BILL ANALYSIS �
AB 1836
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Date of Hearing: April 22, 2014
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND REDISTRICTING
Paul Fong, Chair
AB 1836 (Jones) - As Amended: March 11, 2014
SUBJECT : Vote by mail ballots.
SUMMARY : Requires a person who is returning a vote by mail
(VBM) ballot for another voter to sign a roster and to provide
specified information when returning that ballot. Specifically,
this bill :
1)Requires a VBM identification envelope to contain the
residence address of any person who has been authorized by the
voter to return the VBM ballot.
2)Requires an elections official to provide each polling place
with a blank roster for recording the following information
from each person returning a VBM ballot:
a) The name of the VBM voter;
b) The name of the person authorized by the voter to return
the VBM ballot;
c) The signature of the person authorized by the voter to
return the VBM ballot;
d) The residence address of the person authorized by the
voter to return the VBM ballot; and,
e) The relationship to the voter of the person authorized
by the voter to return the VBM ballot.
3)Requires the voter or person authorized by the voter to return
the VBM ballot, before returning a VBM ballot to an elections
official or a member of the precinct board, to fill in the
information required above and requires the person authorized
by the voter to return the VBM ballot to present proof of his
or her identity and residency that must match his or her name
and residence address printed on the identification envelope.
4)Requires that the proof of identity and residency consist of a
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current and valid photographic identification or a copy of a
current utility bill, bank statement, government check,
paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and
address of the person. Requires an elections official or
precinct board member, if a person is unable to present proof
of his or her identity or residency, to contact the voter to
verify that the person is authorized to return the voter's VBM
ballot. Prohibits a voter's VBM ballot from being counted
unless the person returning the ballot presents proof of
identity and residency or the elections official or precinct
board member verifies that the person is authorized to return
the ballot.
5)Requires the roster to be preserved with other elections
documents.
EXISTING LAW :
1)Requires that an application for a VBM ballot be made in
writing to the elections official having jurisdiction over the
election between the 29th and the 7th day prior to the
election.
2)Permits a VBM voter who is unable to return his or her VBM
ballot to designate his or her spouse, child, parent,
grandparent, grandchild, sibling, or a person residing in the
same household as the VBM voter to return the voter's VBM
ballot to the elections official from whom it came or to the
precinct board at a polling place within the jurisdiction.
3)Prohibits a VBM ballot from being returned by a paid or
volunteer worker of a general purpose committee, controlled
committee, independent expenditure committee, political party,
candidate's campaign committee, or any other group or
organization at whose behest the individual designated to
return the ballot is performing a service. Provides this
prohibition does not apply to a candidate or candidate's
spouse.
4)Requires a VBM identification envelope to contain spaces,
which must contain the name, relationship to the voter, and
signature of the person who is authorized to return the VBM
ballot for another voter. Provides that a VBM ballot shall
not be counted if it is not delivered pursuant to existing
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law.
5)Provides that any person who votes more than once, attempts to
vote more than once, or impersonates or attempts to
impersonate a voter at an election is guilty of a crime
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months
or two or three years, or in county jail not exceeding one
year.
6)Provides that every person who defrauds any voter at any
election by deceiving and causing him or her to vote for a
different person for any office than he or she intended or
desired to vote for is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two or three
years.
FISCAL EFFECT : Unknown. State-mandated local program; contains
reimbursement direction.
COMMENTS :
1)Purpose of the Bill : According to the author:
As we seek to expand voter participation and make it ever
easier for people to register and vote, we also increase
opportunities for fraud. Therefore, while the goal of
increasing the participation of the electorate is
important, it must also be balanced with the other
safeguards to protect the integrity of our voting system.
This concern was voiced by former Gov. Gray Davis when he
vetoed a bill that would have allowed VBM voters'
co-workers or friends to return their ballots to the polls.
Gov. Davis noted that "this bill would weaken the most
important safeguard against fraud by allowing virtually
anyone to handle an official ballot on behalf of the
voter."
Governor Davis' concerns about the susceptibility of VBM
ballots to fraud were also shared by the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform in 2001, a
bi-partisan commission of election experts co-chaired by
former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford. The
Commission issued a number of recommendations for reforming
the electoral process in the U.S, but it specifically
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discouraged the growing use of no-fault absentee balloting.
"Growing use of absentee voting has turned this area of
voting into the most likely opportunity for election fraud
now encountered by law enforcement officials. These cases
are especially difficult to prosecute, since the misuse of
a voter's ballot or the pressure on voters occurs away from
the polling place or any other outside scrutiny. These
opportunities for abuse should be contained, not enlarged."
The Commission noted that VBM ballots increase
opportunities for ballot box stuffing schemes, one of the
oldest and most frequently practiced forms of vote fraud,
citing cases in which persons had fraudulently voted
absentee ballots without the knowledge of voters, or had
voted them on behalf of vulnerable persons such as nursing
home residents.
In California, a policeman for the City of Bell informed
the FBI and the Secretary of State that city officials had
ordered off-duty police officers to provide VBM ballots to
voters and to instruct residents how to vote. He also
asserted that ballots were filled out for people who were
dead. Other Bell residents complained that city officials
walked door-to-door encouraging them to fill out VBM
ballots. In one case, a woman said she signed papers she
had been told were election paperwork, but when she went to
the polls on Election Day, records showed that she had
already voted absentee. Two other voters said that two
council members came to their homes urging them to fill out
VBM ballots. The voters did - and a few weeks later the
council members collected the ballots, saying that they
would personally submit them.
The illegal VBM ballot harvesting in Bell was especially
harmful to its citizenry because VBM ballots supplied most
of the votes cast in a 2005 special election that cleared
the way for Bell City Council members to significantly
increase their own salaries. The high salaries
subsequently paid to top administrators - including nearly
$800,000 for the former city manager - sparked widespread
outrage and criminal charges.
Further, in 2001, a court annulled the results of a Compton
City Council election after it found that the winning
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candidate had illegally registered non-citizens to vote,
told them how to vote, was present when they voted,
harvested their VBM ballots, and then delivered the ballots
to the polls. This vote fraud never would have been
uncovered except for the fact that the incumbent mayor
contested the related mayoral election, which was on the
same ballot, after losing by less than 300 votes.
Although current law limits the persons who may deliver a
VBM voter's ballot to the polls and prohibits candidates
and campaigns from doing this, these safeguards are
impossible to enforce in actual practice. When third
parties show up at a polling place with one or two, or even
a boxful of VBM ballots, they are not asked who they are,
whether they were authorized by the voter, or whether they
are working for a campaign. As we have seen, illegal VBM
harvesting is most likely to be performed by persons
associated with political candidates and parties.
AB 1836 cannot stop all the forms of fraud associated with
VBM ballots. But it will go a long way to prevent the kind
of illegal VBM ballot harvesting schemes we have seen in
Bell and Compton, by ensuring that persons who deliver VBM
ballots to polling places are properly authorized by the
voters in question to handle their ballots. It will also
provide a paper trail as to the identity of these persons,
should any questions arise regarding their qualifications.
2)Current Practice : Under current law, a person that is unable
to return his or her VBM ballot is permitted to designate his
or her spouse, child, parent, grandparent, grandchild,
sibling, or a person residing in the same household as the VBM
voter to return the voter's VBM ballot to the elections
official from whom it came or to the precinct board at a
polling place within the jurisdiction. Additionally, existing
law requires the designated person to provide his or her name,
relationship to the voter, and his or her signature on the VBM
identification envelope and provides that a ballot shall not
be counted if it is not delivered in compliance with the law.
This bill makes changes to this practice and requires a
designated person, when returning the VBM ballot to a polling
place, to also fill out a roster and provide his or her name,
the name of the VBM voter, the signature of the authorized
person, the residence address of the authorized person, and
his or her relationship to the voter. In addition, an
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authorized person must also show proof of identity and
residency. This bill prohibits a voter's VBM ballot from
being counted unless the person returning the ballot presents
proof of identity and residency. Moreover, if the authorized
person is unable to show proof of identity and residency, this
bill prohibits the ballot from being counted unless the
elections official or precinct board member verifies that the
person is authorized to return the ballot. In other words,
this bill could require a VBM ballot to be rejected through no
fault of the voter if the person who is returning the VBM
ballot fails to comply with any of the provisions of this
bill.
3)Existing Penalties : Current law provides for a variety of
safeguards in law to protect against voter fraud and abuse.
Existing law makes it a felony for any person who defrauds any
voter at any election by deceiving and causing him or her to
vote for a different person for any office than the candidate
for whom he or she intended or desired to vote. As mentioned
above, current law also provides that a VBM ballot returned by
an authorized voter will not be counted unless the designated
person provides his or her name, signature and relationship to
the voter on the VBM ballot identification envelope.
Moreover, once the ballot is received by the elections official,
California law requires the elections officials to compare the
signature on a VBM ballot envelope with the signature on that
voter's affidavit of registration before the VBM ballot may be
counted. If those signatures do not match, the ballot will
not be counted. A person who casts a fraudulent VBM ballot at
an election can be charged with a number of different
felonies, any one of which is punishable by up to three years
in state prison.
Furthermore, the Legislature has taken steps recently to address
the potential for fraud in connection with VBM ballots. For
example, many elders in state-licensed or state-subsidized
facilities or programs have physical and cognitive impairments
or conditions that may limit their ability to independently
cast a vote. As a result, many elders choose to vote via VBM
ballot. As a result of the high use of VBM ballots in this
population, some questions and concerns have arisen regarding
the influence elders are receiving from caregivers in the
receipt, completion, and return of their ballots. In response
to those concerns, the Legislature approved and the Governor
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signed AB 547 (Gatto), Chapter 260, Statutes of 2011, which
makes it a misdemeanor for a person who is providing care or
direct supervision to an elder in a state-licensed or
state-subsidized facility or program to coerce or deceive the
elder into voting for or against a candidate or measure
contrary to the elder's intent or in the absence of any intent
of the elder to cast a vote for or against that candidate or
measure.
4)Is There a Problem ? In the background information provided by
the author's office, the author argues that the current
election system is susceptible to fraud and abuse, especially
for VBM ballots. According to the author, due to the
separation of both ballot and voter from the polling place, a
VBM ballot is vulnerable to the possibility of voter coercion
and intimidation. The author provides three examples specific
to California that the author argues demonstrate the need for
this bill. According to the author, a House of
Representatives investigation revealed that a 1996
congressional election in Orange County included 748 votes
that had been cast illegally, including 624 votes cast by
non-citizens and 124 invalid VBM ballots. In addition, in
2001 a court annulled the results of Compton City Council
election after it found that the winning candidate had
illegally registered non-citizens, told them how to vote, was
present when they voted, harvested their VBM ballots, and then
delivered the ballots to the polls. Finally, it was alleged
that in 2009 illegal VBM ballot harvesting took place in the
City of Bell, where allegedly ballots were filled out for
people who were dead, voters were told how to vote and then
their ballots were collected and returned.
While these examples may demonstrate that VBM ballot harvesting
occasionally occurs, in violation of state law, it is unclear
whether the three examples demonstrate that this sort of
election fraud is a widespread problem throughout the state of
California. According to information provided by the
Secretary of State's Election Fraud Investigation Unit, from
1994 to 2010, there has been 1 conviction for fraudulent VBM
voting, 0 convictions for fraudulent handling of ballots, and
0 convictions for corruption of voters.
Additionally, the examples provided involve complicated
multifaceted election schemes to thwart voters and commit
voter fraud. As a result, it is unclear whether this bill,
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which only addresses VBM ballots returned at the polls, would
have prevented this type of election abuse from occurring and
ultimately be an appropriate remedy.
Finally, even if VBM ballot harvesting is a significant problem,
as alleged by the author, the committee may wish to consider
whether this bill is an appropriate response to such a
problem. Should a VBM voter who completes a ballot in
accordance with existing law be disenfranchised due to
improper conduct of a person who returns that voter's ballot,
even if the voter was not involved in that improper conduct?
5)Logistical Issues : This bill adds a variety of new
requirements to the VBM process that has the potential to
create new barriers for an eligible voter who is trying to
cast his or her VBM ballot. Moreover, due to the likelihood
for increased voter confusion as a result of these new
requirements, there will likely be significant delays in
processing voters and subsequently increased wait times at
polling places. To the extent that this bill results in
longer lines at polling places, this bill could result in
reduced voter participation by those voters who are not
willing or able to wait in the longer polling place lines.
Furthermore, this bill does not provide any detail as how or
when an elections official or precinct board member must
contact the voter and verify that the person is authorized to
return the voter's VBM ballot, when an authorized voter is
unable to present proof of identity and residency. Current
law requires a county elections official to certify elections
results no later than 28 days after election day. This new
requirement adds new duties and tasks to elections officials
that could negatively impact the elections officials' ability
to certify election results on time.
6)Arguments in Opposition : The California Association of Clerks
and Election Officials writes in opposition:
Current law provides that if a ballot is received in a
timely manner and the signature matches the signature on
file for voter whose name appears on the ballot, then the
ballot is to be tallied. This is true for ballots returned
by mail or personal delivery by the voter or an authorized
third party. This bill would place an additional burden
upon those voters unable to personally mail or return their
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voted ballot who must, in order to cast their votes, rely
upon their ability to secure a third party to return it in
their stead. Our concern is that this could lead to a
decrease in participation among these voters?
While we share the Assembly Member's concern for security
and integrity of elections, we do not believe this bill
would improve the effectiveness of existing controls and
security measures. If passed, this bill would result in
voters being treated unequally and has the potential to
disenfranchise eligible voters and decrease voter
participation. It would increase costs and cause
congestion at the poll place, negatively impacting voting
at the polls.
7)State Mandates : The last three state budgets have suspended
various state mandates as a mechanism for cost savings. Among
the mandates that were suspended were all existing
elections-related mandates. All the existing
elections-related mandates have been proposed for suspension
again by the Governor in his budget for the 2014-15 fiscal
year. This bill adds another elections-related mandate by
requiring county elections officials to provide blank rosters
at polling places and record information, as specified, from
an authorized person returning a VBM ballot as well as verify
with the VBM voter that the person is authorized to return the
ballot if an authorized voter is unable to show proof of
identity and residence. The Committee may wish to consider
whether it is desirable to create new election mandates when
current elections-related mandates are suspended.
8)Previous Legislation : AB 876 (Garcia) of 2006, would have
required a person who is returning a VBM ballot for another
voter to sign a roster and to provide specified information
when returning that ballot. AB 876 (Garcia) failed passage in
this committee.
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REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION :
Support
None on file.
Opposition
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - Los Angeles
California Association of Clerks and Election Officials
California Professional Firefighters
Analysis Prepared by : Nichole Becker / E. & R. / (916)
319-2094