BILL ANALYSIS
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | AB 2023|
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THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 2023
Author: Saldana (D)
Amended: 4/27/10 in Assembly
Vote: 21
SENATE ELEC., REAP. & CONST. AMEND. COMM. : 5-0, 6/15/10
AYES: Hancock, Denham, DeSaulnier, Liu, Strickland
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : Senate Rule 28.8
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 76-0, 5/13/10 (Consent) - See last page
for vote
SUBJECT : Election results
SOURCE : Secretary of State
DIGEST : This bill authorizes the Secretary of State to
conduct a voluntary pilot program in five or more counties
evaluating the use of post-canvas risk-limiting audits of
election results.
ANALYSIS : Existing law requires an election official,
during the official canvass of every election, to conduct a
public manual tally of ballots tabulated by the voting
system, including vote by mail ballots, cast in one percent
of the precincts chosen at random.
This bill authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS) to
conduct a pilot project in five or more counties to
CONTINUED
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evaluate post canvass risk-limiting audits of election
results. The bill does not relieve a participating county
from conducting the currently required one percent manual
tally. Specifically, this bill:
1. Defines a "risk-limiting audit" as a manual tally
employing a statistical method that ensures a large,
predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual
tally whenever a full manual tally would show an
electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported
by the vote tabulating device for the audited contest.
2. Defines an "audit unit" as a precinct, a set of ballots,
or a single ballot.
3. Provides that a precinct, a set of ballots, or a single
ballot may be used as an audit unit only if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
A. The relevant vote tabulating device is able to
produce a report of the votes cast in the precinct,
on the set of ballots, or on the single ballot.
B. The elections official is able to match that
report with the ballots corresponding to the report
for the purposes of conducting a risk-limiting
audit.
C. Each ballot is assigned to not more than one
audit unit.
4. Requires a risk-limiting audit to begin with a hand
tally of the votes in one or more audit units and to
continue to hand tally votes in additional audit units
until there is strong statistical evidence that the
electoral outcome is correct.
5. Requires the risk-limiting audit to include a full
manual tally of all votes if counting additional audit
units does not provide strong statistical evidence that
the electoral outcome is correct.
6. Encourages the SOS to include urban and rural counties,
counties from northern, central, and southern
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California, and counties with different voting systems.
7. Requires each county that chooses to participate in the
pilot project to conduct a post canvass risk-limiting
audit of one or more contests after each election
conducted in that county in the 2011 calendar year.
8. Requires an elections official who is conducting a post
canvass risk-limiting audit to do all of the following:
A. Provide at least a five-day public notice of the
time and place of the random selection of audit
units to be manually tallied and of the time and
place of the audit.
B. Make available to the public a report of the
vote tabulating device results for the contest,
including the results for each audit unit in the
contest, prior to the random selection of audit
units to be manually tallied and prior to the
commencement of the audit.
C. Conduct the audit upon tabulation of the
unofficial final results or upon completion of the
official canvass for the election.
D. Conduct the audit in public view by hand without
the use of electronic scanning equipment using the
procedures established under existing law for
conducting a manual tally of ballots in one percent
of precincts.
9. Requires the SOS to report to the Legislature on or
before March 1, 2012 on the effectiveness and efficiency
of post canvass risk-limiting audits conducted as part
of the pilot project.
10.Requires the report to include an analysis of the
efficiency of the post canvass risk-limiting audits,
including the costs of performing the audits, as
compared to the one percent manual tallies conducted
under existing law.
11.Prohibits an audit from being conducted under the pilot
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project with respect to a state or multi-jurisdictional
contest unless all counties involved in the contest
choose to participate in the pilot project.
12.Provides that advisory elections and elections for
political party central committee may not be included in
the pilot project.
13.Defines "unofficial final results," for the purposes of
this bill, as election results tabulated as part of an
official canvass but not yet reported to the governing
board or the SOS.
14.Allows a voter to request a recount either upon
conclusion of the official canvass or upon completion of
the post canvass risk-limiting audit, if one is
conducted.
15.Makes other technical changes.
Background
One Percent Manual Tally and the Post-Election Manual
Tally : For 45 years, California law has required elections
officials in counties that use voting systems to tabulate
ballots to manually tally the ballots cast in one percent
of the precincts as a check to ensure that the voting
systems are tallying ballots correctly. Although state law
governing the one percent manual tally has been updated to
reflect changes in voting technology and to provide
additional public notice and reporting requirements, the
requirement to manually tally the ballots cast in one
percent of precincts has not significantly changed since
first being enacted in 1965. In 2007, the SOS conducted a
"top-to-bottom review" (TTBR) of several voting machines
certified for use in California. The purpose of the review
was "to determine whether currently certified voting
systems provide acceptable levels of security,
accessibility, ballot secrecy, accuracy and usability under
federal and state standards." At the conclusion of the
TTBR, the SOS decertified and conditionally re-certified
three voting systems that had been the subject of the TTBR.
The SOS also decertified a fourth voting system, which was
unable to be tested during the TTBR. Subsequently, after
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that system was tested, it too was conditionally
recertified.
Among the conditions that the SOS imposed as part of the
recertification of these voting systems was a requirement
that counties using the systems must conduct a larger
manual tally in close races than the manual tally of one
percent of precincts that is required for all elections.
The manual tally of the additional ballots was required to
be completed during the official canvass of the election.
These post election manual tally (PEMT) requirements were
challenged in court, and on August 31, 2008, the California
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the SOS had the
authority to institute PEMT requirements, but should have
done so using the procedures for adoption of regulations in
the Administrative Procedures Act. The SOS subsequently
adopted emergency regulations so that the PEMT requirements
would be in effect for the November 2008 election. Those
emergency regulations expired in April of last year, and
new PEMT requirements have not been established by statute
or by regulation. One of the primary purposes of the PEMT
requirement was to establish a higher level of confidence
that any error by a voting system in tabulating ballots did
not change the outcome of the election. The pilot project
proposed by this bill could help determine whether a post
canvass risk-limiting audit could serve the same purpose.
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes
Local: No
SUPPORT : (Verified 6/28/10)
Secretary of State (source)
American Statistical Association
Brennan Center for Justice
California Common Cause
Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota
Verified Voting
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : According to the author's office,
this bill authorizes the SOS's office to establish and
conduct a statistically based, post-canvass audit pilot
program. Current law requires county elections officials
to conduct a manual tally of one percent of all precincts
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following each election. The Legislature established the
one percent manual tally in 1965 - 45 years ago - to check
voting machine function and accuracy. Under current law,
however, there is no requirement to expand the manual tally
beyond one percent even when significant differences are
found between the manual tally and the machine count. By
law, the one percent manual tally cannot change election
outcomes either. Instead, when the machine results are
very close, candidates and ballot measure proponents and
opponents must file and pay for expensive hand recounts and
election contests if they wish to challenge the outcome of
a contest.
In 2007, the SOS's office established a Post-Election Audit
Standards Working Group which published recommendations for
how California can improve its elections auditing process.
This bill's pilot program implements many of the Working
Group's recommendations. Allowing and encouraging county
elections officials to implement risk-limiting audits will
improve the likelihood of identifying voting system errors
and security breaches.
Risk-limiting audits also have the potential to reduce the
need for election recounts because the audit model begins
with a small sample and gradually escalates - potentially
to a full hand count - if significant differences persist
between the machine and manual tally results.
Modern auditing methods can help elections officials focus
scarce budget resources on very close races that pose the
highest risk while still confirming the outcomes of
contests that show wide margins after the machine count.
Simply put, statistically based, post-canvass audits can
improve the accuracy of and public confidence in our
elections.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR :
AYES: Adams, Ammiano, Anderson, Arambula, Bass, Beall,
Bill Berryhill, Tom Berryhill, Blakeslee, Block,
Blumenfield, Bradford, Brownley, Buchanan, Charles
Calderon, Carter, Chesbro, Conway, Cook, Coto, Davis, De
La Torre, De Leon, DeVore, Emmerson, Eng, Evans, Feuer,
Fletcher, Fong, Fuentes, Fuller, Furutani, Gaines,
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Galgiani, Garrick, Gilmore, Hagman, Hall, Harkey,
Hayashi, Hernandez, Hill, Huber, Huffman, Jeffries,
Jones, Knight, Lieu, Logue, Bonnie Lowenthal, Ma,
Mendoza, Miller, Monning, Nava, Nestande, Niello,
Nielsen, V. Manuel Perez, Portantino, Ruskin, Salas,
Saldana, Silva, Smyth, Solorio, Audra Strickland,
Swanson, Torlakson, Torres, Torrico, Tran, Villines,
Yamada, John A. Perez
NO VOTE RECORDED: Caballero, Norby, Skinner, Vacancy
DLW:do 6/28/10 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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