BILL ANALYSIS �
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THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 216
Author: Yee (D)
Amended: 4/25/11
Vote: 21
SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES & COMM COMMITTEE : 11-0, 04/05/11
AYES: Padilla, Fuller, Berryhill, Corbett, De Le�n,
DeSaulnier, Pavley, Rubio, Simitian, Strickland, Wright
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : 8-0, 05/26/11
AYES: Kehoe, Walters, Alquist, Lieu, Pavley, Price,
Runner, Steinberg
NO VOTE RECORDED: Emmerson
SUBJECT : Public utilities: intrastate natural gas
pipeline safety
SOURCE : Author
DIGEST : This bill designates the Public Utilities
Commission as the state authority responsible for
regulating and enforcing intrastate gas pipeline
transportation and pipeline facilities pursuant to federal
law, including the development, submission, and
administration of a state pipeline safety program
certification for natural gas pipelines. This bill
requires the commission to evaluate current practices and
to determine whether compatible transmission safety
standards, as defined, should be adopted for the
enhancement of public safety with respect to the proximity
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of pipelines carrying liquid materials to
commission-regulated gas pipeline facilities, as defined,
that are intrastate transmission lines, as defined. This
bill requires the commission, unless it determines that
doing so is preempted under federal law, to require the
installation of automatic shut-off or remote controlled
sectionalized block valves on intrastate transmission lines
that are located in a high consequence area, as defined, or
that traverse an active seismic earthquake fault if the
commission determines those valves are necessary for the
protection of the public. This bill requires the owner or
operator of a commission-regulated gas pipeline facility
that is an intrastate transmission line to provide the
commission with a valve location plan, along with any
recommendations for valve locations, and would authorize
the commission to make modifications to the valve location
plan.
ANALYSIS : Federal law and general orders of the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) require the
commission to regulate gas transmission, distribution and
gathering pipeline facilities which include investor-owned
utilities, master-metered mobile home parks, storage
facilities, and propane operators.
Federal Law and general orders of the CPUC set forth
requirements for the design, construction, testing,
maintenance and operation of utility gas gathering,
transmission and distribution piping systems.
Federal Law and general orders of the CPUC require that
each transmission line have sectionalized block valves
placed at specified intervals and in specified locations
ranging from every 2 miles to every 10 miles and
classifies pipelines based on the types of facilities that
are within 220 yards of its location as follows:
Class 1: an offshore area or location that has 10 or fewer
buildings intended
for human occupancy;
Class 2: any location that has more than 10 but fewer than
46 buildings
intended for human occupancy;
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Class 3: any location that has 46 or more buildings
intended for human
occupancy; or an area where the pipeline
lies within 100 yards of
either a building or a small, well-defined
outside area (such as a
playground, recreation area, outdoor
theater, or other place of
public assembly) that is occupied by 20 or
more persons on at least
5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month
period.
Class 4: any location where buildings with four or more
stories above
ground.
Federal law defines a High Consequence Area as an area
including all class 3 and class 4 locations and some class
1 and class 2 locations with unique circumstances related
to surrounding populated facilities.
This bill
1.Defines a commission-regulated gas pipeline facility to
include transmission, distribution and gathering pipeline
facilities which include investor-owned utilities,
master-metered mobile home parks, storage facilities, and
propane operators.
2.Requires each owner or operator of a commission-regulated
gas pipeline facility that is an intrastate transmission
line to provide the commission with a valve location
plan, along with any recommendations for valve locations.
The commission may make modifications to the valve
location plan or provide for variations from any location
requirements adopted by the commission pursuant to this
section that it deems necessary or appropriate and
consistent with protection of the public.
3.Requires the Public Utilities Commission to require
operators of natural gas transmission pipelines to
install automatic or remote-controlled shut off valves on
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natural gas pipelines in areas of high population density
or which cross active seismic faults. Pipeline operators
are authorized under the bill to recover the costs of
these upgrades from natural gas ratepayers.
4.Requires the commission to additionally establish action
timelines, adopt standards for how to prioritize
installation of automatic shut-off or remote controlled
sectionalized bock vales, ensure that remote and
automatic shut-off valves are installed as quickly as is
reasonably possible, and establish ongoing procedures for
monitoring progress in achieving the requirements of the
bill.
5.Designates the CPUC as the state authority for the
"811/Call Before You Dig" program established by the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation.
Background
Gas Transmission Pipeline Flow . The explosion created a
76-foot-long crater and the released natural gas ignited.
A 28-foot segment of the pipeline (Line 132) was shattered
out of the ground and blasted about 100 feet away. Over an
hour passed before the valves were shut and the flow of gas
stopped. The explosion occurred at 6:11 p.m.; the upstream
valve was closed at 7:30 p.m.; and the downstream valve was
closed at 7:45 p.m. At about 7:42 p.m. flames at the
rupture location had diminished to the point that the
firefighters were able to get closer to the ruptured
pipeline. Once the ruptured section was isolated and the
gas flow was stopped, the resulting fire from the ruptured
line self-extinguished. Later that evening, PG&E isolated
the natural gas distribution system serving residences in
the area, and within a minute of stopping the gas flow at
about 11:30 p.m., fires from escaping natural gas at
damaged houses went out.
The flows to Line 132 were controlled by manual valves
which are hand-operated by wheel and gear assembly or by a
wrench with an indicator to show whether it is open or
closed. Many have questioned whether other technologies
such as automatic or remotely-controlled valves should be
in greater use so that gas flows can be interrupted more
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quickly. After the San Bruno explosion, PG&E was able to
detect pressure changes in Line 132 from its control center
but could not stop the flow of gas from the center due to a
lack of remotely-controlled valves which necessitated the
dispatch of a crew to manually stop the gas flow. That
crew was delayed due to traffic. However the greatest
factor in the delay to shut down the pipes was that the
utility did not know the cause of the explosion. PG&E
control room operators saw drops in gas pressure on the
transmission pipeline system and were also aware that there
had been an explosion in San Bruno but were unable to
connect the two occurrences for some time. Reports to the
control room included speculation of an airplane crash or
gas station explosion.
For more information on the San Bruno tragedy, see the
Senate Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee
analysis.
Related Federal Legislation
There are three measures pending in Congress which also
call for the installation of automatic or remote valves on
gas transmission pipelines.
Related State Legislation
AB 56 (Hill), 2010-11 Session, implements a number of
public safety measures with regard to natural gas pipeline
facilities, including requiring the owner or operator of a
gas pipeline to develop a public safety program and a
facilities modernization program, and requiring the CPUC to
track proposed repairs to gas facilities to determine if
the repairs were made.
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes
Local: Yes
According to Senate Appropriations Committee:
Fiscal Impact (in
thousands)
Major Provisions 2011-12 2012-13
2013-14 Fund
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Development of standards $240
Special*
Increased natural gas costs Likely in the low
millions over Various
to state agencies the next several
years
* Public Utilities Commission Utilities Reimbursement
Account
SUPPORT : (Verified 5/27/11)
American Red Cross, California Chapters
Board of Supervisors, San Mateo County
California Emergency Nurses Association
California Professional Firefighters
California State Firefighters Association
Consumer Attorneys of California
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (if amended)
San Francisco Firefighters
San Mateo County Board of Supervisors
San Mateo County Community College District
San Mateo County Firefighters, IAFF Local 2400
Sempra Energy utilities
Southern California Gas Company
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : According to the author's office,
this bill has two primary goals, to establish standards to
separate gas transmission pipelines from water mains and to
require the installation of automatic or
remotely-controlled valves on all pipelines that cross an
active seismic earthquake fault or are located within a
High Consequence Area.
RM:rm 5/31/11 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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