BILL ANALYSIS
AB 1315
Page 1
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
AB 1315 (Ruskin)
As Amended May 5, 2009
Majority vote
UTILITIES & COMMERCE 10-4
APPROPRIATIONS 11-4
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|Ayes:|Fuentes, Blakeslee, |Ayes:|De Leon, Ammiano, Charles |
| |Carter, Fong, Furutani, | |Calderon, Davis, Fuentes, |
| |Huffman, Krekorian, | |Hall, John A. Perez, Price, |
| |Skinner, Swanson, Torrico | |Skinner, Solorio, Torlakson |
| | | | |
|-----+--------------------------+-----+-----------------------------|
|Nays:|Duvall, Tom Berryhill, |Nays:|Nielsen, Duvall, Harkey, |
| |Fuller, Smyth | |Audra Strickland |
| | | | |
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SUMMARY : Requires the commissioners of the California Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) to designate a president of the
commission from among the members of the commission, instead of
the Governor appointing a president. Also requires the
commissioners to select and direct the PUC's attorney and
executive director, instead of the president. Specifically,
this bill :
1)Requires the commission to designate a president of the
commission from among the members of the commission.
2)Provides that the commission may appoint an attorney and an
executive director and direct the actions of the attorney,
executive director.
3)Deletes the provision that the president may direct the
attorney, the executive director, and other staff of the
commission, with the exception of Division of Ratepayer
Advocate staff.
FISCAL EFFECT : Negligible fiscal impact.
COMMENTS : Prior to 1998, the president of PUC was selected by
its members. The commissioners appointed the attorney and
AB 1315
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executive director, who performed at the direction of the
commission as a body.
PUC has historically been granted broad latitude to set its own
procedures. Any review of PUC decisions has historically been
limited to review only by the Supreme Court. Some had viewed
PUC's independence as less of a virtue and more of a vice.
Rather than independent, PUC had been seen to lack
accountability. SB 33 (Peace) Chapter 509, Statutes of 1999,
attempted to address this perceived lack of accountability by
the commissioners. It centralized the functioning of PUC with
its president by putting PUC's executive director and attorney
directly under the control of the president. It also made the
president more directly accountable to the Governor because the
Governor would appoint the president.
There is concern that by having the Governor appoint the
president, and not having the commissioners select their own
president, this designation has resulted in a lack of
collegiality and the unintended creation of a "super
commissioner." The Governor can re-appoint that same
commissioner as president each term, and that president by
statute directs the policies and executive director, the
attorney, and the over 1,000 staff. The remaining commissioners
can become less significant, especially when the will of
individual commissioners differs from the will of the president.
The previous commissions were not accountable enough, the more
recent commission is way too accountable, but only to the
Governor. Because the State Constitution provides the
Legislature with "plenary power" to confer authority and
jurisdiction upon PUC, AB 1315 is an attempt to find the "just
right" solution.
Analysis Prepared by : Gina Adams / U. & C. / (916) 319-2083
FN: 0000938