BILL ANALYSIS �
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair A
2013-2014 Regular Session B
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AB 1276 (Bloom) 6
As Introduced May 24, 2013
Hearing date: July 2, 2013
Penal Code
MK:jr
PAROLE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS
HISTORY
Source: Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Prior Legislation: SB 9 (Yee) - Chap. 828, Stats. 2012
SB 399 (Yee) - 2010, failed on Assembly floor
SB 999 (Yee) - 2008, died on Senate floor
SB 1223 (Kuehl) - 2004, died on
Assembly Suspense
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California
Mental Health Directors Association; National
Association of Social Workers California Chapter;
Riverside Sheriffs' Association; Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs; Los Angeles Police Protective
League; Los Angeles Probation Officers Union, AFSCME,
Local 685
Opposition:Human Rights Watch (unless amended); Youth Law
Center; Legal Services for Prisoners with Children;
Friends Committee on Legislation of California;
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Assembly Floor Vote: Ayes 47 - Noes 27
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KEY ISSUE
SHOULD A PERSON WHO WAS SENTENCED AS A JUVENILE BE ELIGIBLE FOR
PAROLE AFTER SERVING 20 OR 25 YEARS, DEPENDING ON THE LENGTH OF
ORIGINAL SENTENCE?
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to provide that a person who was
convicted of a non-homicide offense that was committed before
the person had attained 18 years of age shall be eligible for
consideration for parole after serving 25 years in prison, or if
the person was sentenced to less than 40 years of imprisonment
the person shall be eligible for parole consideration after
serving 20 years.
Existing law provides that minors age 14 and older can be
subject to prosecution in adult criminal court depending upon
their alleged offense and their criminal offense history.
(Welfare and Institutions Code ("WIC") �� 602(b); 707.)
Existing law contains three discrete mechanisms for remanding
minors to adult criminal court for prosecution:
Statutory or legislative waiver requires that minors 14 years
of age or older who are alleged to have committed specified
murder and sex offenses be prosecuted in adult criminal court
(i.e., the juvenile court has no jurisdiction over these
cases) (WIC � 602 (a));
Prosecutorial waiver gives prosecutors the discretion to file
cases against minors 14 and older, depending upon their age,
alleged offense and offense history, in juvenile or adult
criminal court (WIC � 707 (d)); and
Judicial waiver gives courts the discretion to evaluate
whether a minor is unfit for juvenile court based on specified
criteria and applicable rebuttable presumptions. (WIC � 707
(a), (b) and (c).)
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Existing law provides that if a prosecution is commenced
against a minor as a criminal case as a "direct file" case -
that is, through either statutory waiver or prosecutorial
waiver - and the minor is convicted of a "direct file"
offense, the minor is required to be sentenced as an adult.
(Penal Code � 1170.17 (a).) Minors who have been convicted in
criminal court of lesser offenses for which they still would
have been eligible for transfer to adult court may be able to
seek a juvenile disposition instead of a criminal sentence
through a post-conviction fitness proceeding. (Penal Code �
1170.17 (b) and (c).) Minors who are convicted in adult
criminal court of offenses for which they would not have been
eligible for adult court prosecution had a petition first been
filed in juvenile court are subject to a juvenile disposition.
(Penal Code �� 1170.17 (d); 1170.19.)
Existing law provides that, these post-conviction proceedings
are not available to minors who are convicted after they have
been remanded to criminal court from the juvenile court pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707 (a) or (c).
Existing law provides, with some exceptions, that when a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has
served at least 15 years of that sentence, the defendant may
submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing and sets forth the requirements for filing and
granting such a petition. (Penal Code � 1170 (d) (2).)
This bill provides that a person who was convicted of a
nonhomicide offense that was committed before the person had
attained 18 years of age shall be eligible for consideration for
parole after serving 25 years in prison or 20 years in prison if
the sentence was less than 40 years.
This bill contains codified intent language stating that it is
the intent of the Legislature to provide a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release according to the standards set
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forth by the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero
(2012)55 Cal 4th 262.
This bill provides that it does not prohibit the imposition of a
life sentence for juveniles convicted of homicide and does not
prohibit or modify the parole procedures for adult offenders.
This section does not limit the access of juvenile offenders to
other programs and appeals that they were eligible for prior to
the enactment of this section.
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in California's
prisons has been the focus of evolving and expensive litigation
relating to conditions of confinement. On May 23, 2011, the
United States Supreme Court ordered California to reduce its
prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two
years from the date of its ruling, subject to the right of the
state to seek modifications in appropriate circumstances.
Beginning in early 2007, Senate leadership initiated a policy to
hold legislative proposals which could further aggravate the
prison overcrowding crisis through new or expanded felony
prosecutions. Under the resulting policy known as "ROCA" (which
stands for "Receivership/ Overcrowding Crisis Aggravation"), the
Committee held measures which created a new felony, expanded the
scope or penalty of an existing felony, or otherwise increased
the application of a felony in a manner which could exacerbate
the prison overcrowding crisis. Under these principles, ROCA
was applied as a content-neutral, provisional measure necessary
to ensure that the Legislature did not erode progress towards
reducing prison overcrowding by passing legislation which would
increase the prison population. ROCA necessitated many hard and
difficult decisions for the Committee.
In January of 2013, just over a year after the enactment of the
historic Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, the State of
California filed court documents seeking to vacate or modify the
federal court order issued by the Three-Judge Court three years
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earlier to reduce the state's prison population to 137.5 percent
of design capacity. The State submitted in part that the, ". .
. population in the State's 33 prisons has been reduced by over
24,000 inmates since October 2011 when public safety realignment
went into effect, by more than 36,000 inmates compared to the
2008 population . . . , and by nearly 42,000 inmates since 2006
. . . ." Plaintiffs, who opposed the state's motion, argue in
part that, "California prisons, which currently average 150% of
capacity, and reach as high as 185% of capacity at one prison,
continue to deliver health care that is constitutionally
deficient." In an order dated January 29, 2013, the federal
court granted the state a six-month extension to achieve the
137.5 % prisoner population cap by December 31st of this year.
In an order dated April 11, 2013, the Three-Judge Court denied
the state's motions, and ordered the state of California to
"immediately take all steps necessary to comply with this
Court's . . . Order . . . requiring defendants to reduce overall
prison population to 137.5% design capacity by December 31,
2013."
The ongoing litigation indicates that prison capacity and
related issues concerning conditions of confinement remain
unresolved. However, in light of the real gains in reducing the
prison population that have been made, although even greater
reductions are required by the court, the Committee will review
each ROCA bill with more flexible consideration. The following
questions will inform this consideration:
whether a measure erodes realignment;
whether a measure addresses a crime which is directly
dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there
is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
whether a bill corrects a constitutional infirmity or
legislative drafting error;
whether a measure proposes penalties which are
proportionate, and cannot be achieved through any other
reasonably appropriate remedy; and
whether a bill addresses a major area of public safety
or criminal activity for which there is no other
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reasonable, appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Graham v. Florida that the Constitution prohibits
giving a life without parole sentence to a juvenile
offender who did not commit a homicide, and found that
if a State imposes a life sentence, it must provide the
defendant with a reasonable opportunity to obtain
release before the end of that term. After hearing
People v. Caballero in 2012, the California Supreme
Court urged the Legislature "to enact legislation
establishing a parole eligibility mechanism that
provides a defendant serving a de facto life sentence
without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide
offense that he or she committed as a juvenile with the
opportunity to obtain release on a showing of
rehabilitation and maturity."
Last year, SB 9 (Yee) specified that juveniles with
LWOP sentences may petition the trial court after
serving 15 years to have their sentences reduced to 25
years to life. However, there is no similar procedure
for juveniles who have received de facto life sentence
for non-homicide offenses. AB 1276 seeks to give a
juvenile who is convicted of a non-homicide offense the
same consideration for parole as a juvenile sentenced
to life without possibility of parole for murder and
granted a new sentence under SB 9.
2. Life or Effectively Life Sentences for Juveniles
In Graham v. Florida (2010) 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 the
Supreme Court held that it is cruel and unusual punishment to
sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole
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for a non-homicide case. The Court found that the rareness of
such a sentence showed:
A national consensus has developed against a life
without parole sentence for one who was a juvenile when
the non-homicide crime was committed. Although the
sentence is permitted in many states, it is currently
being served by only 123 persons, and the majority of
those persons are in Florida. These numbers
demonstrate that the sentence is rare enough to be
considered cruel and unusual. (130 S.Ct. 2026, 176
L.Ed.2d 841.) Although international practice is in no
way controlling, it is worth noting that the United
States is the only country that imposes life without
parole sentences on juvenile non-homicide offenders.
(130 S.Ct. 2033, 176 L.Ed.2d 849.)
The consensus alone is not determinative. The
culpability of the offender is also an important
consideration. As Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S.
551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1, supra, �500,
recognized, juveniles are less deserving of the most
severe punishment. Compared to adults, juveniles have
a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility; they are more vulnerable to negative
influences and outside pressures, and their characters
are not as well formed. Yet a juvenile, punished at a
young age, will generally serve more years in prison
than an adult who receives a life term. (130 S.Ct.
2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 843.) The goals of retribution,
deterrence, and rehabilitation are not advanced or
sufficiently justified by so harsh a sentence. (130
S.Ct. 2028, 2029, 176 L.Ed.2d 843, 844.)
? Nevertheless, the state is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom for a juvenile convicted of a
non-homicide crime. What it must do is give such
defendants "some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation." (130 S.Ct. 2030, L.Ed.2d 846.)
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Defendant's sentence, as it stands, would guarantee
that he will die in prison without such an opportunity,
no matter what he might do to demonstrate that he is
fit to rejoin society. (130 S.Ct. 2032, 176 L.Ed.2d
848.) (See People v. Mendez (2010) 188 C.A.4th 47, 62,
114 C.R.3d 870 [under rationale of Graham, juvenile's
sentence in non-homicide case to term of years that,
after allowance for conduct reductions, would exceed
his life expectancy, is de facto life without parole
sentence and unconstitutional]; 124 Harv. L. Rev. 209
[Graham].) (3 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Punishment � 511)
The Supreme Court again looked at the issue of juveniles
sentenced to life without parole in Miller v. Alabama (2012)132
S. Ct. 2455 and found that a mandatory life without parole
sentence for a juvenile in a homicide was also cruel and unusual
punishment.
Graham also likened life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles to the death penalty. That decision
recognized that life-without-parole sentences "share
some characteristics with death sentences that are
shared by no other sentences." 560 U.S., at ___, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825. And it treated life
without parole for juveniles like this Court's cases
treat the death penalty, imposing a categorical bar on
its imposition for non-homicide offenses. By likening
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles to the
death penalty, Graham makes relevant this Court's cases
demanding individualized sentencing in capital cases.
In particular, those cases have emphasized that
sentencers must be able to consider the mitigating
qualities of youth. In light of Graham's reasoning,
these decisions also show the flaws of imposing
mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juvenile
homicide offenders. Pp. ___ - ___, 183 L. Ed. 2d, at
417-424. (Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459
(U.S. 2012).)
Relying on Miller, the California Supreme Court in People v.
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Caballero found that in a non-homicide case a sentence of 110
years imposed on a juvenile is the legal equivalent of life
without parole. (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal 4th 262.)
Consistent with the high court's holding in Graham,
supra, 560 U.S. ___ [130 S. Ct. 2011], we conclude that
sentencing a juvenile offender for a non-homicide
offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility
date that falls outside the juvenile offender's natural
life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Although proper authorities may later determine that
youths should remain incarcerated for their natural
lives, the state may not deprive them at sentencing of
a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their
rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the
future. Under Graham's non-homicide ruling, the
sentencing court must consider all mitigating
circumstances attendant in the juvenile's crime and
life, including but not limited to his or her
chronological age at the time of the crime, whether the
juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator or an aider
and abettor, and his or her physical and mental
development, so that it can impose a time when the
juvenile offender will be able to seek parole from the
parole board. The Board of Parole Hearings will then
determine whether the juvenile offender must be
released from prison "based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation." (560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S. Ct.
at p. 2030].) Defendants who were sentenced for crimes
they committed as juveniles who seek to modify life
without parole or equivalent de facto sentences already
imposed may file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
in the trial court in order to allow the court to weigh
the mitigating evidence in determining the extent of
incarceration required before parole hearings. Because
every case will be different, we will not provide trial
courts with a precise timeframe for setting these
future parole hearings in a non-homicide case.
However, the sentence must not violate the defendant's
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Eighth Amendment rights and must provide him or her a
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" under
Graham's mandate. (People v. Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th
262, 268-269 (Cal. 2012).)
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The California 4th District Court of Appeal applied the
reasoning from Miller and Caballero to a homicide case where the
defendant was sentenced to 196 years:
Satterwhite claims his sentence of 196 years to life
should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded
for further proceedings, in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Miller, supra, 567
U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455], which held that, in
homicide cases, the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment set forth in the Eighth Amendment to the
federal Constitution prohibits the imposition of a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of
parole on a juvenile offender. (Miller, 567 U.S. at p.
___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2469]; see People v. Caballero
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, fn. 4 [145 Cal. Rptr. 3d
286, 282 P.3d 291 v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262,
268, fn. 4 [145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 282 P.3d 291]
(Caballero).) We agree. (People v. Thomas, 211 Cal.
App. 4th 987, 1013-1014 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2012).)
After Caballero, it is clear that more prisoners with long
sentences they received for a crime committed before they were
18 will bring writs of habeas corpus on the basis of cruel and
unusual punishment. This will lead courts to look at them on a
case by case basis.
3. Parole Process
This bill provides that a person who was sentenced when they
were under 18 shall be eligible for parole after 20 years if
the sentence was less than 40 years and after 25 year if it
the sentence was 40 years or more. The bill codifies that
it is the intent of the Legislature to provide a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release according to the standards set
forth in Caballero.
a. Time frame
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Is parole after 20 or 25 years appropriate? A person
convicted of second degree murder is eligible for parole
in 15 years; murder is excluded from this bill, should a
person who has committed something less than a 2nd degree
murder be eligible for parole at 15 years? A person who
committed 1st degree murder can be eligible at 25 years?
Is this length of time appropriate for a person sentenced
to a non-murder prior to their 18th birthday? What is the
appropriate time for a parole hearing to take place?
b. Timing of hearing
Should the bill clarify that a hearing should take place
prior to the eligibility date so that the case can be
decided prior to the eligibility date so that the person
can actually be released when eligible?
c. Standards for parole
Opponents to this bill express concerns that the existing
parole process will not provide meaningful review and the
current parole process does not take into the type of
considerations outlined in Caballero. Should this bill
specifically list mitigating factors that should be
considered by the Board of Prison Terms when considering
parole of an individual under this bill? If specific
mitigating factors are listed, should the bill also list
aggravating factors so the Board of Prison Terms has
parameters in which to consider these cases?
d. Actual release
In order to provide a meaningful review, the Board of
Prison Terms will actually have to truly consider whether
or not these inmates who were under 18 when they committed
their crimes still are a danger to society. Should the
bill specifically state that a person should be released
unless the Board finds that the person poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from
incarceration?
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4. SB 260 (Hancock)
SB 260 (Hancock) which passed this Committee on April 9,
2013, (4-2), and will be heard in Assembly Public Safety on
July 2 also creates a process following the Caballero case.
As it left the Senate, the bill created a court process. As
recently amended, it is similar to this bill in that it
creates a parole process. The authors and sponsors of this
bill and SB 260, as well as policy and fiscal staff from
both houses, have been working on amending both bills to set
up the appropriate process in response to the Caballero
bill. The intent is that both bills will be identical as to
the non-homicide cases, and SB 260 will also address
homicide cases when they leave the Appropriations
Committees.
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