cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its  
     laws.  Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection  
     Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of  
     Colorado is affirmed."
The Court noted that it did not rely on its own  
interpretation of the amendment, but on the authoritative  
construction of the Colorado Supreme Court.  "The state  
court, deeming it unnecessary to determine the full extent  
of the amendment's reach, found it invalid even on a modest  
reading of its implications."  (  Id  . at p. 5.)  The Court  
also chose not to decide whether Amendment 2 denied  
homosexuals the protections of generally applicable  
anti-discrimination laws, because it found that even if it  
did not have such an effect, the imposition of a special  
disability on homosexuals alone, forbidding them, and no  
others, from seeking the safeguards that others enjoy or  
may seek without constraint was impermissible.  (  Id  . at p.  
The Court noted that when making an equal protection  
evaluation, "we insist on knowing the relation between the  
classification adopted and the object to be attained.  The  
search for the link between classification and objective  
gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause."  (  Id  . at  


p. 7.) 
The Court noted further that "the law will be sustained if  
it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest,  
even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage  
of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems  
tenuous.  The court also notes that by requiring a  
classification bear a rational relationship to an  
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that  
the classifications are not drawn for the purpose of  
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."  (  Id  . at p.  
  Romer  may stand for the proposition that the U.S. Supreme  
Court will seriously scrutinize any statute that clearly  
disfavors homosexuals.  The majority opinion struck down  
the statute because there was no legitimate government  
purpose.  Throughout the years, the Supreme Court in  
applying a rational basis review has rarely invalidated a  
statute based on a illegitimate governmental purpose.   
Usually, the court gives a great deal of deference to  
government's stated purpose without inquiring into its  

An issue raised by legal commentators is whether  Romer  
truly applied a rational basis test.  Although  Romer  stated  
it was applying a rational basis analysis, the practical  
result looked more like a heightened scrutiny analysis, in  
which a state is either required to show an important  
governmental interest or a compelling state interest, not  
merely a legitimate state interest.  This would be  
consistent with previous decisions stating that  
classifications based on sex are subject to a standard  
intermediate between rational basis and strict scrutiny.   
(  Craig v. Boren  (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197.) 

In  Romer  , the court clearly did not buy the government's  
rationale for the statute and found the only plausible  
argument to be discrimination.  Conversely, the author of  
SB 911 contends that the bill is to preserve the union of  
marriage for male-female pairings for the purpose of  
procreation and the survival of the race, not to  
discriminate, and thus would satisfy even the  Romer   
standard of a legitimate governmental interest.

It is indisputable that court's have pointed to the  


fundamental right to marry and have linked that right to  
the right of procreation.  (  Skinner v. Oklahoma  (1942) 86  
L.Ed. 1655, 1660.)  However, to imply that procreation is  
the sole or primary purpose behind marriage ignores the  
surplus of legitimate reasons and concerns which guide  
people to marry.

Opponents state that marriage is a critically important  
institution because it is the only vehicle our society has  
for recognizing the existence of primary relationships not  
defined by blood.  They contend that this relationship has  
powerful emotional consequences, and powerful practical  
consequences as well.

Among the more practical consequences of marriage are the  
rights to:
visit a partner or a partner's child in a hospital;
inherit from your partner is she or he does not have a  
  valid will;
obtain joint health, home and auto insurance policies;
enter joint rental agreements;
continue to live in the family home if one partner enters a  
  nursing home through Medicaid;
make medical decisions on a partner's behalf in event of  
take bereavement or sick leave to care for a partner or a  
  partner's child;
choose a final resting place for a deceased partner 
obtain wrongful death benefits for a surviving partner and  
get an equitable division of property in a divorce;
have joint child custody, visitation, adoption and foster  
  care; determine child custody and support in a divorce;
file joint tax returns; obtain veterans' discounts on  
  medical care, education and home loans;
apply for immigrations and residency for partners from  
  other countries; and 
obtain domestic violence protective orders.

Many of these consequences cannot be duplicated by private  
arrangements or contracts.  Even for those problems which  
can be handled by agreements, that solution is only  
available to people with the money and sophistication to  
hire a competent lawyer.

Thus, like Amendment 2, opponents argue that SB 911 is not  


narrowly drawn as to avoid the over-breadth aspect of  Romer   
and negate its application.  Amendment 2 prohibited  
homosexuals from access to all forms of the political and  
law-making process, except for the ability to obtain a new  
constitutional amendment.  The  Romer  Court found that  
Amendment 2 excluded homosexuals  from "an almost limitless  
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute  
ordinary civic life in a free society."  (  Id  ., at 16.)   
Likewise, while on its face, 
SB 911 appears to exclude persons of the same sex only from  
the right to marry, in practice it would prohibit a surplus  
of opportunities afforded married persons.  Thus, it would  
appear that SB 911 would raise the same over-breadth  
concerns that Amendment 2 raised in  Romer  .

b.   Classification based on gender:  application of a  
heightened scrutiny analysis  

In May 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the states  
refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples  
under the Hawaii marriage law implicates the state  
constitution's guarantee of equal protection, and remanded  
the case for a trial on the issue of whether the state has  
a compelling reason to continue discriminating.  (  Baehr v.  
Lewin  (Haw. 1993) 852 P.2d 44, 58.)  The court held that  
making a person's ability to marry depend on the sex of the  
proposed spouse is sex discrimination under the Hawaii  
Constitution, just as laws which made the ability to marry  
depend on the proposed spouse's race were race  
discrimination under the federal constitution.

While the Hawaii court applied the strict scrutiny test to  
the constitutionality of its marriage law based on the  
state's inclusion of "sex" as a suspect class under its  
equal protection clause, the court correctly noted that  
even under the federal constitution a standard intermediate  
between rational basis and strict scrutiny is applied to  
such classifications.  "(C)lassification by gender must  
serve important governmental objectives and must be  
substantially related to achievement of those objectives  
(citations omitted)."  (  Baehr  , at 72.) 

The dissent in  Baehr  attempted to argue that the state  
marriage law did not constitute a classification based on  
sex because the law "treats everyone alike and applies  
equally to both sexes," with the result that neither sex is  


being granted a right or benefit the other does not have.   
(  Id  ., at 96-97.)  This is similar to an argument put forth  
by the author's office with regards to SB 911. 

In rejecting the dissent's contention, the  Baehr  court held  
                                        that this type of argument was expressly considered and  
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court  in  Loving v. Virginia   
(1967) 388 U.S. 1, 8, regarding laws based on race:

     "Thus, the State contends that, because its  
     miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white  
     and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage,  
     these statutes, despite their reliance on racial  
     classifications do not constitute an invidious  
     discrimination based upon race. . . .  (W)e reject the  
     notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute  
     containing racial classifications is enough to remove  
     the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's  
     proscriptions of all invidious discrimination . . . .   
     In the case at bar, . . . we deal with statutes  
     containing racial classifications, and the fact of  
     equal application does not immunize the state from the  
     very heavy burden of justification which the  
     Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of  
     state statutes drawn according to race." 

Thus, it seems likely that the bill would be subjected to a  
heightened scrutiny analysis, and would be upheld only if  
it was found to serve important governmental objectives and  
was substantially related to achievement of those  
objectives.  Based on the arguments above, it appears that  
this will be a difficult hurdle.

3.  Affects the bill would have on the right to interstate  
The right to interstate travel was first recognized by the  
Supreme Court in  Crandall v. Nevada  (1867) 73 U.S. 6, which  
held that the right is a necessary inference from the  
structure of the Constitution and the federal government.   
In other cases, courts have found the right in an explicit  
provision of the Constitution or through prior decisions of  
the court.  (See  Edwards v. California  (1941) 314 U.S. 160,  
176, stating that the Commerce Clause requires recognition  
of the right to interstate travel.)


More recently, the Supreme Court has held that a state  
cannot discriminate against people entering its territory  
by imposing unconstitutional conditions on the right to  
enter.  (  Shapiro v. Thompson  (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 631,  
state may not impose unduly long residence requirements on  
access to state services.)  While the Supreme Court has  
held that a lesser standard applies when restrictions based  
on interstate travel are of a limited duration, opponents  
argue that this is plainly not the case with the refusal to  
recognize a marriage.  (See  Sosna v. Iowa  (1975) 419 U.S.  
393, upholding one-year durational residency requirement  
for divorce because recent travelers not "irretrievably  
foreclosed" from divorce but "merely delayed.")

Opponents argue that these cases provide strong, additional  
support to the arguments that the United States is one  
nation, that the policy of the Constitution is that we  
should be able to move freely, and that making marital  
status depend on which state you are in at the moment seems  
inconsistent with these basic policies.

Support:  California Catholic Conference; Committee on  
Moral Concerns; Capitol 
                 Resource Institute; Choices Ministry; two  

Opposition:  American Civil Liberties Union; Frontiers News  
Magazine; Planned                                            
 Parenthood; Pacific Pride Foundation; ; Life; Unity Pride  
      nine individuals   

Source:  Author

Related Pending Legislation:  

Prior Legislation:
AB 1982 (Knight, 1996), died on the Senate Inactive File.

AB 167 (Burton, 1991) amended what is now Section 300 to  
delete the reference to male and female, thus statutorily  
providing for same-sex marriage.  Held in the Senate  
Judiciary Committee without a vote. 


AB 2810 (Katz, 1994) provided a scheme for the statewide  
registry for domestic partners which specifically allowed  
for the following rights: hospital visitation; 
conservatorship; and inheritance.  Vetoed by the Governor.