BILL ANALYSIS � 1
SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
ALEX PADILLA, CHAIR
SB 44 - Corbett Hearing Date:
April 5, 2011 S
As Amended: March 29, 2011 FISCAL B
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DESCRIPTION
Federal law and general orders of the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) require the commission to regulate gas
transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline facilities which
include investor-owned utilities, master-metered mobile home
parks, storage facilities, and propane operators.
Federal Law and general orders of the CPUC require that each gas
pipeline owner and operator to have an emergency plan in place
with specified components including written procedures to minimize
hazards resulting from pipeline emergencies, methods of receiving
notifications of emergencies, and communicating with emergency
responders.
Federal Law requires gas transmission pipeline owners and
operators to provide geospatial data to the Secretary of
Transportation (Secretary) for its transmission pipelines and to
update that data as required by the Secretary. The Secretary is
also permitted to provide technical assistance to state and local
officials to improve local response by adapting information
available through the National Pipeline Mapping System to software
used by emergency response personnel responding to pipeline
emergencies.
This bill defines a commission-regulated gas pipeline facility to
include transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline
facilities which include investor-owned utilities, master-metered
mobile home parks, storage facilities, and propane operators.
This bill requires the CPUC to commence a proceeding to establish
emergency response standards, which include emergency response
plans, to be followed by owners or operators of
commission-regulated gas pipeline facilities, in consultation with
the Office of Emergency Services, and first responders including
the California Fire Chiefs Association.
This bill requires the emergency response plans to include a
requirement that pipeline owners and operators provide the State
Fire Marshal and fire chiefs in the pipeline operator's territory
with geographic information system maps of the pipeline system
within the owner's or operator's control.
BACKGROUND
San Bruno Explosion - On the evening of September 9, 2010 a
30-inch natural gas transmission line ruptured in a residential
neighborhood in the City of San Bruno. The rupture caused an
explosion and fire which took the lives of eight people and
injured dozens more; destroyed 37 homes and damaged dozens more.
Gas service was also disrupted for 300 customers.
The pipeline in question is owned and operated by Pacific Gas &
Electric (PG&E) and originally built in 1948. In 1956 it was
relocated and rebuilt to accommodate new housing development. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in conjunction with
the CPUC was on scene within 24 hours to investigate the cause of
the explosion. Although preliminary elements of the investigation
have been detailed, a final report on causation is not expected
until at least fall.
There seemed to be a lack of coordination between the utility and
first responders to the explosion. Although PG&E control room
operators saw drops in gas pressure on the transmission pipeline
system and were also aware that there had been an explosion in San
Bruno, there was a delay in connecting the two occurrences.
Reports to the control room included speculation of an airplane
crash or gas station explosion.
First Responder Pipeline Knowledge - The Police Chief for San
Bruno recently testified before the NTSB, which is the lead agency
responsible for investigating the accident, and reported that
first responders were unaware that there was a transmission line
through the city until after the incident. His knowledge of the
pipelines before the incident was limited to that gained from some
type of regular orientation that PG&E had previously run where "it
was mentioned that there are two pipelines that run the peninsula,
transmission pipelines that go, essentially, through the freeway
corridors of 101 and 280." He also testified that no agency on
the peninsula had maps of the pipeline system and that they had
not accessed the National Pipeline Mapping System prior to the
accident. He acknowledged that they could have done that but it
is not clear whether they knew the maps/systems existed.
PG&E Outreach to First Responders - The San Bruno Fire Chief also
testified that they did work together with PG&E on a "routine
basis?on typical gas leak calls, electrical lines down, pole
fires, transformer fires?In the event of a pipeline, we really
don't have any direct training on pipeline training?So it's really
a basic course of?the procedures to take in case of a gas leak or
electrical failure to deny entry, cordon off the area, look for
any potential ignition sources and so forth, and obviously contact
PG&E."
The Fire Chief was asked about the type of communications or
coordination the fire department had with PG&E with respect to
emergency response coordination and communication. He responded
that "�p]rimarily, the communication was with line personnel.
There was no direct training with any of our command staff
officers" and that there was no communication between the senior
officers in the departments and their PG&E counterparts.
PG&E testified that annual meetings are usually held in the spring
for emergency response agencies and, for the Peninsula, they:
?have about, anywhere from you know, 13, 14 attendees up to
20?The public liaison meeting is intended to increase
partnership and coordination among the local group and the
local emergency response community, whether that be the fire
or police chiefs or the Office of Emergency Services located
in that local area. The kinds of things that they cover are
reviewing and looking upon those various incidents which have
occurred to understand what might have been learned, as well
as go over various aspects of gas and electric infrastructure
as it is high tech, if you may, at its basis and is very
complicated. And there is certainly a level of understanding
that we want to convey around that infrastructure.
However, PG&E also testified that "I think what we learned first
and foremost �from San Bruno] is that, within the emergency
response community there clearly needs to be a greater level of
engagement between the preparedness and the prevention aspects
within the company."
Rulemaking - In February the CPUC opened a rulemaking as part of a
forward-looking effort to establish a new model of natural gas
pipeline safety regulation applicable to all California pipelines.
Among the new rules that will likely be proposed is expanding
emergency and disaster planning coordination with local officials
and strengthening emergency response procedures.
The CPUC has taken notice that "when natural gas transmission
pipelines catastrophically fail, the public turns to local
emergency authorities - police, fire, ambulance - for immediate
assistance. These authorities would not necessarily be familiar
with the location and characteristics of natural gas transmission
and distribution pipelines. In this rulemaking, we will consider
whether we should require pipeline operators to do more for local
authorities, such as providing locational information, training,
special tools, designated utility contacts, or other support.
Mapping - The NTSB also received testimony from PG&E and the
National Association of State Fire Marshals that the National
Pipeline System database and mapping does exist which provides
emergency personnel with access to GIS based data sets that can be
either used online or downloaded to their own systems. If that
system was known to and utilized by first responders during the
San Bruno incident, they would have had access to maps showing the
location of Line 132 and other nearby transmission pipelines. The
San Bruno Fire Chief does not appear to have been aware of this
database and it is not apparent that PG&E included training on
access to the database as part of their liaison meetings with
emergency personnel.
COMMENTS
1. Author's Purpose . After the San Bruno incident the author
met with local fire chiefs who expressed a need for enhanced
communication and coordination with gas pipeline operators
before and during emergency events involving gas pipelines to
ensure that hazards are minimized. The issue was heightened
as greater attention was given to the location of natural gas
pipelines throughout the Bay Area, some of which are adjacent
to fault lines, and the risks associated with earthquakes.
2. Clarity of State Law & Scope of Jurisdiction . For decades
the CPUC has acted under federal law and its own general
order to regulate gas pipeline safety. However nowhere in
the CPUC's rules (e.g. General Order 112-E) or state law is
the scope of the CPUC's jurisdiction clear. As a
consequence, this bill and several others introduced this
year in the aftermath of San Bruno cite back to several
provisions of federal law to define the scope of the
infrastructure affected by the bills. These provisions
however lack transparency and may also result in the author's
intended effect of the bills (e.g. transmission lines) going
beyond the bill's actual affect (e.g. distribution lines and
gathering lines).
The author and committee may wish to amend this bill to
clearly define the infrastructure over which the CPUC has
jurisdiction via federal law to improve the transparency of
the measure and ensure that the bills have their intended
effect.
3. Scope of Response Plans Required . The mapping and
response plan requirements covered by this bill include
transmission, distribution, and gathering lines yet they do
not all pose the same level of threat to life and property.
Collectively these lines cover more than 110,000 miles and
3,200 mobile-home parks, propane operators and storage
facilities and emergency response plans are currently
required under federal law for the owners and operators of
these facilities.
The most significant challenge for emergency response
personnel are transmission pipelines of which there are more
than 10,000 miles in California. Because transmission
pipelines operate at higher pressures, they pose a greater
threat to life and property.
However, the requirements of this bill apply not only to
transmission and distribution pipelines but also to gathering
lines and 3,200 mobile-home parks, propane operators and
storage facilities. Because emergency response plans for
those are covered under federal law and the primary necessity
of emergency responders is transmission and distribution
lines, the author and committee may wish to consider
narrowing the bill to limit the heightened emergency response
plans and standards required by this bill to apply only to
transmission pipelines.
4. Access to Pipeline Mapping . This measure requires all
pipeline operators to provide the State Fire Marshal and all
fire chiefs in the utility's jurisdiction with GIS maps of
all pipelines under the control of the pipeline operator.
The NTSB hearings highlighted that the utilities are required
under federal law to provide transmission pipeline locations
for input into a National Mapping System which can then be
accessed online or interfaced with emergency response
systems. The problem highlighted at the NTSB hearings was
that first responders do not appear to be aware that the maps
exist.
Another issue raised by the bill is what pipeline mapping is
needed by first responders. The mapping language of this
bill currently applies to all pipelines - transmission,
distribution, gathering, mobilehome parks, storage facilities
and propane operators. The magnitude of the task associated
with mapping and creating a separate California database for
the non-transmission pipelines would be immense but the
utility not apparent. The greatest threat comes from
transmission lines because they are highly pressurized. The
author and committee may wish to consider amending this bill
to require that the emergency response standards adopted by
the CPUC address the need for first responders to be aware of
and how to utilize the National Mapping System.
5. CPUC Proceeding . This bill requires that the CPUC open
new rulemaking before July, 2012 to implement the provisions
of this bill. Because the CPUC has a rulemaking open, the
author and committee may wish to consider amending the bill
to permit the CPUC to expand an existing rulemaking to
address these issues.
POSITIONS
Sponsor:
California Fire Chiefs Association
Support:
Alameda County Fire Department
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
Big Bear City Fire Department
Butte County Fire Chiefs Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Professional Firefighters
California Public Utilities Commission (technical amendments)
Camp Park Fire and Emergency Services
City of Napa Fire Department
City of Rancho Cucamonga
Contra Costa County Fire Protection District
Culver City Fire Department
Humbolt No. 1 fire Protection District
Meeks Bay Fire Protection District
Modesto Fire Department
Napa County fire Department/Dry Creek-Lokoya Volunteers
North County Fire Authority
Pacific Gas & Electric
Redondo Beach Fire Department
Richmond Fire Department
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District
The Utility Reform Network (TURN)
Oppose:
None on file
Kellie Smith
SB 44 Analysis
Hearing Date: April 5, 2011