BILL ANALYSIS �
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | SB 131|
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VETO
Bill No: SB 131
Author: Beall (D) and Lara (D), et al.
Amended: 6/19/13
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE : 5-1, 5/7/13
AYES: Evans, Corbett, Jackson, Leno, Monning
NOES: Anderson
NO VOTE RECORDED: Walters
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : 5-1, 5/23/13
AYES: De Le�n, Hill, Lara, Padilla, Steinberg
NOES: Walters
NO VOTE RECORDED: Gaines
SENATE FLOOR : 21-10, 5/29/13
AYES: Beall, Block, Corbett, De Le�n, DeSaulnier, Evans,
Hancock, Hernandez, Hill, Jackson, Lara, Leno, Liu, Monning,
Pavley, Price, Roth, Steinberg, Torres, Wolk, Wyland
NOES: Anderson, Berryhill, Correa, Emmerson, Fuller, Gaines,
Huff, Knight, Nielsen, Walters
NO VOTE RECORDED: Calderon, Cannella, Galgiani, Hueso, Lieu,
Padilla, Wright, Yee, Vacancy
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 44-15, 9/4/13 - See last page for vote
SENATE FLOOR : 21-8, 9/6/13
AYES: Beall, Block, Corbett, De Le�n, DeSaulnier, Evans,
Hancock, Hernandez, Hill, Jackson, Lara, Leno, Liu, Monning,
Padilla, Pavley, Roth, Steinberg, Torres, Wolk, Yee
NOES: Anderson, Berryhill, Calderon, Gaines, Huff, Knight,
Vidak, Walters
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SB 131
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NO VOTE RECORDED: Cannella, Correa, Emmerson, Fuller, Galgiani,
Hueso, Lieu, Nielsen, Wright, Wyland, Vacancy
SUBJECT : Damages: childhood sexual abuse: statute of
limitations
SOURCE : National Center for Victims of Crime
DIGEST : This bill provides that the time limits for
commencement of an action for recovery of damages suffered as a
result of childhood sexual abuse be applied retroactively to any
claim that has not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as
of January 1, 2014. This bill revives, for a period of one
year, a cause of action, as specified, that would otherwise be
barred by the statute of limitations as of January 1, 2014,
provided that the plaintiff's 26th birthday was before January
1, 2003, and the plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her
injury on or after January 1, 2004. This bill provides that a
partyis entitled to conduct discovery before the court may rule
on a motion challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
showing that a person or entity knew or had reason to know, or
was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct and
failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid those acts in the future. This bill
specifies that this entitlement does not apply to a cause of
action revived pursuant to these provisions.
ANALYSIS :
Existing law:
1. Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil
action for damages shall be within two years of the injury or
death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.
(Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 340)
2. Provides that the time for commencing an action based on
injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined,
shall be eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority
(i.e., 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that
the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age
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of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
(CCP Section 340.1)
3. Provides that in civil actions, as described above, against
persons or entities other than the perpetrator, whose
intentional, negligent, or wrongful act was the legal cause
of the sex abuse, the plaintiff must show that the person or
entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on
notice, of unlawful sexual conduct of an employee or agent,
and failed to take reasonable steps, as specified, to avoid
acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future. (CCP Section
340.1)
4. For a period of one year commencing January 1, 2003,
existing law revived certain actions that would otherwise be
barred solely because the applicable statute of limitations
had expired.
This bill:
1. Provides that the time limits for commencement of an action
for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood
sexual abuse be applied retroactively to any claim that has
not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January
1, 2014.
2. Revives, for a period of one year, a cause of action, as
specified, that would otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that the
plaintiff's 26th birthday was before January 1, 2003, and the
plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injury on or
after January 1, 2004.
3. Provides that a party is entitled to conduct discovery before
the court may rule on a motion challenging the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's showing that a person or entity knew or had
reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful
sexual conduct and failed to take reasonable steps, and to
implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid those acts in the
future.
4. Specifies that this entitlement does not apply to a cause of
action revived pursuant to these provisions.
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Background
Before 1990, claims of childhood sexual abuse were governed by a
one year statute of limitations. (CCP Section 340(3).)
However, if the cause of action accrued while the plaintiff was
a minor, the statute was tolled until he/she became an adult.
(CCP Section 352(a).) Thus, any complaint had to be filed
within one year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday.
In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the statute of limitations for
cases involving adult trauma caused by childhood sexual abuse.
(SB 108 (Lockyer), Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990) That law
provides that the time for commencing an action based on
injuries resulting from "childhood sexual abuse" shall be eight
years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., age 26) or
within three years of the date of the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury
or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the
abuse, whichever occurs later. As subsequently interpreted by
the courts, SB 108 changed the statute of limitations for
actions against the perpetrators, but did not change it for
actions against other responsible third parties. (See Debbie
Reynolds Prof. Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 222; Tietge v. Western Province of the Services
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 382)
In 1998, the Legislature responded to this interpretation and
enacted AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chapter 1021, Statutes 1998) to apply
the extended statute of limitations in actions against third
parties. However, any action against any person or entity other
than the sexual abuser would have to be commenced before the
plaintiff's 26th birthday. (CCP Section 340.1(b).) In 2002, SB
1779 (Burton and Escutia, Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002) was
enacted to extend the statute of limitations in cases against a
third party who was not the perpetrator of the sexual abuse
beyond age 26, when the third party knew or had reason to know
of complaints against an employee or agent for unlawful sexual
conduct and failed to take reasonable steps to avoid similar
unlawful conduct by that employee or agent in the future. SB
1779 also created a one year window in which victims could bring
a claim against a third party, when that claim would have
otherwise been barred solely because the statute of limitations
had expired.
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Almost 1,000 cases were filed in California during the one year
window in 2003. However, between 2005 and 2012, about 50
cases were filed by victims who were over the age of 26 in 2003,
but did not make a causal connection between childhood abuse and
problems as an adult until after 2003. The Quarry brothers, who
filed suit in 2007, were among those who filed one of these
cases. The trial court dismissed the case based on their age in
2003 (over 26 years of age), stating that the brothers should
have brought their case within the one year window under SB
1779. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's decision, and held that the one year window only applied
to victims who were both over the age of 26 and had made the
required causal connection more than three years prior to
January 1, 2003. It held that victims like the Quarry brothers
were not barred as of January 1, 2003, and could avail
themselves of the option of filing a claim within three years
from discovery.
Ultimately the Quarry case and about 20 others were taken up by
the California Supreme Court. (Quarry v. Doe (2009) 53 Cal.4th
945.) The Court held that the Legislature failed to make its
retroactive intent in SB 1779 clear, and the rules of statutory
construction required that when the Legislature amends a statute
of limitations, that amendment is presumed to be prospective,
and is retroactive only if the Legislature expressly provides
that it is intended to be retroactive and revive previously
time-barred claims. The majority found the language of SB 1779
did not satisfy that rule of construction, and must be
interpreted prospectively, or limited to the one year window.
The dissent disagreed, and invited the Legislature to fix the
problem.
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local:
No
SUPPORT : (Verified 9/4/13)
National Center for Victims of Crime (source)
American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy
American Association of University Women
Boys and Girls Club - Santa Barbara
California Association of Chiefs of Police
California Coalition Against Sexual Assaults
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California Nurses Association
Child Abuse Listening Mediation
College Democrats at Pacific Union College
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
Equality California
National Association of Social Workers
National Partnership to End Interpersonal Violence
National Safe Child Coalition
Peace Officers Research Association
Protective Parents Association
San Diego County District Attorney
Santa Clara County District Attorney
USA Table Tennis
USA Swimming
Waste Less Living, Inc.
OPPOSITION : (Verified 9/4/13)
California Association of Private School Organizations
California Catholic Conference
California Council of Nonprofit Organizations
California State Alliance of YMCA
La Raza Roundtable
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT : According to the author, "Over the last
27 years the California Legislature has come to have a better
understanding of the insidious and latent nature of the injuries
suffered by a child who has been sexually abused and the reasons
why victims of childhood sex abuse often wait years before
reporting the abuse to law enforcement or otherwise. California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, a remedial statute
intended to provide redress the child sex abuse victims, has
been amended no less than five times since its original
enactment in 1986, consistent with this evolving knowledge of
the latent effects of the original abuse."
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION : The California Catholic Conference
(CCC). states, "Although this bill has now been amended several
times in the Senate, we remain opposed, because the provision in
the bill that would revive time-barred claims of childhood
sexual abuse is tailored to provide relief only to a certain
class of victims to the exclusion of the vast majority of child
abuse victims. Although there have been concepts in the various
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iterations of the bill that the CCC could support, the current
contents are unreasonable and inequitable. If the bill is
intended, as its author has claimed, to provide access to
justice for the victims of child abuse, it makes utterly no
sense to exclude more than 90% of those victims access to the
courts, while granting that same right to a precious few."
GOVERNOR'S VETO MESSAGE:
I am returning Senate Bill 131 without my signature.
This bill makes amendments to the statute of limitations
relating to claims of childhood sexual abuse. Specifically,
it amends and significantly expands a 2002 law to "revive"
certain claims that previously had been time barred.
Statutes of limitation reach back to Roman law and were
specifically enshrined in the English common law by the
Limitations Act of 1623. Ever since, and in every state,
including California, various limits have been imposed on the
time when lawsuits may still be initiated. Even though valid
and profoundly important claims are at stake, all
jurisdictions have seen fit to bar actions after a lapse of
years.
The reason for such a universal practice is one of fairness.
There comes a time when an individual or organization should
be secure in the reasonable expectation that past acts are
indeed in the past and not subject to further lawsuits. With
the passage of time, evidence may be lost or disposed of,
memories fade and witnesses move away or die.
Over the years, California's laws regarding time limits for
childhood sexual abuse cases have been amended many times.
The changes have affected not only how long a person has to
make a claim, but also who may be sued for the sexual abuse.
The issue of who is subject to liability is an important
distinction as the law in this area has always and rightfully
imposed longer periods of liability for an actual perpetrator
of sexual abuse than for an organization that employed that
perpetrator. This makes sense as third parties are in a very
different position than perpetrators with respect to both
evidence and memories.
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For claims against a perpetrator of abuse, the current law is
that a claimant must sue within eight years of attaining the
age of majority (i.e. age 26) or "within three years of the
date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring
after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse,
whichever period expires later"
However, for claims against a third party - e.g. an
organization that employed the perpetrator of the abuse - the
general rule since 1998 was that a claimant must sue before he
or she turns 26. A later discovered psychological injury - no
matter how compelling - could not be brought against a third
party by a person older than 26.
When a number of high profile sex abuse scandals in both
public and private institutions came to light, many felt that
the third party limitation rule described above was too harsh
and that claimants over 26 should be able to recover damages
for later discovered injuries from certain, more culpable
entities.
In 2002, the California Legislature weighed the competing
considerations on this issue and enacted SB 1779, which did
the following: (1) It identified for the first time a new
subcategory of third party defendants which no longer would
have the protection of the age 26 cutoff for claims. Going
forward these defendants - entities who knew or should have
known of the sexual abuse and failed to take action - now
could be sued within three years of the date of discovery of a
claim. (2) Looking backwards, SB 1779 also revived for one
year only (2003) all claims that had previously lapsed because
of the statute of limitation. This very unusual "one year
revival" of lapsed claims allowed victims relief but also set
a defined cut-off time for these lapsed claims.
In reliance on the clear language and intent of this statute,
the private third party defendants covered by this bill took
actions to resolve these legacy claims of victims older than
26. Over 1,000 claims were filed against the Catholic Church
alone, some involving alleged abuse as far back as the 1930s.
By 2007, the Catholic Church in California had paid out more
than $1.2 billion to settle the claims filed during this one
year revival period. Other private and non-profit employers
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were sued and paid out as well.
For the public third parties covered by this bill, however, a
very different result occurred. There is no doubt that in
2002, when SB 1779 was enacted, it was intended to apply to
both public and private entities. Indeed, it would be
unreasonable, if not shocking, for the Legislature to
intentionally discriminate against one set of victims, e.g.
those whose abusers happened to be employed by a public
instead of a private entity. However, due to a drafting
error, the California Supreme Court held in 2007 that SB 1779
did not actually apply to public or governmental agencies.
So, unlike private institutions, public schools and government
entities were shielded from the one year revival of lapsed
claims. As a result, the similarly situated victims of these
entities were not accorded the remedies of SB 1779.
In 2008, the Legislature addressed this unfair distinction
between victims of public as opposed to private institutions.
Note, however, that the bill enacted, SB 640, did not restore
equity between these two sets of victims. Instead of
subjecting public/governmental entities to all of the
provisions of the 2002 law, the Legislature only allowed
victims of public institutions to sue under the new rules
prospectively-from 2009 forward-and provided no "one year
revival" period.
In passing this 2008 law, I can't believe the legislature
decided that victims of abuse by a public entity are somehow
less deserving than those who suffered abuse by a private
entity. The children assaulted by Jerry Sandusky at Penn
State or the teachers at Miramonte Elementary School in Los
Angeles are no less worthy because of the nature of the
institution they attended. Rather, I believe that
legislators, in good faith, weighed the merits of such claims
against the equities of allowing claims to be brought against
third parties years after the abuse occurred. The Legislature
concluded that fairness required that certain claims should be
allowed, but only going forward.
This brings us to the bill now before me, SB 131. This bill
does not change a victim's ability to sue a perpetrator. This
bill also does not change the significant inequity that exists
between private and public entities. What this bill does do
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is go back to the only group, i.e. private institutions, that
have already been subjected to the unusual "one year revival
period" and makes them, and them alone, subject to suit
indefinitely. This extraordinary extension of the statute of
limitations, which legislators chose not to apply to public
institutions, is simply too open-ended and unfair.
For all these reasons, I am returning SB 131 without my
signature.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR : 44-15, 9/4/13
AYES: Allen, Ammiano, Atkins, Bonta, Bradford, Ian Calderon,
Chau, Chesbro, Cooley, Dahle, Dickinson, Fong, Fox, Frazier,
Gatto, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gordon, Gray, Hall, Roger Hern�ndez,
Jones-Sawyer, Levine, Linder, Lowenthal, Mitchell, Morrell,
Mullin, Nazarian, Pan, V. Manuel P�rez, Quirk, Quirk-Silva,
Rendon, Salas, Skinner, Stone, Ting, Waldron, Weber,
Wieckowski, Williams, Yamada, John A. P�rez
NOES: Bocanegra, Ch�vez, Donnelly, Beth Gaines, Grove, Hagman,
Harkey, Jones, Mansoor, Medina, Muratsuchi, Nestande,
Patterson, Wagner, Wilk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Achadjian, Alejo, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonilla,
Brown, Buchanan, Campos, Conway, Daly, Eggman, Garcia, Gorell,
Holden, Logue, Maienschein, Melendez, Olsen, Perea, Vacancy,
Vacancy
AL:k 1/6/14 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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