BILL ANALYSIS 1
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SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
ALEX PADILLA, CHAIR
AB 1315 - Ruskin Hearing Date:
July 7, 2009 A
As Amended: May 5, 2009 FISCAL B
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DESCRIPTION
Current law authorizes the Governor to appoint the president of
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), subject to
confirmation by the Senate.
This bill authorizes the CPUC commissioners to choose a
president from among its members.
Current law authorizes the CPUC president to direct the CPUC
executive director and attorney.
This bill deletes that authority, making the executive director
and attorney subject to direction by the CPUC.
BACKGROUND
Ten years ago, frustrated by the CPUC's independence and lack of
accountability, the Legislature changed the structure of the
CPUC. Rather than the CPUC commissioners choosing a president
from among its ranks, the Governor was given the authority to
choose the president. Power was also consolidated under the
president by giving the president direct authority over the
executive director and general counsel, the two most powerful
staff positions at the CPUC. The point of these changes was to
increase the CPUC's accountability to the Governor.
There appears to be no standard organizational structure within
state government. At the California Energy Commission the
chairman is appointed by the Governor, while the staff reports
to the commission. At the Coastal Commission and the Integrated
Waste Management Board, each elects its own chair from its
membership. At the California Air Resources Board the Governor
appoints the Chair while the board appoints its executive
director.
COMMENTS
1. The author believes that organizational changes made ten
years ago are a failed experiment which has decreased
collegiality among commissioners and unintendedly made the
president into a "super commissioner". This has empowered
the president to act contrary to the desires of the
Legislature, according to the author.
2. Opponents argue that the bill will not make the CPUC
more responsive to the Legislature and will in fact
accomplish the opposite, making the CPUC more insular.
There is no evidence to support the claim that the bill
will make the CPUC responsive, according to the opponents.
They are also concerned that making the Executive Director
accountable to all the commissioners will make the CPUC
less focused, as the commissioners pursue differing
agendas.
3. There has been a notable decrease in collegiality among
commissions in this decade, predating the current set of
commissioners. While this coincides with the
organizational changes which strengthened the president,
it's not clear whether this is because of those
organizational changes. It may simply have been because
the last several CPUC presidents have had strong
personalities.
4. Collegiality is not necessarily a prerequisite to sound
decision-making, though one of the advantages of
decision-making by a commission is that the give and take
among commissioners results in better decisions. When
commissioners are disagreeable with each other the give and
take quickly deteriorates. Factionalization can take hold,
resulting in decisions made without the benefit of a full
consideration of alternate viewpoints. A strong president
can end up dominating the other commissioners, depriving
the public of the benefit of the wisdom and judgment of all
five commissioners.
5. In the end, all this bill does is ensure that whoever
becomes president does so with the consent of his or her
colleagues. While this may reduce the accountability of
the CPUC to the Governor, a Governor has many ways to
influence the CPUC, including controlling the CPUC's
budget. Experience shows that state agencies can function
properly whether there is a leader appointed by the
Governor or selected from among its membership. The
question of whether the changes in this bill are
appropriate may simply rest on whether one is satisfied
with the conduct and decision-making of the CPUC. If there
is dissatisfaction sometimes the best way to foster change
is simply to shake up the box, no matter how gently.
6. Double Referral - This bill has been double referred to
the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Due to time
constraints, if amendments are proposed in Committee these
amendments must be taken in the second Committee.
ASSEMBLY VOTES
Assembly Floor (43-27)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (11-4)
Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee
(10-4)
POSITIONS
Sponsor:
Communications Workers of America
Support:
California Labor Federation
Consumer Federation of California
Sierra Club California
State Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO
The Utility Reform Network
Oppose:
AT&T
California Cable and Telecommunications Association
California Communications Association
California Public Utilities Commission
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Sempra Energy
Southern California Edison
Randy Chinn
AB 1315 Analysis
Hearing Date: July 7, 2009