BILL ANALYSIS
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Date of Hearing: July 10, 2007
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Dave Jones, Chair
ACA 2 (Walters) - As Amended: July 5, 2007
SUBJECT : Eminent Domain: broad restrictions on use
KEY ISSUES :
1)Should the eminent domain provisions of the California
Constitution be amended so as to BROADLY prohibit, subject to
certain exceptions, the use of eminent domain for purposes of
economic development, increasing tax revenue, or private use?
2)Should land near closed military installations in San
Bernardino County be exempted from the general prohibitions of
this measure? Are there other communities facing economic
hardships as severe as those in San Bernardino County, which
might justifiably use eminent domain for purposes of
redevelopment?
3)IS THIS MEASURE SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT TO ACA 8, WHICH THE
COMMITTEE APPROVED LAST WEEK, TO MAKE IT INCONSISTENT FOR THE
COMMITTEE TO APPROVE IT AS WELL? IF SO, WHAT ARE THESE
DIFFERENCES?
synopsis
This measure seeks to amend our state constitution so as to
broadly prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, the use of
eminent domain for purposes of economic development, increasing
tax revenue, or private use. In addition, the measure seeks to
require that the "public use" for which property will be taken
must be stated in writing prior to the commencement of eminent
domain proceedings. The measure includes provisions relating to
offers of just compensation and opportunities for the property
owner to repurchase in the event that the property is not used
for the stated public use. Finally, the measure seeks to grant
a special exemption for redeveloping property located near a
closed military base or installation in San Bernardino County.
Supporters contend that this broad constitutional reform is
necessary in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo
decision, which employed a definition of "public use" to uphold
the taking of private property and its transfer to other private
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parties as part of a redevelopment project. This proposed
constitutional amendment seeks to prevent such a taking and,
according to the author and supporters, limit the meaning of
"public use" to instances where the condemned property will be
owned or occupied by the condemning public entity. Opponents
claim that this bill is an unwise over-reaction to the Kelo
decision, and that it fails to take into account
socially-important situations in which it is necessary to use
eminent domain for purposes of economic revitalization. While
opponents agree that carefully crafted and measured changes are
necessary in order to address legitimate concerns about the
potential abuse of the eminent domain, they strongly oppose this
broad approach and instead support what they suggest is the more
thoughtful and more surgical approach contained in ACA 8 (De La
Torre), which passed out of this Committee last week. The
analysis suggests that this measure contains substantial
differences with the approach taken by ACA 8, thereby raising
the question whether passage of this measure would at all be
consistent with the Committee's passage of ACA 8 last week.
SUMMARY : Proposes to place before the voters of California a
constitutional amendment that would prohibit the use of eminent
domain for purposes of economic development, increasing tax
revenue, or private use. Makes other changes relative to offers
of just compensation and a property owner's right to repurchase.
Specifically, this bill :
1)Prohibits the taking of property under eminent domain for
purposes of economic development, increasing tax revenue, or
private use.
2)Provides that the public use for which private property shall
be taken must be stated in writing prior to the commencement
of eminent domain proceedings.
3)Prohibits the taking of private property without the express
written consent of the owner when the same use will be
maintained following the taking.
4)Provides that the property owner's acceptance of money
initially deposited as just compensation shall not prejudice
the owner's right to challenge the amount of just
compensation, or to challenge the taking as being for a
private use.
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5)Permits the taking of private property if necessary to
eliminate a specific, recurring, and ongoing threat to public
safety, provided that the conditions that pose the threat
exist on each parcel taken.
6)Permits the taking of private property under a declared state
of emergency or to abate nuisances such as blight, obscenity,
pornography, or hazardous substances or environmental
conditions, provided that the taking is limited to abatement
of specific conditions on specific parcels.
7)Provides that if property taken by eminent domain ceases to be
used for the use stated at the time of the taking or if the
property is not put to the stated use within 10 years, then
the former owner and heirs shall have the right to acquire the
property at fair market value at the time of conveyance.
Provides further that, upon reacquisition the property shall
be assessed for purposes of taxation at its base year value,
with any authorized adjustments, at the time the property was
acquired by the condemnor.
8)Exempts from the provisions of this measure any real property
within a duly formed redevelopment project area as of January
1, 2008, if the real property is adjacent to a closed military
facility or installation.
9)Provides that the provisions of this measure shall apply to
both new and pending projects, unless a resolution of
necessity was adopted prior to the effective date of this
measure.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Provides that private property may be taken or damaged for a
public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury
unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the
owner. (Cal. Const. Art. 1, Section 19.)
2)Authorizes, under the Community Redevelopment Law, the
creation of redevelopment agencies in order to eradicate
"blight." Provides that an area is blighted if it is
"predominantly urbanized" and subject to certain adverse
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physical and economic conditions that impose a serious
physical and economic burden on the community which cannot be
reversed or alleviated by private enterprise or governmental
action, or both, without redevelopment. (Health & Safety Code
sections 33320.1, 33030, and 33031.)
3)Provides that a governing body may adopt a "resolution of
necessity" as a prerequisite to initiating an eminent domain
proceeding. Provides that a resolution of necessity shall
include, among other things, a general statement of the public
use for which the property will be taken and a declaration
that the governing body has found and determined that (a)
public interest and necessity require the proposed project;
(b) the project has been planned in a manner that will promote
the greatest public good and the least private injury; and (c)
an offer to purchase has been made to the property owner or
owners. (Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1245.210 through
1245.230; see also Government Code Sections 7267, 7267.1, and
7267, relating to government offers to purchase real
property.)
4)Establishes, under the Eminent Domain Law, the general
procedures by which a government entity may exercise its power
of eminent domain. (Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, commencing with Section 1230.010.)
5)Found and declared, in 1989, that the closure of two military
facilities within the County of San Bernardino would cause
serious economic hardship in that county, including loss of
jobs, increased unemployment, deterioration of properties and
land utilization and undue disruption of the lives and
activities of the people. Found and declared, further, that
it is the policy of the Legislature to assist communities
within the County of San Bernardino in their attempt to
preserve the military facilities and installations for their
continued use as airports and aviation-related purposes.
(Health & Safety Code Section 33492.40.)
FISCAL EFFECT : As currently in print this bill is keyed
non-fiscal.
COMMENTS : This proposed constitutional amendment is one of a
number of pending efforts to reform the eminent domain process,
a reform movement that gained considerable momentum in the wake
of a recent and controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision.
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(Kelo v. City of New London Connecticut (2005) 125 U.S. S. Ct.
2655.) The Kelo decision upheld a use of eminent domain to
acquire private property as part of a waterfront economic
development project. Critics of the decision claim that in
upholding a redevelopment plan that transferred property from
one private party to another, the court ignored the clear
constitutional requirement that a taking of private property
must be justified by a "public use." State and federal courts
have used a broad and elastic definition of "public use" since
at least the early 19th century, including private-to-private
transfers. (Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and
Resource Allocation by Government, 1789-1910, in American Law
and Constitutional Order: Historical Perspectives 132-41
(Friedman & Schieber eds., 1978).) But the Kelo decision
seemed to some particularly egregious, involving as it did the
displacement of modest homes in order to make way for a
development project anchored by a wealthy pharmaceutical
company.
The Kelo decision spurred efforts around the nation to limit the
use of eminent domain, especially when it involved
private-to-private transfers in the name of economic
redevelopment. This movement also found its way to California,
as witnessed by last year's narrowly defeated Proposition 90,
even though California law only permits private-to-private
takings if the property had been determined to be "blighted."
In Kelo, the condemning agency did not even claim, much less
present a finding, that the property was blighted. Instead, the
City of New London defined "public use" in terms of the alleged
benefits that would accrue to the public at large in the form of
economic revitalization and corresponding increases in tax
revenue.
This proposed constitutional amendment responds to the broad
definition of "public use" upheld in the Kelo decision by
expressly prohibiting the use of eminent domain for purposes of
economic development, increasing tax revenue or public use.
This bill would exempt from this general prohibition the taking
of public property to eliminate specific and recurring threats
to public safety or to abate blight or other public nuisances.
Existing law already requires a finding of "blight" before a
public entity may use eminent domain for purposes of economic
redevelopment. This measure would specify, however, that when
eminent domain is used to eliminate blight, nuisance, or threats
to public safety, the condemnation shall be limited to specific
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parcels. Finally, this measure would exempt from its sweep any
property located near closed military facilities and
installations in San Bernardino County, since, as noted in the
legislative findings and declarations in a prior version of this
bill, the closure of bases there "has caused serious economic
hardship in that county."
Background: A Brief History of Eminent Domain : Because this
bill would modify long-standing constitutional provisions, a
brief sketch of the overall developments in eminent domain law
is in order. Eminent domain generally refers to the power of
government to require the sale of privately held property, so
long as the property is needed for a "public use" and the
property owner is given "just compensation." Historically the
exercise of eminent domain did not require express statutory or
constitutional authority, but was rather assumed to be an
inherent attribute of the sovereign. (See e.g. P. Nicholas, The
Law of Eminent Domain (1950) 7-34.) Although the history of the
Fifth Amendment suggests that its drafters were primarily
concerned with creating a "just compensation" requirement,
modern courts now hold that the Fifth Amendment creates a two
prong test: the property must be taken (1) for a public use and
(2) just compensation must be given to the property owner. (See
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 694
(1985).
Twentieth Century Case Law and the "Public Use" Question :
Although "just compensation" is still an essential
constitutional requirement, the most controversial cases of the
past 50 years or so - including the 2005 Kelo decision - have
addressed the meaning of "public use." The courts have
vacillated over time between a "narrow" and "broad" reading of
the public use requirement. The broad view generally interprets
"public use" as a use primarily for the "public benefit" or
"public interest," while the narrow view means something more
akin to "public ownership," except that the narrow view could
permit the transfer of property to a privately-owned entity
(such as a public utility), so long as it performed a function
or service traditionally performed by government. (Lawrence
Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Or. L.
Rev. 203 (1978).)
In the past fifty years, the most controversial "public use"
decisions have necessarily involved cases in which the power of
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eminent domain was used to transfer property from one private
owner to another private owner. To be sure, the earliest
eminent domain cases also involved private-to-private transfers,
as in the cases of railroad and canal construction. However,
railroad and canal construction seemed consistent with
"traditional" uses of eminent domain and a narrow reading of
"public use," insofar as those services could be used by all
members of the public - assuming they had need of them and could
afford the fares or shipping rates.
However, in the second half of the twentieth century, state and
local governments began to use the power of eminent domain as
part of comprehensive plans of "urban renewal" and "economic
development." Although the context of eminent domain may have
been changing, the courts continued their long-standing
precedent of defining "public use" flexibly, and generally
showing deference to legislative determinations. In Berman v.
Parker (1954) a unanimous United States Supreme Court upheld the
use of eminent domain as authorized by Congress for
redevelopment in the District of Columbia. In this important
case, the Court determined redevelopment to be a public purpose
for which Congress could exercise its power of eminent domain.
(348 U.S. 26.)
This broad reading of public use and deference to legislative
determinations was reaffirmed and expanded thirty years later in
a case involving the Hawaii state legislature's attempt to
dismantle that state's near-feudal land tenure through a policy
that forced landholders to sell to long-term tenants under
certain circumstances. Relying heavily on the Berman case,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held that a state can use
its power of eminent domain to pass property from one private
party to another private party so long as there was some
"justifying public purpose." The question, according to the
Court, is not whether the legislative determinations will
accomplish its goals, but whether there is any rational basis
for the policy. Justice O'Connor concluded that correcting the
social and economic problems created by Hawaii's skewed land
tenure system was a justifiable public purpose. (Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff (1984) 467 U.S. 229.)
Kelo v. City of New London : The Kelo decision is best
understood in light of long-standing precedents permitting a
broad understanding of "public use" and judicial deference to
legislative determinations as to what constituted public use.
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Nonetheless, Kelo did mark a departure in certain respects.
Unlike the Berman case, the City of New London did not contend
that the condemned properties were "blighted." Rather, the city
used its power of eminent domain to take a number of modest
homes for the purpose of developing a waterfront neighborhood
that would feature a Pfizer pharmaceutical complex and adjacent
offices, hotels, residences, shops, and services. The city
contended that this development project would create a
significant public benefit by reviving an economically stagnant
neighborhood, creating jobs, and generating increased tax
revenues that could be used to fund needed public services. A
slim majority of the Court voted to uphold the city's use of
eminent domain for this development project and, in so doing,
used a broad definition of "public use" and showed great
deference to legislative determinations by state and local
policy-makers. In that sense, the Kelo decision was not so
different from prior cases.
But as was made clear in Justice O'Connor's dissent - recalling
that Justice O'Conner authored the Midkiff opinion - Kelo did
not involve "blight" and did not seek to address some historical
peculiarity, like Hawaii's skewed land tenure system. However,
Justice Stevens' majority opinion assumed that the blight
finding in Berman was not essential to finding that the urban
renewal project served a legitimate public purpose. Rather, the
clear conclusions to be drawn from Berman and Midkiff, Stevens
contended, was that an eminent domain action that transferred
property from one private party to another only needed to be
justified by a legislatively determined public purpose.
Redevelopment and Eminent Domain Law in California : In his
majority opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens stressed that the
Fifth Amendment only establishes minimum requirements and that
"nothing in our opinion precludes any state from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power." He cited as
an example California redevelopment law, which expressly
requires a finding of blight. (Kelo, supra at 2668, fn. 23.)
Indeed, the California Legislature has long recognized the
controversial nature of eminent domain, and has over the years
added statutory restrictions on its use, particularly with
respect to redevelopment and the eradication of blight. Unlike
other states, California redevelopment agencies derive their
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain from an
express grant in the Community Redevelopment Law.
In addition, California redevelopment agencies are only
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authorized to exercise eminent domain within the boundaries of a
designated redevelopment project area and only after adopting a
redevelopment plan in compliance with specific statutory
procedures. By definition, a redevelopment project area is
deemed "blighted," since a finding of blight must be made before
an area may be designated a redevelopment project area.
How Does ACA 2 Compare With ACA 8, Which Recently Passed Out Of
This Committee? A careful review of this measure along side ACA
8 (De La Torre) quickly demonstrates that this measure
substantially differs from ACA 8 (which was heard and passed by
this Committee last week) in a number of important ways. Some
of the more significant differences appear to include the
following:
First, while this measure imposes a general prohibition
against the use of eminent domain for any purpose of
economic development or increasing tax revenue, ACA 8 would
only limit the use of eminent domain for economic
development if it involved the conveyance of an
owner-occupied home or a small business to another private
party.
Second, both ACA 2 and ACA 8 create exemptions for
purposes of responding to an emergency or eliminating
blight, nuisances or threats to public safety. The most
significant difference, however, is that ACA 2 would
require that the conditions giving rise to the exemption -
and most relevantly to the blight exemption -- applied to
each particular parcel of property that is taken. ACA 8,
other the other hand, would, like existing law, potentially
permit the taking of a non-blighted parcel within a wider
project area that is deemed to be blighted.
Third, the "public safety" exemption in ACA 2 would
require a finding by a superior court, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a specific, recurring, and
ongoing threat to public safety exists. ACA 8 would
apparently permit this determination to be made by the
redevelopment agency, subject to existing notice and public
hearing requirements, without having to have its
determination affirmed by a superior court.
Fourth, ACA 8, as amended in this Committee last week,
eliminated from its definition of "public work or
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improvement" any reference to "incidental" private uses.
ACA 2, however, despite its desire to more narrowly define
public use, defines "public use" to include leasing space
for privately-owned and operated business activity
"incidental to, and compatible with, the public work or
improvement."
Fifth, both ACA 2 and ACA 8 require that the "public
use" for which property is taken shall be stated in
writing, and both permit the original owner to repurchase
the property in the event that the property is not used for
the stated public use. However, where ACA 2 would permit
repurchase to the former owner "and heirs," ACA 8 expressly
states that the opportunity to repurchase does not apply to
any heirs or successors of the original owner.
Sixth, ACA 2 creates an exemption for property within a
redevelopment project area that is adjacent to a closed
military facility or installation in San Bernardino County.
ACA 8 makes no such geographical distinctions.
Finally, ACA 8 provides that if eminent domain is used
under the exemption for eliminating blight, a small
business owner (25 employees or less) will have an
opportunity to participate in the redevelopment project.
ACA 2 has a more narrowly tailored definition of the blight
exemption, as noted above, but its blight exemption does
not include a requirement that a small business owner, or
anyone else, be given an opportunity to participate in the
project.
Because There Are Substantial Differences Between This Proposal
and ACA 8, As Noted Above, Would Not Passage Of This Measure Be
Inconsistent With The Committee's Passage Of ACA 8 Last Week?
Does the San Bernardino County Exemption Unwittingly Illustrate
The Need for Eminent Domain as a Redevelopment Tool? As noted
above, this measure exempts from its provisions any property
within a duly formed redevelopment project area that is adjacent
to a recently closed military facility in San Bernardino County.
Although legislative findings have been deleted from the
current version of this measure, an earlier version included
legislative findings that the closure of military facilities in
San Bernardino County "has caused serious hardship to that
county." These findings alluded to an existing section of the
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Community Redevelopment Law finding that closures would cause
serious economic hardship in San Bernardino County and declaring
a legislative intent to preserve the former bases for use as
airports or aviation-related purposes. (Health & Safety Code
Section 33492.40.) This provision, first enacted in 1989,
authorized the creation of a Joint Powers Authority to further
redevelopment in areas adjacent to Norton Air Force Base and
George Air Force Base, which were two of several military
installations closed in 1988 by Public Law 100-526. Similar
special project areas have been established for closed military
facilities throughout the state, including Castle Air Force
Base, Mather Air Force, Fort Ord, Mare Island Naval Shipyard,
Alameda Naval Air Station, March Air Force Base, Hamilton Army
Air Field, and Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, among others.
These specially created project areas typically create
exemptions to existing redevelopment law, such as suspending the
usual requirement that a project area be "predominantly
urbanized" or modifying affordable housing requirements.
(Health & Safety Code Sections 33492 et seq.)
Nothing in existing law could be construed as requiring an
eminent domain exemption for areas affected by base closures in
San Bernardino, or any other redevelopment project area for that
matter. Indeed, the major apparent purpose of this proposed
amendment is to curtail the use of eminent domain for purposes
of redevelopment.
But the exemption proposed in this measure is revealing. In
creating the Joint Powers Authority in San Bernardino County in
1989, the Legislature did indeed issue findings and declarations
to the effect that the closure of military bases there would
cause economic hardship. In particular, the legislation
expressly included among the hardships "loss of jobs, increased
unemployment, deterioration of properties and land utilization
and undue disruption of lives and activities of the people."
This measure, in short, by exempting project areas adjacent to
closed military installations in San Bernardino, tacitly admits
that eminent domain is sometimes necessary for purposes of
economic development and job creation, even in the absence of a
specific finding of blight on a specific parcel and even if the
taking involves conveyance to a private party for something
other than a narrowly defined "public use."
The Committee may wish to ask the author why areas near closed
military installations in San Bernardino County should be
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exempted when areas next to other closed installations should
not. But even more critically, the Committee may wish to ask the
author why it is acceptable to use eminent domain for purposes
of private development if the economic hardship and job loss is
caused by a base closure, but not if the economic hardship and
job loss is caused by something else. Given that this bill is
presented as one based upon long-standing constitutional
principles, what is the precise constitutional principle that
would justify imposing greater or lesser limitations on the use
of eminent domain contingent upon the circumstances that give
rise to economic hardship?
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : According to the author, U.S. Supreme
Court's Kelo decision "opened the door to government taking land
from one private owner to another in order to redevelop the land
and benefit the local government by the increase in tax
revenues." This measure, the author writes, is a "direct
response" to that decision. By weakening traditional
constitutional restrictions, the author contends, Kelo creates
the possibility that "local governments could decide that a
particular property owner is undesirable and force the sale of
his/her property." The Framers of the Constitution, the author
believes, "did not intend for the Fifth Amendment to be abused
in this way. In light of the resulting diminished Fifth
Amendment protections, it is incumbent upon our State government
to fill the void left by Kelo." A fact sheet provided by the
author states this bill will help to remedy the void in part by
prohibiting the "condemnation of nonblighted property for
private business development."
At the time of this writing, the Committee had not received any
letters in support of the current version of this bill.
However, the single letter of support from Orange County
Supervisor Chris Norby in support of the previous version would
seem to apply to this version as well. On behalf of the Orange
County Board of Supervisors, Norby writes that this measure will
ensure that eminent domain proceedings will only be used "to
acquire private property for public uses" and not for "economic
development or private purposes." Norby claims this measure
"goes a long way toward protecting Californians and their
property from seizure by the government" for purposes of
economic development and will offer citizens "better protection
than that afforded through the U.S. Constitution based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo."
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ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION : Opponents, all of whom support the
alternative measure ACA 8, generally contend that this measure
is an over-reaction to the Kelo decision. The League of
California Cities (League) claims that this measure "is an
unnecessarily broad response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Kelo v. the City of New London." The League claims that the
Kelo majority was clear that the law of eminent domain is
particular to each state and specifically cited California
Redevelopment Law as a specific example of such a limitation.
The League, in an apparent reference to ACA 8, argues that "an
appropriate response [to] the Kelo decision would be to prohibit
the taking of single-family or owner-occupied residences when
the purpose of the [taking] is for economic development."
The League further argues that "ACA 2 would prohibit nearly all
actions where a property was condemned and then turned over to
another private party, even when the transaction fulfills an
important government objective." This measure, the League
believes, will severely undermine the ability of cities to
"improve slums, clean contaminated properties, and revitalize
deteriorated business districts." Finally, the League points
out that even the provision of ACA 2 that permits the use of
eminent domain to eliminate threats to public safety provides
that a court must find evidence of the threat by clear and
convincing evidence. According to the League, this would mean
that "a city would be prohibited from acquiring a crack house
unless it first allowed a court to second-guess the
determination of criminal behavior that had been made by the
police."
The California Redevelopment Association (CRA) similarly alleges
that this measure is "an overreaction to the U.S. Supreme
Court's Kelo vs. New London decision." CRA also points to the
protections in existing law and claims that this measure will
only "hamstring government at those times its need to safeguard
the public's interest." CRA claims that this measure would
prohibit local governments from engaging in many traditional
public projects that require the use of eminent domain. "Local
governments," CRA agues, "use redevelopment to revitalize
run-down areas, to clean-up contaminated properties and return
land to productive use, and to deal with irresponsible property
owners." ACA 2 will inhibit government's ability to perform
these vital functions, according to CRA. For that reason CRA
endorses what it considers the "more balanced" approach of ACA
8.
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The California State Association of Counties (CSAC) opposes this
measure for similar reasons as those noted above. CSAC adds,
however, that the San Bernardino County exemption "explicitly
recognizes the utility of the eminent domain power." CSAC notes
that "while the circumstances of the military base closure and
the economy of the region are undoubtedly worthy of continued
revitalization efforts, such a project serves as evidence that
eminent domain can be a useful tool for local agencies for
redevelopment purposes."
PENDING RELATED MEASURES : ACA 8 (De La Torre), which passed
this Committee last week, prohibits the use of eminent domain to
take owner-occupied homes and small businesses (25 or fewer
employees) if the property will be transferred to a private
party. However, property may be taken from small business and
transferred to a private party if the purpose is to eradicate
blight, and the small business owner is given an opportunity to
participate in the project or is offered relocations expenses of
the fair market value of the business. Makes other exemptions
as specified, and would require the public use to be stated in
writing.
SCA 1 (McClintock) provides generally that private property may
not be taken or damaged for economic development, increasing tax
revenue, or any other private use. Provides generally that
property taken by eminent domain must be owned or occupied by
the government or condemning agency. Provides that if the
property is not used for its stated use, it must be offered back
to the original owner.
AB 1161 (Tran) requires the state Department of Transportation,
when it acquires property through eminent domain, to sell
property that is not used for the purpose for which it was
acquired.
AB 887 (De La Torre) provides that a redevelopment agency that
exercises the power of eminent domain must comply with certain
notification requirements before adopting a resolution of
necessity.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
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Chris Norby, Orange County Supervisor
Opposition
California Redevelopment Association
California State Association of Counties
League of California Cities
Analysis Prepared by : Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334