BILL ANALYSIS � 1
SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
ALEX PADILLA, CHAIR
SB 216 - Yee
Hearing Date: April 5, 2011 S
As Introduced: February 9, 2011 FISCAL B
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DESCRIPTION
Federal law and general orders of the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) require the commission to regulate
gas transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline facilities
which include investor-owned utilities, master-metered mobile
home parks, storage facilities, and propane operators.
This bill defines a commission-regulated gas pipeline facility
to include transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline
facilities which include investor-owned utilities,
master-metered mobile home parks, storage facilities, and
propane operators.
Federal Law and general orders of the CPUC set forth
requirements for the design, construction, testing, maintenance
and operation of utility gas gathering, transmission and
distribution piping systems.
Federal Law and general orders of the CPUC require that each
transmission line have sectionalized block valves placed at
specified intervals and in specified locations ranging from
every 2 miles to every 10 miles and classifies pipelines based
on the types of facilities that are within 220 yards of its
location as follows:
Class 1: an offshore area or location that has 10 or
fewer buildings intended for human occupancy;
Class 2: any location that has more than 10 but fewer
than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy;
Class 3: any location that has 46 or more buildings
intended for human occupancy; or an area where the pipeline
lies within 100 yards of either a building or a small,
well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation
area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly)
that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a
week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period.
Class 4: any location where buildings with four or more
stories above ground.
Federal law defines a High Consequence Area as an area including
all class 3 and class 4 locations and some class 1 and class 2
locations with unique circumstances related to surrounding
populated facilities.
This bill requires the CPUC to open a new, or expand an existing
proceeding, to determine whether increased safety measures
should be adopted for the enhancement of public safety for the
proximity of commission-regulated pipelines to pipelines that
carry water for fire suppression and the installation,
maintenance, location, and type of type of sectionalized block
valves used for commission-regulated pipelines.
This bill requires the CPUC to adopt standards that require the
installation of automatic shut-off or remote controlled
sectionalized block valves on all commission-regulated pipelines
that are located in a high consequence area or that traverse an
active seismic earthquake fault unless the commission determines
it is prohibited under federal law.
This bill requires that remotely controlled or automatic
shut-off valves be installed on all sectionalized block valves
for pipelines in High Consequence Areas and those that traverse
an active seismic earthquake fault and that the CPUC establish
action timelines and priorities for the installation of those
valves and ongoing procedures for monitoring the progress of
installation.
This bill designates the CPUC as the state authority for the
"811/Call Before You Dig" program established by the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation.
BACKGROUND
San Bruno Tragedy - On the evening of September 9, 2010 a
30-inch natural gas transmission line ruptured in a residential
neighborhood in the City of San Bruno. The rupture caused an
explosion and fire which took the lives of eight people and
injured dozens more; destroyed 37 homes and damaged dozens more.
Gas service was also disrupted for 300 customers.
The pipeline in question is owned and operated by Pacific Gas &
Electric (PG&E) and originally built in 1948. In 1956 it was
relocated and rebuilt to accommodate new housing development.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in conjunction
with the CPUC was on scene within 24 hours to investigate the
cause of the explosion. Although preliminary elements of the
investigation have been detailed, a final report on causation is
not expected until at least the fall.
Gas Transmission Pipeline Flow - The explosion created a
76-foot-long crater and the released natural gas ignited. A
28-foot segment of the pipeline (Line 132) was shattered out of
the ground and blasted about 100 feet away. Over an hour passed
before the valves were shut and the flow of gas stopped. The
explosion occurred at 6:11 p.m.; the upstream valve was closed
at 7:30 p.m.; and the downstream valve was closed at 7:45 p.m.
At about 7:42 p.m. flames at the rupture location had diminished
to the point that the firefighters were able to get closer to
the ruptured pipeline. Once the ruptured section was isolated
and the gas flow was stopped, the resulting fire from the
ruptured line self-extinguished. Later that evening, PG&E
isolated the natural gas distribution system serving residences
in the area, and within a minute of stopping the gas flow at
about 11:30 p.m., fires from escaping natural gas at damaged
houses went out.
The flows to Line 132 were controlled by manual valves which are
hand-operated by wheel and gear assembly or by a wrench with an
indicator to show whether it is open or closed. Many have
questioned whether other technologies such as automatic or
remotely-controlled valves should be in greater use so that gas
flows can be interrupted more quickly. After the San Bruno
explosion, PG&E was able to detect pressure changes in Line 132
from its control center but could not stop the flow of gas from
the center due to a lack of remotely-controlled valves which
necessitated the dispatch of a crew to manually stop the gas
flow. That crew was delayed due to traffic. However the
greatest factor in the delay to shut down the pipes was that the
utility did not know the cause of the explosion. PG&E control
room operators saw drops in gas pressure on the transmission
pipeline system and were also aware that there had been an
explosion in San Bruno but were unable to connect the two
occurrences for some time. Reports to the control room included
speculation of an airplane crash or gas station explosion.
Valves - Generally there are three types of valves used in
natural gas transmission pipelines: sectionalized block valves
which are manually controlled; remotely controlled valves which
can be opened and closed from a utility's gas control center;
and automatic valves which have programmed operating parameters.
When there is a deviation from those parameters (e.g. drop or
increase in gas flow) the valves will automatically close
without human direction.
Federal law specifies the location for sectionalized block
valves. State and Federal law are silent on remote and
automatic valves.
PG&E reports that its transmission pipeline system has tens of
thousands of valves. Approximately 2,600 are block valves. Of
these, about 200 are remotely or automatically controlled. At
hearings recently conducted by the NTSB PG&E also reported that
they have automatic and remote valves at compression stations,
pressure limiting stations, and storage facilities. They have
also installed them over seismic faults where we they feel that
there's a risk that could be mitigated by the use of the
automatic or remotely controlled valve in addition to bridge
crossings.
They further report that the cost to replace a block valve with
an automatic valve and the accompanying control mechanisms is
estimated to average $500,000 per valve and can range from
$150,000 to $1 million for a 24-inch valve.
Rulemaking - In February the CPUC opened a rulemaking to
consider rules rulemaking in a forward-looking effort to
establish a new model of natural gas pipeline safety regulation
applicable to California pipelines. Among the new rules that
will likely be proposed is to require operators to perform
evaluations for installing automatic or remote controlled valves
on transmission pipelines.
The CPUC has taken notice that when a transmission line fails,
it is important that an operator be able to respond in a timely
fashion to a failure, especially if the failure is in a High
Consequence Area. Long distances and availability of personnel
can impact response as it did in the San Bruno incident; delayed
response can result in loss of life and property damage. This
rule would require utilities to develop criteria for installing
either automatic or remotely controlled valves located in High
Consequence, Class 3 or Class 4 areas. Considerations must
include the location of the valve and the estimated response
times.
Independent Review Panel - On September 23, 2010, the CPUC
created an Independent Review Panel of experts to conduct a
comprehensive study and investigation of the September 9, 2010,
explosion and fire. The CPUC directed the panel to make a
technical assessment of the events, determine the root causes,
and offer recommendations for action by the CPUC to best ensure
such an accident is not repeated elsewhere. The CPUC encouraged
the panel to make such recommendations as necessary. Such
recommendations could include changes to design, construction,
operation, maintenance, and replacement of natural gas
facilities, management practices at PG&E in the areas of
pipeline integrity and public safety, regulatory changes by the
CPUC itself, and statutory changes to be recommended by the
CPUC.
COMMENTS
1. Author's Purpose . The author has two primary goals - to
establish standards to separate gas transmission pipelines
from water mains and to require the installation of
automatic or remotely-controlled valves on all pipelines
that cross an active seismic earthquake fault or are
located within a High Consequence Area.
To achieve this purpose and focus the scope of the bill on
addressing these two issues, the author has agreed to the
following technical and clarifying amendments:
Clarity of State Law & Scope of Jurisdiction - For
decades the CPUC has acted under federal law and its
own general order to regulate gas pipeline safety.
However nowhere in the CPUC's rules (e.g. General
Order 112-E) or state law is the scope of the CPUC's
jurisdiction clear. As a consequence, this bill and
several others introduced this year in the aftermath
of San Bruno cite back to several provisions of
federal law to define the scope of the infrastructure
affected by the bill. These provisions however lack
transparency and also may result in the author's
intended effect of the bills (e.g. transmission lines)
going beyond the bill's actual affect (e.g.
distribution lines and gathering lines). The
amendments will clearly define the infrastructure over
which the CPUC has jurisdiction via federal law to
improve the transparency of the measure and ensure
that the bills have their intended effect.
Scope of Bill; Types of Pipelines Affected - In its
current form, this bill applies to all pipelines
regulated by the CPUC which would include distribution
and gathering lines and storage facilities,
mobile-home parks and propane services. The focus of
concern since San Bruno has been on transmission
pipelines which carry extraordinary volumes of gas and
are highly pressurized. The amendments will narrow
the scope of this bill to apply only transmission
pipelines.
Commission Rulemakings - this bill directs the CPUC to
open a new proceeding to establish safety standards
for the installation of the automatic or remotely
controlled valves considering the differences in
pipeline sizes, proximity to critical areas and
similar issues. The need for a separate proceeding to
evaluate those issues is not necessary since the bill
will mandate the use of the automatic and remote
valves in specified locations. The amendments will
eliminate the requirement that the CPUC open that
proceeding.
811 Call Before You Dig - This bill directs the CPUC
to implement and enforce an 811/Call Before You Dig"
program. However, this program is up and running and
there is no evidence that it is not effective in its
purpose. The amendments will strike this provision.
2. Valve Locations . Federal law has detailed spatial and
location requirements for the installation manually
controlled valves which are referred to as sectionalized
block valves. With more than 10,000 miles of transmission
lines in the state the task of replacing a good portion of
these valves will be no small undertaking. The new
mechanisms (remote or automatic) will require excavation
and the installation of underground vaults at each location
many of which could pose an engineering and geographic
challenge. Additionally, the spatial and location mandates
for the sectionalized valves were based on an assumption
that most if not all of them would be manually controlled
and therefore would require closer proximity to ensure
greater access by utility personnel who have to be
dispatched to manually control them.
However, when those valves are retrofitted with remote or
automatic controls, the same spatial applications may not
be necessary in order to achieve the goals of this bill
which are to shut down gas flow as soon as possible in the
event of an emergency since that objective will now be
controlled from the utility's central control room or
automatically based on set parameters. The author and
committee may wish to consider allowing gas pipeline
operators to develop valve location plans for review and
approval by the CPUC which include proposals to vary the
locations of valves where engineering, geography, or other
circumstances necessitate a variance and would authorize
the CPUC to consider and approve those variations where
appropriate.
3. Related Federal Legislation . There are three measures
pending in Congress which also call for the installation of
automatic or remote valves on gas transmission pipelines:
H.R. 22 (Speier) requires that the U.S. Department of
Transportation adopt standards to require gas pipeline
operators to install and use automatic or remote shut
off valves to reduce risks in the event of rupture.
The standards would apply to all new pipelines and,
for existing pipelines, those located within 10 miles
of a significant earthquake fault or in a Class 3 or 4
location.
S. 234 (Feinstein/Boxer) requires the installation and
use in pipelines and pipeline facilities, wherever
technically and economically feasible, of remotely or
automatically controlled valves that are reliable and
capable of shutting off the flow of gas in the event
of an accident, including accidents in which there is
a loss of the primary power source.
S.275 (Lautenberg) requires the Secretary of
Transportation to adopt regulations within two years
that require the use of automatic or remote controlled
shut-off valves, or equivalent technology, where
economically, technically, and operationally feasible
on transmission pipelines constructed or entirely
replaced.
4. Related State Legislation . AB 56 (Hill) implements a
number of public safety measures with regard to natural gas
pipeline facilities, including requiring the owner or
operator of a gas pipeline to develop a public safety
program and a facilities modernization program, and
requiring the CPUC to track proposed repairs to gas
facilities to determine if the repairs were made.
POSITIONS
Sponsor:
Author
Support:
American Red Cross, California Chapters
California Professional Firefighters
California State Firefighters Association
Consumer Attorneys of California
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (if amended)
San Francisco Firefighters
San Mateo County Board of Supervisors
San Mateo County Community College District
San Mateo County Firefighters, IAFF Local 2400
Sempra Energy utilities (if amended)
Southern California Gas Company (if amended)
Oppose:
None on file
Kellie Smith
SB 216 Analysis
Hearing Date: April 5, 2011