BILL NUMBER: SB 31 AMENDED
BILL TEXT
AMENDED IN SENATE JANUARY 19, 1999
INTRODUCED BY Senators Peace, Morrow, Costa, Perata, and
Rainey
(Principal coauthors: Assembly Members Ashburn, Calderon,
and Frusetta)
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Ashburn, Calderon, Frusetta,
Leach, McClintock, Scott, and Soto)
Soto, and Wayne)
DECEMBER 7, 1998
An act to amend Sections 188, 189, and 190.2 of the Penal Code,
and to amend Section 3 of Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998,
relating to murder.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
SB 31, as amended, Peace. Murder: special circumstances.
(1) Existing law defines the term malice, for purposes of murder,
and provides that malice may be express or implied. Under existing
law malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature.
This bill would delete the term deliberate from this definition of
express malice and provide that this definition is declaratory of
existing law.
(2) Existing law, as amended by initiative statute, provides that
any murder that is perpetrated by specified means or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, is murder of
the first degree. The initiative statute provides that any amendment
of its provisions by the Legislature shall require a 2/3 vote of the
membership of each house.
This bill additionally would provide that a murder committed with
the intent to kill that is perpetrated by means of arson or
kidnapping, or a murder perpetrated by a defendant who intentionally
kills a victim who is under 14 years of age at the time of the
murder, and the defendant knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is under 14 years of age, constitutes murder in the first
degree. Because it would amend an initiative statute, the bill would
require a 2/3 vote.
(3) Existing law, as amended by initiative statute, provides that
the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first
degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without
the possibility of parole where one or more special circumstances has
been charged and found to be true.
This bill would include within the enumeration of special
circumstances a murder where the defendant intentionally killed the
victim, who was under 14 years of age, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the victim was under 14 years of
age. The bill would provide that these provisions shall become
effective only when submitted to, and approved by, the voters.
This bill would incorporate additional amendments to Section 190.2
of the Penal Code proposed by Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998,
but not yet approved by the voters, to be operative only if both that
chapter and this bill are approved by the voters. The bill also
would amend Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 to make conforming
changes.
Vote: 2/3. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: no.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. Section 188 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
188. Such malice Malice may be
express or implied. It is express when there is manifested an
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It
is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart.
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional
doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no
other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of
malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite
such that awareness is included within
the definition of malice.
SEC. 2. Section 189 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
189. (a) All murder which is perpetrated by means of a
destructive device or explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under
Section 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any murder which is perpetrated by
means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally
at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death, or any murder which is perpetrated by means of kidnapping or
arson and the kidnapping or arson is done with the intent to kill the
victim or victims of that kidnapping or arson, or any murder
perpetrated by a defendant who intentionally kills a victim who is
under 14 years of age at the time of the murder, and the defendant
knows or reasonably should know that the victim is under 14 years of
age, is murder of the first degree.
(b) All kinds of murders other than those listed in subdivision
(a) are of the second degree.
(c) As used in this section, "destructive device" means any
destructive device as defined in Section 12301, and "explosive" means
any explosive as defined in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety
Code.
(d) To prove the killing was "deliberate and premeditated," it
shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and
meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.
SEC. 3. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code, as amended by Chapter 478
of the Statutes of 1995, is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of
murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section
190.4 to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first
or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense
committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California
would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed
murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area,
dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would
create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect,
an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted
to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act
or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human
beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37,
830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged
in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was
intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace
officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who,
while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties,
was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or
the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was
intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her
official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1,
who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her
duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally
killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed
during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which
he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section
602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a
former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state
prosecutor's office in this or any other state, or of a federal
prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record
in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state,
and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or
to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former
official of the federal government, or of any local or state
government of this or any other state, and the killing was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the
phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity" means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in
wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her
race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in,
or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of,
or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit,
the following felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of
a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section
460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the
administration of poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder
was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another
person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any
vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim, who was under
14 years of age, and knew or reasonably should have known that the
victim was under 14 years of age.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under
subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an
actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to
be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at
the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the
special circumstance in order to suffer be
punished by death or confinement
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to
kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests,
or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree
shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true
under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual
killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in
paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been
found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and
Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 4. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code, as amended by Section 2
of Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998, is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of
murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section
190.4 to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first
or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense
committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California
would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed
murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area,
dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would
create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect,
an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted
to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act
or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human
beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37,
830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged
in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was
intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace
officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who,
while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties,
was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or
the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was
intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her
official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1,
who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her
duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally
killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed
during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which
he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section
602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a
former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state
prosecutor's office in this or any other state, or of a federal
prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record
in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state,
and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or
to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former
official of the federal government, or of any local or state
government of this or any other state, and the killing was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the
phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity" means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of
lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her
race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in,
or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of,
or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit,
the following felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of
a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section
460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in
subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific
intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the
elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special
circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is
committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the
murder.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the
administration of poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder
was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another
person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any
vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim, who was under
14 years of age, and knew or reasonably should have known that the
victim was under 14 years of age.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under
subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an
actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to
be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at
the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the
special circumstance in order to suffer be
punished by death or confinement
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to
kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests,
or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree
shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true
under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual
killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in
paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been
found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and
Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 5. Section 3 of Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 is
amended to read:
Sec. 3. Section 2 of this act affects an initiative statute and
shall become effective, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 8 of SB ____ 31 of the
1999-2000 Regular Session, only when submitted to, and approved by,
the voters of California, pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 10
of Article II of the California Constitution.
SEC. 6. (a) Section 1 of this act is declaratory of existing law.
(b) Section 2 of this act is intended to clarify that a murder
committed with the intent to kill which is perpetrated by means of
arson or kidnapping constitutes murder in the first degree.
SEC. 7. Sections 3 and 4 of this act affect an initiative statute
and shall become effective, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 8, only when submitted to, and approved by, the voters of
California, pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II
of the California Constitution.
SEC. 8. (a) Section 4 of this act incorporates amendments to
Section 190.2 of the Penal Code proposed by both this act and Chapter
629 of the Statutes of 1998. It shall become operative only if (1)
both this act and Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 are submitted
to, and approved by, the voters pursuant to subdivision (c) of
Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution, and (2) this
act and Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 both amend Section 190.2
of the Penal Code.
(b) If this act and Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 are
approved by the voters at the same election, Section 3 of this act
and Section 2 of Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 shall not become
operative.
(c) If Chapter 629 of the Statutes of 1998 is approved by the
voters at an election held before the election at which this act is
submitted to the voters, Section 3 of this act shall not become
operative and shall not be submitted to the voters.