BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    �



                                                                      



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          |SENATE RULES COMMITTEE            |                  AB 2055|
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                                 THIRD READING


          Bill No:  AB 2055
          Author:   Fuentes (D)
          Amended:  8/7/12 in Senate
          Vote:     21

           
           SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE  :  7-0, 7/3/12
          AYES:  Hancock, Anderson, Calderon, Harman, Liu, Price, 
            Steinberg

           ASSEMBLY FLOOR  :  72-0, 5/3/12 - See last page for vote


           SUBJECT  :    Search warrants: tracking devices

           SOURCE  :     Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office


           DIGEST  :     This bill requires a warrant for information 
          received from the use of a tracking device.

           ANALYSIS  :    The U.S. Constitution provides that "the right 
          of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
          papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
          seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
          issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
          affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
          searched and the persons or things to be seized."  (Fourth 
          Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.)

          The California Constitution provides that "the right of the 
          people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
          effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not 
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          be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable 
          cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
          describing the place to be searched and the persons and 
          things to be seized."  (Article I, � 13 of the California 
          Constitution.)

          Existing law defines a "search warrant" as an order in 
          writing in the name of the People, signed by a magistrate, 
          directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to 
          search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or 
          personal property, and in the case of a thing or things or 
          personal property, bring the same before the magistrate.  
          (Penal Code � 1523.)

          Existing law provides that a search warrant may be issued 
          upon any of the following grounds:

           When the property was stolen or embezzled.

           When the property or things were used as the means of 
            committing a felony.

           When the property or things are in the possession of any 
            person with the intent to use them as a means of 
            committing a public offense, or in the possession of 
            another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the 
            purpose of concealing them or preventing them from being 
            discovered.

           When the property or things to be seized consist of any 
            item or constitute any evidence that tends to show a 
            felony has been committed, or tends to show that a 
            particular person has committed a felony.

           When the property or things to be seized consist of 
            evidence that tends to show that    sexual exploitation 
            of a child, or possession of matter depicting sexual 
            conduct of a person under the age of 18 years, has 
            occurred or is occurring.

           When there is a warrant to arrest a person.

           When a provider of electronic communication service or 
            remote computing service has records or evidence, showing 

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            that property was stolen or embezzled constituting a 
            misdemeanor, or that property or things are in the 
            possession of any person with the intent to use them as a 
            means of committing a misdemeanor public offense, or in 
            the possession of another to whom he or she may have 
            delivered them for the purpose of concealing them or 
            preventing their discovery.  (Penal Code � 1524(a).)
           
          Existing law sets forth procedures for a search warrant 
          issued for records of a foreign corporation that provides 
          electronic communication services or remote computing 
          services to the general public, where those records would 
          reveal the identity of the customers using services, data 
          stored by, or on behalf of, the customer, the customer's 
          usage of those services, the recipient or destination of 
          communications sent to or from those customers, or the 
          content of those communications.  (Penal Code � 154.2.)

          Existing law provides that a provider of electronic 
          communication or remote computing service shall disclose to 
          a governmental prosecuting or investigating agency the 
          name, address, local and long distance toll billing 
          records, telephone number or other subscriber number or 
          identity, and length of service of as subscriber to or 
          customer of that service and types of services the 
          subscriber or customer utilized when the governmental 
          entity is granted a search warrant.  (Penal Code � 
          1524.3(a).)

          Existing law provides that a provider of wire or electronic 
          communication services or a remote computing service, upon 
          the request of a peace officer, shall take all necessary 
          steps to preserve records and other evidence in its 
          possession pending the issuance of a search warrant or a 
          request in writing and an affidavit declaring an intent to 
          file a warrant to the provider.  Records shall be retained 
          of a period of 90 days which shall be extended for an 
          additional 90-day upon a renewed request by the peace 
          officer.  (Penal Code � 1524.3(d).)

          Exiting law provides that a search warrant cannot be issued 
          but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or 
          describing the person to be searched or searched for, and 
          particularly describing the property, thing or things and 

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          the place to be searched.  (Penal Code � 1525.)

          This bill allows a tracking-device search warrant to be 
          issued when the information to be received from the use of 
          a tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show a 
          felony has been committed or is being committed, tends to 
          show that a particular person has committed a felony or is 
          committing a felony, or will assist in locating an 
          individual who has committed or is committing a felony.

          This bill provides that a tracking-device search warrant 
          shall be executed in a manner meeting the requirements 
          specified in Penal Code Section 1534(b).

          This bill requires a tracking-device search warrant to 
          identify the person or property to be tracked and to 
          specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days, 
          from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be 
          used.

          This bill allows the court to grant one or more extensions 
          for the time that the device may be used if good cause is 
          established.

          This bill provides that each extension may last a 
          reasonable length of time, but may not exceed 30 days.

          This bill states that the search warrant shall command the 
          officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking 
          device or by serving a warrant on a third-party possessor 
          of the tracking data.

          This bill requires the officer to perform any installation 
          authorized by the warrant during the daytime, unless the 
          magistrate expressly authorizes installation at another 
          time for good cause.

          This bill mandates execution of the warrant to be completed 
          no later than 10 days immediately after the date of 
          issuance.

          This bill deems a warrant executed within this 10-day 
          period to be timely executed.


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          This bill provides that after 10 days the warrant shall be 
          void, unless it has been executed.

          This bill states that an officer executing a 
          tracking-device search warrant is not required to knock and 
          to announce his or her presence before execution.

          This bill requires the officer executing the warrant to 
          file a return to the warrant no later than 10 calendar days 
          after the use of the tracking device has ended.

          This bill requires the officer executing the warrant to 
          serve a copy of the warrant on the person who was tracked 
          or whose property was tracked no later than 10 calendar 
          days after the use of the tracking device has ended.

          This bill authorizes a judge, for good cause, to delay 
          service of a copy of the warrant if a government agency 
          makes this request.

          This bill provides that the order permitting the 
          installation of a tracking device may authorize the 
          installation and its use only with the State of California, 
          provided the tracking device is installed within the State 
          of California.

          This bill defines a "tracking device" as any electronic or 
          mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement 
          of a person or object.

          This bill defines "daytime" as the hours between 6:00 a.m. 
          and 10:00 p.m. according to local time.

          This bill specifies that it shall not be construed to 
          create a cause of action against any foreign or California 
          corporation, its officers, employees, agents, or other 
          specified persons for providing location information.

           Background
           
           United States v. Jones  .  On January 23, 2012, the  U.S. 
          Supreme Court decided the case of U.S. v. Jones  (132 S.Ct. 
          945(2012)) and found that the government's attachment of a 
          GPS device to a vehicle and its use of that device to 

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          monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a search under 
          the Fourth Amendment.  In  Jones  , all members of the Court 
          found that the law enforcement's attachment and subsequent 
          monitoring of a GPS on a vehicle violated the Fourth 
          Amendment, although with two concurring opinions, various 
          justices reached that conclusion using different legal 
          reasoning.

          In  Jones  , the United States Supreme Court held that 
          attaching a global positioning system (GPS) device to a 
          person's vehicle to track his or her movements constitutes 
          a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
          Authorities obtained a search warrant to install a GPS 
          device on defendant's car as part of a drug trafficking 
          investigation.  But, the authorities did not install the 
          device until after the warrant expired.  The device was 
          used to track the defendant's movements for almost one 
          month.  When charges were filed against defendant, he moved 
          to suppress the GPS evidence as the product of an illegal 
          search.  The prosecution argued at trial and on appeal that 
          a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment had not 
          occurred because Jones did not have a reasonable 
          expectation of privacy in the location of his vehicle on 
          public streets, which was visible to all.  

          The Supreme Court found the government's use of a GPS 
          monitoring device is a search within the meaning of the 
          Fourth Amendment, and therefore must be reasonable.  The 
          majority decision was not based on the reasonable 
          expectation of privacy test for challenges to law 
          enforcement surveillance, which is generally employed.  
          (  Katz v. U.S.  (1967) 389 U.S. 347.)  Instead, the majority 
          based its decision on common law trespass principals, 
          holding that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle (an 
          "effect") for purposes of data collection constitutes a 
          search because the government physically occupied private 
          property for the purpose of information gathering.  But 
          five of the justices (the four members of the Alito 
          concurrence, plus Justice Sotomayor) were critical of the 
          trespass theory, stating the majority should have used the 
          reasonable expectation of privacy test.

          While the Court's decision established that the use of a 
          tracking device qualifies as a search, the opinion left 

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          open other questions.  First, the Court left open the 
          questions of whether a warrant is required for these types 
          of searches and whether it requires probable cause, as 
          opposed to a lesser standard like reasonable suspicion.  
          The Court also did not answer the question of how it might 
          apply the Fourth Amendment to law enforcement data 
          collection that does not require a physical intrusion, such 
          as where GPS or toll paying devices are installed or used 
          by the owner and the information they produce are mined by 
          law enforcement authorities.  Although, the Court did 
          suggest that the expectation of privacy analysis would 
          apply, and four judges concurred with the majority that 
          this would be the proper analysis.  

           FISCAL EFFECT  :    Appropriation:  No   Fiscal Com.:  No   
          Local:  No

           SUPPORT  :   (Verified  8/7/12)

          Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (source) 
          Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
          Riverside Sheriffs' Association
          California District Attorneys Association

           ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT  :    According to the author:

               On January 23, 2012, the United States Supreme Court 
               held in  United States v. Jones,  that the warrantless 
               use of a self-contained GPS tracking device 
               ("slap-on") on a motor vehicle, and its use of that 
               device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constituted 
               a "search" and therefore violated the protections 
               guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
               States Constitution.

               Prior to the  Jones  decision, case law had separated 
               GPS vehicle tracking devices into two separate 
               categories: (1) tracking devices that are self-powered 
               and attached to the external carriage of a vehicle 
               (commonly referred to as a "slap-on" device), and (2) 
               tracking devices which are installed through an 
               intrusion into the vehicle and which may connect the 
               tracking device to the vehicle's internal power supply 
               (commonly referred to as a "hard-wire" device).

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               In  People v. Zichwic  (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 
               954-956, the California Court of Appeal held that the 
               attachment of a vehicle tracking device to the 
               external undercarriage of the defendant's vehicle 
               without a warrant ("slap-on" device) did not violate 
               the Fourth Amendment, because the tracking device was 
               place on the exterior of the defendant's vehicle and 
               because the defendant's vehicle travelled in areas 
               that were otherwise visible to the public.

               However, where an intrusion is required to place a 
               tracking device into an area where the suspect 
               possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy 
               ("hard-wire" device), and where the item or vehicle is 
               located in a place where a suspect has a reasonable 
               expectation of privacy, a warrant is required for both 
               the installation and monitoring of the tracking 
               device.  (  People v. Smith  67 Cal.App.3d 638, 654; 
                United States v. Karo  468 U.S. 705, 714-718.)

               Because the Court in  Jones  ruled that the use of a 
               self-contained GPS tracking device constituted a 
               search under the 4th Amendment, but did not 
               specifically state that a warrant was required to use 
               these devices nor did the Court opine on whether or 
               not any of the warrant exceptions apply to the use of 
               a self-contained GPS tracking devices, courts and law 
               enforcement agencies are using different standards for 
               the use of these devices.

               AB 2055 would amend California law to require the use 
               of a warrant whenever a "slap-on" GPS tracking device 
               is used by law enforcement to monitor a motor 
               vehicle's movements, and to specifically authorize the 
               court to issue a warrant for the use of a "slap-on" 
               device.  The proposal would be modeled on Rule 
               41(e)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
               Procedure, which provides that law enforcement 
               officers have 10 days to execute the warrant after it 
               has been issued and then have 45 days from the date of 
               issuance to monitor the GPS tracking device.  Rule 
               41(e)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
               has withstood court challenge which would guarantee 

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               the constitutionality of our proposal.


           ASSEMBLY FLOOR  :  72-0, 5/3/12
          AYES:  Achadjian, Alejo, Allen, Ammiano, Atkins, Beall, 
            Bill Berryhill, Block, Blumenfield, Bradford, Brownley, 
            Buchanan, Butler, Charles Calderon, Campos, Carter, 
            Cedillo, Chesbro, Conway, Cook, Davis, Dickinson, 
            Donnelly, Eng, Feuer, Fong, Fuentes, Beth Gaines, 
            Galgiani, Garrick, Gatto, Gordon, Gorell, Grove, Hagman, 
            Halderman, Harkey, Hayashi, Hill, Huber, Hueso, Huffman, 
            Jeffries, Knight, Lara, Logue, Bonnie Lowenthal, Ma, 
            Mansoor, Mendoza, Miller, Mitchell, Monning, Morrell, 
            Nestande, Nielsen, Norby, Olsen, Pan, Perea, V. Manuel 
            P�rez, Portantino, Silva, Skinner, Solorio, Swanson, 
            Torres, Valadao, Wagner, Wieckowski, Yamada, John A. 
            P�rez
          NO VOTE RECORDED:  Bonilla, Fletcher, Furutani, Hall, Roger 
            Hern�ndez, Jones, Smyth, Williams


          RJG:n  8/7/12   Senate Floor Analyses 

                         SUPPORT/OPPOSITION:  SEE ABOVE

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